

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM HAYES TO McKINLEY
1877-1896



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO

MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED
LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM

HAYES TO McKINLEY
1877-1896

BY

JAMES FORD RHODES, LL.D., D.LITT.

AUTHOR OF THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 TO THE FINAL RESTO-
RATION OF HOME RULE AT THE SOUTH IN
1877; HISTORICAL ESSAYS; LECTURES
ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
DELIVERED AT OXFORD;
HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL WAR

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1919

All rights reserved

COPYRIGHT, 1919,
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1919.

Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

PREFACE

IN writing in 1888 the introduction to my History I said that it was my purpose to continue it down to the inauguration of Grover Cleveland in 1885. Subsequent reflection, however, convinced me that the year 1877, when occurred the final restoration of home rule in the South, was a more fitting termination. Nevertheless I had determined, after proper studies had been made, to go on with my History. Distracted for a while by my Oxford Lectures and one volume "History of the Civil War," I have now been able to fulfil my original promise and to do more, by continuing the story on to 1896.

I have to thank Edward L. Burlingame, then editor, for the use of articles appearing in *Scribner's Magazine* for July, September, October and November 1911; and J. Franklin Jameson, editor, for the use of the article in *The American Historical Review* for April 1910.

I owe a literary revision of this volume to my son, Daniel P. Rhodes. I am indebted to D. M. Matteson for valuable assistance in historical research and for a careful reading of the manuscript with verifications. I acknowledge the aid of my secretary Miss Wyman; that of Charles K. Bolton, librarian, Miss Wildman and Miss Cattnach, assistants, of the Boston Athenæum.

Boston, 1919.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

	PAGE
INAUGURATION OF HAYES	1
HAYES'S CABINET	2
THE SOUTHERN QUESTION	6
SOUTH CAROLINA	7
LOUISIANA	8
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	12
RAILROAD STRIKE OF 1877	13
RAILROAD WAR OF RATES	14
REDUCTION OF WAGES	19
RIOT IN BALTIMORE	20
RIOT IN PITTSBURG	23
RAILROAD STRIKE ELSEWHERE	39
ANTHRACITE COAL REGION	43
REFLECTIONS ON THE MOB DEMONSTRATIONS	46

CHAPTER II

THE MOLLY MAGUIRES	52
FRANKLIN B. GOWEN	58
JAMES MCPARLAN	59
THE STRIKE OF 1875	62
THE MOLLY MAGUIRES	64
TRIAL OF MOLLIES	73
CONVICTION	74
JAMES MCPARLAN	75
ROMAN CATHOLICS	79
CONVICTIONS — JAMES MCPARLAN	80
SENTENCES	84
EXECUTIONS	85

CHAPTER III

	PAGE
THE NEW YORK CUSTOM HOUSE	88
THE SILVER QUESTION	93
JOHN SHERMAN'S WORK	97
HAYES'S FIGHTING SPIRIT	101
FINANCIAL DEPRESSION	104
THE BENNER BOOM	107

CHAPTER IV

GRANT — THE PRESIDENCY	109
GRANT'S CANDIDACY	112
REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1880	114
JAMES A. GARFIELD	115
CONKLING	116
GRANT — BLAINE	119
CONKLING'S SPEECH	121
GARFIELD'S SPEECH	122
NOMINATION OF GARFIELD	126

CHAPTER V

DEMOCRATS NOMINATE HANCOCK	128
GARFIELD	128
POLITICAL CAMPAIGN OF 1880	131
GARFIELD'S ELECTION	137

CHAPTER VI

BLAINE, SECRETARY OF STATE	140
APPOINTMENT OF ROBERTSON	142
ASSASSINATION OF GARFIELD	146
TRIAL OF GARFIELD'S ASSASSIN	147
GARFIELD'S ASSASSIN HANGED	151
BLAINE — CHILE — PERU	152
PEACE CONGRESS	156
BLAINE	158

CONTENTS

ix

CHAPTER VII

	PAGE
PENDLETON CIVIL SERVICE ACT	161
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	164
THE TARIFF COMMISSION	169
THE TARIFF COMMISSION BILL	175
TARIFF OF 1883	177

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHINESE QUESTION	180
CALIFORNIA	181
THE CHINESE	183
CHINATOWN	188
BRET HARTE	188
THE SANDLOTTERS	191
SAN FRANCISCO	192
CHINESE IMMIGRATION	193
ACT OF MAY 1882	195

CHAPTER IX

REDUCTION OF POSTAGE	197
CHESTER A. ARTHUR	198
GRANT AND ARTHUR	200
GRANT & WARD	202
REPUBLICAN PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN	205
REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1884	209
BLAINE NOMINATED	214

CHAPTER X

NOMINATION OF CLEVELAND	215
THE "MUGWUMP CAMPAIGN"	216
GROVER CLEVELAND	217
MUGWUMP REVOLT	221
THE OHIO ELECTION	223
BLAINE'S CAMPAIGN	224

	PAGE
BURCHARD	225
THE MILLIONAIRES' DINNER	228
NOVEMBER ELECTION	230
BLAINE'S DEFEAT	231
CLEVELAND	233
GRAIN — PIG IRON	235

CHAPTER XI

CLEVELAND'S CABINET	240
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	244
DEMOCRATIC DISAPPOINTMENT	247
CLEVELAND'S SWEEP	249
CLEVELAND'S IRRITATION	251
LOWELL AND CLEVELAND	252
PROGRESS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	254

CHAPTER XII

CLEVELAND AND SILVER	255
GRANT	258
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION	262
CLEVELAND'S CONTEST WITH SENATE	263
GEORGE F. HOAR	266
REPEAL OF THE TENURE OF OFFICE ACT	268
SOUTHWESTERN RAILROAD STRIKE	269
HOXIE AND IRONS	270
JAY GOULD	275
JOSEPH R. HAWLEY	277
THE CHICAGO RIOT	278
TRIAL OF THE ANARCHISTS	281
EXECUTION OF ANARCHISTS	283
HENRY GEORGE	285
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT	288
SHELBY M. CULLOM	289
ELECTORAL COUNT ACT	292

CONTENTS

xi

	PAGE
PENSIONS	294
DEPENDENT PENSION BILL	297
DEMOCRAT IN THE WHITE HOUSE	301
BATTLE-FLAG ORDER	303

CHAPTER XIII

CLEVELAND'S 1887 MESSAGE	305
BLAINE'S ANSWER	308
CLEVELAND NOMINATED	309
REPUBLICAN CONVENTION	310
NOMINATION OF HARRISON	313
MILLS TARIFF BILL	317
CAMPAIGN OF 1888	319
ELECTION OF HARRISON	326

CHAPTER XIV

HARRISON'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS	328
CLARKSON	331
TANNER	332
THEODORE ROOSEVELT	333
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	334
BLAINE — PAN-AMERICAN CONGRESS	338

CHAPTER XV

THOMAS B. REED, SPEAKER	341
REED RULES	343
THE DEPENDENT PENSION BILL	345
THE MCKINLEY BILL	346
RECIPROCITY	350
SILVER	351
WINDOM'S SOLUTION	353
SILVER ACT OF 1890	355
ANTI-TRUST ACT OF 1890	358
THE FEDERAL ELECTION BILL	360
NEGRO SUFFRAGE	363

CHAPTER XVI

	PAGE
THE MCKINLEY BILL	365
FALL ELECTIONS OF 1890	365
THE BARING PANIC	368
BILLION DOLLAR CONGRESS	371
MCKINLEY FOR GOVERNOR	371
CHILE	374

CHAPTER XVII

HARRISON AND BLAINE	380
HARRISON RENOMINATED	382
CLEVELAND NOMINATED	384
THE POPULIST PARTY	385
THE HOMESTEAD STRIKE	386
AUSTRALIAN BALLOT	389
ELECTION OF CLEVELAND	390
HARRISON	392

CHAPTER XVIII

CLEVELAND'S POPULARITY	394
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1893	395
CLEVELAND — CANCER	397
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1893	401
REPEAL OF SILVER PURCHASE	403
WILLIAM J. BRYAN	405
CLEVELAND AND SHERMAN	407
OFFICE SEEKERS	410
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	412
WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION	414

CHAPTER XIX

TARIFF OF 1894	418
INCOME TAX	422
CHICAGO RAILWAY STRIKE	424

CONTENTS

xiii

	PAGE
THE TREASURY DEFICIT	426
MORGAN CONTRACT	431
BONDS — POPULAR SUBSCRIPTION	438
REHABILITATION OF THE NAVY	439

CHAPTER XX

THE VENEZUELAN CONTROVERSY	443
ARBITRATION	452
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	456
GROVER CLEVELAND	457

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM
HAYES TO MCKINLEY

CHAPTER I

MANY of our Presidents have been inaugurated under curious and trying circumstances but no one of them except Hayes has taken the oath of office when there was a cloud on his title. Every man who had voted for Tilden — whose popular vote exceeded that of Hayes by 264,000 — believed that Hayes had reached his high place by means of fraud. Indeed some of his supporters shared this belief and regarded as monstrous the action of the Louisiana Returning Board in awarding him the electoral vote of Louisiana. Hayes's title came from the decision of the Electoral Commission as to the disputed States, Florida, Louisiana, Oregon and South Carolina, which was ratified by Congress and gave him a majority of one in the electoral college. When the count was completed and the usual declaration made Hayes had no choice but to abide by the decision. Duty to his country and to his party, the Republican, required his acceptance of the office. And there is good reason for thinking that he had no doubts whatever regarding his

proper course. For he believed that he was fairly elected. "I am overwhelmed with callers congratulating me on the results declared in Louisiana," he wrote to Carl Schurz on December 6, 1876. "I have no doubt that we are justly and legally entitled to the Presidency; my conversation with Sherman, Garfield, Stoughton and others settles the question in my mind as to Louisiana."¹ Nevertheless in spite of his perfect legal title, his moral title was unsound and it added to the difficulty of the situation that the opposition, the Democrats, had a majority in the House of Representatives. None but a determined optimist could have predicted anything but failure for an administration beginning under such conditions.²

Hayes took the oath of office on Sunday, March 4, but did not deliver his inaugural address until the following day. He spoke with dignity and sympathy of the disputed presidency, promised a liberal policy toward the Southern States and declared that "a thorough, radical and complete" reform in our civil service was a "paramount necessity." Our need was "a return to the principles and practices of the founders of the government." Appointment to office should not be made merely as a reward for partisan service. Public officers should have a tenure during good behavior and, disregarding their party, should owe their whole service to the Government.

¹ Schurz's Political Career, Bancroft and Dunning, 373; Life of Hayes, C. R. Williams, i. chap. xxvi., ii. 152.

² This account is from my article in the *Century Magazine* for October 1909, reprinted in my "Historical Essays." For an account of the disputed presidency and the Electoral Commission see my *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877*, vii. chap. xlv.

and to the people. And "the President of the United States should strive to be always mindful of the fact that he serves his party best who serves the country best."¹

Hayes chose for his cabinet men in sympathy with his high ideals. William M. Evarts, the Secretary of State, a graduate of Yale College and a student at the Harvard Law School under Judge Story, was a lawyer who could fight for his client with knowledge of the law and human nature, with skill in the examination of witnesses and readiness to expose the weak points of his adversary. Some men would have been content with his high position and large fees at the New York bar but he was eager for a broader field which he found in three important State trials. He was one of the leading counsel for the defence of Andrew Johnson in the Impeachment trial, showing skill in the management of the case and effectiveness in his exhaustive plea. He appeared for the United States at the Geneva arbitration and had charge of the Republican cause before the Electoral Commission of 1877 when his industry, adroitness and zeal won a signal triumph in a difficult case. In certain negotiations he had shown that he was a statesman as well as one of the ablest lawyers in the country and his activity in politics was in association with the best men of his State and nation.

John Sherman, the Secretary of the Treasury, was the most capable financier in public life. He had been in Congress first as representative and then as senator from 1855 to 1877 and stands out prominently in the history of those 22 years, bringing his clear and vigorous intellect

¹ Richardson, vii. 444.

to bear on the most important political questions. His remarkable industry enabled him to get at the facts in a case where others failed and his power of clear statement made him a convincing advocate. Though intensely partisan he was of an amiable temper and always endeavored to be fair in debate. He loved his party and his country and in exciting times of political strife was apt to think the two were one and the same thing. Withal, on important questions when party lines were not distinctly drawn he was a trimmer but his trimming was never for personal advantage but for what he conceived to be his country's good. He seemed to think that as the people had pronounced opinions on subjects which in Europe were left to experts, they must be humored while they were being educated with the result that in the end their judgment would be sound. His public and private character was above reproach.¹

Carl Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, who had come to this country in 1852, was an active political force in the campaign of 1860, urging his German countrymen in the most persuasive manner to vote for Lincoln. He served with credit in the army and afterwards gave his country six years of almost ideal service in the Senate where he developed into a political orator of the highest rank. His speeches appealed to the educated and uneducated alike; they delighted the mass of his hearers and were afterwards read with close attention. He spoke English and German equally well. Together with John Sherman, he had breasted the tide of inflation in Ohio (when

¹ I have been helped in this characterization by Edward L. Pierce's review of John Sherman's *Recollections* in the *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, i. 553.

Hayes was chosen Governor) with unequivocal arguments and manly appeals to reason and good sense. Schurz's selection was a graceful recognition by the President of his services to the Republican party in 1875 and 1876 but it was the more noteworthy because Schurz stood for the independent thinker in politics, was an aggressive and uncompromising reformer and the leader in 1872 of the Republican revolt from Grant.

Devens, the Attorney-General, had served with credit in the army during the Civil War and held the honorable position of Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Thompson of Indiana, Secretary of the Navy, was selected as the choice of Senator Morton, the appointment being brought about in this wise. Sherman said to Morton that Hayes would like his advice concerning a cabinet appointment, whereupon Morton sent his brother-in-law Holloway to Columbus as his representative, where Hayes asked him if Morton would himself accept a cabinet position. No, was the reply; "The Senator had said that he would never put himself in a place from which he could be dismissed by any man." Morton had however sent a list of names, any of whom would be satisfactory, and from this list Hayes selected Thompson.

Hayes, magnanimously and with considerable foresight, had determined to offer the position of Secretary of War to General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the great commanders of the Southern Confederacy who had surrendered his army to General Sherman twelve years before. But during his interview with Holloway he asked him how Senator Morton would regard such an appointment. The question, said Holloway afterwards, nearly

took his breath away and he burst out, "Great God, Governor, I hope that you are not thinking of doing anything of that kind." This spontaneous utterance undoubtedly represented a pretty general and firm opinion in the Republican party which found various modes of expression inducing Hayes to give up the idea, although Sherman, General of the army, and doubting the wisdom of the appointment, said that he would be willing to receive the President's orders through his old antagonist. So Johnston was passed over but Key of Tennessee, who had served in the Confederate army and voted for Tilden, was made Postmaster-General, while the war portfolio went to McCrary of Iowa who had been a useful member of the House of Representatives.¹ Although the appointment of Johnston would have added to its strength, the cabinet as finally made up was an excellent one and created a favorable impression upon the country; it was spoken of as the ablest cabinet since Washington's.

Before the harmonious coöperation necessary in a successful cabinet could be developed the President was obliged to grapple with the Southern question. The Stevens-Sumner plan for reconstruction of the South on the basis of universal negro suffrage and military support of the governments thus constituted had failed. One by one in various ways the different Southern States had recovered home rule until on the inauguration of Hayes, carpet-bag-negro governments existed in but two States, South Carolina and Louisiana. In South Carolina the Hayes electors had a majority on the face of the returns,

¹ Life of Morton, Foulke, ii. 479; J. D. Cox in the *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1893, 826.

and so had Wade Hampton, the Democratic candidate for Governor, but the Board of State Canvassers had secured a Republican legislature by declining to issue certificates to members elected from two counties. The Democrats, refusing to sit with the Republicans, organized a House of Representatives of their own and for some days the two bodies met in the same chamber where a fight to the death was prevented only by the moderation of the leading Democrats and the presence of the United States troops. By the statute it was the duty of the legislature to canvass the returns for Governor; in accordance therewith the Republican legislature, throwing out two counties, declared that Chamberlain was elected Governor, while the Democratic House, which had meanwhile withdrawn to another hall, joined with a number of Democratic senators in declaring Hampton duly chosen. Hampton had at his back the white people in the State of education and property, and the Chamberlain government, without the support of the United States army, was certain to fall.

Such was the state of affairs when Hayes became President. On March 23 he summoned Hampton and Chamberlain to Washington, had full and frank conferences with each and in the end determined to withdraw the United States troops from the State House at Columbia. This was done on April 10 and on that day Chamberlain abdicated the governorship and turned over the records and papers of the executive office to Wade Hampton.¹ "Good government," Chamberlain wrote in the *Atlantic*

¹ Gov. Chamberlain's Adm. in South Carolina, Allen; Appletons' Ann. Cyc., 1876; Col. A. C. Haskell in Proceedings of Mass. Hist. Soc., 3d ser., i. 86.

Monthly for April 1901, "was fully secured. Economy succeeded extravagance; judicial integrity and ability succeeded profligacy and ignorance on the bench; all the conditions of public welfare were restored."

The case of Louisiana was much more troublesome. Packard, the Republican candidate for Governor, had received as many votes as Hayes and logic seemed to require that if Hayes was President by virtue of the electoral vote of Louisiana Packard was Governor. While the question was pending Blaine said in the Senate: "You discredit Packard and you discredit Hayes. You hold that Packard is not the legal governor of Louisiana and President Hayes has no title." And nearly all of the leaders of the Republican party held this view. To these and their followers Blaine applied the name "Stalwarts," stiff partisans, who did not believe in surrendering the hold of the Republicans on the Southern States.

Confronted with the dilemma of continuance or withdrawal of support of the Republican party in Louisiana, a weak man would have allowed things to drift, while a robust partisan of the Conkling and Chandler type would have sustained the Packard government with the whole force at his command. Hayes was neither weak nor a Stalwart; he was a patriotic man given to earnest reflection as he tried to discover which way his duty should lead him. During the "embarrassing period" between the election and the declaration of the result, when the issue was a long while doubtful, it was apparent to him that if he was adjudged the presidency "his administration would enter upon a voyage which would not be one of smooth waters and halcyon skies." His paramount duty appeared to be, as he expressed it, "the pacification of the

country"; in other words, as we see it now, this was to relieve the South of the incubus which had weighed upon her since the Reconstruction legislation was put in force. Naturally the advice of statesmen and politicians was at his command but, while perplexed with doubt like a flash came the thought that he could appeal to ex-President Theodore Dwight Woolsey of Yale College, "whom we almost worship," he said. Hayes must have known that in New Haven "it was the unfaltering trust in Woolsey's impartiality which made him to be a judge and a ruler over his fellows," adjusting clashing interests and disentangling snarled controversies.¹ "I wrote to him," so Hayes related the circumstance afterwards, "and then followed implicitly President Woolsey's advice."²

Louisiana was the crucial question and Hayes attacked it before South Carolina. He sent to New Orleans a Commission of five, who were "known to the country as men of character and ability and moderate views,"³ "holding various shades of political belief."⁴ The excellent instructions they received were drawn up by Secretary Evarts, who made it clear that it was the desire of the President "to put an end to even the appearance of military intervention in the domestic affairs of Louisiana."⁵ The Commission found two Governors and two legislatures. The Democratic, whose Governor was

¹ J. H. Thayer in *Atlantic Monthly*, Oct. 1889, 558. Thayer wrote further: "Once and again was his advice sought by the authorities at Washington; and that he did not serve his country at the court of St. James was due to the judgment he passed on himself, not to that which President Hayes passed on him."

² Speech at Yale Commencement, *New York Tribune*, July 2, 1880; *The Nation*, July 8, 1880. See *Life of Hayes*, C. R. Williams, ii. 287.

³ *The Nation*, April 5, 1877.

⁴ Report of Commission, April 21.

⁵ April 2.

Nicholls, was based upon the original returns, occupied Odd Fellows Hall as a temporary State House, and in all departments, including the Supreme Court, was in active operation. It was a government resting upon the consent of the governed, who possessed intelligence and property, which was exactly the reverse of the Packard government, Republican, whose support came almost entirely from negroes and place-hunting white men. Packard occupied the State House and insisted that his legal title was good; an armed police force watched over him by day and by night, while Nicholls required no guard as he attended to the duties of his office. Packard had no militia, Nicholls had three thousand well-equipped, well-officered troops ready to respond instantly to his call. Packard could not sustain his government without active support from the President. He had no moral backing, and as soon as Hayes's policy was foreshadowed members began to desert his legislature to join that of Nicholls.

On receiving the report of the Commission of April 12, Evarts telegraphed to them that the President would be prepared to remove the troops stationed in proximity to the State House provided he had satisfactory assurances that a peaceful solution of the disputed governments would ensue. Such an assurance was obtained by the Commission from Governor Nicholls and on April 20, the President directed his Secretary of War to withdraw the troops from the immediate vicinity of the State House to their barracks outside of the city. This was done. The Packard legislature dispersed, still more of the members being admitted to seats in the Nicholls House and Senate.¹

¹ Ex. Doc. No. 97, 45th Cong. 2d Sess.; Appletons' Ann. Cyc., 1877, p. 460.

Packard abandoned the contest and Nicholls and his legislature were left in undisputed control. Home rule was now secured in all the reconstructed Southern States and it was certain that a return to the régime under Grant was impossible.

The withdrawal of the support of about one hundred United States troops ¹ from Packard seems a simple thing but it wrought a peaceful revolution. To the Southerners, who had endured the rapacious and corrupt governments of the carpet-baggers and negroes, it came as the dawn of a new and better day.

Splendid as the President's acts in the settlement of the South Carolina and Louisiana controversies appear to us, they were differently regarded by a large portion of the Republican party. While the lawyers could furnish cogent reasons why Packard was not entitled to the governorship, although the electoral vote of Louisiana had been counted for Hayes, the Stalwarts maintained, with very effective logic to partisan Republicans, that no legal quibble could varnish over so glaring an inconsistency. Hayes had however the support of his cabinet, of even Sherman, the most partisan of the able triumvirate, Sherman, Evarts and Schurz. Sherman wrote in a private letter, "So far as the Southern question is concerned I

¹ After the election of 1876 and presumably until President Hayes gave his order of April 20, there were twenty-five companies of United States soldiers in New Orleans, the total strength of which was about 1000 officers and men. Stationed in the Orleans Hotel, which was adjacent to the St. Louis Hotel (occupied by the Packard government as the State House) and connected with it by a passageway, were two to four companies, 80 to 160 officers and men. President Hayes spoke of the Mechanics Institute as the building used as a State House but the Boston *Daily Advertiser* of April 21 says that the President was mistaken and that the order was afterwards amended by substituting St. Louis Hotel for Mechanics Institute.

feel that the President did right," and during the Ohio canvass of 1877 he made a set speech sustaining that view.¹ Nevertheless the inaugural address, the distinctively reform cabinet, the refusal to sustain Packard so exasperated the party workers that it could be said that within six weeks after his inauguration Hayes was without a party. The men who carried on the organization made more noise than the independently thinking voters, who believed in Hayes and his policy. Except at the South he received little sympathy from the Democrats in whose eyes fraud was written on his brow. He had the honor and perquisites of office which were rightfully theirs.²

Although no backward step was possible after the withdrawal of the troops from the State Houses of South Carolina and Louisiana, Hayes would have liked congressional support and sympathy for his act but he needed them very much more in the next most important step of his administration. This related to finance. In the development of their financial policy it was evident that he and his Secretary of the Treasury would be hampered from not having a majority in Congress at their back. Presidents before and after Hayes have made a greater or less employment of their patronage to secure the passage of their favorite measures but Hayes immediately relinquished that weapon by taking a decided position for a civil service based on merit. "Now for civil service reform!" he wrote in his diary.³ In a little over a month

¹ The speech was in August, the date of the letter Oct. 17. John Sherman's *Recollections*, ii. 586, 596.

² My article in *Century Magazine* for October 1909, reprinted in *Historical Essays*.

³ April 22. *Life of Hayes*, C. R. Williams, ii. 69.

after ordering the troops away from the State House in New Orleans he announced his policy in a letter to his Secretary of the Treasury. "It is my wish," he wrote, "that the collection of the revenues should be free from partisan control and organized on a strictly business basis with the same guaranties for efficiency and fidelity in the selection of the chief and subordinate officers that would be required by a prudent merchant. Party leaders should have no more influence in appointments than other equally respectable citizens. No assessments for political purposes on officers or subordinates should be allowed. No useless officer or employé should be retained. No officer should be required or permitted to take part in the management of political organizations, caucuses, conventions or election campaigns. Their right to vote and to express their views on public questions, either orally or through the press, is not denied, provided it does not interfere with the discharge of their official duties." The mandatory parts of his letter he incorporated in an order to federal office-holders, adding: "This rule is applicable to every department of the civil service. It should be understood by every officer of the general government that he is expected to conform his conduct to its requirements."¹

A liberal and just Southern policy and the beginning of a genuine reform in the civil service are measures which distinguish and exalt President Hayes's administration but, in July 1877, public attention was diverted from all these by an extensive strike on the railroads which amounted almost to a social uprising. The depression

¹ The date of the letter is May 26, of the order June 22. Richardson, vii. 450.

following the panic of 1873 was widespread and severe, and the railroad interest, which was the largest single business interest in the country, suffered more than any other. In the years of settlement consequent upon the panic and depression, one-fifth in value of the railroad investment of the country was sold under foreclosure of mortgage.¹ For the railroads feel keenly business stagnation which results at once in a diminished freight and passenger traffic; and, in any event there would have been bankruptcies and receiverships but the situation was aggravated by a war of rates between the trunk lines, as the railways running from Chicago and St. Louis to the seaboard were called. There were four distinct interests, the New York Central, the Erie, the Pennsylvania and the Baltimore and Ohio, all having adequate facilities to do more business than was offered them, and the natural competition was increased by the rivalry between the cities of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Moreover the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada and transportation by the Lakes and the Erie Canal were factors to be reckoned with. It was unquestionably a difficult situation and the railroad managers showed little ability in meeting it. In 1874, the railroads began bidding against each other for the business that was in sight with the result that towards the end of 1875 the through rates on the trunk lines were made without regard to the cost of transportation, while during the season of navigation the lake boats were willing to carry grain at a rate sufficient to pay a seaman's wages and insurance for the mere purpose of avoiding the deterioration likely to result

¹ A. T. Hadley, *Labor's Cyc.*, iii. 41.

from the vessels being laid up in the summer. In December 1875, an agreement was made between the railroads to maintain rates but it was broken two months later and a large part of the year 1876 was marked by a fierce and destructive war of rates. A mention of most of the prevailing freight charges will hardly convey an idea of the fierceness of the war, for the reason that since 1876, a great reduction has been made in the cost of carrying freight¹ with a corresponding reduction in regular rates, yet a traffic manager of to-day would assert that it would mean absolute ruin to carry cattle from Chicago to New York for a dollar a carload which rate was made during the conflict.² Passenger rates were likewise demoralized and the only good feature of the war was that the low fares permitted a vast number of persons to visit the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia who otherwise would have been debarred from this improving influence. Low rates to Philadelphia need not necessarily have influenced the whole through traffic but this was a war in which the encounters were at many places. A concrete case will illustrate the advantage of the passenger who travelled between competitive points. Two persons going from Cleveland to Boston in August 1876 compared notes as to the cost of their journey. One had paid \$6.80 for his ticket from Cleveland to Boston, the other had the courtesies of the Lake Shore and Boston and Albany railroads as the common giving of free passes was called. While this person paid nothing from Cleve-

¹ Written before the Great War beginning in August 1914.

² Hadley, *The Amer. Railway*, 361; *Railroads, Their Origin and Problems*, C. F. Adams, 152. Adams mentions a number of rates that were made in 1876.

land to Buffalo and nothing from Albany to Boston, he had to buy a ticket from Buffalo to Albany for which he paid the legal rate of two cents per mile or \$5.94. His passes covering considerably more than half of his journey of 682 miles had saved him eighty-six cents.¹

While the railroad war may have been of transitory benefit to a few, its general and lasting results were not only ruinous to the bondholders and stockholders of the railroads but were bad for the business community at large. Simple fidelity to a fair agreement would have ended it in a day but this seemed impossible to bring about. Agreements were made but were soon broken. It was said that a railroad president, who had himself solemnly promised to maintain rates, went out from the meeting of railroad presidents and managers, and immediately cut the rates to secure a large amount of desirable business. More frequently would a freight agent be guilty of the infraction; openly condemned by his superior his offence was winked at. Such "smartness" presumably placed him in the line of promotion; so his example was demoralizing to other competitors. In his despair an honest freight agent was heard to say that he

¹ This is partly from memory. I was the passenger who bought the ticket from Cleveland to Boston and my distinct recollection is that I paid \$6.80 for it. Professor Henry E. Bourne has made a search in the Cleveland newspapers for me and finds in August, 1876 (the month in which I made the journey) an advertised rate from Cleveland to New York of \$6.50. The ordinary difference in fares to Boston would be more than 30 cents, yet I seem to remember the \$6.50 fare to New York and the \$6.80 to Boston; on the pro-rata basis the fare would have been \$7.09. The charter of the N. Y. Central R. R. (Apr. 2, 1853) limited its passenger fares to two cents per mile but the N. Y. Central R. R. people maintained that this applied only to local fares, while Albany and Buffalo were through points. The distance from Buffalo to Albany is 297 miles; at two cents per mile the fare is \$5.94. It is possible it may have been a trifle higher in 1876.

wished Congress would pass a law compelling the railroads to keep their agreements. Public sentiment received a fit expression in these words of the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*: "A railroad war of the trunk lines is about as certain in recurrence as the smallpox or the change of seasons. Periodically, and with many formalities, agreements are made between the rival parties and periodically, but without any formality, the agreements thus made are broken. . . . How childish is this marching up a hill and then marching down again every few months by our great railroads kings!"¹ Thomas A. Scott declared that "during the first six months of 1877, not a farthing was made on through competitive freight by any line."² John Sherman wrote to his agent in London: "The railroad companies have for several years competed with each other in a very improvident and reckless way and are now, and have been for some time, carrying freight for less than cost. This has caused a large reduction of the net income of roads, has led to the loss of dividends, and now to the reduction of wages of employes to rates scarcely sufficient to support life. Hence the strikes."³

In April 1877 the railroad presidents entered into a fresh agreement in regard to rates and this was made

¹ April 7, 1877, 308.

² Testimony, Pa. Riots, 929. This is the report of the committee appointed to investigate the railroad riots in July 1877 made to the Pa. Legislative in 1878. It will be referred to as Pa. Riots.

³ Aug. 6. Sherman's Recollections, i. 582. See C. F. Adams, Railroads, Their Origin and Problems, article in *The American Railway*; Hadley, Railroad Transportation, article in *The American Railway*; Johnson, Amer. Railway Transportation; Ripley, Railway Problems; Burton, Crises and Depressions; J. S. Thorold Rogers in *Princeton Review*, Jan. 1879; Brassey, *Nineteenth Century*, May 1879; Appletons' Ann. Cyc., 1874-1877; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*; *The Nation*, 1877.

more solid by a subsequent one, dividing the west-bound tonnage by percentages under a pooling arrangement. Both these agreements were to take effect on July 1, but, confronted with the immense falling off in earnings due to the hard times and their own unwisdom, the presidents did not wait for results from these agreements; in order to recoup themselves for past losses, they somewhat hastily and jauntily announced a reduction of ten per cent in the wages of their employés. This was done on the New York-Philadelphia-office-ultimatum-plan which I may thus describe: the railroad president in his well-appointed office, with the wage sheet on his desk, calculated that the engineer, fireman and brakeman, receiving so much by the job or by the day, obtained adequate monthly wages and that they could afford to help in bearing the burden of the commercial depression. The next step was the posting of a peremptory order announcing the ten per cent reduction. Herein lay two errors: the one, logical, the other administrative. For, in the first place, due weight was not given to the unsteadiness of the work. With laudable intent too many men were kept on the rolls on the principle that half a loaf is better than no bread. Moreover some of the work was done under conditions which reduced the net return; for example crews of freight trains were left away from home a day or a night with their board and lodging to pay. The other error lay in reducing the wages hastily by a peremptory order. Thomas A. Scott, the president of the Pennsylvania railroad, denied that there was any agreement among the railroads to reduce wages and did not know whether such a policy was discussed at a meeting of the presidents held in the en-

deavor to agree upon a system of pooling earnings.¹ But the uniform action seems to suggest some tacit understanding. This was not necessary to meet combinations among laborers; though the powerful organization of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers was already in existence, trade-unionism on the whole was in its infancy. It is almost certain that if the division-superintendents, master mechanics and other like officials of any one railroad had been called into council with their president, they would have advised against an arbitrary reduction. They were close to the men having, not infrequently, social relations at least with the locomotive engineers, and they were aware how hard the reduced traffic was bearing on the employés. Their plan would have been to say to the men, Come let us reason together. Each would have presented his side, the grievances on the one hand, the necessities of the situation on the other. Employers and employed might then have stood shoulder to shoulder in an honest endeavor to cope with a deplorable condition of affairs. The locomotive engineers were a high class of labor, acquiring little properties, creating homes, having a stake in the country, patriotic; and while it was not primarily their strike, their active sympathy and coöperation was an important factor in it. They might have been moderators instead of being one of the parties to the conflict. Whatever might have been the outcome of such a plan, it would have been better than the actual event.

The drama opened at Martinsburg, West Virginia, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad on which the ten per cent. reduction was ordered to take effect on July 16.

¹ Pa. Riots, 928.

Accepted by other employés it was resisted by the firemen who during that afternoon began to abandon their trains. By persuasion and threats they induced other workmen to join them. No trains were allowed to pass; a blockade of freight was created and maintained. The strike spread quickly over the line, by midnight the strikers were in control of a large part of the railroad and the strike had become a riot. The Governor called out the whole military force of the State, which consisted of three volunteer companies, but they were unable to cope with the situation, so that on the 18th he called upon the President for aid. The President responded by the usual proclamation¹ and at once sent 250 regulars to Martinsburg. The rioters dispersed, and order was restored, but this by no means opened up the line. Trains that might pass through Martinsburg under guard were stopped elsewhere and there were not soldiers enough to look after every point of contact between the laborers and the railroad. Moreover it was difficult to obtain men to operate the trains even when they were promised protection. Serious trouble broke out at Cumberland, a station farther west on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in the adjoining State of Maryland and the railroad company called upon the Governor of Maryland for military aid. On July 20 he issued a proclamation, placed the two regiments in Baltimore under orders, directing the Fifth to proceed to Cumberland and the Sixth to remain on duty at the armory. The tocsin which at about six o'clock in the evening summoned the dilatory soldiers drew forth at the same time a mob of the unemployed, strikers, outcasts and "plug-uglies," determined that

¹ Richardson, vii. 447.

troops should not be sent to Cumberland to put down the strike. The Fifth regiment, numbering 250, reached Camden station by an unlooked-for detour without serious molestation, but there they were attacked with stones and pistol shots by the rioters who were in possession of the lower part of the station, and who had already threatened with death the engineer and fireman of the train there in readiness, if they made an attempt to pull out towards Cumberland. Meanwhile on account of the menacing attitude of the mob, the mayor of Baltimore suggested to the Governor the inadvisability of sending any of the militia away from Baltimore and the Governor at once revoked his former order, making such a disposition of his force. The Fifth regiment was indeed in no condition to take the offensive but on the other hand was in danger of being overpowered by the mob; three companies of the Sixth were therefore ordered to the rescue. These left their armory at about eight o'clock in the evening and had no sooner emerged from the building than they were set upon by an angry mob, assailing them with bricks and cobblestones and firing at them with pistols. These companies, composed mainly of youths between eighteen and twenty-five, were not well disciplined, still they marched on with a fair degree of order, but numbering only one hundred and twenty men, were in danger of being overwhelmed by the mob of three or four thousand. They did what untrained militia generally do in such a situation — opened fire without orders; and as they went down the street they continued firing. Nine rioters were killed, three died later from their wounds and fourteen were wounded. The firing did not disperse the mob but the

shedding of blood exasperated them ; wild with rage they pursued the soldiers until these companies of the Sixth, far from being in a position to relieve their beleaguered comrades, were badly in need of help themselves. No one in that uniform was safe from the fury of the mob. Many of the soldiers sought safety in houses, along the route, changed their clothes to civilian dress and so escaped. Only a small remnant reached the station and remained at the post of duty.

The mob surrounded the Camden station and began setting fire to the company's property. At first they prevented the firemen from putting out the flames but, in the end, better counsels prevailing, they desisted with the result that the destruction of property was not large. The entire police force of the city was at the station on duty all night ; they repeatedly charged the mob and made arrests but it was not deemed prudent to make any further use of the militia. Nor, even if the State soldiers had been well disciplined, had the Governor a sufficient force at his command. Hard times had reduced the appropriations so that the militia of Maryland numbered in all but 725 men. On this same night [July 20] the Governor called upon President Hayes for assistance. Next day the President issued the usual proclamation¹ and ordered an adequate force of regulars to Baltimore under the command of General Hancock who, with the troops stationed at New York City, arrived there in the early morning of July 22. After consultation with the Governor he disposed his soldiers at the threatened points and their presence brought the rioting to an end. Order was restored but, at the time that the conditions of my

¹ July 21. Richardson, vii. 448.

narrative divert our attention to Pennsylvania, the freight-blockade on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was not raised.¹

On July 19, the trouble in Pennsylvania began at Pittsburgh. Since the panic of 1873, the Pennsylvania Railroad had made two reductions in wages, one in 1873 of ten per cent. and another of like amount, which went into effect on June 1, 1877. Both of these were accepted by the men, but before their acquiescence in the second reduction, a committee of engineers paid a visit to Thomas A. Scott, the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, canvassed with him the proposed cutting down of their wages and were apparently convinced that it was inevitable, receiving at the same time the promise that their pay should be restored as soon as conditions permitted.² The other trainmen however grumbled at this reduction and were already in a discontented mood when the order was issued to run double-headers on all freight trains on the Pittsburgh-Altoona division. A double-header meant two locomotives on one train of thirty-four cars where the steep grades rendered additional power necessary instead of running the train in two sections and making the junction at the top of the pass or at Altoona whence one locomotive could haul it to Philadelphia. This plan saved the wages of a freight conductor, a flagman and the brakeman hitherto needed for the second section, an economy forced upon the company, so A. J. Cassatt, the

¹ Parl. Papers, sess., 1877, Commercial, No. 22, vol. lxxxiv [c. 1853]; report of Com. of Labor, 1887; Message of Governor of West Va., 1879; report of Secretary of War, 1877; report of Adj.-Gen. of Md., 1877; Message of Governor of Md., 1878. A thesis prepared for me by D. M. Matteson rendered these available. I have also consulted Dacus, *The Great Strike*; Allan Pinkerton, *Strikers, Communists, Tramps and Detectives*.

² Scott's testimony, Pa. Riots, 2, 924, 925.

third vice-president, testified, from the low freight-rates rather than from the decreased tonnage.¹ This order, which was to take effect on July 19, gave general dissatisfaction but no active protest was expected by the officials, and the general superintendent of that division left Pittsburg that morning on his vacation. Indeed a number of the early trains went out double-headers without any trouble, but the two brakemen and flagman of the 8.40 A.M. refused to go out on their train, and as no other trainmen would take their places, the despatcher got together a crew from the yard men, who were however prevented from making up the train by the strikers assaulting them with coupling pins. Twenty to twenty-five men were engaged in this disturbance; they took possession of the switches, refused to permit any trains to pass out of the yard and persuaded the various freight crews that came in from time to time, both from the east and the west, to join forces with them. This incident together with the trouble at Martinsburg inaugurated the most alarming strike and riot in the history of the United States.²

Whenever there is a great strike, the outside public looks on: its sympathy may be with the workmen or it may be with their employers, but it is always a factor to be reckoned with. At the outset public sentiment in Pittsburg was with the strikers, partly because it was believed that the last reduction of wages was unfair and partly because the Pennsylvania Railroad was thoroughly hated in this town. From the large manufacturer and merchant to the small shop-keeper the belief was general

¹ Pa. Riots, 4, 59, 696.

² Written in 1909.

that the company discriminated against Pittsburg in its freight tariff. It was alleged that the railroad carried goods from Chicago to Philadelphia for less than from Chicago to Pittsburg; that Pittsburg manufacturers could ship their merchandise to San Francisco via Boston at a lower rate than from Pittsburg to San Francisco direct; and that no manufacturer could live without drawbacks and rebates. When complaint was made to Scott he was ready with his reply: the discrimination was due to the war of rates, through freight being carried at a less rate per mile than local freight; and while this was to a certain extent a true explanation, every business man could add that Pittsburg suffered because it had no competing line and was at the mercy of the Pennsylvania Railroad. In fact ruin stared many manufacturers in the face because they were unable to compete with the manufacturers of towns more fortunately situated. The sentiment of the business men and the natural sympathy of the laborers and mechanics in every factory were reflected in the newspapers which almost unanimously supported the strike.¹

Begun unexpectedly and on the spur of the moment, the strike grew so rapidly that soon the Pennsylvania Railroad at Pittsburg was in the hands of the striking workmen who would not move the trains themselves nor permit other men to take their places. It is generally the theory of the employer in such cases that a large number of competent workmen can be had if furnished adequate protection, and while in 1877, persuasion and threats had not been erected into the system since built up by

¹ Pa. Riots, 18, 273, 374, 928-932.

the trade-unions, yet on this July 19, persuasion was employed and, when it failed, threats were ready. For, on account of the enormous number of the unemployed, steady men were everywhere seeking jobs and intimidation was probably necessary to keep the vacant places unsupplied. Thus a freight blockade was established although passenger trains were permitted to run.

Before noon of the 19th the acting Superintendent went to the City Hall and asked the protection of ten policemen and the mayor's presence at the yard. The mayor must have been either weak and timid or else in sympathy with the strikers, for he said he had no men to send. Owing to the hard times the force had been reduced to one hundred and twenty, only nine of whom were on duty during the day. But the acting Superintendent found ten of the discharged policemen who were willing to serve when assured of their pay by the railroad, and as the mayor absolutely refused to go to the scene of trouble, the Superintendent took this small force with him to the railroad yard. While in the act of opening a switch he was struck in the eye by a striker and as the rioters numbered a hundred he decided not to attempt moving the trains at once, but appealed to the mayor for additional protection, which was not furnished. During the next four days the mayor and police practically disappear from the history of the riot.

Between eleven o'clock and midnight of the 19th the acting Superintendent saw the sheriff of the county and demanded protection. The result of the interview was that these two together with General Pearson, the commander of the Sixth division of the Pennsylvania militia with headquarters at Pittsburg, went out to Twenty-

eightth Street, which was the scene of the trouble, and addressed a crowd of two hundred. The sheriff advised them to disperse and was thus answered: "Go home! We are not going to allow any freight trains to leave until the difficulty between us and the railroad company is settled. The mayor and policemen are on our side and prominent citizens have offered to assist us in provisions and money to carry on the strike."¹ This reply satisfied the sheriff that there was a riot which he could not quell with a posse of citizens and he thereupon telegraphed to the Governor for military aid. But the Governor was beyond the limits of the State and travelling towards the Pacific coast and the Adjutant-General, Latta, was exercising his authority as commander-in-chief of the State militia. He had been thoroughly informed about the doings in Pittsburg by the railroad officials in Philadelphia, and was ready to take action: he accordingly authorized General Pearson to call out his troops and to take command. Pearson, who had seen three years' service during the Civil War, rising to the command of a brigade, ordered out three regiments and a battery. The Eighteenth responding at noon of Friday, July 20 with about 225 men, were sent to the stock yards east of Pittsburg and acquitted themselves with credit during the whole trouble. But the members of the other two regiments assembled slowly and when they came to the rendezvous, it was evident that they sympathized with the strike. At 6.35 on the evening of the 20th, Pearson telegraphed to Latta that he had only been able to collect

¹ Pa. Riots, 7, 79, 176, 177, 374, 485. I have changed the third person to the first. Some prominent citizens denied any offer of aid. Certain tradesmen were willing to trust the strikers for provisions.

230 men [meaning in addition to the 18th regiment], while he needed 2000 as the mob had grown to four or five thousand; and he suggested that troops be sent from Philadelphia. Latta ordered to Pittsburg the First division of the National Guard, composed almost entirely of Philadelphia men. On this day, the 20th, a proclamation was issued by the Secretary of State in the Governor's name and with the State seal ordering the mob to disperse. This produced no effect whatever. The rioters knew that the Governor was out of the State; they believed or pretended to believe that the railroad people had issued the proclamation and that the troops had been illegally ordered out without authority from the Governor.¹ The trainmen held a meeting and sent their demands to the Superintendent, two of which were that there should be no double-headers except on the coal trains,² and that the wages existing before June 1st should be restored.

The situation was taking on the aspect of war and Pearson knew that if an affray should take place, the Twenty-eighth Street crossing, which was a mile east of the Union station, would be the scene of it. On the morning of the 21st, aware that the Philadelphia division was on the way, he ordered his two available regiments and the battery to take possession of the crossing and hold it. These troops were under the immediate command of a brigade commander who failed to carry out his orders and, dressed in citizens' clothes, encouraged his men to fraternize with the mob. By three o'clock

¹ Latta reported his action to the Governor who approved it.

² It was the practice before the strike to run the coal trains as double-headers.

of Saturday afternoon, July 21, 650 Philadelphia soldiers, under the command of Brinton, a Civil War veteran, arrived at the Union station. They were a brave body of men; many had seen service in the Civil War and some of the companies were composed of the élite of their city. But they had little relish for the fight before them, for they were hungry. Owing to bad management they had been on short rations although their journey lay entirely within the populous and fertile State of Pennsylvania. Leaving Philadelphia at about two in the morning they had once had coffee and sandwiches on the way, and the same again on their arrival at the Union station but nothing else.

Saturday afternoon was a bad time to tackle a mob in Pittsburg. It was a general half holiday and the crowd was swelled by the mill and factory hands and the miners in the neighborhood, who, as well as the trainmen, were exasperated by the news of bloodshed in Baltimore and doubted the legality of the presence of the State troops. Tramps abounded and these together with outcasts and criminals gave a lawless complexion to the mob they re-enforced. It is said that Cassatt was asked to defer the offensive movement until Monday but he insisted that the State should restore to the railroad its property. Latta and Pearson met the Philadelphia troops at the Union station and Brinton acted under the command of his superior officers.¹ Before setting out on the march to 28th Street he gave instructions to his two brigadiers and to his regimental commanders to the effect that he did not want a shot fired, but that if personal violence was

¹ Pearson and Brinton were of equal rank but Pearson was the senior officer.

attempted the men should defend themselves.¹ The Philadelphia troops then marched to the 28th Street crossing where they found the Pittsburg militia fraternizing with a mob of many thousands in which the vicious element was large. They partly cleared the tracks but as the rioters pressed between their ranks they were forced to the defensive and formed a hollow square. A bayonet charge wounded a number of the mob and exasperated the rest. The rioters threw stones and lumps of coal at the soldiers and followed up these missiles with pistol shots. Emboldened by the lack of resistance, those in front seized the muskets and attempted to wrest them from the troops. Some few were disarmed, when at about five o'clock a scattering fire began along the line, which increased to a volley, but, as the officers did their best to stop it, lasted less than a minute. But at least sixteen of the rioters were instantly killed and many were wounded. The occurrence was extremely unfortunate, and although the firing was done without precise orders and the only warrant for it was Brinton's general instructions, it had become necessary in order to avoid broken ranks and a general disarming of the troops. Moral support should have been forthcoming for these brave militia men who had been precipitately ordered forward to attempt an impossible task; but the Pittsburg public generally regarded their act as murderous. Some of the newspapers were rabid. One headed its account with "Blood or Bread. The worthy strikers arm themselves and assemble thousands strong to compel their rights"; another, "Seventeen citizens shot down in cold blood by the roughs of Philadelphia. The

¹ Pa. Riots, 907.

Lexington of the labor conflict at hand. Threats that the Philadelphia soldiers will not be allowed to go home alive."

The firing temporarily dispersed the mob and the troops were masters of the situation but were not in sufficient force to remain so, and reinforcements that were expected did not arrive. The railroad officials could not get engineers and crews to take charge of trains, so no trains went out. About dusk Brinton withdrew his troops for rest and food to the lower round house at 26th Street supposing that the upper round house at 28th Street would be occupied by the Pittsburg militia. But this was not to be. The Pittsburg troops had throughout fraternized with the mob, some of them quitting the service; and, after the firing, the number of sympathetic desertions increased. Those remaining were intimidated, as was also their brigade commander who, as the mob grew more excited and angry, dismissed his troops lest, as he afterwards defended this act, they should exasperate the rioters to further violence. So the affair had simmered down to a contest between the mob and the Philadelphia soldiers. The exasperation at the bloodshed of the afternoon was increased by the report, which may have been true, that some of the killed were innocent spectators; for the neighboring hill had been covered with people and the firing had been high. A report that women and children were among the killed ¹ aggravated the wrath of the people and when the mob reassembled at the 28th Street crossing on the tracks in the railroad yard they were bent on revenge, took the offensive and laid siege to the Philadelphia troops in the round house. These

¹ Probably a false report.

were without food. Provisions were sent to them from the Union station a mile away, in express wagons which, being unguarded were intercepted by the rioters. Possessed of fire-arms from having broken into a number of gun shops, the rioters with some attempt at military order marched to the round house and poured volley after volley into the windows eliciting no response from the Philadelphia soldiers who were under orders not to fire unless absolutely necessary for self-protection. But after proper warning they did fire at men attempting to use a field piece captured from a Pittsburg battery, and killed perhaps two or three. Failing to overpower their enemy by assault the rioters tried fire. They applied the torch to the upper round house and the neighboring buildings. Breaking in the heads of barrels of oil, taken from the detained freight, they saturated cars of coke with it, ignited them and pushed the cars toward the lower round house in the attempt to roast out the beleaguered soldiers, who by means of the fire apparatus managed for a while to stay the fire. It was a terrible ordeal they were passing through. "Tired, hungry, worn out, surrounded by a mob of infuriated men, yelling like demons, fire on nearly all sides of them, suffocated and blinded by smoke, with no chance to rest, and little knowledge of what efforts were being made for their relief, with orders not to fire on the mob unless in necessary self-defence, the wonder is that they were not totally demoralized; but the evidence of all the officers is that the men behaved like veterans."¹

It is probable that the original railroad strikers had

¹ Report of the Committee of the Pennsylvania legislature appointed to investigate the railroad riots of 1877.

little or no part in this attack; they certainly had none in the arson and pillage which followed. They had invoked a spirit with which they were not in sympathy. The controlling force now was the tramps, communists, criminals and outcasts, — the dregs of society and these could work their will unrestrained. As I have said before, the mayor and police counted for nothing towards the preservation of order. The sheriff with some deputies went to the 28th Street crossing with the first advance of the Philadelphia troops but effected nothing; after the firing, threats were made to murder him and he disappeared, going first to his home and then apparently for greater security to his office. His ultimate safety may have been due to the newspapers incorrectly reporting that he had been shot by the mob. The mob set fire to the remaining railroad buildings in the yard, to the laden freight cars and locomotives.¹ Barrels of spirits taken from the freight cars were opened and drunk; another goad to the men was supplied by women who abused the troops and pillaged with ardor; thus the work of destruction and plunder of the goods in transit went on with renewed fury. The firemen responded to the fire alarm but were not allowed to play upon the burning railroad property; after some parley however they got permission to put out the flames which had spread to private buildings. That Saturday night Pittsburg witnessed a reign of terror.

At last the lower round house took fire and the Philadelphia troops were forced to abandon it and retreat. Unable as they were to cope with the mob their only

¹ 1600 cars (including passenger and baggage) and 126 locomotives were burned.

thought was self-preservation. At about eight o'clock on Sunday morning, July 22 they marched out in good order. Their progress was not opposed but, after passing, they were fired upon from street corners, alley-ways, windows and house-tops. Shots were fired at them from a street car and from the sidewalk in front of a police station where a number of policemen were standing. The troops turned and used with some effect their rifles and a Gatling gun which they had brought with them in their retreat. Finally they reached the United States arsenal and asked for shelter and protection which the commandant, fearing that he could not defend the place against an attack of the mob, refused. Leaving their wounded the Philadelphia troops, no longer hindered by the mob, marched on, crossed the Alleghany River to Sharpsburg and encamped near the workhouse, where they were given bread and coffee, their first food since the snack of the previous afternoon at the Union station. Through the efforts of Cassatt they were supplied with regular rations; and later they were ordered east to Blairsville [52 miles east of Pittsburg] where, being supplied by Scott with woolen and rubber blankets, they did guard duty for a number of days. During their retreat three or four had been killed or died afterwards from their injuries and thirteen were wounded; fifteen were wounded in the affray at the 28th Street crossing.¹ The coroner held inquest over nineteen bodies of the rioters; it was thought others had been killed and disposed of secretly. Many were wounded.

On Sunday, the 22d, the rioting, with arson and pillage,

¹ The evidence differs as to the exact number. It is possible some of the thirteen wounded may have been wounded in the round house.

went on and in the afternoon the Union station and Railroad hotel and an elevator near by were burned. Then as the mob were satiated and too drunk to be longer dangerous, the riot died out; it was not checked. The following incident illustrates the general alarm of that day. The State authorities driven from the Union depot hotel took refuge in the Monongahela House, the leading hotel in Pittsburg, where they wrote their names in the usual manner in the hotel register; but these were scratched out by the hotel people and fictitious names put in their place. On Monday through the action of the authorities, supported by armed bands of law-abiding citizens and some faithful companies of the Pittsburg militia, order was restored. The damage to property during the riot was almost three millions. Under a State law of 1841, enforced by a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Allegheny County (of which Pittsburg was the county-seat) paid damages to the amount of \$2,765,891. "The law," declared the Court, "will not tolerate the spectacle of a great city looking on with indifference while property to the value of millions is being destroyed."¹

Order was restored but business and the daily occupations on which depend the life and regulation of an in-

¹ Co. of Allegheny *vs.* Gibson, 35 Amer. Rep. 680. My main authority for this account is the report of the committee of the Pa. legislature appointed to investigate the railroad riots of July 1877, and made in 1878. I have occasionally referred to it as Pa. Riots. This report was made available for me by an elaborate thesis written by D. M. Matteson which gives a full account of the riot based mainly on this report, though employing also other authorities, including the Message of Governor of Pa., 1878; the Report of the Adjutant General for 1877, which contains also the reports of Brinton and Pearson and their subordinates; and the Report of the Sec. of Internal Affairs, 1880-1881, pt. iii., Industrial Statistics. I have further used the report of the U. S. Commissioner of Labor for 1887; Dacus, *The Great Strike*; Allan Pinkerton, *Strikers, Communists, Tramps and Detectives*.

dustrial community, were not resumed. Governor Hartranft, alarmed at the seeming anarchy prevailing in his State, for the trouble had spread far and wide, was hastening home from the far West on a special train and, from a telegraph station in Wyoming on Sunday, July 22, he ordered out the whole militia force of Pennsylvania and called upon the President for aid. Hayes responded at once, issued his third proclamation [July 23] and ordered General Hancock to Philadelphia as the best point from which to survey the whole field. Troops on the way from New England and New York to Maryland and West Virginia were stopped in Philadelphia and a light battery from Fort Hamilton was sent thither; as New York City must not be neglected this was replaced by a battery from Fort Niagara. Hancock himself reached Philadelphia on the morning of the 23d receiving that day from the President "full authority to move any troops within your division as you may think necessary during these disturbances." Making use of this enlarged authority he ordered out the entire available force of the military division of the Atlantic, including the troops in the South.¹

Governor Hartranft reached Pittsburg on the 24th and stopped overnight. He found the city quiet but coal was getting scarce and the food supply was running low, hence he made up his mind that the railroads centring in Pittsburg must be opened as soon as possible, although many influential citizens, still a prey to the terror, tried to persuade him to defer the attempt. He issued a stern proclamation, hastened to Philadelphia and after consultation with Generals Hancock and Schofield (the latter

¹ Governor's message, 13, 37; Rep. of Sec. of War, 88.

of whom was fresh from a long conference with the President and his cabinet in Washington) developed his plan. Setting out from Philadelphia at two in the afternoon of July 26 with two hundred men, he collected troops at various points on the way and proceeded towards Pittsburg. His progress was hampered from the difficulty of obtaining crews to run the several trains which carried the soldiers. In some cases, the same engineer and fireman ran the whole distance between Philadelphia and Pittsburg [349 miles]; in others, crews for the engines and trains were made up from the soldiers of the expedition. Leaving Philadelphia at two on Thursday afternoon, he reached Pittsburg at dawn on the Saturday, a run which is now made by the Pennsylvania special in seven hours and three minutes.¹ Brinton commanded the van of the Governor's force and made his reëntry into Pittsburg with a caution born of his experience of the previous week. An open car with a Gatling gun and thirty sharpshooters was placed in front of the two locomotives which drew the cars filled with soldiers and more sharpshooters with a Gatling were in an open car at the rear end of the train. The Governor, who had been in active service during the whole of the Civil War ending as brevet-Major-General, assumed command of the whole force [about 4000] as commander-in-chief of the army of the State, acting under a law of 1864, which had been passed during the war and which gave the Governor power to send troops without requisition from the local authorities. In addition, six hundred United States regular soldiers under orders from Hancock were sent to Pittsburg. The city took on the appearance of an armed camp.

¹ In 1909.

On Thursday [the 26th] the Pennsylvania Railroad people began cautiously to repair the tracks that had been destroyed by the fire during the riot. The mail trains had continued to run, as the strikers and the mob would not interfere with carriage which had at its back the authority of the United States, and the running of mail trains involved a considerable amount of passenger traffic: through passenger trains, at least, had been operated, though with considerable difficulty. For the most part they were sent over the Western Pennsylvania [now the Conemaugh division] which left the main line at Blairsville Intersection but some of the mails were transferred by wagon round the place of riot and destruction of the terrible Saturday. Under protection of the military the work of repair proceeded rapidly but, when all was ready it was difficult to find employés willing to run the trains. The State authorities however had brought from Philadelphia ten competent men who were at hand for any emergency; and the knowledge that the State was ready to supply its own men to perform railroad service had much influence toward inducing some of the old employés to make a break. On Sunday night, July 29, eight days after the night of riot and terror, the first freight train was sent out on the main line under a military guard, and although either this one or the one following was wrecked at Spring Hill¹ by a removed switch, the movement was followed up with vigor on the Monday. A succession of freight trains were despatched, all under guard, and there ensued a rush of the striking trainmen to secure their old places. The Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne and Chicago Railroad had already been opened and the Alle-

¹ About 14 miles east of Pittsburg.

gheny Valley resumed operations on this same Monday. The strike at Pittsburg was over. The men on the Pennsylvania Railroad returned to work at the reduced wages which had gone into effect on the first of June. The troops began leaving Pittsburg on July 31 and they were gradually withdrawn: the last of the State militia departed on August 10, but some of the United States regulars remained three weeks longer.

Meanwhile the strike had spread to a large number of railroads between the seaboard and the Missouri River and a spirit of unrest and lawlessness had invaded many of the Northern States. Although apparently no strike existed at Reading, Pennsylvania, a mob of discharged railroad employes and sundry outcasts, inspired doubtless by the riot in Pittsburg, rose on Sunday night, July 22 and burned the Lebanon Valley railroad bridge over the Schuylkill River and next day took possession of the town, stopped trains and caused much alarm. The Chief of Police, a veteran soldier, attempted to raise an extra force but was thwarted by the opposition of the citizens. A regiment of the State militia was ordered to Reading and in the evening about 250 men arrived. Finding that the railroad station had been already secured by the coal and iron police, they set off, at the request of the railroad officials, through a cut to release a train held by the mob. This cut was three or four hundred yards long, thirty feet high and walled; and on either side of the railway, four feet from the top, was a foot-way, an excellent position from which to attack the troops with missiles. Stones and rocks were hurled at the soldiers, every step of whose progress was marked with their blood. After enduring this for two-thirds of the distance, the troops began firing

without orders and in the end discharged two volleys ahead to clear the cut and two more to protect their rear. Eleven of the mob were killed or died soon afterwards and fifty or more were wounded. Only fifty of the soldiers were uninjured although none of the wounds were fatal. It was dark and the troops failed to see a body of police in line at the end of the cut who were exposed to their fire. Seven of these were hurt but all recovered. This was the only affray in Reading but to preserve the peace there were required 125 extra police, who were sworn in by the mayor after he had hurried home from his vacation, as well as 200 United States regulars.

New York State did not suffer as acutely as Pennsylvania; nevertheless the contagion crept over the border. A threatened strike of the last days of June was realized in fact on July 20 when the firemen and brakemen on the Western division of the Erie railway struck against the reduction of wages of June, and, concentrating at Hornellsville, stopped all trains and tore up the track to prevent the passage of troops. The Erie was in the hands of a State receiver who was at once furnished troops for his protection by the Governor, Lucius Robinson. But the strike spread to other points on the Erie and also to the New York Central and Lake Shore railroads. On July 23, the Governor ordered the whole military force of the State under arms: 16,000 men were in active service during the troubles, and, according to the British Consul-General, they "seemed determined to do their duty in upholding the law and protecting the rights and property of their fellow citizens."¹ In most cities of New York the police were efficient, and while there were riotous

¹ Parl. sess. papers, 33.

demonstrations, there was only one serious riot [at Buffalo, July 23] and that in comparison with the affrays in Pennsylvania was insignificant. The remembrance of the draft riots of 1863 was still fresh so that public attention was directed to New York City where there was an army of the unemployed and where the dangerous classes abounded. Considerable anxiety was felt in regard to the public meeting, under socialistic and communistic auspices called for Wednesday evening, July 25, in Tompkins Square. Considering the matter carefully, the mayor and police authorities decided to permit the meeting but to suppress promptly and sternly the least attempt at disturbance. The police were out in force and were kept well in hand and three regiments of militia under arms were subject to the call of the mayor. One of these was the Seventh, who, from their armory five hundred yards away could reach Tompkins Square in ten minutes ready for action. It is said that some of the communists, in taking stock of the measures to preserve order, got a look into this armory and, seeing the best young citizens of New York lying on their arms with the determined look of men who are out on grave duty, felt their courage for the attempt to overturn society ooze away. Inflammatory speeches, made in English and German, were probably taken seriously by the communists and socialists but did not goad them to riotous action and indeed the majority of the 10,000 or 12,000, who had gathered together, was an ordinary good-natured crowd, actuated by curiosity rather than bent on mischief. "The meeting," wrote the British Consul-General, "was a complete fiasco"¹; and this result had a pacifying influence

¹ Parl. sess. papers, 37.

throughout New York State and all over the disturbed part of the country.

By July 28, the riotous demonstrations had ceased, the trouble in the State of New York was over and nearly all of the State militia were sent home. The trainmen resumed work on the Erie and New York Central at the reduced wages.¹

New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Kentucky and Texas were disturbed by strikes and affected by the general unrest and lawlessness. One occurrence claims our attention. The strike on the railroads in Chicago furnished an occasion for the rising of a mob of the dangerous classes, who were numerous in this city, owing to the large and conglomerate foreign population. The mayor was determined and the police efficient and the story of July 24 and 25 is that of many conflicts between the police and the mob, the police maintaining the upper hand. There were State troops available and also six companies of United States regulars, who, on their way east, had been stopped by the Secretary of War and for whom the proper requisition had been made by the Governor. The mayor was loath to call upon the troops but on July 26, the situation had become so grave that he authorized their use. On this day a desperate conflict took place at the Sixteenth Street viaduct between the mob and police in which ten rioters were killed and forty-five wounded. Nineteen police were injured. The appearance of the United States regulars on the scene put an end to the rioting and their continued presence in the city insured tranquillity. Six companies were there on the

¹ By July 28, work on these two lines was pretty generally if not entirely resumed.

26th and later thirteen more companies arrived, General Sheridan himself reaching Chicago on the 29th.

The country may be said to have been in a tumult from July 16 to 31, but with one exception, the rioting was over before the last day of July and the strike was settled. In the main the strikers failed to secure the restoration of the pay which they had demanded.

The tragic episodes in Pittsburg set the whole country in an uproar and the final act of the drama was played in eastern Pennsylvania in the centre of the anthracite coal region where a large number of workmen, always overbearing and lawless, were now rendered desperate by the hard times, reduced pay and diminished work. On July 24 the rolling-mill men of the Lackawanna Coal and Iron Co. struck for 35 per cent. advance which was refused. The railroad employés quit work and stopped [July 25] the running of all trains on the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad except those carrying the mails. Thrown out of work by the stoppage of the trains the miners met 6000 or 8000 strong [July 26] and demanded an advance of 25 per cent.; owing undoubtedly to the aggressive spirit developed, some of the more daring drove away by threats the men who manned the pumps, the working of which was necessary to prevent the mines from flooding.¹ The centre of this trouble was the city of Scranton and its mayor, R. H. McKune, was a masterful man equal to the emergency. Calling an advisory meeting of citizens to sustain him he swore in a special

¹During miners' strikes it is usual, by tacit agreement between employers and men for the engineers who run the stationary engines, to continue at their posts that the mines may be pumped, otherwise they would fill with water to the great loss of the owner and the detriment of the men when work should be resumed.

police force of 120 and placed a veteran soldier at their head. The militia in their neighborhood were not summoned for fear that they should fraternize with the strikers. The mayor persuaded the miners to permit the mines to be pumped, and ignored his City Council who voted that the special police were not required. The manager of the Coal and Iron Company put a notice in the newspaper to the effect that employés of the Iron and Steel Works who wanted to work, should have adequate protection and thereupon [July 31] a good many of the men went back to their places. On the 30th, the mayor told the executive committee of the strikers that the citizens needed the running of the trains for the conduct of their business and that he intended to start a train at 9.50 next morning, and, if the strikers attempted to obstruct it, he should use his whole force against them. Demanding an answer that afternoon, he got it, and next day the old trainmen returned to their work and the train service was resumed. Some of the miners went back into the mines but the unemployed and turbulent called a meeting on August 1 which was attended by 6000 or 8000. A false report of the position of the Iron Company enforced by demagogic speeches so fired the men that they adjourned to clear out the Lackawanna Iron and Coal Company's machine shops and blast furnaces and the car shops of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad. Willing workmen were driven from their work and the blast furnaces left to chill. The mayor himself came into conflict with the rioters, was knocked senseless and a Catholic priest, who came to his rescue, was assaulted. The mob then took possession of the principal street of the city, surrounded, pelted and fired at fifty of the police

who were attempting to quell the riot. The mayor, whose jaw had been broken when he was struck down, soon recovered consciousness and followed the mob; he gave the order to fire and three of the ringleaders fell dead at the first volley. The mob scattered, gathered again when the mayor, at the head of twenty-five specials, moved against them and ordered them to disperse, which they did without resistance.

No soldiers were still under arms but after this riot this part of the anthracite region was ablaze, as the miners were out at Wilkesbarre as well as at Scranton. The mayor called upon the governor for troops, who sent immediately Brinton's, Pearson's and one other division to his aid. Governor Hartranft himself left Pittsburg and established his headquarters in Luzerne county.¹ He also asked Hancock for United States regulars and as many of these as could be spared were despatched; the force was added to from time to time, the aggregate number during August being 1578 divided among Scranton, Wilkesbarre, Mauch Chunk and Easton. The Pennsylvania militia and regulars did excellent guard duty but were not required to show their fighting mettle as there was no more rioting. But the turbulent character of the population, ever ready for an outbreak, made their presence necessary for a long while. The regulars remained through August, a large force of the militia until September and three companies and a battery [State troops] until November 15.²

¹ The county in which Scranton was situated.

² My main authority for this account is a thesis prepared for me by D. M. Matteson based on the Report of the Committee appointed to Investigate the Railroad Riots, Message of the Governor of Pa., 1878; Report of the Adjutant-General of Pa. for 1877; Report of the Sec. of

It is probable that the ratio of unemployed to the total population has never been larger in this country than during 1877 and the strikes and riots of that year constituted the most serious labor disturbance that has ever occurred in the United States.¹ For a while freight traffic on the most important railroads of the country was entirely suspended and the mail and passenger trains were run only on sufferance of the strikers. Business was paralyzed. The action of the mob in Baltimore, Pittsburg, Reading, Chicago and Scranton seemed to threaten the chief strongholds of society and came like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky, startling us rudely. For we had hugged the delusion that such social uprisings belonged to Europe and had no reason of being in a free republic where there was plenty of room and an equal chance for all.² The railroad managers had no idea that they were prodding a slumbering giant when their edict of a ten per cent. reduction went forth. The industrious workmen who began an honest strike against what they deemed an unfair reduction and unjust exactions, little imagined that they would soon be allied with the dregs of society. Their experience recalls this statement of Niebuhr's: "A man of great distinction who had lived through all

War, 1877; Parliament Papers, 1877, Commercial, No. 22, vol. lxxxiv. [c. 1853]; Joseph A. Dacus, *The Great Strike*; Allan Pinkerton, *Strikers*, etc.; Samuel C. Logan, *A City's Danger and Defense*; Terence V. Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*; *History of Scranton*. For the strikes and riots in general I have read carefully the American correspondence and leader in the *London Times*, Aug. 23, 1877; *Harper's Weekly*, July 1877; Goldwin Smith, *The Labour War in the United States*, *Contemporary Review*, Sept. 1877; R. P. Porter, *The Truth about the Strike*, *Galaxy*, Dec. 1877; Thomas A. Scott, *The Recent Strike*, *North American Review*, Sept. 1877.

¹ Written in 1909.

² See a thoughtful article by E. L. Godkin, *The Nation*, Aug. 2, 1877, 68.

the terrors of the French Revolution but had kept his hands clean once said to me, 'You do not know what a recollection it is to have lived during a revolution: one begins the attack with the best and in the end one finds oneself among knaves.'"¹ Writers however, who have based their accounts on newspaper sources, have pushed historical parallels too far when they have compared the riots of 1877 with the terrible days of the first French Revolution and of the Paris Commune of 1871. In truth a thorough study will show much more conspicuous diversities than resemblances between the American and the French uprisings.

Heretofore, except for the suppression of the New York City draft riots during the Civil War and for the enforcement of the governmental policy of reconstruction in the Southern States, United States soldiers had been rarely and sparingly used in domestic troubles. In July 1877, the governors of West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Illinois called upon the President for assistance, which, as we have seen, was promptly sent. In Missouri and Indiana as well as in Illinois the regulars were employed on the demand of the United States marshals, acting under the authority of the United States courts through the receivers whom they had appointed. Where the regular soldiers appeared order was at once restored without bloodshed and it was said that the rioters feared one federal bayonet more than a whole company of militia.² The President acted with judgment and decision and it

¹ Lectures on the History of Rome, 507.

² In the review of the first year of his administration, President Hayes wrote in his diary, "The riots — not a man shot, but order promptly and firmly upheld."

was due to him that order was ultimately restored. During the rest of the year there was much thoughtful and earnest discussion of the riots in private gatherings and many a grateful word was said of the quiet unassuming man in the White House who saw his duty clearly and never faltered in its performance. It was seen that the federal government with a resolute President at its head was a tower of strength in the event of a social uprising. The number of outcasts and the prevalence of the mob spirit, disclosed by the events of July, made thoughtful men shudder as they reckoned what might have happened had not the disputed presidency of a few months earlier been peacefully settled. The number, ready to enlist under any banner that promised a general overturn and a chance for plunder, would have proved a dangerous factor had Republicans and Democrats come to blows.

Many reflecting men found a capital expression of their own sentiments in an editorial article by Horace White in *The Nation* of August 9, which contained a powerful plea for a larger federal standing army. "The militia at best," he wrote, "are a clumsy substitute either for a military or a police establishment." The present "condition of things is intolerable and can be amended only by an increase of the military establishment of the nation. . . . The British islands, protected like ourselves by sea from the danger of foreign invasion, maintain a force of not less than 40,000 regular troops as an auxiliary police for home duty. . . . Twenty-five thousand trained soldiers in addition to our present force,¹ under the immediate orders of the President, when lawfully called

¹ The regular army consisted of 23,944 men.

upon by any State, are few enough for the existing needs of the country. . . . No champion of public liberty can pretend that the country is in any danger from the misuse of twenty-five regiments whose pay and rations depend upon the votes of Congress from year to year." The trade-unions which have grown fast since 1877 have generally (I believe) opposed any increase of the federal army on the line advocated in Horace White's article, because apparently they do not wish to relinquish the element of terror in the conduct of strikes. It may well be questioned whether this opposition is prudent. In any conflict between employer and employé the most important factor is the disinterested public who believe in the enforcement of the law and the preservation of order; and the industrious laborer, with an eye to insure for his cause the support of this sentiment, should be as much concerned as the capitalist at the prospect of the dangerous classes getting the upper hand. His interest lies with the railroad and with the factory rather than with outcasts and communists.

From the close of the Civil War to the end of the century, the gulf between labor and capital was constantly widening; the difficulty of either workman or employer putting himself in the other's place increased. This tendency was much accelerated by the autocratic reduction in wages of 1877, and by the strikes and riots which ensued. It is true that victory rested with the railroad companies but it was a Pyrrhic victory.

In his annual message of December 1877, President Hayes said that his Southern policy had been "subjected to severe and varied criticism." He might have drawn a strong argument in its favor from the events of July.

The old Confederate States were stripped bare of United States troops, yet they¹ vied in peace and order with New England, these two sections contrasting strangely in their tranquillity with the rest of the country. Moreover it was said that General Schofield was assured that 100,000 men in the South were ready to come at the call of the President to protect the government or any State from insurrection.²

The States in which the troubles occurred or were threatened learned the valuable lesson that their militia must be reorganized. In all but New York it was found defective and in the improvement that was at once begun, the New York Seventh was taken as a model. All that Godkin says about the effectiveness of regulars is true³ but there are points of superiority in a first-class militia regiment like the Seventh. Made up of men of good physique, character and social standing, owners of property or presumably inheritors of it such a body, when it acquires the discipline of regulars, has behind it, in dealing with an insurrection, an invincible moral force. Moreover, in ordinary times, they are pursuing peaceful occupations and are not withdrawn from the industrial life of the community, while the rank and file of garrisons

¹ With the exception of Texas.

² Dacus, 166.

³ "Regulars the mob knows to be a machine — the most terrible of all the machines invented by man, by which the wills of a thousand are wielded, even unto death, by the will of one and which knows nothing of single shots, which feels every blow through its whole mass, and, when it strikes, strikes like the flail of destiny, without remorse, or pity, or misgiving. . . . Killing by militia is apt to arouse a thirst for vengeance, like the killing in a street-fight, while a volley from regulars has the terrors of legal execution. . . . Means of prompt and effectual prevention must be provided, either by an increase of the standing army or some change in the organization of the militia which will improve its discipline and improve its mobility." *The Nation*, Aug. 2, 1877, 68.

of regulars are not, in a time of order and security, a welcome addition to the population of any city. A curious circumstance, which throws some light on the personnel of the Seventh is that during their term of service in New York City they made arrangement for their meals with Delmonico.¹

Macaulay wrote that the use of the word, cabal, in 1671, "by a whimsical coincidence" was made "so infamous" that it has never since been employed "except as a term of reproach."² Similarly, in reviving a meaning attributed to the word in Philadelphia between 1794 and 1806,³ "scab" was employed in July 1877 to denote a workman who supplants a striker. The leader of the strike at Allegheny City said that "if the railroad could get scabs to run the trains, all right, let them."

¹ The meals were not to cost over \$1.25 per day per man. While this in comparison with an à la carte repast at Delmonico's is low, yet good rations could be furnished at that price. During the strike and after the riot in Stark County, Ohio, in 1876, when a number of militia companies were sent thither by Governor Hayes, his Adjutant-General arranged with a hotel in Massillon to furnish three meals per day at a cost of either 50 cents or 60 cents per man. (I think the price was between the two as the result of a compromise, the hotel wanting 60 cents, the Adjutant-General holding for 50 cents.)

² I, chap. ii.

³ *New Princeton Rev.*, July 1886, 54; *Lippincott's Magazine*, March 1876, 386.

CHAPTER II

MY relation of the occurrences at Reading and Scranton has taken us amongst the population of the anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania. No history of the time can be complete without some reference to the Molly Maguires whose activity caused a profound sensation in the coal region and attracted considerable attention from the rest of the country.

The field of that most useful of domestic fuels, anthracite coal, embraces an area of 472 square miles ¹ all contained in the counties of Dauphin, Northumberland, Columbia, Schuylkill, Carbon and Luzerne, which had in 1870 a population of 436,437 and produced in 1876 more than twenty million tons of coal.² The operations of the Molly Maguires which I shall relate centre in Schuylkill and Carbon counties, north of Reading and south of Scranton. The name and organization of this hide-bound secret order came from Ireland: no one but an Irish Roman Catholic was eligible for membership.³ The authorities differ as to the exact time when the real outrages of the Molly Maguires began and, during the Civil War, there is some confusion between them and

¹ The annual report of Pa. Sec. of Internal Affairs, 1876-1877, pt. iii., Industrial Statistics.

² *Geological Survey*. In 1876, 20,351,000; in 1877, 22,910,000. In 1880, the population of these counties was 545,911.

³ "The applicant must be an Irishman or the son of an Irishman." Dewees, 97.

the "Buckshots" whose main idea was resistance to the draft; but a review of the specific character of their work leaves no doubt that, from 1865 on, the Mollies were in full swing. The time and place could hardly have been more favorable. During the war there had been an enormous demand for anthracite coal at high prices and this had caused a large influx of foreigners, Irish, English, Welsh, Scotch and Germans, so that the colliery towns were under their control; and the Irish from their number and aggressiveness were the most important single factor.¹ Many of the Mollies were miners and the mode of working the mines lent itself to their peculiar policy. Miners were paid by the cubic yard, by the mine car, or by the ton, and in the driving of entries by the lineal yard. In the assignment of places which was made by the mining boss there were "soft" jobs and hard. If a Molly applied for a soft job and was refused, his anger was aroused and not infrequently in due time the offending boss was murdered. If he got employment, there was constant chance for disagreement in measuring-up the work and in estimation of the quality of the coal mined, for it was the custom to dock the miners for bad coal with too much slate and dirt, and a serious disagreement was apt to be followed by vengeance. Little wonder was it that, as the source of the outrages was well understood, mining bosses refused to employ Irishmen, but this did not insure their safety as they might then be murdered for their refusal. A good Superintendent of

¹ FOREIGN POPULATION

	IRELAND	ENGLAND AND WALES	SCOTLAND	GERMAN EMPIRE	POLAND
1870	45,466	32,003	3091	20,320	273
1880	42,894	32,583	3010	20,412	1915

any colliery would, in his quality of superior officer, support an efficient mining boss and would thus fall under the ban himself. John T. Morse, Jr., who made a contemporaneous study of the Molly Maguires, wrote in his vivid account of their operations: "The superintendents and 'bosses' in the collieries could all rest assured that their days would not be long in the land. Everywhere and at all times they were attacked, beaten, and shot down, by day and by night; month after month and year after year, on the public highways and in their own homes, in solitary places and in the neighborhood of crowds these doomed men continued to fall in frightful succession beneath the hands of assassins."¹

The murders were not committed in the heat of sudden passion for some fancied wrong: they were the result of a deliberate system. The wronged individual laid his case before a proper body demanding the death, say, of a mining boss and urging his reasons. If they were satisfying, as they usually were, the murder was decreed but the deed was not ordered to be done by the aggrieved person or by any one in his and the victim's neighborhood. Two or more Mollies from a different part of the county or even from the adjoining county were selected to do the killing because, being unknown, they could the more easily escape detection. Refusal to carry out the dictate of the conclave was dangerous and seldom happened, although an arrangement of substitution, if properly supported, was permitted to be made. The meeting generally took place in an upper room of a hotel or saloon and, after the serious business, came the social reunion with deep libations of whiskey.

¹ *Amer. Law Review*, Jan. 1877, 233.

In attempting to give precise figures some writers have undoubtedly exaggerated the number of murders by this order from 1865 to 1875 but no one can go through the evidence without being convinced that a great many men were killed to satisfy the revengeful spirit of the Molly Maguires. Some of the victims were men so useful, conspicuous and so beloved in their communities that their assassination caused a profound and enduring impression. In some cases, so Dewees (who has written a very useful story ¹) asserts, robbery was added to murder; superintendents, who were carrying the money for the monthly pay of the miners and laborers, were waylaid as they drove along some lonely road in the desolate country. While the murders were numerous, still more numerous were the threats of murder and warnings to leave the country written on a sheet of paper with a rude picture of a coffin or a pistol and sometimes both. One notice read: "Mr. John Taylor — We will give you one week to go but if you are alive on next Saturday you will die." Another, to three bosses, charged with "cheating thy men" had a picture of three pistols and a coffin and on the coffin was written, "This is your home."² In other mining districts and in manufacturing localities during strikes and times of turbulence similar warnings have been common and have been laughed at by mining bosses, superintendents and proprietors; but, in the anthracite region between 1865 and 1876 the bravest of men could not forget how many of his fellows had been shot and suppress a feeling of uneasiness when he found such a

¹ The Molly Maguires, F. P. Dewees, of Pottsville, a member of the Schuylkill county bar, 1877.

² Dewees, 367 *et seq.*; see also 123.

missive on his doorstep or posted up on the door of his office at the mine. Many a superintendent and mining boss left his house in the morning with his hand on his revolver, wondering if he should ever see wife and children again.

The young men of the order were selected for the commission of murder; above them were older heads holding high office and, in a variety of ways, displaying executive ability. They were quick to see what a weapon to their hand was universal suffrage, and, with the aptitude for politics which the Irish have shown in our country, they developed their order into a political power to be reckoned with. Numbering in Schuylkill county only 500 or 600 out of 5000 Irishmen in a total population of 116,000,¹ the Molly Maguires controlled the common schools and the local government of the townships in the mining sections of the county. They elected at different times three county commissioners and came near electing one of their number, who had acquired twenty thousand dollars worth of property, associate Judge of the Court of Oyer and Terminer. In one borough a Molly was chief of police; another in Mahanoy township, Jack Kehoe, was High Constable.² In the elections were fraudulent voting, stuffing of the ballot-boxes and false returns; in the administration of the offices, fraud and robbery. In Mahanoy township \$60,000 were drawn for the schools and eleven-twelfths of it stolen. Exorbitant road taxes were a fruitful means by which township officials robbed

¹ Census of 1870, Gowen. The 5000 is an estimate of those of a voting age from census data.

² "In Carbon county two Mollies have at different times held the office of County commissioner and a Molly also succeeded in being elected to the legislature." Dewees, 32 n.

the taxpayers and put the money in their own pockets. In August 1875 an ex-county commissioner, a Molly, and two commissioners then in office, not actually belonging to the order but in sympathy with it, had been convicted of stealing the county funds and each had been sentenced by a full bench [September 6] to two years' imprisonment. At the fall election for governor in this year [1875] the Molly Maguires, who were naturally Democrats, foresaw Republican success and sold their vote in Schuylkill and Luzerne counties to the Republicans for a certain amount of money in hand and an implied agreement that these convicted commissioners and other criminals who were called by a leading Molly "our men" should be pardoned.¹ It is hardly to be supposed that the Republican politicians who made this bargain were aware of the thoroughly criminal nature of the Molly Maguires, for they had astutely covered themselves with a virtuous cloak, securing from the Legislature in 1871 a charter for the Ancient Order of Hibernians whose motto was "Friendship, Unity and Christian Charity." On October 10, 1875 in a letter to the Shenandoah *Herald* Jack Kehoe denied with indignation that the Molly Maguires were synonymous with the Ancient Order of Hibernians, which latter was "composed of men who are law abiding and seek the elevation of their members."² Kehoe was crafty enough

¹ Elections in Pennsylvania were much closer then than now [1909]. In 1875 Hartranft's majority for governor over Judge Pershing, Democrat, was only 12,000 in a vote of 596,000. Although the returns show normal Democratic majorities in Schuylkill and Luzerne counties, Dewees has no doubt that the Molly vote was sold and delivered; what Pershing lost in the Molly strongholds was counterbalanced by gains elsewhere. Dewees feels sure that Hartranft was ignorant of the transaction, 222 *et seq.* On March 16, 1876, the three commissioners were pardoned. Pa. Legislative docs., 1877, ii. 1252.

² Dewees, 380.

to see the advantage of throwing dust in the eyes of the public and, when the outside world was bargained with, the A. O. H. was put forward, but, as matter of fact, it was the old story of ravening wolves in sheep's clothing.

Despite the large number of murders by Molly Maguires from 1865 to 1875 there were few arrests, few trials and never a conviction for murder in the first degree. The defence usually relied on, an alibi, was made fairly easy to establish as the men who did the killing were unknown in the locality of it and as there were Mollies in abundance equal to any amount of false and hard swearing at the dictation of their order.

During the summer and autumn of 1874 the Molly Maguires were at the height of their power, yet, while there was nothing in sight menacing their dominion, operations against them had been commenced by Franklin B. Gowen. Shortly after coming of age, Gowen, in company with others, had worked a mine in Schuylkill county but, owing to the aftermath of the panic of 1857, his venture had not been successful. He turned to the study of law and was admitted to the Schuylkill county bar, was elected District Attorney and later, securing a large and lucrative practice, became attorney for the Philadelphia and Reading railroad, and in 1869, at the age of thirty-three, its president. He organized the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co. which secured an immense amount of coal land and became the largest producer of anthracite coal.¹ He knew Schuylkill county through and through and made up his mind that a regular and profitable conduct of mining operations would become impos-

¹ In 1876, 3,071,000 tons; 1877, 5,183,000 tons. Pa. report on industrial statistics, 1876-1877.

sible, should the terror of the Molly Maguires continue and grow. As the guardian of the great Reading property, he felt it his duty to break up the criminal organization and, in addition to his local knowledge and experience, he possessed peculiar qualities for the work. With restless ability and indomitable energy he combined, in a remarkable degree, both physical and moral courage. He was convinced that the Molly Maguires could be exposed only by the employment of secret detectives and, with this view, he applied to Allan Pinkerton of Chicago, "an intelligent and broad-minded Scotchman." "I will secure an agent or officer," Pinkerton said to him, "to ferret out the existence of this society. Whoever I get is to be paid so much a week, no matter if he finds out nothing. He is bound to me, never under any circumstances to take a reward for his services from anybody and, if he spends five years and obtains nothing in the way of information, he must have every month or every week exactly the same compensation as if every week he had traced a new murder and every month had discovered a new conspiracy. He is never to gain pecuniarily by the success of his undertaking; but as a man who goes into this organization as a detective takes his life in his own hands, I will send no man on this mission of yours, Mr. Gowen, unless it be agreed beforehand, and I can tell him so, that he never is to be known in connection with the enterprise."¹ Pinkerton chose James McParlan, a native of Ireland and a Roman Catholic, who coming to Chicago in 1867 had been a teamster, the driver of a meat wagon, a deck hand on a lake steamer, a wood-chopper in the wilds of Michigan, a private coachman in Chicago, a

¹ Gowen's argument, *The Commonwealth vs. Thomas Munley*, 16.

policeman and detective, then an employé in a wholesale liquor establishment, developing from this into the proprietor of a liquor store and a saloon. The store burned down in the great fire of 1871 and, as the saloon was no longer remunerative, he sold it out and, in April 1872, went into the employ of Allan Pinkerton. In October 1873, at the age of twenty-nine he reported to the Pinkerton agent in Philadelphia for orders, with the understanding that he was to receive twelve dollars a week as his salary and, in addition, his expenses. After some preliminary observation of his field, he took up his residence in the anthracite region, in the following December, first at Pottsville, then at Shenandoah. Under a disguise and the assumed name of James McKenna, McParlan was a "broth of a boy" who could sing a song, dance a jig, pass a rough joke, and stand treat, apparently taking his full share of whiskey which was the usual beverage. Still other qualities were needed; so he said he had killed his man in Buffalo and was a fugitive from justice. Supposedly a workman, he got a job but found this too confining and laborious and soon appreciated that it was unnecessary for his object. But he had to account for the money which he spent freely and, quickly learning that honest labor was no recommendation to the Molly Maguires, he concocted the story that he was in receipt of a pension from the United States government, fraudulently obtained, and that he was also a counterfeiter engaged in "shoving the queer." This latter proved a clever device as it explained both his ready command of money and the frequent journeys from place to place which were necessary in his work of detection, warning and prevention of crime. The tale, as McParlan told it on

the witness stand¹ [and as Dewees has related it], is better than any detective story for it is based on a diary of actual happenings in the shape of regular written reports to a superior officer in Philadelphia. McParlan gained the confidence of his brother Irishmen and Catholics and, on April 14, 1874, was initiated into the Ancient Order of Hibernians, in other words became a full-fledged Molly Maguire. Loud, brawling, boastful of crimes and in education superior to most of his fellows, he was soon chosen Secretary of his division² the duties and privileges of which office made him a local leader, gave him an insight into the secret workings of the order and imparted to him a knowledge of their past crimes and projected murders. While he was working with zeal and discretion, learning each week something more of their practices and plans of operation, other events were tending towards the end.

With a fatuity which organized labor has frequently shown, the Labor Union³ of Schuylkill and Carbon counties, utterly blind to the results of the panic of 1873 and to the continuance of a certain business depression, precipitated a strike in December 1874 by demanding higher wages, a demand so silly that it was abandoned in the following March. Then the operators became convinced that a reduction in the cost of mining coal was needed and in their turn asked the miners to accept lower wages, to which, so just was the demand, these workmen were willing to yield. Then, as often happens the Labor

¹ It will be explained later how McParlan came to testify despite the original bargain.

² In a County there were many divisions.

³ This Union was known under different names.

Union, in the endeavor to save something from the wreck, insisted that the composition be made with their officers, thus recognizing the Union. This Gowen and Parrish (the president of the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal Co.) who led the operators refused to do and the fight continued, resulting by the beginning of June 1875 in the complete defeat of the once powerful Labor Union. It is rare if ever that a defeat of miners occurs without the destruction of property by the turbulent spirits as a measure of revenge. In February a large shaft house near Pottsville was burned. During March, April and May lawlessness reigned. Desperate miners set fire to breakers and houses. Mobs assembled, drove willing men from their work, took possession of locomotives and trains, derailed them and rioted in the destruction of other property. Goldwin Smith visited the region at this time and "found something like an industrial reign of terror" due to "foreigners, probably restless spirits, many of whom had been actually engaged in the labor wars of Europe and had carried the instinct of industrial strife and violence with them to their new country."¹

An occurrence at the end of the strike furnishes the opportunity to introduce a coadjutor of McParlan, R. J. Linden, the assistant superintendent of the Pinkerton agency in Chicago, who was sent to the anthracite region and became Captain of the Coal and Iron Police, his calling of detective being known only to the few whose guiding hands were in the enterprise. During the month of May it became evident that many of the miners out-

¹ *Contemporary Review*, Sept. 1877, 531. Smith does not mention the year and I have assumed that his visit was in 1875 although it may have been made during the "long strike" of 1870-1871.

side of the Union were willing to go to work on the operators' terms and Gowen told these so-called "blacklegs" that, if they would go into the mines, he would give them adequate protection. As a result of this assurance a number of mines in the neighborhood of Shenandoah and Mahanoy City began working [June 1 and 2, 1875], which so exasperated the Union miners that during the night of June 2 a large mob collected bent on mischief. At six o'clock in the morning of the 3d five hundred rioters assembled at the West Shenandoah colliery determined to drive out the blacklegs. A mob of coal miners is perhaps no worse in its composition than a mob of iron workmen or stevedores but its appearance is more appalling. The miners have lived in coal and breathed its atmosphere; the grime of it is in their faces and hands; and this together with their life away from the sunlight and air give them most diabolical countenances. Their leisure hours being passed mainly in whiskey-drinking, there is nothing in their recreation to make them less brutal. It was five hundred such men, rendered desperate by the loss of their work, that Captain Linden and his twenty-four Coal and Iron Police had to face; and such a job requires the courage and steadiness of veterans. Armed with Winchester rifles, they were equal to the emergency; they stood firm; they did not fire a shot. The five hundred rioters were vociferous and threatening but finally slunk away. Later an encounter with the sheriff and his posse caused him to call upon the Governor for troops. A regiment sent to Mahanoy valley preserved the peace and work at the mines was resumed.

It would not be just to charge all the depredations during the break-up of the strike to the Molly Maguires.

English, Welsh and Scotch miners, who would shrink from systematic and cold-blooded murder, will, in the intensity of conflict, burn and destroy the property of the mine-owner with whom they are at war. The Molly had a hand however in some of the outrages and he sympathized with them all for, true to his Irish Roman Catholic blood, he hated the capitalist and had a profound contempt for the law.¹

The unrest in the minds of the defeated miners had doubtless something to do with the recrudescence of crime in 1875, as the Molly Maguires were exasperated at the outcome of the strike; and while their attacks were on individuals for personal reasons each one was a blow at the large property interest of the anthracite region as well as at society itself.

As the result of a certain feud, a Molly, in accordance with the rule of the organization, brought his case before a convention held in a second-story room of a hotel in Mahanoy City. He maintained that he had been shot at and that it was the intention of two brothers named Major and of one "Bully Bill," otherwise William M. Thomas, a Welshman, to kill him. He therefore asked his society to put these three men out of the way. The meeting to consider this request was opened with prayer and presided over by Jack Kehoe, the county delegate of

¹ The English policy toward Ireland served as "an opportunity for the Protestant to possess himself of the land and wealth he coveted. . . . Its effect upon the Irish was to make them slaves with the vices of slaves. They grew in jealousy, in malice and in feline methods of defence, of treachery and trickery. The Irish contempt for law is an unfortunate heritage of the many years when law was tyranny, and prejudice against themselves was not only looked upon as a virtue but paid for by the ecclesiastical and governing authorities as a professional service." *England and the English*, Price Collier, 284.

Schuykill, the highest officer in the county organization. There were also present the County Delegate of Northumberland, three body-masters (the body-master was the chief officer of the division), three other officers and James McParlan [McKenna] our detective, as secretary of the Shenandoah division. The matter was discussed and after some consideration a motion was made that Thomas and the Major brothers be killed; it was carried. The mode of the killing caused some discussion but there seemed to be no lack of men ready and willing to do the job. In the end certain Mollies were agreed upon and selected for the murders, McParlan being one of those assigned for the despatch of Thomas. There being no further business before the meeting, it adjourned in due form. Having doubtless taken many drinks of whiskey, the Mollies dined at the tavern, when, so the account reads, other matters were sociably discussed.¹

Owing to changes of mind of different Mollies for various reasons, lack of fit opportunity to shoot the victim, and the influence of McParlan for procrastination, no assault was made on Thomas until June 28. McParlan had constantly in mind the prevention of murder and at the same time, as he never expected to testify as a witness, he aimed so to conduct things that the Mollies should be caught in some overt act. From his frequent reports to the Pinkerton office in Philadelphia and his constant communication with Linden, he hoped that arrests might be made "in the very commission and act of crime,"² although it was within the chances that he might himself be captured with the other Molly Maguires. It was an extremely difficult game to play and it is no

¹ Dewees, 133. This meeting was on June 1, 1875. ² Morse, 242.

wonder that it did not always succeed. At the time of the attempt to kill Thomas, he was ill and unable to give Linden the proper warning.

On the morning of June 28, four Mollies from Shenandoah of the ages of nineteen to twenty-three started out to kill Thomas, expecting to shoot him as he walked towards the drift mouth of Shoemaker's colliery, a mile from Mahanoy City. Thomas was in the stable talking to the stable-boss. The hour of half past six arrived and the Mollies, becoming impatient that he did not come out, started towards the stable, and, when they reached the door, one fired at Thomas, hitting him in the breast. Thomas jumped towards the man, grasped the revolver, when a second bullet took effect; then another Molly shot him twice in the neck one wound being within a quarter of an inch of the jugular vein; the other two fired but apparently did not hit the victim; Thomas, covered with blood, fell and crawled under the horses that had not been hit; one horse was killed and another wounded. Thinking that Thomas was dead ¹ the assassins fled to Shenandoah and "wet with sweat" found McParlan and reported what they had done.

Jimmy Kerrigan, the body-master of the Tamaqua division, Schuylkill County, and his chum, Thomas Duffy, hard drinkers, reckless and quarrelsome in their cups, had been arrested and imprisoned more than once by the police; they had conceived therefore a violent hatred against Policeman Yost, who, with an associate, constituted the night watch of Tamaqua, and who on one occasion had overcome the resistance of Duffy by beating

¹ The wounds were not fatal and Thomas recovered. The importance of the incident comes from the subsequent arrests and convictions.

him on the head with his club. Yost was a man of good character, kindly nature and popular in the community but the Tamaqua division decided that he must die.

At the same time the Mollies of Storm Hill, Carbon county, had determined upon the murder of John P. Jones, a mining boss in the employ of the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal Company, because it was supposed that he had blacklisted William Mulhall and Hugh McGehan. An exchange of "Mollie courtesies" was at once suggested and decided upon. Carbon county Mollies were to be sent over for the murder of Yost and in return Schuylkill Mollies would undertake to put Jones out of the way. Yost was to be assassinated first and the time fixed upon was the early morning of July 6 at the hour when he should extinguish the last gaslight in the town. Mulhall, who was a married man with a large family, was relieved from the work and James Boyle, being conveniently at hand, was substituted in his place.

McGehan and Boyle, the Carbon county representatives, came to Tamaqua and were guided by Kerrigan and Duffy. About midnight Duffy took the two to the cemetery and returned to the Union House, an inn kept by a prominent Molly, so that he might prove an alibi when, as was highly probable, suspicion fell upon him. Somewhat later Kerrigan took a bottle of whiskey to the cemetery but the drink was for himself and Boyle, as McGehan, who was a tall young man [about twenty-two] of powerful frame with brawny arms, never touched a drop of liquor. Kerrigan led the two to the street lamp and placed them under the shade trees near by. After a while Yost and his associate watchman appeared and went into Yost's house to get something to eat. Coming out at a little

after two o'clock Yost went at once to the lamp-post, placed his ladder against it, began to climb the ladder, heard footsteps behind him, and turned round to see who was coming from under the trees. As he turned, McGehan reached up and shot him in the right side. Yost fell off the ladder, exclaiming "Oh my God! I am shot, my wife!"¹ His wife leaning out of the window saw him climbing the ladder, saw the flash of the pistol, heard that and a second report,² the scream of her husband, the sound of retreating footsteps, and, rushing downstairs and out, found him mortally wounded. "Give me a kiss," he said; "I am shot and have to die." Later to his brother-in-law he said, "This is the last of me; I must die; I have been so long in the army and escaped, and now I must be shot innocently."³ He died that day but not before stating that he had seen his murderers plainly, they were both Irishmen but neither was Kerrigan nor Duffy who were the only enemies he had in the world.

Kerrigan piloted McGehan and Boyle away to a point whence they could easily return to their own county. McGehan boasted to Kerrigan of the deed. I dislike, he said, to draw Irish blood but I want no better sport than to shoot such men as Yost. When he was shot he "hollered" like a panther.⁴ The murderers reached their homes without apprehension. Not until seven months afterwards were they arrested.

McGehan became a hero. All the Mollies admired his "clean job," for which it was generally recognized a

¹ Dewees, 161.

² Boyle fired but missed his mark.

³ Albright's argument, 13.

⁴ Ibid., 33. I have changed the third person to the first. Yost was a Pennsylvania German sometimes spoken of as Pennsylvania Dutch.

suitable reward should be given. A leading Molly of Carbon county, Campbell, bestirred himself in his behalf and started him in a saloon near Storm Hill.

In a little town in Schuylkill county on Saturday evening, August 14 a Molly had an altercation with Esquire Gwither, whom he abused for issuing a warrant against him. The Esquire ordered him out of his office and on his refusal to go put him out by force. The Molly ran home, obtained his shot-gun and, encountering the Esquire in the street, shot him dead, then fled from the county. The Esquire was highly esteemed and his murder caused general indignation.

This murder was committed on the spur of the moment but later on the same night, at a picnic near Shendoah, Gomer James, a young Welshman, a watchman at a coal drift, was shot boldly and openly by a Molly Maguire, and died within a few minutes. A number of months previously his death had been determined upon by the society in the usual manner.

Thomas Sanger, an Englishman thirty-three years old, of good character and amiable disposition, a mining boss at Ravens Run colliery, had somehow incurred the ill will of some of the Molly Maguires and he was doomed to die. On the morning of September 1, a little before seven o'clock, as he walked towards the mine to set the men to work, he was attacked by five Mollies, shot and killed, as was also William Uren, a young man who was with him and interfered in his defence. Although a hundred men and boys witnessed the assault, they were so terrified by the promiscuous firing that they made no attempt to arrest the Mollies, who escaped to the mountains. McParlan was unable to prevent this murder but soon after-

wards learned from the perpetrators of it the whole particulars.

The sensation in Schuylkill and Carbon counties was profound. The victims had been Welsh, Pennsylvania-German or English and the feeling of their blood-brothers towards the Irish Catholics was growing into a keen desire for vengeance. John T. Morse Jr. has graphically described the sentiment outside of Pennsylvania. "In 1875 these anthracite districts had become one vast Alsatia," he wrote. "From their dark and mysterious recesses there came forth to the outside world an appalling series of tales of murder, of arson and of every description of violent crime. It seemed that no respectable man could be safe there, for it was from the respectable classes that the victims were by preference selected; nor could any one tell from day to day whether he might not be marked for sure and sudden destruction."¹

But the day of reckoning was at hand although the Mollies, arrogant in their success, drunk with deeds of violence and thirsting for blood, little recked that the period of their dominion was drawing to an end.

It will be remembered that in return for the murder of Yost, the Schuylkill county Mollies had promised to kill John P. Jones, a Welshman, a mining boss at Storm Hill, Carbon county. Through McParlan, he had been put on his guard and, for a number of weeks, had slept at the house of his superintendent under guard of Coal and Iron policemen. The changes of design and shifting of plans were so frequent that the detective was unable to trace them all and he hoped that this project had been

¹ *Amer. Law Review.*

abandoned when the community received another shock in the following manner.

Jimmy Kerrigan, who knew the by-paths in this difficult mountainous country, led Edward Kelly, whose selection had been by lot, and Michael J. Doyle (who had volunteered to take the place of a married man with a family) into Carbon county and they stopped all night with Campbell, in whose saloon they were well entertained. Jones, passing the first night for a long while in his own house, left it, after taking breakfast and chatting with his family, at a little after seven on the morning of September 3, to go to the mining superintendent's office near the railroad station. As the train from Tamaqua was nearly due, a hundred men, miners and railroad employés were about the place and, as Jones approached them, two strange men suddenly stepped forward and fired a number of balls into his body, killing him almost instantly; at once they fled to the mountains. Wild excitement prevailed at the station but the mining superintendent kept his head and organized a party for pursuit. Jimmy Kerrigan led his two men by unfrequented roads and by-paths and, eluding all pursuers, got them safely by Tamaqua, five miles from the scene of murder. Had he kept on, instead of stopping to show his hospitality, he could have taken them to Tuscarora, where there was a nest of Molly Maguires. Some of these could easily have conducted the assassins to Pottsville, where, merged in the crowd, detection would have been impossible. But when they had left Tamaqua behind and were near his own house Kerrigan left them in the bush and went home to get them whiskey and something to eat.

Meanwhile Beard, a young law student, who had seen the dead body of Jones immediately after the murder and was one of the first to bring the news of it to Tamaqua, happened to hear that Jimmy Kerrigan with two strange men had been seen west of the town. Going to a hill whence with a spy-glass a pretty good view of the surrounding country could be obtained he saw Kerrigan wave a handkerchief, whereupon two other men appeared and the three went to a spring on the side of the mountain. Hurrying back to town, Beard together with an elder brother mustered a force of twenty, went out to the bush, captured Kerrigan and his associates and bringing them to town had them confined in the Tamaqua lockup. They were surrendered to the Deputy-sheriff of Carbon county on his properly supported demand.

The pent-up feeling of the community now broke out; the rage of the Welsh, English and Pennsylvania Germans against the Molly Maguires was violent and it was only by the best of management that the authorities prevented an attempted lynching at Tamaqua and again later when the prisoners passed Storm Hill in the train. Finally they were safely lodged in the Mauch Chunk jail.

"The whole district," wrote Morse, "appeared to be upon the verge of a riotous outbreak."¹ Murders by Molly Maguires stopped but threats and "coffin-notices" were served by them upon men who were active in the prosecution of the prisoners; these were disregarded and counter-notices sent to the leading Mollies at which they were surprised and indignant. Amongst a number of manifestations of the intense strife that prevailed the

¹ *Amer. Law Review*, 234.

most notable was the work of a self-constituted vigilance committee who, shortly after midnight of December 10, attacked the house of a leading Molly, near Mahanoy City, shot dead one of the murderers of Sanger and Uren, got a rope around the neck of another (who in some manner escaped) and, through an unhappy mistake killed the sister-in-law of a third. The trial of the murderers of Jones which had been fixed for October 19 was postponed on sufficient ground; and, as it was well understood that strong evidence for an alibi was being manufactured and as the Molly Maguires were at the height of their political power, fears were entertained by many that the assassins would escape the punishment which was justly their due. But these people had no conception of the impending doom of the terrible order owing to the irrefragable evidence gathered by McParlan, the energy and discretion of Gowen and Parrish and the high character of the bench and bar of Carbon and Schuylkill counties.

On January 18, 1876 the trial of the three assassins of Jones began at Mauch Chunk before Judge Dreher. Assisting the District Attorney in the prosecution were Charles Albright and F. W. Hughes, one a Democrat, the other a Republican, who had clasped hands in the determination to rout out the Molly Maguires by process of law. Five attorneys appeared for the defence, of whom two at least were able lawyers and a third was the Republican member of Congress for Schuylkill county. The prisoners demanded separate trials and the Commonwealth elected to begin with Michael J. Doyle. The testimony presented on its part was complete. The defence was a carefully manufactured alibi but as it was evident that

the Commonwealth stood ready to prosecute for perjury as well as for murder, the counsel for Doyle, either too timid or too honorable to put upon the stand men who they knew would swear falsely, did not call their witnesses and let the case go to the jury on the evidence of the Commonwealth. Three arguments were made by the prosecution; two "stirring appeals to the jury"¹ on behalf of the prisoner. On February 1 the jury brought in a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, the first conviction in the anthracite region of a Molly Maguire for a capital crime. Later the judge refused a motion for a new trial and sentenced Doyle to be hanged.

Kerrigan decided to turn State's evidence and, before the conviction of Doyle told Albright and Hughes (who were accompanied by a stenographer) the story of the murders of Jones and Yost and disclosed the inside workings of the society of Molly Maguires. On February 4 Campbell was arrested as accessory before the fact to the murder of Jones and on the same day the two principals and three accessories to the murder of Yost were committed to the Pottsville jail. On February 10 two men² were arrested for the murder of Sanger and Uren at Ravens Run.

The Molly Maguires were much alarmed. They knew that the arrests of Campbell and of the murderers of Yost were due to the disclosures of Kerrigan and they were bitterly indignant at his treachery, but they did not believe that the arrest of Sanger's assassin could be laid to his charge, as Kerrigan was in a different division

¹ Dewees, 246.

² It was afterwards discovered that one of these was not an active participant in the crime, see Dewees, 307.

and had no intimate connection with the murder. It was rumored that a detective was in their midst and suspicion fell upon McParlan. Having heard the report more than once Jack Kehoe, one of the most adroit men in the society, became convinced of its truth and sent the word around that McParlan [McKenna] was a detective and that members must beware of him. Hearing this, McParlan went to Kehoe and demanded, "Why do you spread these reports about me?" "I heard it from a conductor on the Reading railroad," was the answer. "He called me into the baggage car and said that I might be certain that you were a detective. I told him it was not the first time I had heard the charge made against you." McParlan denounced the charge as a slander and demanded a convention of the order to investigate the matter. "I will let the society try me," he said; "and if I find out the man who is lying about me, I will make him suffer. It is a terrible thing to charge a man like me with being a detective." They agreed that a county convention should be called and, as Kehoe was too nervous to write the notices, he asked McParlan to write them in his name, who therefore summoned in proper form all the body-masters of the county to convene at Shenandoah for his own trial [about March 1].

Meanwhile the report concerning McParlan gained force, helped on by the assertion of the leading attorney for the defence of Doyle that, in some unaccountable way, the attorneys for the Commonwealth got hold of the minute details of their line of defence.¹ On the day before the one fixed for the convention, McParlan, while at

¹ McParlan was aware of the various steps and his information was communicated to the attorneys for the Commonwealth.

Pottsville, was charged with being a detective by another Molly, who further asserted that the convention at Shenandoah was a game of his to get all the body-masters and officers together and have them arrested by Captain Linden and his Coal and Iron Police. To allay this suspicion McParlan went at once to see Linden and asked him not to have the police there at all. "I believe," he said, "I can fight them right through and make them believe I am no detective." Linden reluctantly consented but told McParlan that he was running a very great risk.

Linden was right. Earlier in the day, McParlan had seen Kehoe and the two arranged to travel together to Shenandoah that evening, that they might be there for the convention early on the morrow. But Kehoe stole away thither on an earlier train, got together McAndrew, the body-master of the Shenandoah division, and a number of the Mollies, telling them that, beyond doubt, McParlan was a detective and that he must be killed. "For God's sake have him killed to-night," he added, "or he will hang half the people in Schuylkill county." The men consented, McAndrew with reluctance as he was fond of McParlan. Kehoe went home but a dozen men assembled a little below the station, armed with axes, tomahawks and sledges and waited for the coming of McParlan, intending to inveigle him down there on the track and kill him, avoiding the use of fire-arms in order not to attract the policemen around the station.

Meanwhile McParlan was travelling towards Shenandoah on the evening train, his suspicions aroused from Kehoe's failure to join him as agreed, and they grew, when he was not met as usual at the station by five or six comrades to discuss the news and have a drink. He

went into the saloon of a member whom he found so nervous and excited that he could hardly open the bottle of porter called for. Walking on he met another member, ordinarily friendly, who hardly spoke to him, then another, Sweeney, who was less cold but of whom he was so suspicious that as they went on together he invented some excuse to make him walk ahead lest he should receive a blow from behind. He kept his hand on his revolver ready to meet an attack. Arriving at McAndrew's he noticed two Mollies on guard and that his friend was nervous and uneasy. Sweeney went out, came back again and threw a little piece of snow at McAndrew as a signal for action to which the latter replied, "My feet are sore; I guess I will take off my boots" which was as much as to say I have abandoned the project. With truth did McAndrew tell McParlan next day, "I saved your life last night." McParlan on the alert knew something was up and after a question about the meeting said good night and started for his boarding house but not by his usual route, taking instead a by-way through a swamp. He slept little for he was constantly on his guard against an attempt at assassination.

Next morning there was no sign of a convention and McParlan made up his mind to go to Girardville and demand of Kehoe the reason. Hiring a horse and cutter, he took McAndrew with him; and two other Mollies in a similar conveyance started after them. What does this mean? asked McParlan. "Look here," was the reply, "you had better look out, for that man who is riding in that sleigh behind you calculates to take your life. Have you got your pistols?" "Yes," said McParlan. "So have I," returned McAndrew, "and I will lose my life

for you. I do not know whether you are a detective or not but I do not know anything against you. I always knew you were doing right and I will stand by you. Why don't they try you fair?" Then McAndrew told of the plot of the previous day adding, "You will find out that you are in a queer company this minute." "I do not give a cent," replied McParlan; "I am going down to Kehoe's." To Kehoe's they went. Kehoe was surprised to see McParlan still alive in company with the men who had agreed to kill him. Yet they fell to discussing the burning question when Kehoe intimated to him that he had learned his true character from Father O'Connor. On McParlan's determining to go to see the priest at Mahanoy Plane, a number of Mollies went along. The one to whom the killing of the detective was assigned got too drunk to make the attempt; but on their return to Shenandoah McAndrew would not permit McParlan to go to his boarding house for fear of assassination but insisted that he should sleep in his [McAndrew's] quarters.

Having failed to find Father O'Connor when he left Kehoe's, McParlan made a second unsuccessful attempt on the next day, but not caring to pass another night at Shenandoah he went on to Pottsville. "There," he said to Captain Linden, "I have come to the conclusion that they have had a peep at my hand and that the cards are all played." Shadowed by Linden, he went, on the following day, to Mahanoy Plane, had a long talk with Father O'Connor, learning that not only O'Connor, but two other Catholic priests as well, believed that he was a Pinkerton detective in the employ of the Reading company. Satisfied that his mission was generally known he returned to Pottsville that evening and next morning [March 5 or 6]

left for Philadelphia, ending his experience of nearly two years as a Molly Maguire.¹

A word here should be said concerning the position of the Roman Catholic clergy. Father O'Connor's aversion to McParlan was not due to any love for the Molly Maguires. On the contrary he had denounced them from the pulpit and read only a short time previous, the pastoral letter of Archbishop Wood excommunicating all lawless societies and especially the Molly Maguires. But Father O'Connor looked upon McParlan as a stool-pigeon egging his associates on to crime in order to enhance his own glory and profit as a detective.²

Wood was the Archbishop of Philadelphia and had almost from the first been cognizant of and sympathetic with the means which Gowen employed to bring the Molly Maguires to justice.³

The trial of Edward Kelly for the murder of Jones began at Mauch Chunk on March 27. The counsel for the Commonwealth was the same as in the Doyle case. The lawyers for the prisoner made "eloquent appeals" invoking sympathy for him "on account of his youth" and for his "poor desolate widowed mother."⁴ On April 6, the jury brought in a verdict of murder in the first degree, the second conviction of the kind in the history of the anthracite region against a Molly Maguire. He was sentenced to be hanged. Death warrants were issued by the Governor fixing the day of execution for

¹ McParlan's testimony in the case of *The Commonwealth vs. John Kehoe et al.*; Dewees.

² *Ibid.*

³ Gowen's argument in the case of *The Commonwealth vs. Thomas Munley*.

⁴ Dewees, 280.

Doyle on May 3 and for Kelly on May 4 but before the sentences were executed the cases were taken on writs of error to the Supreme Court of the State.

Schuylkill county was the scene of the next prosecution of the Molly Maguires. On May 4 at Pottsville before a full bench of five judges in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, Judge Pershing presiding, commenced the trial of Hugh McGehan and James Boyle who had shot Policeman Yost, and of three companions,¹ accessories before the fact, all having elected to be tried together. Albright, Hughes and Gowen assisted the District attorney and able lawyers appeared for the prisoners.

The Molly Maguires were stunned by the convictions in Carbon county yet they could not believe that their dominion of eleven years was being utterly destroyed. The eager crowd who assembled in the Court House at Pottsville had not abandoned hope when news came that Jack Kehoe, the county delegate of Schuylkill county, and seven other Mollies had been arrested. Their simulated confidence gave way to panic, then succeeded a feeling of desperation, boding danger.

The Commonwealth put upon the stand their chief witness, James McParlan. The disclosure of his mission rendered secrecy unnecessary longer; he was willing to testify, and, after Gowen, Hughes and the District attorney had heard his personal relation, they were glad to have the same story told to the jury. The Molly Maguires knew Jim McKenna, a man with bushy red hair and rough dress, a brawler and a roysterer; "the biggest Molly of us all." They saw before them in the witness-box James

¹ James Carroll, James Roarity, Thomas Duffy.

McParlan, a man slightly built but muscular, of fair complexion, closely cut dark chestnut hair, above a broad full forehead and gray eyes. Dressed plainly in black, wearing spectacles, with an intelligent and grave countenance and gentlemanly bearing, he resembled a college professor rather than a rowdy frequenting bar-rooms and saloons. McParlan told his wonderful story slowly, without an attempt at theatrical display and he was listened to with breathless interest by judges, attorneys, prisoners and officers of the law. He remained upon the witness-stand for four days and, instead of being shaken by the searching cross-examination to which he was subjected, he was able to add evidence which told against the prisoners and which had been objected to on his examination-in-chief. Accurate and truthful, he excelled as witness as he had as detective and, when he finished his testimony, the case of the Commonwealth was won.

Kerrigan was put upon the witness-stand and told the truth. Two weeks after the trial had commenced when the defence had nearly closed their testimony, one of the jurors was taken ill and died five days later. This rendered a new trial necessary.

In the meantime, in Carbon county, Campbell was convicted of the murder of Jones as accessory before the fact, the trial lasting from June 20 to July 1; and in Schuylkill county on June 27 Thomas Munley, brought to trial for the murder of Sanger, was on July 12 found guilty of murder in the first degree, the first verdict of that kind in Schuylkill county against a Molly Maguire. McParlan testified in both trials and Kerrigan in that of Campbell.

Before the conclusion of the trial of Munley, a jury

was impanelled in the Yost case and on July 13 the second trial began, being the Commonwealth against four of the accused, Duffy having demanded a separate trial. McParlan told his damning tale for the fourth time and demonstrated that he was in every respect an unimpeachable witness. The arguments of Albright and Hughes in their trial have been printed and give one a good idea of the ability in which the prosecution was conducted and the dignity that obtained generally during the proceedings. At eleven o'clock on the night of July 22 the jury brought in a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree against all four of the defendants.

Duffy's trial and conviction took sixteen days [September 6-21]. In due time sentences of death were pronounced against the murderers of Sanger and Yost. From January 18 to September 20 in this Centennial year of American independence (which was being celebrated with great *éclat* in the chief city of the Commonwealth, only a few hours' travel from Mauch Chunk and Pottsville) the Molly Maguires had learned much law. The ignorant were amazed that more than one Molly should be condemned for the murder of one mining boss or one policeman — that three should hang for the killing of Jones and five for the assassination of Yost. The leaders of the organization had thought that in their meeting-rooms and saloons they could concoct the crime of murder, assigning the commission of it to the younger members while they themselves incurred no guilt. They were astounded therefore that Campbell was convicted for planning the assassination of Jones, and Carroll, Roarity and Duffy for helping on that of Yost, when no

one of the four fired a shot or assisted in the actual deed.¹

More surprises were in store as the inexorable prosecutors for the Commonwealth, armed with the weapons which the law put into their hands, pursued their undeviating course. In the Court of Quarter Sessions, Schuylkill county, Jack Kehoe and a number of other Molly Maguires were convicted for aggravated assault and battery, with intent to kill William M. Thomas, and, in a trial immediately thereafter, for conspiracy to murder the Majors.² A number of the Mollies turned State's evidence. Other convictions followed, among them those of two men and two women for perjury; these had sworn falsely to an alibi in the Yost and Sanger cases. The Molly Maguire organization was shattered. Having for the defence of their members charged with murder some of the best lawyers in the region, their money was exhausted. In a number of instances during the September term, counsel was assigned by the Schuylkill county Court. On May 6 when McParlan went on the witness-stand, he was guarded by a strong body of police; in September he could walk the streets of Pottsville unguarded. Next to McParlan³ the anger of the Molly Maguires was most bitterly aroused against Gowen and

¹ In his argument in the Yost case, 18, Albright said: "The Court will tell you that a conspiracy to commit a crime may be entered into by persons who are not present at the commission of the crime, although they may be as guilty as if actually present. Men may agree that a certain person shall be killed . . . and they may agree upon the details: That A and B shall murder a man and that C and D shall remain elsewhere to aid, assist and abet them, and in the eyes of the civil and moral law C and D, who do not actually commit the crime, are as guilty as A and B who do."

² See the story of the County Convention at Mahanoy City, *ante*.

³ Excepting of course Kerrigan and others who turned State's evidence.

he, in his argument in the Munley trial, defied them to assassinate him.

On October 16 the majesty of the law had a triumph in the court-room of Schuylkill county. Nineteen convicted Molly Maguires, handcuffed and fastened together by a chain, were brought in for sentence. Jack Kehoe, the able and cruel county delegate, who has played a prominent part in this story, got fourteen years of imprisonment at hard labor. Three other Mollies received the same. The sentences of the others were for shorter terms, from seven years to one. Four were sent to the penitentiary for perjury.¹

Carbon county followed with an impressive case. "Yellow Jack" Donahue after a trial of five days [October 19-24] was convicted of the murder of Morgan Powell, a mining boss, whom he had killed in December 1871. So low were the fortunes of the organization that Donahue, an old member and body-master of the Tuscarora division, could hire no counsel and was defended by four lawyers appointed by the Court.²

The four murder trials in Carbon county took respectively fourteen, ten, eleven and five days; the three in Schuylkill county respectively fifteen, eleven and fourteen

¹ The sentences of five were postponed, three at least of whom had turned State's evidence.

² My authorities are The Molly Maguires, Dewees; arguments of Albright and Hughes in Yost case; argument of Gowen in Sanger case; report of the case of The Commonwealth vs. J. Kehoe *et al.*, with the testimony and arguments of Counsel in full, stenographically reported; The Molly Maguires trials, John T. Morse Jr., *Amer. Law Review*, Jan. 1877; *New York Tribune*, Aug. 14, Oct. 17, 1876; Cleveland Moffett in *McClure's Magazine*, Dec. 1894; *Macmillan's Magazine*, Dec. 1896.

I have used freely my paper on the Molly Maguires read at the first public meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Letters in Washington, Dec. 14, 1909 and reprinted in the *American Historical Review* for April 1910.

— an admirable result worthy of imitation as we consider the interminable length to which our trials for capital crime now drag along, and worthy of being compared (I think) to the best English practice. And had there been no appeal, execution would have followed conviction about as swiftly as in England. But these men had a chance for life which they would not then have had in the older country: their cases were taken up to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on writs of error. Two appeals were heard and these seem to have served as test cases for the others. In that of the four murderers of Yost who were tried and convicted together, a full bench of the Supreme Court declared their opinion through the medium of the Chief Justice: "The sentence of the Court of Oyer and Terminer is affirmed and the record is ordered to be remitted for execution of the sentence according to law." On the same day, May 7, 1877, the judgment of the Court in the case of Campbell *vs.* Commonwealth [Carbon county] was likewise affirmed, six justices sitting, and an associate reading the opinion.¹

"They dare not hang so many," said Edward Kelly after his conviction for murder; "if they let any one go free, then they must let all free."² "I don't think the old man at Harrisburg will go back on us," were the words of Jack Kehoe to the warden of the Schuylkill county jail. "The old man" was the Governor: he issued neither pardons nor commutations: on the contrary he issued death warrants fixing the day of execution for the ten murderers.

On June 21, 1877 at Mauch Chunk four Molly Maguires

¹ Penn. State reports, Norris, iii. 126, 200.

² Dewees, 351.

were hanged, three for the murder of Jones, one for the murder of Powell in 1871. At Pottsville six were hanged, five for the murder of Yost and one for the murder of Sanger.¹ Never did the Society reappear in the anthracite region. The weapon of coolly devised and violent assassination was never afterwards employed on the part of Labor. The region did not again suffer from the lawlessness which had prevailed there from 1865 to 1875.² That this result was accomplished, not by vigilance committees and lynchings but by the regular, patient and considerate process of law was due to Gowen, McParlan, Parrish, the bench of Carbon, Schuylkill, Columbia and Northumberland counties and the lawyers who acted for the Commonwealth. To these must be added the Roman Catholic church which, though in a difficult situation (for the Molly Maguires were Catholics and there were many Catholic sympathizers with them outside of the organization), was, as has always been the case in the United States (I believe), on the side of law and order.

The racial characteristics shown in this story are worth a passing note. All the Molly Maguires were Irish.³ McParlan who exposed them and served his employer with stanch fidelity was Irish and Gowen, to whom the greatest credit is due for the destruction of the society, was the son of an Irishman.

A peculiar feature stands out, differentiating the Molly Maguires from any criminal organization (so far as I know) of any other peoples of the Indo-European family. We read of strong drink and carousing, of robbery and murder but nowhere, during the orgies of whis-

¹ *New York Tribune*, June 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, July 7, 1877.

² Written in 1909.

³ But not all were born in Ireland.

key, of dissolute women. We read of wives and families, of marriage and the giving in marriage, of childbirth but nowhere of the appearance of the harlot. The Irishman, steeped in crime, remained true to the sexual purity of his race.

The characteristic failings of the Celts, as the ancient Romans knew them, were intensified in their Irish descendants by the seven centuries of misgovernment of Ireland by England. Subject to tyranny at home the Irishman, when he came to America, too often translated liberty into license and, so ingrained was his habit of looking upon government as an enemy, that, when he became the ruler of cities and stole the public funds, he was, from his point of view, only despoiling the old adversary. With his traditional hostility to government, it was easy for him to become a Molly Maguire, while the English, Scotch and Welsh immigrant shrank from such a society with horror.

CHAPTER III

IN the reform of the civil service Hayes proceeded from words to action. He reappointed as postmaster of New York City Thomas L. James, who had conducted his office on a thorough business basis and gave him sympathetic support. The New York Custom-house had long been a political machine in which the interests of politicians had been more considered than those of the public it was supposed to serve. The President began an investigation of it through an impartial commission and he and Sherman came to the conclusion that the renovation desired could not be effected so long as the present collector, Chester A. Arthur, and the naval officer, A. B. Cornell remained in office. Courteous intimations were sent to them that their resignations were desired on the ground that new officers could better carry out the reform which the President had at heart. Arthur and Cornell, under the influence of Senator Conkling, refused to resign and a plain issue was made between the President and the New York senator. At the special session of Congress in October 1877, he sent to the Senate nominations of new men for these places but the power of Conkling, working through the "courtesy of the Senate" was sufficient to procure their rejection.

In December at the regular session, the President renewed the controversy. "I am now in a contest on the

question of the right of senators to dictate or control nominations," he wrote in his diary on December 9. "Mr. Conkling insists that no officer shall be appointed in New York without his consent, obtained previously to the nomination. This is the first and the most important step in the effort to reform the civil service."¹ Three days later he wrote in a private letter, "It looks as if the courtesies, *esprit de corps*, etc., etc., of the Senate would keep them [*i.e.* the Senators] in Conkling's hands."² The President foresaw correctly the result. The new nominations failed of confirmation.

In March 1878 Hayes reviewed in his diary the first year of his administration: "On the whole, the year's work has produced results: Peace, safety, order in the South to an extent not known for half a century. . . . Civil service reforms: (a) No nepotism in executive appointments. (b) No machine work by federal officeholders, in caucuses or elections. (c) Congressional dictation resisted, — for the most part successfully. (d) Removals except for cause not made; fewer removals than under any administration in its first year since John Q. Adams's. (e) Officers secure in their terms, if conduct, official and private, is good. . . . The pervading sense of responsibility for faithful and honest official conduct has given purity and efficiency to the service. Fewer scandals than before in many years. A list of foreign appointments and officials retained, that will compare well with *any* previous record in our history. Look at our European representatives. [A list is given.] . . . The most important appointments are the judicial.

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 87.

² Ibid., 87 n.

They are for life and the judiciary of the country concerns all interests public and private. My appointments will bear examination.”¹ [The appointments are named.] In a survey thirty-eight years afterwards² we may confirm these words of Hayes written confidentially during 1878 in his diary.

The President undoubtedly thought more of the present than he did of posterity and rejoiced at the success of the “administration ticket” in New Hampshire. “It encourages me,” he wrote in his diary [March 1878], “to be more and more faithful in adhering to reform of the civil service. Let me disregard more and more ‘influence’ of every sort and be guided by a sense of duty alone. It is hard to have friends made sour because their wishes are not heeded. Newspaper and other abuse is not comforting, to say the least. But the second thought of the best people is I believe with me. — Good for New Hampshire.” It was natural to overestimate the comfort derived from this state election as he felt during the previous October that there was “a very decided opposition to the administration in both houses of Congress among the Republican members.”³

While the Senate had refused its confirmation to his New York Custom-house nominees, Hayes had no idea of giving up the fight. “I am right,” he wrote, “and shall not give up the contest.” In July 1878, after the adjournment of Congress, he removed Arthur and Cornell and appointed Merritt and Burt in their places. During the following December, these appointments came before the Senate for confirmation. “The political event

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 88 n., 89 n.

² Written in 1916.

³ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 82, 89 n.

of the last week," Hayes wrote in his diary on December 16, "is the opposition of Conkling." Many senators "will not oppose Conkling on the question. Senatorial courtesy, the senatorial prerogative and the fear of Conkling's vengeance in the future control them. He is . . . vindictive and not restrained by conscience. The most noticeable weakness of Congressmen is their timidity. They fear the use to be made of their 'record.' They are afraid of making enemies. They do not vote according to their convictions from fear of consequences." Sherman, as the Custom House was in his department, decided to resign if the appointments were rejected and he made a strong personal appeal to Senators Allison, Windom and Morrill that they should not permit "the insane hate of Conkling" to override the good of the service and the party. A seven hours' struggle ensued in the Senate but Merritt and Burt were confirmed by a good majority.¹ "We are successful," wrote Hayes next day in his diary. "Thirteen Republicans voted to confirm. There were two or three others who were of the same mind but were controlled by promises. One or two would have voted with us if their votes had been needed." After the confirmation the President wrote to Merritt: "In making appointments and removals of subordinates, you should be perfectly independent of mere influence. Neither my recommendation nor that of the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the recommendation of any member of Congress or other influential person should be specially regarded. Let appointments and removals be made on business principles and by fixed rules."² Ten days later,

¹ Feb. 3, 1879, vote for Merritt 33:24; for Burt 31:19.

² Feb. 4, 1879.

he confided to his diary: "There can be no complete and permanent reform of the civil service until public opinion emancipates Congressmen from all control and influence over government patronage. Legislation is required to establish the reform. No proper legislation is to be expected as long as members of Congress are engaged in procuring offices for their constituents. . . . Impressed with the vital importance of good administration in all departments of government, I must do the best I can, unaided by public opinion, and opposed in and out of Congress by a large part of the most powerful men in my party." ¹

Hayes appreciated fully what he had to contend with. Conkling, who hated Blaine, was at one with him in opposing the administration. Hayes had offered a seat in his Cabinet to Eugene Hale, a Congressman from Maine, who declined it and then Blaine insisted on the appointment of William P. Frye, a Maine lieutenant of his and a man of ability but the President refused to have Blaine dictate who should be a member of his Cabinet. To this was largely due his opposition. Conkling had urged Thomas C. Platt for a place in the Cabinet. The refusal intensified Conkling's other reasons for his virulence. Conkling sneered at "snivel service reform" and had Anthony Trollope's *Autobiography* then been published he would have quoted with delight this long-tried civil servant's condemnation of competitive examinations and repeated with gusto the Englishman's allusion to "the damnable system of so-called merit." Cameron desired his son continued as Secretary of War and Logan wanted

¹ *Life of Hayes*, Williams, ii. 88, 94, 95, 97; John Sherman's *Recollections*, chap. xxxv.

a Cabinet position for himself ; neither wish was gratified, hence their opposition.¹

The silver question absorbed the attention of the country. Since 1834 gold had been practically the financial basis and through expert routine, the coinage act of 1873 prohibited the coinage of the $412\frac{1}{2}$ grain silver dollar, which at the existing ratio of 16:1 was worth more than the gold dollar. Between 1873 and 1877, the production of silver increased and it became worth less than gold, the dollar bringing in the market about 90 to 92 cents as measured in gold.² The same class of men who had advocated a large issue of paper now turned their attention to silver as "cheap money" and they denounced its demonetization as the "crime of 1873." Other patriotic citizens deemed silver, coin as well as gold, a symbol of a certain amount of labor and scarcity and entitled to recognition, and they looked upon the act of 1873 as "the unwisdom of a few people assuming to be wise for the whole of a great people."³ Their advocacy came from no desire to cheat the creditors of the government but because they looked upon the restoration of silver to its proper place as a simple measure of justice. A meeting in Chicago was typical of the sentiment of the country west of the Alleghanies. The chairman declared that the restoration of silver to legal-tender quality "would certainly turn the tide of affairs and open the way to returning prosperity." The resolutions committee in the words of its head told the President and his advisers

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 17, 22, 24; Trollope's Autobiography, 34, 255.

² In November, 1877 "greenbacks" were worth $97\frac{3}{8}$ in gold. The nation was $2\frac{5}{8}$ per cent short of being on a gold basis.

³ Francis A. Walker, Andrews's Last Quarter of the Century, i. 278.

“that there is a thunder-storm brewing in the West and that . . . somebody is likely to be hit by the lightning of public wrath and indignation unless they concede the just demands of the people.”¹ The House of Representatives during the autumnal special session of 1877, under a suspension of the rules, passed by a vote of 163 to 34 a bill for the free and unlimited coinage of the 412½ grain silver dollar, making that dollar likewise a full legal tender for all debts and dues.² The Senate was still Republican but the Republican senators were by no means unanimous for the gold standard. Sherman became convinced that although the free-silver bill could not pass the Senate, something must nevertheless be done for silver, and, in coöperation with Senator Allison he was instrumental in the adoption of the compromise which finally became law. This remonetized silver, providing for the purchase of not less than two million dollars' worth of silver bullion per month, nor more than four millions and for its coinage into 412½ grain silver dollars; it made this dollar “a legal tender . . . for all debts and dues, public and private except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract.” Thus was brought into circulation what was contemptuously called “the dollar of the daddies” and the “buzzard dollar.” The first appellation explains itself, the second came from likening the eagle upon the reverse of the coin to a buzzard.

The silver people did not strengthen their cause historically from their iteration and reiteration of the “Crime

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 120.

² Nov. 5, 1877. The Democratic majority in the House was twelve. Twenty-four Republicans voted against the bill.

of 1873," as, whatever else may be thought of that act, it was honestly brought forward and enacted without any idea of favoring the creditor class. No authority on this subject is better than John Sherman, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, who wrote in his mature life: "There never was a bill proposed in the Congress of the United States which was so publicly and openly presented and agitated. I know of no bill in my experience which was printed, as this was, thirteen times in order to invite attention to it. I know no bill which was freer from any immoral or wrong influence than this act of 1873."¹

Sherman and Allison were honest and capable men, and it would have been the easy course for the President to ratify their action. The pressure upon him from men in his own party, among them influential journalists, to sign the so-called² Bland-Allison Silver Compromise bill was great. The advice of his trusted Secretary of the Treasury, to whom he owed more than to any other one man, was in the same direction. Therefore Hayes's stand is admirable from any point of view and the printing of selections from his diary demonstrates the high moral plane on which he moved.

"The Silver Bill," he wrote on February 17, 1878, "has passed the Senate with amendments that will send it back to the House. It will no doubt reach me during this week. I have given the subject some study and much anxious reflection. I shall veto the bill. It will probably become a law notwithstanding my veto. . . . I feel

¹ Recollections, i. 467. These Recollections were written in 1895.

² Richard P. Bland of Missouri was the advocate of free silver in the House and the leader of the free silver party.

the importance and responsibility of my action. But I have no misgiving. The nation must not have a stain on its honor. Its credit must not be tainted. This is the first and great objection: It is a violation of the national faith."

Few things in the annals of government by discussion are more interesting than Cabinet meetings, of which there is no formal report or record. The account that Hayes gave in his diary of the Cabinet which considered the Silver Bill belongs to this class of relations. "I had prepared a veto message," he wrote on February 26, the day of the meeting, "and read it to the Cabinet. Colonel Thompson opposed a veto. . . . Here was a measure long discussed — the people almost unanimously for it — two thirds of each House for it — the measure a wise one and demanded very earnestly by the country. . . . Sherman disliked the condition of things. Belmont, the agent of the Rothschilds, fears the effect of a veto — prefers the bill should be approved, *bad* as he thinks it is. . . . McCrary also fears a veto." Evarts, Judge Key and Judge Devens regarded a veto "as on all accounts the true course. General Schurz thinks a veto, if successful, will save the country from an immoral and dangerous measure, and if not successful the consequences will be less damaging than the effect of concurrence."

On the last day of February the President vetoed the bill. "I sent in my message against the Silver Bill yesterday," he wrote. "The message was short and I hope forcible. My objection to the bill is that it authorizes what I think is dishonest."¹ The years have

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 119, 120, 122, 123, 126; John Sherman's Recollections, chaps. xxxi, xxxii.

justified the action of Hayes but Congress promptly passed the bill over the veto.

After nearly a year of office the President wrote: "I have tried to do my duty. The crowd of business, the urgent misrepresentations poured into my ears by men who ought to be trustworthy, have led to mistakes, serious mistakes, mainly in appointments, but the general course has been right. I have been firm and self-possessed on the most difficult and trying occasions. I am not liked as a President by the politicians in office, in the press, or in Congress. But I am content to abide the judgment — the sober second thought of the people."¹

The brightest page in the history of the Republican party since the Civil War tells of its work in the cause of sound finance and no administration is more noteworthy than that of Hayes. Here again the work was done by the President and his Cabinet in the face of a determined opposition in Congress. During the first two years of his administration, the Democrats had a majority in the House, and during the last two a majority in both the House and the Senate. The Republican party was sounder than the Democratic on the resumption of specie payments and in the advocacy of a correct money standard, but Hayes had by no means all of his own party at his back. Enough Republicans were however of his way of thinking to prevent an irremediable inflation of either greenbacks or silver.

In November 1877, the Democratic House passed a bill repealing the Resumption Act of 1875² but Sherman

¹ Diary, March 1, Williams, ii. 126 *n*.

² See my vol. vii. 69 *et seq*.

convinced the Senate Finance Committee that he could bring about resumption and this Committee refused to make a favorable report on the House bill which was never enacted by the Senate. But Congress forbade the further retirement of greenbacks, the amount of which outstanding remained at \$346,681,016 and has so remained until this day.¹

The credit for what was accomplished in finance belongs in the main to John Sherman, a great financier and consummate statesman; but he had Hayes's constant sympathy and support. It was their custom to take long drives together every Sunday afternoon and discuss systematically the affairs of the Treasury and the official functions of the President. No President ever had a better counsellor than Sherman, no Secretary of the Treasury more sympathetic and earnest support than was given by Hayes. Sherman refunded 845 millions of the public debt at a lower rate of interest, showing in his negotiations with bankers a remarkable combination of business and political ability. Cool, watchful and confident, he grasped the point of view of New York and London financial syndicates, and to that interested and somewhat narrow vision he joined the intelligence and foresight of a statesman. Despite the bad effect of the railroad riots, the silver and other currency legislation of Congress, Sherman brought about the resumption of specie payments on the 1st of January, 1879, the date fixed in the bill of which he was the chief author and which, four years before, he had carried through the Senate. When as Secretary of the Treasury he made his

¹ 1916. Hepburn, *Hist. of Currency*, chap. xiii.

formal report in December 1878, the United States legal tender notes, commonly called greenbacks, were practically at par with gold so that on the day fixed, resumption was accomplished without the least disturbance. It was once the fashion of his opponents to discredit his work and, emphasizing the large crop of 1878 and the European demand for our breadstuffs and cotton,¹ to declare that resumption was brought about by Providence and not by John Sherman. No historian of American finance can fail to see how important is the part often played by bountiful nature, but it is to the lasting merit of Sherman and Hayes that, in the dark years of 1877 and 1878, they, with cool heads and unshaken faith, kept the country in the path of financial safety and honor despite bitter opposition and clamorous abuse.

These two years formed a part of my own business career and I can add my vivid recollection to my present study of the period. As values steadily declined and losses rather than profits in business became the rule, the depression and even despair of business men and manufacturers can hardly be exaggerated. The daily

¹ EXPORTS

FISCAL YEAR	COTTON	GRAIN *	PORK †	BEEF ‡	LARD
1875-1876 .	\$192,659,262	\$131,181,555	\$45,408,478	\$3,186,304	\$22,429,485
1876-1877 .	171,118,508	118,041,613	55,808,826	7,503,475	25,562,665
1877-1878 .	180,031,484	181,727,841	56,665,725	7,983,090	30,014,254
1878-1879 .	162,304,250	210,355,528	55,882,001	7,219,458	22,856,673

* Includes all breadstuffs, such as corn meal, flour, etc. †

† Includes bacon and hams; is chiefly bacon and hams in fact, rather than mess pork.

‡ This seems to be the first year when fresh "beef" is especially mentioned.

list of failures and bankruptcies was appalling. How often one heard that iron and coal and land were worth too little and money too much, that only the bondholder could be happy, for his interest was sure and the purchasing power of his money great! In August 1878 when John Sherman went to Toledo to speak to a gathering three thousand strong, he was greeted with such cries as, "You are responsible for all the failures in the country"; "You work to the interest of the capitalist"; "Capitalists own you, John Sherman, and you rob the poor widows and orphans to make them rich."

By many the resumption of specie payments was deemed impossible. The most charitable of Sherman's opponents looked upon him as an honest but visionary enthusiast who would fail in his policy and be "the deadest man politically" in the country. Others deemed resumption possible only by driving to the wall a majority of active business men. It was this sentiment that gave strength to the majority in the House of Representatives which was opposed to any contraction of the greenback currency and in favor of the free coinage of silver and of making it likewise a full legal tender. Most of these members of Congress were sincere and thought that they were asking no more than justice for the trader, the manufacturer and the laborer. The "Ohio idea" was originally associated with an inflation of the paper currency but by extension it came to mean an abundance of cheap money, whether paper or silver. Proposed legislation with this as its aim, was very popular in Ohio, but, despite the intense feeling against the President's and Secretary's policy in their own State and generally throughout the West, Hayes and Sherman maintained

it consistently and finally brought about the resumption of specie payments.¹

On May 17, 1878, the Democratic House passed a resolution for the appointment of a committee to investigate Hayes's title and aroused some alarm lest an effort might be made "to oust President Hayes and inaugurate Tilden." Although this alarm was stilled less than a month later by a decisive vote of the House, the action and investigation were somewhat disquieting.²

In a refined broad nature like Hayes's, the fighting spirit is generally absent. Not so with him. His contest with Congress is best told in his diary. "The Forty-fifth Congress adjourned" [March 4, 1879] he wrote on March 9, "without making provision for the support of the army and for the payment of the civil list. I therefore immediately called a special session of the Forty-sixth Congress to meet the 18th — two weeks after the adjournment of the Forty-fifth Congress. The appropriation bills were defeated by a disagreement between the House and the Senate.³ The House insisted on the right to force its views on several questions of general legislation upon the Senate by the threat of defeating appropriations if the Senate did not yield. The Senate adhered to its own views — hence no appropriations for the purposes named. Now the question will come to me. The Senate and House in the Forty-sixth Congress being both Democratic will insist on the right to repeal the election laws and in case of my refusal will put the re-

¹ John Sherman's Recollections, ii.; Life of Hayes, Williams, ii.; Hepburn; *Globe*; Public docs. I have used freely my article on President Hayes's Administration printed in the *Century Magazine* for Oct. 1909 and reprinted in my volume of Historical Essays.

² *Century Magazine*, Oct. 1909. ³ The Senate was then Republican.

peal on the appropriation bills. They will stop the wheels — block the wheels of government if I do not yield my convictions in favor of the election laws. It will be a severe, perhaps a long contest. I do not fear it. I do not even dread it. The people will not allow this revolutionary cause to triumph." The "election laws" authorized the use of the army "to keep the peace at the polls" and the Democrats, having possession of the House and the Senate for the first time since 1861, objected strenuously to the whole federal supervision of elections. Their first intention was to pass the repeals as separate measures but this was abandoned and their purpose was expressed in riders to the appropriation bills.

"As to some of the measures which it is sought to repeal," wrote Hayes in his diary on March 18, 1879, "I would regard it a duty to approve separate bills, framed in the usual way for that purpose. And as to all of them I would consider with favor independent measures modifying, amending and improving them without impairing their efficiency. But presented in a way used for the purpose of coercion, I cannot even consider their merits." March 23: "The attempt to pass a measure under a menace that the government shall be stopped if the President declines to yield his convictions of duty has never yet succeeded — has never before been made. To consent to it is to make a radical change in the character of the government. The House of Representatives, in case this principle is established, becomes the government." March 27: "Every measure should stand or fall on its own merits. This should be the fundamental principle in legislation."

In the contest with Congress the President won ; and his

confidence to his diary (July 3) two days after adjournment is a natural exultation. "I am now experiencing one of the '*ups*' of political life. Congress adjourned on the 1st after a session of almost seventy-five days mainly taken up with a contest against me. Five vetoes, a number of special messages and oral consultations with friends and opponents have been my part of it. At no time — not even after the nomination at Cincinnati — has the stream of commendation run so full. The great newspapers and the little have been equally profuse of flattery. Of course it will not last. But I think I have the confidence of the country. When the *Tribune* can say, 'The President has the courtesy of a Chesterfield and the firmness of a Jackson' (!) I must be prepared for the counterblast. . . . I . . . have, I think, vindicated the power of the National government over congressional elections and the separate authority of the executive department of the government. Inasmuch as I stood firmly and successfully against the dictation of my own party leaders in the Senate, I have a feeling that the applause given to the firmness exhibited against the pretensions of the adversary as to the powers of a bare majority of Congress, is not altogether unreasonable."¹

It had really been a notable partisan fight and the country would have been excited had it not occurred contemporaneously with the revival of business as the "boom of 1879" was beginning. So far as we may judge of popular sentiment, it was with the President and the contest solidified the Republican party placing it in line with Hayes. The State elections in the autumn were

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 177, 181, 183, 206.

favorable to the Republicans; although this result may have been due to the improved business, the President naturally saw in it the approval of his policy.

The depression following the panic of 1873 was the most severe of any since the Civil War. The contemporary material and the recollections of business men give it a unique character. The years 1874, 1875, 1876 presented some alleviation. The rebound from the stringency, the actual scarcity of money in 1873 gave to 1874 a hope that the financial discipline would not long endure. During that and the following year, expectation was rife that some measure of inflation of the currency would be enacted by Congress and this expectation served to inculcate the belief that the depression was not hopeless. In 1876 the Centennial Exhibition and the presidential campaign turned men's minds from their own distress. The visitors to the Exhibition were from all parts who had scraped together enough money to take themselves and their families thither and, enjoying a wonderful display, forgot their trials. The presidential election too was absorbing. Masses of people believed that either Democratic or Republican success was necessary for the salvation of the country and, "as the country was in danger and must be saved," what mattered the temporary commercial depression? But after the presidential election and the almost contemporary closing of the world's fair in 1876, there was no mitigation of the terrible distress. Masses of laborers were out of employment being severely put to it to get bread for their wives, children and selves. Merchants and manufacturers had difficulty in making both ends meet; many failed; one failure led

to another and financial and commercial solvency seemed to be a dream of the past. There was no relief in sight. The European countries were alike suffering and had not the power, if they had the desire, to purchase American securities and thus give a lift to affairs in the United States. The days from November 1876 to the spring of 1879 were dreary and apparently there was not a ray of light. Failures and suspensions of payment of manufacturers and traders, receiverships of railroads were the rule. Croakers predicted universal bankruptcy and it was difficult to traverse such a prediction. A disputed presidency and the apparent eagerness of the outcasts for a commotion added real terror to the situation. Soon after the settlement of the disputed presidency came the railroad strike and riots of 1877. Little wonder was it that a contemporary chronicler called the riots "a widespread rising against society itself."¹

In the darkest hour when predictions were made freely that there could be no revival, the revival came but men in actual business did not perceive it. John Sherman however saw it coming. After his visit to Toledo in August 1878, when he was interrupted with jeers and insults, he went to Cincinnati and addressed the Chamber of Commerce. "I think it," he said, "a hopeful fact that after this week there will be an end of bankruptcies, that all men who believe that they are not in a condition to pay their debts will have taken the benefit of the law provided for their relief and after Saturday next we will all stand upon a better basis — on the basis of our property and our deserved credit." Sherman made reference to

¹ *The Nation*, Aug. 2, 1877, 68.

the national bankrupt law, by which men under certain conditions could get a discharge from their debts; the repeal of this law went into effect on September 1.¹ The list of bankruptcies as read in the daily press was appalling and seemed to confirm the views of the croakers that the country was in the throes of universal bankruptcy. But John Sherman saw further ahead than the practical men of business and thus continued his address at Cincinnati: "I believe that we are through with this [severe crisis]; a ray of hope has dawned on us and we are certainly entering upon a career of prosperity. Every sign of business is hopeful, we have paid off immense amounts of our debts. We do not owe Europe anything of consequence.² . . . From this time on we will be more prosperous. Take heart, you men of Cincinnati; you men who represent the great interests in this great city, you who live in the heart of the great West, take heart in the transaction of your business, because I believe you have reached a solid basis upon which to conduct your business profitably, the basis of solid coin."³ Abundant crops of grain and cotton with a European demand brought gold to the United States during 1879, and, owing to this and Sherman's refunding operations, business was practically based on coin: this influx of gold was alike a cause and an indication of a revival of business. Pig iron was the barometer of trade.

¹ Aug. 28, 1878. John Sherman's Rec., ii. 665. It was the third United States bankrupt law, enacted in 1867 and amended and supplemented in 1874.

² *The Nation* of March 28, 1878 said, "The importations of U. S. bonds from Europe continue in sufficient volume to take up all the bills made against the enormous exports of domestic products."

³ Recollections, ii. 662, 665; *ante*.

Its manufacture and the manufacture of its products had been unduly stimulated before 1873 with the result that during the crisis they were depressed below their normal condition.

In 1876 a remarkable book "Benner's Prophecies" was published in Cincinnati by Samuel Benner, "An Ohio Farmer," in which he made the predictions that pig iron would be lower in each 1876 and 1877 than in the two years immediately preceding but that it would begin to advance in 1878 and be higher respectively in 1879, 1880 and 1881 than during the previous years; having reached a very low price in 1877, the rebound would carry it to a high figure which could not be maintained. Despite the prophecies of John Sherman and of Benner, men of business doubted.¹ At a largely attended and good representative meeting of the American Iron and Steel Association held in Pittsburg on May 5, 1879, no one was keen enough to hint at the remarkable revival that was at hand. Eastern pig-iron makers had difficulty in convincing Westerners that an advance in pig iron of one dollar per ton had actually been made and maintained in the East. The Westerners were still in the state of gloom, full of criticism of the Lake Superior ore companies for having advanced the price of ore fifty cents per ton. But in two months all had more orders than they could fill and in September faced an imaginary iron famine; had it not been for the immense reserve stocks of pig iron in Great Britain, prices would have gone higher than the extravagant figures that they actually reached. Known

¹ *The Nation* of May 22, 1879 spoke of "the prevailing depression in business from which this country has been suffering for six years and from which nearly every country in Europe is suffering still."

in the history of iron as the "Benner boom," this revival touched all industries, helping in a marked degree the railroads and the merchant marine. An advance in railroad stocks on the Wall street exchange preceded the "iron boom" but, acted on by it, continued with periods of wild speculation and enormous sales but, in general, with buoyancy, a European demand for American securities and legitimate advance in the prices of the best class of railroad bonds and shares. Hayes had therefore nearly two years of good business to end his administration in striking contrast with the same period of beginning; and he and Sherman might well maintain that they had done naught to impede natural forces but had aided them to the best of their power. As matter of fact they and their party received full credit but no more than their due.

CHAPTER IV

AFTER the elections of 1878, resulting in a Democratic House and Senate, the "Stalwarts" alienated by the President's Southern policy and the party workers by his efforts to reform the civil service were ready to believe that defeat awaited the Republican party in 1880. But Hayes's wise administration and the improvement in business and financial conditions caused a strong undercurrent of confidence, resulting in an eager competition for the Republican nomination for President. The Senatorial triumvirate, Conkling of New York, J. D. Cameron of Pennsylvania and Logan of Illinois were first in the field with their warm advocacy of General Grant, whom, in the various ways necessary to bring a man before the country, they put forward as a candidate during 1879.

Soon after the expiration of his second term, Grant started on a tour round the world and was received both in Europe and in Asia with distinguished courtesies never before accorded to an American citizen. Full reports of his progress were given by the newspapers, and every one felt a glow of pride in reading of the honors bestowed upon the representative of his country. When Grant arrived at San Francisco in September 1879, he was certainly the most popular man in the United States. His reception in San Francisco could not have been more enthusiastic and the leisurely trip thence to Chicago was at-

tended by a continuous ovation, which was later repeated when he went from his old home of Galena to Philadelphia. The demonstrations were a non-partisan tribute to the first citizen of the country, but as the "Grant boom" was already well in progress, those favoring it did not scruple to make political capital out of the enthusiasm elicited by their candidate. The Senatorial triumvirate had no assurance from Grant that their efforts met with his favor, but Conkling, from intimate association with him during his presidency, knew his man and was well aware that his silence gave consent.

In August 1879, Grant wrote to Badeau in a private letter, "I am not a candidate for any office nor would I hold one that required any manœuvring or sacrifice to obtain"; and, during the first few months after his homecoming, his position undoubtedly was that if the Republican party unanimously, or nearly so, demanded that he should be their candidate, he would deem it his duty to comply with their wish. Twice he had been unanimously nominated and, as he believed that he had served his country well in the presidential chair, it is not surprising that he thought the nomination might be offered him again with one voice. While the feeling against a third term might have prevented in any case a unanimous call, yet had Grant rounded out his military career by making an excellent President, it is almost certain that, when the Convention met, he would have had a sufficient following to secure his nomination by a good majority on the first ballot. Adept as were the senatorial triumvirate in all the arts of political manipulation, they could not have hoped for success had not Grant been strong with a mass of the people whose thoughts dwelt upon him at Appo-

mattox rather than in the White House. Those national traditions, to be sure, which implied distrust of the continuance of one man in high office with the possible consequences of personal ambition shaping the country's policy and misusing the patronage, supplied an argument well-nigh unanswerable against a third term directly succeeding the second; but little weight should be attached to these considerations in the case of a former President.

Early in 1880, Grant went to Cuba and was out of the country a little over two months. Meanwhile the senatorial triumvirate were actively at work. It was argued that Grant was needed to maintain a vigorous Southern policy and to protect the negro at the South in his exercise of the suffrage. Already through the suppression of the negro vote, the Democrats had secured the House and the Senate and, although a number of Southern States had voted for Grant in 1868 and 1872 and for Hayes in 1876, it was evident that in 1880 the "solid South" (that is, all the former slave States) would be for the Democratic candidate. Moreover, so the argument ran, the Democrats, indignant at the manner of their defeat in 1876, and now having possession of the Senate and the House, would by fair means or foul "count in" their candidate unless they had for their opponent the resolute and warlike Grant.

Cameron was the first to produce results, having called the Pennsylvania State Convention for the early date of February 4, 1880, but he had to encounter in his State a strong feeling for Blaine who, next to Grant, was the most formidable candidate. Cameron, however, was audacious and had a powerful machine. He dominated the Conven-

tion, which by a vote of 133 to 113 instructed the delegates to the National Convention to vote for Grant and, then without a division, adopted the unit rule. The unit rule implied that the whole vote of the State should be cast for the candidate in whose favor the instructions were given, and that, on all questions coming before the National Convention, a majority of the delegation should decide how the State as a whole should vote. Three weeks later, Conkling followed with his New York State Convention, which he conducted with great skill, although in one respect his task was easier than Cameron's, inasmuch as the sentiment for Grant was stronger in New York than in Pennsylvania. He did not deem it wise or necessary to provide for the unit rule in unequivocal language, but by deft management he had the Convention adopt a resolution which implied this rule without arrogantly over-riding the minority.

While the Pennsylvania and New York Conventions gave an impetus to the boom for Grant, they showed that instead of the party calling upon him with one voice for its leader, his nomination must be fought for in the manner of ordinary candidates. The attitude of Grant himself reflects the change in his opinion from December 1879 to May 1880. In December, while in Philadelphia, he was asked, "Will you not be disappointed after such an ovation from San Francisco to Philadelphia if you are not returned to the presidency?" "No, not at all, but Mrs. Grant would," was his reply. In January George William Curtis thought that, though he did not seek the nomination, he expected it and, before the end of February, the general impression was that he would take it in any honorable way that he could get it. In May, his

bosom friend, General Sherman, wrote in a private letter: "Grant is still a candidate, but instead of being nominated by acclamation, will have to scramble for it, a thing I cannot help but regret, as his career heretofore is so splendid that I cannot help feeling it impaired by common politics. He could so nobly rest on his laurels but his family and his personal dependents prod him on, and his best friends feel a delicacy about offering advice not asked." Grant's situation supplies a commentary on the neglect of its ex-Presidents by a great nation which might give them some official position with a liberal salary or, at all events, grant them a sufficient pension to enable them to live in dignified retirement. For Grant needed a job. He loved city life and the society of rich men, but had not sufficient wealth to reside in New York unless he could obtain such employment as would give him an addition to his private means. This fact, together with the feeling that, if the country elected him for another term, its careful choice would be a vindication of his two administrations, led him, as events progressed, to grasp eagerly for the prize.

The opposition to Grant kept pace with the movement in his favor and at first was based almost entirely on the deep-seated conviction that a third term was undesirable but, as the canvass grew in heat, the scandals of his administrations were revived and urged as a reason why the great trust should not again be committed to his hands. Blaine had a large following and was as good a Stalwart as Grant himself, having indeed coined the appellation. John Sherman, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Senator Edmunds were advocated by those who approved of Hayes's administration, Edmunds being the

first choice of the Independent Republicans, while E. B. Washburne of Illinois had a certain support.

Logan was the last of the Senatorial triumvirate to do his special work and his Convention did not meet until the 19th of May. In Illinois, it had been the custom for the State Convention to choose all the delegates, the district delegates as well as those from the State at large, and this custom was now followed, with the result that a solid delegation for Grant was selected, but, under Logan's management, the proceedings were so high-handed that nine congressional districts at once entered a protest and it was significant that one of these districts was Grant's own. Soon afterward there was an indignant mass-meeting in Chicago. It was decided to send anti-Grant delegates from these nine districts and carry the contest into the National Convention.

The date fixed for the assembling of this Convention was Wednesday, June 2, and the place, Chicago. Before the appointed day, many prominent delegates and the advocates of the several candidates came together in order to settle certain preliminaries by private discussion and conference rather than to carry all dissensions into the great convention hall. This pre-convention work had for its centre the Republican National Committee, a body always existent, composed of one member from each State and Territory. The contest in the Committee, and indeed in the Convention, until the balloting for candidates began, resolved itself into one between the Grant and anti-Grant forces. A majority of the members of the Committee were opposed to Grant's nomination, but Senator J. D. Cameron was chairman and the fact of his holding this position prompted the triumvirate to a

bold plan to secure the organization of the Convention. It was the rule for the chairman of the National Committee to call the Convention to order and then to give way to a temporary chairman selected by the Committee. The Committee's choice would be anti-Grant, but Cameron would recognize a motion from the floor to substitute a Grant man and on this vote he would apply the unit rule and likewise on any appeal from his ruling. The temporary chairman so chosen would continue the same parliamentary practice, a permanent organization friendly to Grant would be effected and he would be nominated on the first ballot. An analysis of the delegations shows clearly that, if the unit rule could have been enforced, this plan might have been carried out to the letter. The plan leaked out and the anti-Grant men were in dismay, for they lacked cohesion and were supporting several candidates, while the Grant party was like a military force obeying implicitly its leaders. On May 30, Garfield arrived in Chicago and brought order out of chaos by insisting that the defeat of the unit rule was more important than the nomination of any candidate. He, with a number of other delegates, representing different candidates, waited upon Conkling and gave him to understand that, on questions of organization, the anti-Grant men would act together. Under this inspiration, which brought jarring elements into union, the majority of the National Committee threatened to depose Cameron as chairman, unless this plan of the triumvirate should be abandoned. A compromise was arrived at. Senator George F. Hoar, who was neither for Grant nor for Blaine, was agreed upon as temporary chairman and the question of the unit rule went to the Convention, where the anti-Grant forces were

in a majority. John M. Forbes, who was the Massachusetts member of the National Committee and an Independent, made this private note of opinion and of the action of the majority, "In spite of the objections to Grant, I preferred him, as being an honest man, to Blaine ; but, for the purposes of a fair organization of the convention, a combination with the Blaine leaders was necessary, and by patience and firmness we prevented the breaking up of the convention."

The Convention-building on the shore of the lake was said to be "one of the most splendid barns that was ever constructed." It held the delegates, alternates, press reporters, officials, distinguished guests and 10,000 spectators. The acoustic properties were good. Flags and pictures of prominent Republicans covered the walls. The weather was comfortably cool during the first part of the proceedings and the demand for tickets to the galleries was great. The Convention was called to order at noon of Wednesday, June 2, by Cameron, who, after a few remarks, said that the Republican National Committee had instructed him to place in nomination, as temporary chairman, George F. Hoar. Hoar was elected unanimously and, on taking the chair, made a brief speech, when the Convention accomplished some routine business and, after a session of three hours, adjourned until the next day.

Conkling and Garfield were the heroes of the Convention and led the opposing forces. Conkling stopped at the Grand Pacific Hotel and, despite his supercilious manner, courted publicity. While eating his breakfast, he was gaped at by curious crowds. Frequenting the office, the lobby and other public rooms, and reclining on the

public sofas, he apparently desired personal homage from the crowd of lookers-on who, coming from various States to witness a convention and shout for their candidate, wandered about the hotels, eager to see the leaders of their party. Perhaps he thought to win favor for Grant by treating the crowd with unusual affability. His entrance into the Convention hall was a studied performance. Waiting until the opening prayer had secured order he moved with a graceful stride down the long aisle, his physical attractions displayed to the best advantage. And like a popular actor coming upon the stage he got his round of applause. But once in his seat, he laid affability aside and, relishing the contentious part of his mission, he allowed the spirit of domination full sway and, by sarcastic words and sneering tone, irritated his opponents and alienated wavering delegates whom different tactics might have won to his cause. Nevertheless, his leadership was effective in holding the following of Grant together without a break. When Conkling, early on the second day, was arguing in favor of his motion for a recess, Garfield, the time of whose entrance had perhaps been craftily arranged, entered the hall, eliciting a burst of cheers which drowned Conkling's voice. These two brought into opposition in this episode remained antagonists throughout the Convention and it was an encounter of giants. Garfield was fair, conciliatory, persuasive and, in every move and speech, made friends for his cause, — opposition to the unit rule and the third term.

The first conflict in the Convention hall between Conkling and Garfield occurred early on the third day when Conkling offered a resolution that each delegate was

bound in honor to support the candidate, whoever he might be, and all who refused should lose their seats in the Convention. On a roll-call of the States the ayes were 716, the noes, 3. On this announcement Conkling moved that all who had voted "no" had forfeited their votes in this Convention. These three were from West Virginia; they rose in their places and said that they intended to support the nominee, but did not deem the resolution wise. It was a question how the Convention would act, to what extent it might rebuke this exhibition of independence, when Garfield rose and, in a brief but impassioned speech, espoused the cause of the three dissentients, ending with a request to Conkling to withdraw his motion. Garfield had so evidently carried the Convention with him that Conkling, after an exhibition of bad temper and an unsuccessful attempt to draw the presiding officer into the controversy [Hoar had been made permanent chairman], complied with Garfield's request. It is said, however, that he wrote on a newspaper, "I congratulate you on being the dark horse," and sent this to Garfield; or, as another version of the incident has it, the message was written on a card which was passed to Garfield, who read, "Is this the first appearance of the dark horse in this Convention?"

The action of the Convention on the report of the Committee on Credentials was on the whole favorable to the anti-Grant forces. The important decision was that the eighteen anti-Grant delegates from Illinois were given seats. It was during the consideration of the case of Illinois on Friday, the third day of the Convention, that a scene occurred which throws doubt on the claim of a National Convention to being a deliberative body.

It was midnight and Emery A. Storrs, an eloquent lawyer from Chicago, in a speech advocating the admission of the entire Grant delegation from Illinois, mentioned almost in one breath, "James G. Blaine" and "the grand old silent soldier." When the galleries resounded in cheers for Grant, Conkling rose and waved his handkerchief to the galleries; these responded with the waving of handkerchiefs and the brandishing of umbrellas. The cheers, accompanied by singing, lasted twenty or thirty minutes after which followed a wild demonstration for Blaine. Robert Ingersoll, who was on the platform, waved a woman's red shawl. Men took off their coats and used them for flags. Forbes wrote that the enormous audience was made up largely of Grant's Chicago friends; on the other hand, the New York *Times* [which favored Grant] declared that the galleries were packed with Blaine shouters. Both seem to have been partly right. Forbes wrote further that the delegates "caught the fever, and one faction after another yelled and paraded with the flags about the hall, acting like so many Bedlamites. An enthusiastic woman jumped on a rail behind the chairman and began to harangue the meeting, balancing herself doubtfully on the narrow edge until ex-Governor Jewell gallantly supported her by both his hands until she could be pacified. In swinging her parasol about, she nearly struck me, just below her, and to avoid further danger, I raised my umbrella, and sat safe under her (its) lee until she subsided."

One of the rules which governed the Convention of 1876 had left it doubtful whether the unit rule prevailed and on that account an "unseemly controversy" had arisen. For the sake of avoiding any uncertainty, the

majority of the Committee on Rules added a clause which in set terms demolished the unit rule. Garfield, being the chairman of the Committee, was again the centre of attraction; he presented the report and made a cogent argument in its favor, at the same time treating the minority with consideration and courtesy. Again he carried the Convention with him and his report was adopted. This action put an end to the hope of nominating Grant on the first ballot and showed that his supporters must win over doubtful delegates by persuasion instead of by force: but, had the unit rule been enforced, Grant would have received on the first ballot enough votes, probably, to secure the nomination.

The majority report of the Committee on Resolutions made no reference to Civil Service Reform, which in 1880 was a vital question, but on the floor of the Convention, Barker, a Massachusetts delegate, moved the addition of a resolution, declaring for it in no uncertain terms. This gave rise to one of the best remembered sayings of this Convention. Flanagan of Texas sprang quickly to his feet declaring, "To the victors belong the spoils" and asking "What are we up here for? I mean that members of the Republican party are entitled to office, and if we are victorious, we will have office." This caused general and hearty laughter. Other objections were made and the result looked uncertain, but Charles R. Codman, another Massachusetts delegate, made a vigorous remonstrance against an indicated tendency to shelve the subject, and, after some further discussion, the Civil Service Reform plank was adopted by a *viva voce* vote.

Not until the evening of Saturday, the fourth day, were the candidates put in nomination. Two speeches were

made which, with the exception of Rufus Choate's tribute to Webster in 1852, are the most splendid examples of our convention oratory. In due course, the turn of Conkling came to nominate Grant. He mounted a table on the reporters' platform and began with a slight variation of Miles O'Reilly's lines :

"And when asked what State he hails from,
Our sole reply shall be,
He hails from Appomattox
And its famous apple tree."

He declared that with Grant the Republican party could "grandly win." Pointing out in well-chosen words Grant's title to greatness, he was never effusive, tawdry or grandiloquent. He seized the salient points that suggested to all grateful recollections. Certainly he was a strong candidate who was victor in war, magnanimous at Lee's surrender, a lover of peace as shown by the Geneva arbitration, a believer in sound money as exemplified by the veto of the inflation bill. The only objection to Grant, Conkling said, was the "third term" and to this objection he applied his scathing ridicule. He was heard all over the hall and the long applause that followed was not entirely that of a clique; part of it was in genuine approval of an eloquent speech. Benjamin Harrison, a delegate from Indiana, a cold critic of oratory, who later developed into an excellent public speaker, unconsciously applauded as vigorously as Grant's most sympathetic friends, although he himself was opposed to the general's nomination. Conkling's was an effective speech in holding together his solid phalanx, but it failed in conciliation. As the necessary votes to nominate Grant must come largely from the supporters of Blaine

and Sherman, it was not a happy stroke to cast a slur on each of those candidates. After Grant's nomination had been seconded in a five-minute speech, Garfield rose to present the name of Sherman. To follow Conkling's oration was a difficult rôle and his subject was far less inspiring, yet he made a great speech, presenting strong reasons for the nomination of Sherman and receiving an enthusiastic acclaim from the audience in the Convention hall. Afterwards it was often sneeringly suggested that Garfield spoke for himself rather than for Sherman, but this sneer was prompted by the outcome of the Convention.

It was nearly midnight of Saturday when the Convention adjourned. No ballot was taken and the main business went over to Monday. During the interval of one whole day in which it had been hoped that some combination would be made, nothing apparently was determined, and, when the Convention met on Monday, June 7, the nomination seemed no more imminent than when the delegates had come together during the preceding week. On the first ballot Grant received 304; Blaine 284; Sherman 93; George F. Edmunds 34; E. B. Washburne 30; William Windom 10; necessary to a choice, 378. It was clear that the adherents of Blaine and Sherman could control the nomination by uniting on one or the other, but such a combination was never made. Sherman expected the nomination by drawing from the backers of both Grant and Blaine in the event that the sharp contest should result in the nomination of neither. He was friendly to both candidates and to their chief supporters, but he suffered from not having a unanimous delegation from his own State, Ohio giving

him only 34, to Blaine 9 and Edmunds 1. In Ohio two delegates were chosen from each Congressional district by a district convention and four from the State at large by the State convention, which had this year instructed these to vote for Sherman and requested the district delegates to do likewise. In certain parts of the State, however, there was a strong feeling for Blaine and, Sherman being aware of this, desired that Garfield's district should send him as a delegate. [Garfield was still a representative in the lower house of Congress, although he had been chosen senator for six years from March 4, 1881.] Sherman had practically the naming of the delegates at large and Garfield, assuring him of his earnest support, told him that he was eager to go to the Convention as one of the four; and so it was arranged. Garfield's influence in his own district was very powerful yet this district sent two delegates who voted for Blaine. In view of all the facts, it is pretty difficult to avoid the alternative mentioned in a private letter of Sherman's of April 8: "If this district [Garfield's] should be against my nomination, it would be attributed to either want of influence on his [Garfield's] part, or, what is worse, a want of sincerity in my support." A survey of the whole proceedings of the Convention reveals Garfield's work on behalf of his candidate as a cold performance of duty utterly lacking enthusiasm; and this is entirely comprehensible when it is remembered that the personal and political friendship between him and Blaine was so close that Blaine's nomination would undoubtedly have given him great pleasure. On the twenty-ninth ballot nineteen delegates from Massachusetts dropped Edmunds and voted for Sherman, making his vote 116. This

proved that he was satisfactory to the Independent Republicans but on the next ballot he received only 120 and afterwards his vote fell off, rendering it apparent that he could not attract a sufficient number of the supporters of Blaine to secure the nomination. This meant that he was out of the race. The highest number that Blaine received was 285. He could not get the votes of the Independent Republicans who actually preferred Grant to him, nor could he attract the Sherman strength. Politically the supporters of Blaine and Grant were sympathetic, both being, in the main, Stalwarts, but the bitter feeling between Conkling and Blaine made any diversion to him from the Grant following impossible. Grant's highest vote was 313, and this on the ballot next to the last, when his full strength was called out to prevent the nomination of Garfield. His average vote was about 306, the exact number that he received on the last ballot, and these 306 have gone down into history as the solid Grant phalanx, steady in their support, holding firm to him to the last. So faithful and consistent a following was exceedingly likely at any time to draw from the other candidates and bring about a stampede to Grant as the strongest; and it was then thought, and present study confirms the contemporaneous impression, that a union of the anti-Grant forces was possible on no other man than Garfield.

For some weeks before the Convention, Garfield had been talked of as the possible nominee and, when the delegates and hangers-on came to Chicago, the gossip of the crowd pointed in his direction. On the third day of the Convention, after having espoused the cause of the three recalcitrant delegates from West Virginia and made

his famous reply to Conkling, he must have felt that his hold on the delegates was powerful and that if neither Grant, Blaine nor Sherman could secure the prize, he might win it for himself. His speech nominating Sherman was one of the great efforts of his life and furthered his own cause far better than that of the man for whom he spoke. On the Sunday night, however, intervening between his speech and the balloting, he refused, according to the New York *Tribune*, to entertain the idea of being a candidate. On Monday (June 7), twenty-eight ballots were taken and the twenty-ninth, the first ballot of the Tuesday, gave no indication that the dead-lock would be broken, nor was there any notable change until the thirty-fourth. On the second ballot Garfield had received one vote from Pennsylvania which, with five exceptions, was continued to the thirty-fourth. On different occasions, he got another vote, twice from Alabama, three times from Maryland. On a number of ballots, he received two from Pennsylvania but on no ballot, a total of more than two until the thirty-fourth when Wisconsin gave him 16. In this crucial moment of his life, Garfield said: "Mr. President, I rise to a question of order. . . . I challenge the correctness of the announcement. The announcement contains votes for me. No man has a right, without the consent of the person voted for, to announce that person's name, and vote for him, in this Convention. Such consent I have not given." This is the official account, which Senator Hoar, who be it remembered was the presiding officer, corrects slightly in his Autobiography by saying that after the word "given" there should be a dash instead of a period, for he interrupted Garfield, in the middle of a sentence, by declin-

ing to entertain his question of order and commanding him to resume his seat. "I was terribly afraid," Hoar further related, "that he would say something that would make his nomination impossible, or his acceptance impossible, if it were made." Garfield afterwards said to the reporter of a Cleveland newspaper: "If Senator Hoar had permitted, I would have forbidden anybody to vote for me. But he took me off my feet before I had said what I intended." These statements must be given their due weight; yet nobody can doubt that Garfield, with his magnificent presence and stentorian voice, could have commanded the attention of the Convention and, by declining emphatically to be a candidate under any circumstances, have turned the tide which was setting in his favor. But his characteristic vacillation prevented him from taking the most glorious action of his life, that of absolutely refusing consent to his nomination. But apparently the thought of his trust was overpowered by the conviction that the prize was his without the usual hard preliminary work.

On the thirty-fifth ballot, Garfield received 50; on the thirty-sixth and last, 399; to Blaine, 42; Sherman, 3 and Grant, 306. The Blaine and Sherman following, together with the Independent Republicans nominated Garfield. Both Blaine and Sherman sent telegrams, asking their delegates to vote for him and, on the last ballot, Garfield had the solid vote of Maine and all but one from Ohio (that one being, of course, his own).

In his Recollections John Sherman has magnanimously absolved Garfield from any breach of trust; after Gar-

field's death he once said to me, "Garfield had a great head and a great heart."¹

¹ In this account of the Convention I have been much assisted by a thesis written for me by D. M. Matteson. He used the files of the New York *Tribune*, *Times* and *Herald*. The *Tribune* was anti-Grant and pro-Blaine, the *Times* pro-Grant and the *Herald*, professedly independent. Also Horace White, *International Rev.*, Aug. 1880; Badeau, Grant in Peace; A. B. Paine, Thomas Nast; Young, Around the World with Grant, ii.; Boutwell, Sixty Years; M. J. Cramer, Grant; G. W. Childs, Recollections; Writings of J. J. Ingalls; Schurz, Reminiscences, iii.; *Cong. Record*; Grant's Letters to a Friend; Ammen in *N. Amer. Rev.*, Nov. 1885; Howe, Stoughton, Boutwell, Black, *N. Amer. Rev.*, Feb., Mar., Apr., May, 1880; B. P. Poore, Reminiscences, ii.; *Harper's Weekly*; Byers, Twenty Years in Europe; *Forum*, Nov. 1895; Edward Cary, Life of G. W. Curtis; Curtis, Orations and Addresses, ii.; Blaine, Twenty Years; *Pa. Monthly*, Apr. 1880; *Puck*, 1880; Gail Hamilton, Blaine; Alexander, Polit. Hist. of N. Y., iii.; John Sherman's Recollections, ii.; J. M. Forbes, Letters and Recollections, ii.; G. F. Hoar, Autobiography, i.; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Apr. 1880; J. P. Smith, Republican Party in Ohio, i.; W. S. Kerr, Sherman, ii.; G. O. Seilhamer, Republican Party; A. B. Conkling, Conkling; A. K. McClure, Our Presidents; G. T. Dawson, Logan; C. E. Fuller, Reminiscences of Garfield; Letters of Mrs. James G. Blaine; Wisconsin in Three Centuries, iv.; *Atlantic Monthly*, Aug. 1880, Apr., June, 1884; T. E. Burton, Sherman; Hamlin Garland, Grant. I have also used the Official Proceedings of the Republican National Convention of 1880 and the file of *The Nation*.

CHAPTER V

ON account of lack of physical strength, Tilden renounced a renomination for the presidency and the Democrats nominated General Winfield S. Hancock. "If when we make up our estimate of a public man, conspicuous both as a soldier and in civil life," said ex-President Hayes in 1886, "we are to think first chiefly of his manhood, his integrity, his purity, his singleness of purpose, and his unselfish devotion to duty, we can say truthfully of Hancock that he was through and through pure gold."¹ It may have been because of the unsullied name of their candidate that the Democrats during the canvass attacked freely Garfield's personal reputation. His connection with the Credit Mobilier² was harped upon and the charge was made that he had sold himself for three hundred twenty-nine dollars. The figures 329 were chalked everywhere in convenient spots and they were a prominent inscription in the transparencies borne by Democratic torchlight processions. In the De Golyer pavement transaction Garfield's fee of five thousand dollars was alleged to be too large for a lawyer of his standing and was therefore given on account of his political position and his chairmanship of the Committee on Appropriations in the House of Representatives. Also his vote for the "Salary Grab" bill was discreditable.³

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 409 *n*.

² See my vol. vii. 16.

³ My vol. vii. 20.

Touching this last his own defence may be accepted as adequate; it was part of the appropriations bill and the vote that he gave for the "salary grab" was to save the general act and an extra session of Congress.¹ In regard to all three he stood trial before his very intelligent Congressional district in 1874 and won his case. That year he was nominated by a good majority in his district where election was sure and in 1876 and 1878 by acclamation; in January 1880, the Republicans of the Ohio legislature named him unanimously as their candidate for United States senator and chose him to represent Ohio in the Senate to take his seat on March 4, 1881.² Now he received the Republican nomination for the presidency. No party vindication could have been more complete.

As candidate for President he stood before the whole country. It may be that the independent voters claimed too much in their assertion that their voice would decide the election but it is indisputable that, after their careful examination of these charges against his personal character, their adhesion was a factor of strength for Garfield; they had control of certain journals and were noted for their vigorous political expression; their advocacy therefore was of the utmost importance to voters who had not made up their minds and colors the historical treatment of the canvass. When *The Nation*, after making a careful analysis of the two charges, believed that Garfield's version of the Credit Mobilier transaction had "the strongest kind of corroboration" and concluded that, in his connection with the De Golyer contract he

¹ Riddle, *Life of Garfield*, 258 *et seq.* See also chapter on the Credit Mobilier and De Golyer contract, 219, 262.

² My vol. vii. 17.

had shown indiscretion but nothing worse, it spoke for many men who wanted to believe in the candidate of the Republican party.¹ Unquestionably he won the independent voters, as was shown by his support on the stump by Carl Schurz² and J. D. Cox, by the vigorous and attractive writing of George William Curtis in *Harper's Weekly* and by the powerful advocacy of Godkin in *The Nation*.³ Hayes wrote in his diary, "General Garfield's nomination was the best that was possible."⁴

Garfield's letter of acceptance was "a cruel disappointment to those Independents who had hoped to find in it a trumpet-call."⁵ They were right in considering Civil Service Reform an important issue of the day, which was perceived by John Sherman, who, through political acuteness and the influence of his chief, had become a latter-day convert. Garfield asked him what he thought of the letter of acceptance and received this reply: "Your letter of acceptance I approve heartily although I thought you yielded a little too much in one or two sentences on the civil service question. Although politicians have undertaken to ridicule and belittle the efforts of President Hayes to bring about some sort of civil service reform, yet the necessity of such a reform is so ingrafted in the minds of the leading sensible people of the northern states that anything like an abandonment of that idea

¹ *The Nation*, June 17, 24, July 1, Aug. 19, 1880.

² Carl Schurz wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge on June 22: "I have known Garfield very well for many years, and I have full confidence in his integrity. He is, in my opinion, incapable of a dishonest act. . . . I think the country will soon be fully satisfied of the uprightness of his character." Carl Schurz, *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers*, iii. 507.

³ *The Nation*, July 22, Sept. 2, Oct. 7, 1880. I have attributed many of the leading articles in *The Nation* to Godkin.

⁴ *Life of Hayes*, Williams, ii. 239.

⁵ *The Nation*, July 15, 1880.

will not meet favor.”¹ Garfield’s halting utterance on the vital question contrasted unfavorably with Hayes’s manly and outspoken declaration.

While the Independents voted for Garfield they could not control the issues on which were fought out the campaign. Although the Republicans hardly “waved the bloody shirt,” they pushed the argument of “the solid South” to the fore. This meant that the former slave States, most of which were in the Southern Confederacy, combined with three or four Northern States could elect a president and control the legislation of the country. They would repeal the statute forbidding the payment of any claims to any person who could not prove his loyalty. This would open the door to the payment for property lost at the South during the war; and why would they not go further and give the Confederate soldiers pensions? A quietus to this that was called the “rebel claims” argument was given by a letter of General Hancock in which he said that “the Government can never pay a debt, pension or reward of any sort for waging war upon its own existence.”²

“Waving the bloody shirt” implied horror at the outrages on the negroes and the advocacy of federal legislation to bring them to an end but the “solid South” argument was somewhat different: the burden of this was that the negroes were deprived of their votes. Even if there were no danger of a drain on the United States treasury in favor of those who attempted to destroy the Union, the intimidation of desirous negro voters and the consequent carrying of former slave States by the Dem-

¹ John Sherman Rec., ii. 779.

² *The Nation*, Sept. 30, 1880.

ocrats was unfair, which an honest ballot and fair count would frustrate. In his letter of acceptance Garfield spoke for this and during the early days of the canvass the attempt was made "to fire the Northern heart" by dwelling upon the wickedness of the South.

Maine held a State election in September and the gubernatorial candidate of the "Greenback" party,¹ who was ratified by the Democrats, was elected. As Maine was considered a reliable Republican State,² this result staggered for the moment the Garfield party but out of the defeat and Hancock's enthusiastic congratulation of the successful governor, they drew inspiration leading them to a change in tactics. The Maine victory, which was considered one for the greenbackers, gave Wall street a shock, resulting first in a decline and then a feverish market, which was aggravated by Hancock's despatch of felicitation.³ A depression in the New York stock market was a better argument for the Republicans then than now ⁴ and this was adroitly used to show that if a continuance of sound financial conditions were desired, Garfield should be chosen. Scanning closely the Democratic platform, it was seen that it declared for "a tariff for revenue only." Such a policy, the Republicans argued, would result in closing factories, throwing laborers out of employment, depriving energetic men of a profit on their outlay and produce a depression like that from which the country had just emerged owing to the wise Republican policies of sound finance and protection to

¹ See my vol. vi. 160, vol. vii. 175.

² The Fusionists (Democrats and Greenbackers) had carried it in 1878. But in 1879 "the Republicans regained most of the ground they had lost the year before." *Life of Blaine*, Stanwood, 219.

³ *New York Times, Herald, Finan. and Com. Chronicle.*

⁴ 1916.

American labor. On September 25 Garfield wrote to John Sherman: "I think our friends should push the business aspect of the campaign with greater vigor than they are doing, especially the tariff question which so deeply affects the interests of manufacturers and laborers. The argument of the 'solid South' is well enough in its way and ought not to be overlooked."¹ Hancock himself seemed to think the outspoken declaration of his platform unwise and granted an interview in which he said that "the manufacturing or industrial interests of the country will have just as much protection under a Democratic administration as under a Republican administration" and that "the tariff question is a local question."² The jeers and ridicule greeting this last remark was a hard fate for a gallant soldier who had stated a truth recognized later by his present opponents. "The real struggle in tariff legislation is one of *sections*," wrote John Sherman in 1895 when discussing the McKinley Tariff bill of 1890, "or as General Hancock truly said it is 'a local question.'"³ But the Republicans in 1880 maintained that the issue was between a revenue and protective tariff; on that issue they deserved the support of the business interests and of workingmen. Manufac-

¹ John Sherman, Rec., ii. 787.

² Boston, *Daily Globe*, Oct. 10, Paterson *Guardian*, Oct. 8; Boston *Evening Transcript*, Oct. 13-22. Hancock added: "The same question was brought up once in my native place, in Pennsylvania. It is a matter that the general government seldom cares to interfere with."

³ John Sherman, Rec., ii. 1084. Sherman added: "The Republican party affirms that it is for a protective tariff. The Democratic party declares that it is for a tariff for revenue only; but generally when Republicans and Democrats together are framing a tariff, each member or senator consults the interests of his 'destrict' or state." Writing of the Tariff bill of 1883, Sherman spoke of "the conflict of selfish and local interests, mainly on the part of manufacturers," 852. See Stanwood, *Amer. Tariff Controversies*, ii. 200.

turers, who were nearly all of Republican proclivities, were quick to see the point and got up noon-day meetings which were conducted and attended by business men. Business men's processions were organized and serious-minded citizens of years and experience rode on horseback or carried a torch to show how they regarded the gravity of the situation and the necessity of a continuance of the protective tariff legislation.

Ohio and Indiana had State elections in October. Ohio was then regarded as a sure Republican State and Garfield's personal popularity was looked upon to increase the normal Republican majority. But the Republicans felt that they must carry Indiana, a Democratic State, to offset the disaster in Maine. Every kind of effort was made to effect this result. It was eminently desirable to have Conkling's assistance, both for his power as an orator, his hold on the country and for his influence with General Grant who would be a tower of strength. After the nomination of Garfield, Conkling was asked to name a candidate for Vice-President, which he sternly refused to do¹ but the nomination of Chester A. Arthur was a "sop thrown to him."² Yet, since the Chicago convention, Conkling had been sulky and had refused to participate in the conference of leading Republicans which Garfield had travelled from Mentor to New York City to attend. But after the defeat in Maine Conkling was prevailed upon to speak and he addressed a large meeting in the Academy of Music,³ New York, urging the cause of the Republican party with laudation of Grant but with a bitter reference to Hayes and an almost "insulting com-

¹ Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling, Conkling, 608.

² Hayes, Life, ii. 239.

³ Conkling, 615.

mendation" of Garfield.¹ Still the party was glad to have him on any terms and he with General Grant² spoke on September 28 to a monster meeting at Warren, Ohio. Grant's speech was only seven minutes long but it produced a great impression and was issued as a campaign document.³ When Conkling went to Indiana he was shrewd enough to fall in with the party tactics and place the tariff question conspicuously in the front. Apparently every string was pulled. Garfield was a Campbellite (the Campbellites were a religious organization otherwise known as Disciples of Christ), had been a lay preacher and president of Hiram (Ohio) College, the principal educational institution of his sect; and it was estimated that in Indiana there were 5000 Campbellite voters who for the most part were Democrats. Therefore a still hunt was made to induce them to come over to the Republican side on the ground of religious affiliation. Such measures were legitimate but money was used to an extent hitherto unknown in American politics. It was said that the State was plastered over with two dollar bills. To raise the necessary campaign funds, financial men and manufacturers were levied on without stint and assessments on federal office-holders were freely made. Garfield was privy to the exactions from those holding office⁴ but it must be remembered that such contributions were not in 1880 contrary to law. The truth about In-

¹ *The Nation*, Sept. 23, 1880.

² This was magnanimous on the part of Grant as his disappointment at not being nominated at Chicago was keen. Grant in Peace, Badeau, 324; Life of Grant, Louis A. Coolidge, 547.

³ Conkling, 618.

⁴ Thomas W. Brady was second assistant postmaster-general, a hold-over from Grant, and during Garfield's administration was shown to be implicated in the "star route frauds." He was dismissed by Garfield

diana was told after the election by Vice-President-elect Arthur at a dinner at Delmonico's in New York City to the Secretary of the Republican Campaign committee, who had Indiana especially in charge. "Indiana," said Arthur, "was really I suppose a Democratic State. It had been put down on the books always as a State that might be carried by close and perfect organization and a great deal of — (laughter). I see the reporters are present, therefore I will simply say that everybody showed a great deal of interest in the occasion and distributed tracts and political documents all through the State."¹

The Republicans carried Indiana by a plurality of nearly 7000; Ohio by 23,000. This was a pretty sure indication of Garfield's election in November. But before that took place a desperate attempt was made to stem the current.

It must be remembered that in 1880 the so-called Chinese question was one of vital importance. The Republicans in their platform declared against "the unrestricted immigration of the Chinese" and the Democrats said that there ought to be "no more Chinese immigration except for travel, education and foreign commerce." Shortly before the November election there was scattered

and a week later published the following letter: "Mentor, O. Aug. 23, 1880. My dear Hubbell. Yours of the 19th received and contents noted. Please say to Brady that I hope he will give us all the assistance possible. I think he can help effectually. Please tell me how the departments generally are doing. As ever yours J. A. Garfield." J. A. Hubbell was chairman of the Republican congressional committee and levied the two per cent contribution on the government clerks. *Boston Eve. Transcript*, May 4, 1881; *New York World, Sun*, *ibid.*; see also *New York Herald*; Sparks's *National Development*. For an account of the "Star route frauds," see Sparks, 188 *et seq.* For Garfield's comment on the Hubbell letter see the newspapers.

¹ *The Nation*, Feb. 24, 1881.

broadcast the so-called "Morey letter" in which Garfield favored, as it was popularly stated, "Chinese cheap labor."¹ He at once denounced the letter as a forgery, which indeed it was, but its publication probably cost him the electoral vote of California. But he carried New York which was necessary for his election and received 214 to Hancock's 155 electoral votes.

From my narrative, it will plainly appear that the centering of attention on the tariff was what carried Indiana and the election, but Garfield's own opinion, who watched closely every point, must be given. "The distrust of the solid South," he wrote in a private letter two days after the election, "and of adverse financial legislation have been the chief factors in the contest."²

Garfield personally contributed to his success. He was a wonderful campaigner and, despite the warnings by friends of the fate of Scott, Douglas and Greeley, discussed freely in public "passing events and current issues." Blaine, likewise a remarkable stump orator, truly said in his eulogy: "Garfield spoke to large crowds as he journeyed to and from New York in August, to a great multitude in that city, to delegations and deputations of every kind that called at Mentor during the summer and autumn. With innumerable critics watchful and eager to catch a phrase that might be turned into odium or ridicule or a sentence that might be distorted to his own or his party's injury, Garfield did not trip or halt in any one of his seventy speeches."³ Garfield had a magnetic personality and although he did not write out his re-

¹ This letter was published in the New York *Truth* of Oct. 20, Boston *Globe*, Oct. 21. See Appletons' *Ann. Cyc.*, 1880, 576; also *The Nation*.

² J. Sherman, *Rec.*, ii. 789.

³ Feb. 27, 1882.

marks he divined the proper sentiment that his auditors liked to hear. These apparently off-hand speeches had the quality he showed in his familiar conversations with all sorts of men. With a broad though superficial intelligence he had the sympathetic word for the farmer, the man of finance, the manufacturer or the student.

Nor must it be forgotten that the clean and able administration of Hayes contributed to Republican success. While stalwart politicians contemptuously spoke of "the old woman policy of Granny Hayes"¹ the plain people admired his conduct of business and showed their admiration by voting for the continuance in power of his party. He could truly say at the close of his term of office: "I left this great country prosperous and happy, and the party of my choice strong, victorious and united. In serving the country I served the party."²

In bringing this view of Hayes's administration to an end the tributes of three men are well worth citing. William McKinley: "Hayes was a pure man — pure in his life, pure in his walk, pure in his conversation; his whole life was an example to the young men of the United States." Carl Schurz: "Public station in this country has seldom, if ever, been graced by a man of purer character or higher and more conscientious conception of duty and more patriotic motives."³ And Woodrow Wilson: Hayes was "upright, public spirited, inclined to serve the country unselfishly and in the interest of sound policy."⁴

¹ Sparks, *National Development*, 117.

² Williams, ii. 227.

³ Williams, ii. 403, 405.

⁴ *Hist. of the Amer. People*, v. 169. In this account of Hayes's administration, I have been helped by Sparks's *National Development* (Hart's *American Nation* series); Carl Schurz, *Reminiscences*, iii.; *Life of Sherman*, Burton; J. D. Cox on Hayes's Administration, *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1893; *Hist. of the U. S. 1870-95*, E. B. Andrews.

CHAPTER VI

THE President-elect between election and the inauguration has much to do and among his various occupations he must give his chief attention to the forming of his Cabinet. The voice of the country with no uncertain sound demanded the continuance of Sherman in the Treasury department; next to Garfield he had the largest support from business and intelligent men. A partisan he could always be counted upon for party service and once, when unjustifiably suspected of this he gave in a brief speech at his Mansfield (Ohio) home a contribution to our political parlance that has many times served journalists when they desired to twit some seeker of political support who cloaked his real design. "I came west," he said, "purely on private business — to repair my fences."¹ While a party man he was nevertheless a wise patriot, earned fully the popular designation of statesman, and commended himself without the least calculation on his part to the independent voters whose voice was heard in *The Nation*: "If Mr. Garfield retains Sherman as Secretary of the Treasury it will be understood that he has *not* surrendered to the Bosses. If Mr. Sherman is not retained the sign will be equally clear that the Machine has overmastered him."² Sherman would have been glad to continue in his position but before *The Nation*

¹ J. Sherman, Rec., ii. 728.

² Dec. 2, 1880.

had spoken for its adherents he was aware that he would not be asked to retain the Treasury portfolio. Garfield on a visit to Washington during the latter part of November¹ had asked Blaine to be his Secretary of State; coming directly from Blaine to Sherman he related what he had done and told Sherman that Blaine thought it would be unfriendly discrimination of other members of Hayes's cabinet to continue Sherman.² Of course this was a subterfuge. Blaine and Sherman were two stars in the Republican party — too great to work harmoniously together in the same Cabinet. Moreover Blaine could not have failed to include Sherman in his dislike of the Hayes administration. "I have not entered the White House for thirty-seven months," he wrote to Garfield in March, 1881, "my last visit being February 4, 1878."³

It was entirely apparent that a choice must be made between Blaine and Sherman and there is no reason to believe that Garfield hesitated for a moment. He loved Blaine and theirs was a warm political as well as personal friendship. Respectively forty-nine and fifty years old they were physically and mentally magnificent creatures. They were both present at the Union Club in Cleveland during the receipt of the returns from the Ohio State election of October 1876; being in good health and spirits their commanding presence lent grace to the occasion and impressed a prominent business man of more than ordinary intelligence to remark to a friend, In those two men lie the hope of the party and the country. The private correspondence between the two during the winter of 1880–1881 is a frank interchange of views, lighted

¹ Mrs. Blaine's Letters, i. 184; *New York Times*, Nov. 24, 30.

² J. Sherman, Rec., ii. 802.

³ Gail Hamilton, 503.

up by personal amenities of an attractive order. Blaine confined to the house by a "sharp attack" of gout had improved his "hours of misery" by reading Trevelyan's *Early History of Charles James Fox* and Garfield told him in reply that he also had been perusing the "brilliant book." When Blaine on December 20, 1880 wrote his acceptance of Garfield's "generous invitation" to enter his Cabinet as Secretary of State he ended his letter with "however much I might admire you as a statesman I would not enter your Cabinet ¹ if I did not believe in you as a man and love you as a friend," and Garfield wrote to Blaine at ten o'clock on the morning of his inauguration: "Dear Blaine, Come to me at the White House the first moment I am free. With the love of comradeship of eighteen years and with faith in the next four, I am as ever yours." ²

In a confidential letter declining the office of private secretary to Garfield although the offer came with the promise of greater distinction than the post had formerly carried, John Hay mingled compliment with a mild suggestion anent one of Garfield's weak points: "You go into the Presidency with the best equipment possible. Besides the qualities that are personal to you, you know more of the past and present of government, more history and more politics than any man since the younger Adams. . . 'One thing thou lackest yet'; and that is a slight ossification of the heart. I woefully fear you will try too hard to make everybody happy — an office which is outside of your constitutional powers." ³

¹ Blaine was United States senator from Maine and the place was his as long as he should want it.

² Gail Hamilton, 495, 503.

³ Letters of J. Hay, ii. 59; Life of Hay, W. R. Thayer, i. 442.

Garfield's inaugural address was a disappointment. Reading over the addresses which had been made by incoming Presidents he said to John Hay that he found inspiration in the shape of a model in none of them except Lincoln's: but he failed to profit by his literary study. There could be no greater contrast than that between his halting utterances and the direct unambiguous words of Lincoln. It is extraordinary that when Garfield spoke in the House, in Convention or from the stump he spoke with eloquence and courage; in his letter of acceptance and in his inaugural address he failed utterly to rise to the standard which he had previously set up.

The friendly letters between Garfield and Blaine between December 10, 1880 and March 4, 1881 contain the inside history and they promise a wise administration. Although Blaine perhaps exhibited too great masterfulness he gave good advice about cabinet selections and future policies. Garfield accepted all of his suggestions in good part and did not feel the slightest irritation at words wherein the future Secretary seemed to assume that he would be the dominating head. As one now reads these letters and thinks of the real capacity of the two men, the wisdom of their ambitions, their hold on the country, the real activity of business and the contentment of employer and employed, one cannot be other than surprised at the sad outcome.

The history of the next four months turns on the appointment of the Collector of the port of New York City. On March 23 for that place the President sent to the Senate the nomination of William H. Robertson. Robertson was a strong Blaine man, an uncompromising political enemy of Conkling, had at the Chicago convention

led the opposition in the New York delegation to the Unit rule which Conkling had tried to force and had joined in the stampede to Garfield. There was no apparent reason except political for his appointment. Merritt whom Hayes had appointed in opposition to the Conkling-Arthur machine had still two years of incumbency, had been a faithful officer, and being the choice of Hayes and Sherman, had wrought in the interest of good administration. There was no pretence that Robertson would be a better collector and to secure the place Merritt had to be removed in direct contradiction to the spirit of Garfield's inaugural regarding fixity of tenure in the civil service. As one goes over the familiar correspondence between Garfield and Blaine one is astounded. The conciliation of the New York senator was a frequent theme. "I am very anxious that you should do just the right thing with Conkling," wrote Blaine¹ and suggested that Garfield invite Conkling to Mentor for consultation: this was done and the President-elect even entertained the idea (which however was abandoned) of asking the New York senator to be a member of his Cabinet.² Blaine did not like the idea writing, "Conkling is bound to go with you anyway if your treatment of him be decent and honorable and you will never deal otherwise with him."³

Garfield wrote to Conkling on January 31, 1881, "I would be glad to consult you on several subjects relating to the next administration — and especially in reference to New York interests." On February 16 Conkling paid the visit, was cordially received and had a long conver-

¹ Jan. 28, 1881.

² Gail Hamilton, 497, 500.

³ Gail Hamilton, 498.

sation with Garfield.¹ On Sunday night March 21, Conkling called on the President at the White House, who said that he was "not ready to consider New York appointments" and reaffirmed the promises made at Mentor.² But forty-eight hours later he sent Robertson's name to the Senate and, through his nomination to what was considered by the New York machine the most desirable and lucrative New York office within the gift of the President, he declared war upon the New York senator. So far as I know neither the apologists for Garfield nor Blaine explain this sudden change which was in no way in the interest of good administration but merely an attempt to build up a Blaine-Garfield machine in New York in opposition to that of Conkling. Lacking precise intelligence otherwise, one is led to accept Platt's explanation "that after Conkling's call upon the President," Blaine saw Garfield "and induced him to nominate Robertson":³ this indeed was the contemporary belief.

Grant did not like the appointment, writing from Mexico during May: "I am completely disgusted with Garfield's course. . . . I will never again lend my active aid to the support of a presidential candidate who has not strength enough to appear before a convention as a candidate. . . . Garfield has shown that he is not possessed of the backbone of an angle-worm."⁴

¹ Conkling, 634. ² Autobiog., T. C. Platt, 49. ³ Platt, 150.

⁴ Life of Grant, Louis A. Coolidge, 551; Grant in Peace, Badeau, 533.

Henry L. Dawes wrote in the *Century Magazine* for January 1894 that, Nineteen under the lead of William H. Robertson refused to be bound by these instructions [the Unit rule in New York] and cast their votes for Blaine. Conkling "never forgave the nineteen and swore especial vengeance upon Robertson their leader." — 341.

Conkling thought that "both Garfield and Robertson were minor offenders compared to Secretary Blaine. . . . It was Blaine who had

It is undoubted that the duty of appointing officers disturbed Garfield. The crowd of office seekers was said to be almost unprecedented although there was no change of the party in power and the President made a general announcement that he should make no removals except for cause.¹ Once he impatiently exclaimed to Blaine: "I have been dealing all these years with ideas and here I am dealing only with persons. I have been heretofore treating of the fundamental principles of government and here I am considering all day whether A or B shall be appointed to this or that office."² Again he said, "My God! what is there in this place that a man should ever want to get into it?"³

Whether the appointment of Robertson was an act of perfidy as maintained by Conkling's friends or an impetuous decision to fight it out with the New York senator, Conkling's subsequent action was absurd. He will not, prophesied Blaine, "saw off the limb of a tree when he is on the other end."⁴ This is exactly what Conkling did. When the confirmation of Robertson appeared certain he and his brother senator Platt resigned their positions as United States senators and appealed to the New York legislature for a vote of confidence by returning them to the Senate. This they did not obtain. The anti-Conkling men contested their election and the

talked Garfield into nominating Robertson for collector, well knowing that the act would be looked upon as an intolerable insult to him. I would, he said, "have supported the administration faithfully but for the nomination of Robertson, my bitterest political enemy in the State of New York. . . . It was simply intolerable." Interview with Conkling May 1881 by T. B. Connery, managing editor New York *Herald*. *The Cosmopolitan Magazine*, June 1897, 149, 153.

¹ *The Nation*, March 24, 1881.

² Blaine's eulogy.

³ Gail Hamilton, 514.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 498.

struggle was on with Vice-President Arthur at Albany assisting his friend, when, on the point of departure for Williamstown to be present at the Commencement of his alma mater, Williams College, Garfield was shot by a disappointed office seeker at the Pennsylvania railroad station [July 2d]. "I am a Stalwart," said the assassin, "Arthur is now President of the United States."¹ The contest in the Albany legislature dragged on and before the end of July Conkling and Platt were defeated; Conkling retired to private life. Garfield lingered with the ups and downs of a man of vigorous constitution in a brave battle with death² but on September 19th he succumbed and Chester A. Arthur became President.

Two of his Ohio friends may best sum up Garfield's character. Hayes wrote in his diary during 1883: Garfield "had large faculties — memory, analysis, fluency, the debating faculty; he was the best popular debater of his time. He was not executive in his talents — not original, not firm, not a moral force. . . . His course at various times when trouble came betrayed weakness. The Credit Mobilier affair, the De Golyer business, his letter of acceptance and many times his vacillation when

¹ Record of the Trial, i. 177.

² Charles Eliot Norton wrote on Aug. 31 to Lowell, our minister to England: "This protracted anxiety, these partial reliefs and frequent disappointments have been very wearing, and have made us restless and uneasy. Many people, like the doctors at the bedside, have grown visibly older. . . . Perhaps nothing has been of more service than the example of patience, fortitude, simplicity and sweet domestic worth shown by Mr. and Mrs. Garfield under a trial so severe and made enormously more grievous by the terrible glare of publicity in which they have had to endure it. This exhibition of admirable character has produced a great effect. The impression made by it is very deep. It is a blessing for the country that such a standard should have been held up." Letters of Norton, ii. 123.

leading the House, place him in another list from Lincoln, Clay, Sumner, all the other heroes of our civil history.”¹ And John Sherman in 1895: “I knew Garfield well. . . . He was a large, well-developed, handsome man, with a pleasing address and a natural gift for oratory. . . . But his will power was not equal to his personal magnetism. He easily changed his mind and honestly veered from one impulse to another. . . . After his election he was chiefly guided by his brilliant Secretary of State.”²

The trial of Garfield’s assassin began on November 14 in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and was conducted in such a way as to be a disgrace to American jurisprudence. The presiding Justice seemed to be impressed by the mawkish sympathy with the murderer that sometimes pervades the community. He said on the first day of the trial, “The reproach shall not rest upon the court that he was hurried to the gallows without a fair trial, to appease public indignation at his act.”³ But looking at it through the perspective of thirty-five years, the public was right in dwelling upon sympathy with the mother, wife and children of the martyred President and with bitter regret that a man in full physical and mental strength should have been murdered by a villain. The defence was badly conducted. A brother-in-law from Chicago, the chief attorney for the defence, was not a good lawyer and, unused to criminal proceedings and the practice in the District of Columbia, made halting, labored and incompetent attempts to clear his

¹ Williams, ii. 364 *n*.

² Rec., ii. 807.

³ Record of the Trial, i. 17. It was the criminal term and one Justice conducted the trial.

client. A local attorney assigned by the Court to assist him withdrew from the case at the end of a week but about a month later a lawyer, who had been State's Attorney in Chicago for twelve years, entered the case for the defence.

The chief offender was the Justice, who failed to insist on proper decorum in the Courtroom during what should have been an "imposing solemnity." Tragedy ought to have been the note but while the prisoner's interruptions were farcical and wild, it cannot be maintained with the desirable result in view, that the trial was a farce. It is better described "as a species of melodrama, in which everybody was entitled to make the most of his own rôle."¹ The chief sinner against the respect due the bench and the bar was the prisoner himself. "The trial was manifestly the great pleasure of his life," wrote Dr. Folsom, who observed for eleven days his conduct in Court and spoke of it as characterized by "ruffianly brutality and lewdness." "At last he was the centre of observation and he revelled in it to the utmost, irrepressible, voluble, coarse, vulgar and yet always speaking of himself as 'high toned,' allowing that he had been thought 'cranky' all his life, one moment grinning with pleasure, the next convulsed with passion, and constantly injuring his own cause by calling his best witnesses liars . . . and his counsel a jackass."²

"(Laughter)" is scattered through the official report as the trial drew a large and constant crowd who laughed and applauded at the "sharp hits of the prisoner, counsel

¹ *The Nation*, Nov. 24, Dec. 8, 1881.

² *Studies of Criminal Responsibility* by Charles Follen Folsom, written in 1882. Privately printed (1909), 58, 59.

and witnesses." The Justice "allowed the audience a latitude that no judge with a proper sense of the dignity of his court would have countenanced."¹ Mrs. Blaine wrote in a private letter on December 11,² "I have been again to the trial, the most interesting place, by all odds, in Washington and endured the bad air and stifling companionship of the crowded court-room for three hours." On December 16: "Day before yesterday the prisoner made in court an appeal to those who had 'come into fat office through him, to send in contributions. If they are afraid to do it over their own names, let them do it on the sly; but do it they must, or I will call names.'"³ On November 29, the prisoner was placed on the stand and examined for four days.⁴ His talk about the Oneida Community, of which he had been a member for a number of years, was lewd and disgusting; in general the exhibition he made of himself was one to make the judicious grieve.

The trial stretched out to an interminable length. It began on November 14, 1881 and the verdict was not rendered until January 25, 1882. The pleas of the counsel consumed the best part of ten days⁵ to which must be added one session for the ex-State's attorney of Chicago and one for the prisoner himself.⁶ But the jury were out only thirty minutes when they brought in their verdict of guilty.⁷ The prisoner impressed the "country at large as being an unscrupulous dangerous villain with a badly

¹ *The Nation*, Dec. 29, 1881, Jan. 5, 1882.

² 1881.

³ Gail Hamilton, 547, 549. Mrs. Blaine writes further in her letter of Dec. 16, "All the Stalwarts are going in" [into office].

⁴ Appletons' Ann. Cyc., 1881, 383. ⁵ Appletons' Ann. Cyc., 1881, 393.

⁶ Record of the Trial.

⁷ Appletons' Ann. Cyc., 1881, 393.

arranged mind, feigning insanity to save his neck.”¹ Undoubtedly this was the opinion of the patient jury. The verdict met with “almost universal approval.”² For it was a plain case. The President had been murdered by a man who was not insane. Lese-majesty had been committed by this attack on the chosen representative of the sovereign people. The Justice sentenced the prisoner to be hanged on June 30.³

The approval of the verdict was not meted out to the conduct of the trial. “Scandalous,” *The Nation* called it.⁴ The trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States before the Senate on Impeachment by the House of Representatives for High Crimes and Misdemeanors lasted 57 days; the trial of Garfield’s assassin 72. The United States Government publication of the Impeachment trial covers 1640 pages in three volumes; that of this murder trial is contained indeed in three volumes but the pages number 2681. The remedy for the length and misconduct of the trial lay with the Justice who for the time being was an autocrat. He should have held the prosecution within bounds, should have appointed an eminent attorney for the defence, who would have conducted the case within recognized rules and done the best possible for his client; and the Justice should have muzzled the prisoner. Such a course would undoubtedly have met the approval of his brethren of the bench and bar. After the jury had been selected, a week were enough to satisfy the ends of justice and give the guilty man a proper chance for his life.

¹ Folsom, 67.

² Ibid.; *The Nation*, Feb. 2, 1882.

³ Feb. 4.

⁴ Jan. 5, 1882.

It is not necessary to have recourse to English procedure for a model. When McKinley was murdered, the assassin was brought into court on a Monday nine days after the President's death; the jury was selected, witnesses were examined on that and the following day. The Judge's charge was delivered and the verdict rendered on Tuesday. On Thursday the death sentence was pronounced; the assassin was electrocuted within forty-five days of the death of the President.¹

Nothing was omitted to save the life of Garfield's murderer. A motion for a new trial was made: it was overruled. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and was heard by the Chief Justice and three associates:² they refused a rehearing of the case. Application was made to Justice Bradley of the United States Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus: it was denied.³ The President was asked for a reprieve: he refused it. The assassin was hanged on June 30, 1882, the very day on which he had been sentenced to die by the Justice who had tried the case.⁴

¹ McKinley was assassinated on Sept. 6, 1901, died on Sept. 14; the trial of the assassin began on Sept. 23; he was sentenced on Sept. 26 and electrocuted on Oct. 29.

² At the general term May 1882. D. C. Reports, 498.

³ Ibid., 560.

⁴ My chief authority is, Assassination of President Garfield, Record of the Trial, Washington Government Printing Office, 1882, for the convenient loan of which I am indebted to the State Library of Massachusetts, Boston. The trial gave a new meaning to the word "crank." It is now the fashion to call that large class to which the assassin belongs "cranks." *The Nation*, Dec. 8, 1881. "Persons whom the Americans have begun to designate as 'cranks' — that is to say, persons of disordered mind, in whom the itch of notoriety supplies the lack of any higher ambition." *Pall Mall Gazette*, Jan. 14, 1882. Oxford Dict. "The person who adopts 'any presentiment, any extravagance as most in nature' is not commonly called a Transcendentalist, but is known colloquially as a 'crank.'" O. W. Holmes (1884), Emerson, 150, Century Dict.

Shortly after Garfield's death all the members of his Cabinet tendered their resignations to President Arthur, who asked them to hold on until the meeting of Congress in December; during October when the Secretary of the Treasury left the Cabinet Blaine renewed his resignation, which was met with the same request but in December he gave up the portfolio of State to Frederick T. Frelinghuysen.¹

Whatever else he is, Blaine is an interesting man and he could occupy no position without impressing upon it his character and this he did while Secretary of State under Garfield and Arthur. His conduct of a phase of his department occasioned much discussion and criticism; an examination of it therefore is pertinent to a history of this time.

He found a war waging between Bolivia and Peru on one side and Chile on the other with Chile completely victorious, having subjugated her two antagonists, the stake being their nitrate beds and guano deposits. General Hurlbut, minister to Peru, espoused her cause and General Kilpatrick, also a selection of Blaine, minister to Chile, sided with the victorious nation. The two ministers quarrelled. Hurlbut's despatches showed zeal for Peru's contention that no treaty of peace should provide for a cession of territory although it might involve a money indemnity; and while Kilpatrick was seriously ill and confined to his bed for the greater duration of his

¹ Frelinghuysen was from New Jersey. Arthur's other appointments were Charles J. Folger of New York, Secretary of the Treasury; Benjamin H. Brewster of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General; Timothy O. Howe of Wisconsin, Postmaster-General; William E. Chandler of New Hampshire, Navy; Henry M. Teller of Colorado, Interior; Robert T. Lincoln, War held over from Garfield's Cabinet.

mission,¹ he was equally zealous for Chile. Blaine, suspecting, if not convinced in his own mind that Great Britain was at the back of Chile² and being more or less tinctured with Anglophobia, sympathized with Peru. But his sympathy did not prevent a recognition of Chile's "right of conquest" nor a desire "to see a just and honorable peace at the earliest day practicable."³ He was averse from being in any way mixed up in the war and, taking into account the officious conduct of his ministers, conducted the affair admirably and preserved the country from undesirable intermeddling. In all of his action he had the approval of his presidents. "No step committing this government to anything whatever of importance," Blaine testified under oath — "no step outlining or prefacing any policy that would involve the government in any direction whatever — was ever taken by me in the ten months I was Secretary of State, without the knowledge, consent, cheerful willingness and advice of either President Garfield or of President Arthur."⁴

It was not the Secretary of State but his accredited ministers who muddled affairs. Blaine then adopted a wise expedient. He sent William H. Trescot as special envoy to Chile, Peru and Bolivia and, in evidence of the apparently friendly relations then existing between Arthur and Blaine, the President directed that Walker Blaine (a son of James G.), third assistant Secretary of State, should be attached to this mission [November 1881]. Trescot, a South Carolina gentleman of excellent man-

¹ He died in Chile during December 1881.

² Blaine's Testimony, April 26, 1882; Chili-Peruvian Investigation, 217; House Reports, 47th Cong. 1st Sess.

³ Blaine to Trescot, Dec. 1, 1881, Foreign Relations, 1881, 147, 149.

⁴ Blaine's Testimony, 205.

ners, had been Assistant Secretary of State under Buchanan and coming to Washington after the Civil War had, on account of his experience, honesty and ability, been employed by Republican administrations in the diplomatic service and had been assisting Blaine "especially with reference to South American matters."¹ Of him Walker Blaine wrote in a private letter from Chile, Mr. Trescot "has been most delightfully kind to me in every way in admitting me to full confidence in all his views and in taking me into advice and conference, so that I am really learning a little about diplomacy under the best master of the art in America."²

It is difficult to see how the instructions to Trescot³ could have been bettered. They were carefully prepared and gone over by the Secretary, the special envoy and the President.⁴ In his familiar letters Walker Blaine gave an account of the reception he and Trescot met in South America. Peru overflowed with enthusiastic attentions. "I think," wrote Walker to his Father, "if we had given a hint the Peruvians would have presented us with fortunes. It was really embarrassing to avoid the attentions. I really think that they look upon us as a sort of saviours and Trescot says it will be necessary to send a fleet to rescue us at the end of the mission, so little will the performance, that we hope to succeed in, correspond with Peruvian expectation. I can assure you, however, that it made me proud to hear how, with Spanish extravagance, they spoke of you."⁵ From Chile he wrote to his Mother: "Chile has not overflowed with enthusiasm

¹ Blaine's Testimony, 191.

² Gail Hamilton, 552.

³ Foreign Relations, 1881, 143.

⁴ Blaine's Testimony, 206.

⁵ Dec. 25, 1881, Gail Hamilton, 551.

to quite so great an extent as Peru but our reception has been most marked. . . . The position of affairs is about this. Nobody in Peru will, I think, sign a treaty of peace with cession of territory. Nobody here, without. . . . It would really not do for me to say how great lions the members of the commission are. Peru was almost at our feet and every one in Chile is devotion itself. . . . You have no idea how well known Father [James G. B.] is down here, — better than anybody, I think; nor have you any idea how they hate Hurlbut, but they say that they gave Kilpatrick the grandest funeral ever seen in Chile, government paying every bill at a cost of more than \$10,000.”¹

While Trescott thought the conditions imposed by Chile hard and Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, the Secretary of State succeeding Blaine, deemed her demand exorbitant,² they were unable by friendly representations to moderate her terms. The only alternative was to intervene on the side of Peru and such a policy neither the President nor his Secretary was willing to adopt. The President said that he had neither the right nor the inclination to dictate to these South American republics and peace was concluded between Peru, Chile and Bolivia without interference from the United States [1883–1884]. Chile obtained the unconditional cession of the province of Tarapaca with its valuable nitrate beds and guano deposits; and a conditional reversion of two other provinces, the real ownership of which has not been settled to this day (1917); meanwhile they are provisionally occupied by Chile which collects all of their fiscal revenues. It is

¹ Jan. 10, 20, 28, 1882, Gail Hamilton, 552.

² Foreign Relations, 1882, 62, 73, 74.

difficult to see wherein Frelinghuysen's conduct of the affair differed from Blaine's; and this is not remarkable, as both were under the orders of the same President, whose policy in regard to the Chile-Peruvian war was consistent throughout.¹

Both Blaine and Frelinghuysen were able and patriotic men, but Blaine was an aggressive Secretary while Frelinghuysen was of the kind considered "safe."² It was natural then that in many respects they should differ in their conduct of State affairs. Blaine had at heart the assembling of a Peace Congress of the independent nations of North and South America and, speaking for the President he, on November 29, 1881 issued "an earnest invitation" to all those powers to participate in such a Congress to be held in Washington on November 24, 1882 "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America."³ Blaine was called a "jingo" but nothing could be further from jingoism than this despatch where, in depicting the horrors of war, he rivalled the address of a Peace Society. But Frelinghuysen considered it desirable to withdraw the invitation and, in a despatch to Trescott of January 9, 1882, he in effect did this for the reason that he considered such an assemblage a discrimination against other

¹ Foreign Relations, 1881, 1882, 1883; Chili-Peruvian Investigation, House Report, 47th Cong. 1st Sess.; Gail Hamilton; *The Nation*, last half of 1881, first half of 1882; Blaine, Political Discussions; Enc. Brit. eleventh ed., articles Chile, Chile-Peruvian War, Peru; President's messages Dec. 1882, 1883, 1884; conversation with E. V. Morgan, ambassador to Brazil, March, 1917; Stanwood, Life of Blaine; Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography; Fish, American Diplomacy; Bryce, South America; Latané, Diplomatic Relations; Akers, A History of South America; Markham, History of Peru. See *Boston Herald*, Dec. 2, 1918.

² *The Nation*, Dec. 15, 1881.

³ Foreign Relations, 1881, 24.

nations with whom we were at peace.¹ This drew from Blaine an indignant letter to President Arthur, in which with due courtesy to the President, he rendered good reasons for adhering to the original plan.² But Arthur determined to follow Frelinghuysen. As peace between Chile and Peru seemed doubtful, he asked in April 1882 an expression of opinion from Congress; and, as it took no action, he decided to postpone the meeting of the American nations and so notified the several governments to whom invitations had been sent.³

Blaine suffered the usual fate of being ahead of his time. All of his sanguine anticipations may not have been realized but the disinterested attitude on the part of the "Great Republic of the North," as the other nations called our government, could not have failed to promote good feeling; and such an assemblage would have carried benefits in its train. The luncheons, dinners and other meetings, the personal interviews would tend to a better acquaintance; and it was well worth while to bring in contact the Anglo-American and Latin civilizations. For the Americans had much to learn from their Southern neighbors. The cultivation of their language was a necessary forerunner to amicable relations and the fostering of trade.⁴

If a man make a misstep it is apt to dog his footsteps thereafter. So it was with Blaine. It was charged that his "South American policy had consisted in trying to

¹ Foreign Relations, 1882, 57.

² Feb. 3, 1882, Political Discussions, 407.

³ President's Message, Dec. 1882.

⁴ See Foreign Relations, 1882; Blaine's Foreign Policy of the Garfield Administration, Political Discussions, 411; *The Nation*, 1882; Gail Hamilton; Stanwood, *Life of Blaine*; Fish, *American Diplomacy*.

put the guano beds of Peru into his own pocket.”¹ So current was this accusation that it was investigated by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which sat for a long while and examined many witnesses, among them ex-Secretary Blaine. All of the Committee, except Perry Belmont, united in a report in which they said, “There has not been the slightest intimation or even hinted suspicion that any officer in the Department of State has at any time had any personal or pecuniary interest, real or contingent, attained or sought,” in the Chile-Peruvian transactions.² That this was not a “whitewashing” report but a complete exculpation of Blaine cannot fail to be the conclusion of the careful historical investigator.

Belmont badgered Blaine in Committee and the angry colloquy between the two was creditable to neither. “The insolence of this young man is intolerable,” declared Blaine on April 27. “I have no more regard for his insults than I would have for those of a garbage boy on the streets — not a particle more.” Later during the same day Belmont called Blaine, “a bully and a coward,” and Blaine angrily replied: “This man has disgraced his place; he is the organ of the men who are behind him. He was put here to insult me. . . . It is not in Mr. Belmont’s power to insult me. He may say falsehood and bully and coward and all that, as much as he pleases. I recognize this that he is speaking for men behind him.”³

The efficient Secretary of State and eulogist of Garfield did not appear at his best before the Committee. He was exasperated at the critical detraction and incorrect

¹ Gail Hamilton, 526.

² P. vi.

³ Report, 223, 239.

statements of a faction of his own party and this exasperation broke out when Belmont, a Democrat of high standing, pressed him closely, imputing corruption in his conduct of affairs between Chile and Peru. One may wish that Blaine had avoided even the appearance of evil, but he was a speculator or speculating investor. "I shall send Father some stock points this spring," wrote Emmons, a son, from Chicago. Blaine was building a large and expensive house in Washington and Mrs. Blaine said in a private letter, "Stocks have gone up tremendously, so we shall put the last inch into the house."¹ It was indiscreet for the Secretary of State and dominating head of the Cabinet to be "in the market," but evidently that was not Blaine's opinion at the time nor was it the opinion of his family when Gail Hamilton's Biography was published, otherwise these familiar letters would have been carefully expurgated.²

One of Blaine's greatest triumphs was his eulogy on Garfield delivered in the House of Representatives on February 27, 1882. This was his last public appearance in the hall³ in which he had won wide-spread fame and during his association with which he had fallen from the high estate that a man of his ability and position should always occupy. But on this day, at least, he was the centre of the country's attraction and regarded only as Garfield's trusted friend. "When I say," wrote Mrs. Blaine in a private letter, "that I could ask nothing more for it [the eulogy], both as to audience, subject-matter, time and place, delivery and reception, you will

¹ Feb. 3, May 22, 1881, Gail Hamilton, 532, 536.

² Gail Hamilton's Biography was published in 1895.

³ Stanwood, 256.

see that it equalled an unequalled occasion, for probably your Father had not in that vast assembly a more exacting critic than myself.”¹ John Sherman, who during Blaine’s life-time was not over fond of him, wrote in 1895 of this address, having a prominent place as chairman of the Senate Committee of invitation and procedure: “Blaine died January 27, 1893. Who now living could pronounce such a eulogy?”²

¹ Gail Hamilton, 560.

² Rec., ii. 839.

CHAPTER VII

THE greatest event of Arthur's administration was the passage in 1883 of the Civil Service Act known as the Pendleton bill.¹ It was, as Ostrogorski truly remarked, "the Magna Charta of civil service reform."² "The whole of the constitutional history of England," wrote Dr. Stubbs, "is a commentary on this charter."³ Likewise may it be said that the history of civil service reform in the United States is a commentary on the Act of 1883. Grant had shown what a half-hearted executive might do without congressional support. Hayes with single-minded purpose and pertinacity, opposed by all the leaders of his party except Sherman,⁴ his Secretary of the Treasury, had done as much under the circumstances for the cause of civil service reform as a zealous and common-sense President could do unaided by legislative action. As the result of his grapple with the spoils system, he wrote, "Legislation is required to establish the reform."⁵

Garfield, champion of the reform as representative, was a sad disappointment as presidential candidate and President. Lamentable is it to record for one who admired him while living that his death rather than his life

¹ Approved Jan. 16, 1883.

² Democracy, ii. 491.

³ Cited in Enc. Brit. 11th ed., article Magna Carta.

⁴ I have not regarded Schurz as a party leader.

⁵ In 1879. Life of Hayes, Williams, i. 97.

gave an impetus to the movement. The public mind had been prepared by Sumner,¹ Jenckes, George William Curtis, Schurz and, most of all, by Hayes when the quarrel over the New York Custom House between the President and Conkling and the following assassination of Garfield by a disappointed office-seeker brought it to the grim determination that "the offices" should be taken out of politics. Many civil service reform associations had been organized under Hayes's administration, but not until August 1881, the next month after Garfield's assassination, was the National Civil Service Reform League formed and not until then did its President, George William Curtis, speak more wisely than he knew, "We have laid our hands on the barbaric palace of patronage and begun to write on its wall 'Mene, mene'!"²

It is one of the striking but praiseworthy anomalies of American politics that Arthur, who had been a New York City spoilsman, became as President a supporter of the merit system. In his first message to Congress, that of December 1881, he maintained that "original appointments should be based upon ascertained fitness"; in the following July he made a public statement that no office-holder need feel obliged "to make political contributions"; and, in his message of December 1882, he said that if the bill pending before the Senate should be passed by Congress it would receive his "unhesitating support." That was the Pendleton bill. Pendleton, Democratic senator from Ohio, had shown a vital interest in the subject by bringing an inchoate measure before the Sen-

¹ See Pierce, iv. 191.

² Life of Curtis, Cary, 273; address of R. H. Dana at Chicago, 1914, Proceedings, 97.

ate in December 1880 and a year later he introduced a bill for the reform of the civil service by Dorman B. Eaton, a pioneer and efficient worker in the cause. Referred to the proper Committee, the chairman of which was Hawley, a Republican, it was reported back to the Senate, which took no action upon it at that session. Before the subject was again tackled the fall elections occurred in which the Democrats were eminently successful; this result, it was thought, gave an impetus to the reform. The Civil Service reform bill came up in December 1882 in the charge of Senator Pendleton, who advocated it in a speech mingling partisanship with effective argument.¹

¹ Pendleton said: "The civil service is inefficient; it is expensive, it is extravagant; it is in many cases and some senses corrupt; it has welded the whole body of its employés into a great political machine; it has converted them into an army of officers and men, veterans in political warfare, disciplined and trained, whose salaries, whose time, whose exertions at least twice within a very short period in the history of our country have robbed the people of the fair results of presidential elections." The bill, he continued, has for foundation the simple idea "that the offices of the government are trusts for the people. . . . The existing system, 'the spoils system,' must be killed or it will kill the republic. . . . The purpose of this bill is merely to secure the application of the Jeffersonian tests, fidelity, honesty, capacity"; to secure the methods known in various occupations of life as "competition, comparison." Sherman said, "If my colleague can by his political allusions persuade his associates to vote with him, I shall be very glad of it"; for the reform must be brought about by the Republican party.

Hawley said: "It has become the fashion very largely among a class of men who have or claim for themselves . . . a culture superior to the average to speak of the whole public service of this country as corrupt. . . . The country is not in a ruinous condition; it is the most magnificent nation that ever lived under the sun. There are 55,000,000 here. Some of us now here will be living when they shall number 100,000,000. The nation has gone through the most glorious war in history. . . . I believe in my country. I believe it is an honest country, as honest as ever lived. I believe it is the strongest and freest and best and it has as good a civil service as any other country or a better one." But Hawley was in favor of the bill, believing that we must search steadily for better things.

Hoar supported the bill because, "It is the measure agreed upon by the

On December 27 the bill passed the Senate by 38:5; on January 4, 1883 by the House, after very little debate, the vote standing 155:47.¹ On January 16, it was approved by the President. The act provided for the appointment of three Civil Service Commissioners, "not more than two of whom shall be adherents of the same party"; these Commissioners should aid the President "in preparing suitable rules for carrying" the act into effect; but the rules must "provide and declare . . . for open competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for the public service now classified or to be classified hereunder. Such examinations shall be practical in their character." No public officer should be under obligation to make any political contributions or render any political service; no senator or representative in Congress and no executive officer should solicit or receive any political assessments.² Open competitive practical examinations without distinction of party and regardless of personal influence were the essence of the act; and such examinations were requisite to enter the classified service.³ I have defined in a note below "the classified

large majority of persons who have made a special study of this cause; it proceeds with a statesmanlike caution in making the necessary experiment"; it is a measure justified in the great offices at New York [in the Custom House the reform of which was due to Hayes in conflict with Arthur], to some extent in Boston and in the Interior Department here [the work of Schurz]; and the President's constitutional power is in no way impaired. Dec. 12, 13, 14, 1882, Record, 204, 206, 209, 242, 273.

¹ The five Senate nays were Democrats, absent 33. In the House, the yeas were 102 Republicans, 49 Democrats, 4 Nationals; the nays 39 Democrats, 7 Republicans, 1 National. Record, 661, 867; Amer. Hist. Assoc. Papers, i. 123.

² Other officers are named in Sec. 12 but those mentioned in the text are the important ones.

³ Rule 5 said: "There shall be three branches of the service, classified under the civil service act (not including laborers or workmen or officers required to be confirmed by the Senate) as follows:

service" as originally specified, but under this act, the act of March 3, 1871 and the power conferred upon him by the Constitution the President had full authority to place other parts of the executive service under the civil service rules. It is easy to see from the general character of the law that much depended upon its administration and for this a President in full sympathy with it was needed. Such a man was Arthur. He appointed as chairman of the commission Dorman B. Eaton who with Curtis and Schurz had wrought zealously for the reform and whose appointment could not be bettered. At the request of President Hayes, he had investigated the civil service of Great Britain, writing as a result of his investigation his book on the subject, which was an efficient influence in the education of the public mind. The merit system was not a generation old in England and, whatever might be said in Congress, intelligent people had no scruples in taking lessons from a beacon of civilization. An influence of inestimable value in forming a wise public sentiment was the weekly *Nation* which hammered away for civil service reform.¹

The first report of the Civil Service Commission, written undoubtedly by Eaton, showed into what earnest hands the administration of the law had fallen. They made the rules which after very slight modifications

"1. Those classified in the Departments at Washington shall be designated 'The Classified Departmental Service.'

"2. Those classified under any collector, naval officer, surveyor or appraiser in any customs district shall be designated 'The Classified Customs Service.'

"3. Those classified under any postmaster at any post-office, including that at Washington, shall be designated 'The Classified Postal Service.'"
First Ann. Rep. Civil Serv. Com., 45.

¹ Historical Essays, 280.

were approved and promulgated by the President. They told that, under the law and rules, selections for the public service were made on the basis of merit instead of favor and influence; and that in fact a merit system of office had been substituted for a spoils system.¹ After the act had been in operation a year the President wrote, "Upon the good results which that law has already accomplished I congratulate Congress and the people and I avow my conviction that it will henceforth prove to be of still more signal benefit to the public service."

The number of offices placed at once under the civil service rules was 14,000 out of a total of 110,000, being 12½ per cent; in 1893 there were upwards of 45,000 on the merit system; on June 30, 1915, 292,296 out of 476,363 or 61 per cent.² As matter of fact, with certain exceptions

¹ First rep. of Civil Serv. Com., 7, 9, 11.

² The Commissioners say in their report of Nov. 13, 1915: "Of the 184,067 persons whose positions are not subject to competitive examination under the civil-service rules, 10,690 are presidential appointees, 8930 being post-masters of the first, second and third classes; 5292 are clerks in charge of contract postal stations; 72,000 are clerks in third and fourth class post-offices; 8098 are mail messengers; 12,129 are star-route, steamboat and screen wagon contractors; 4456 are pension examining surgeons; 20,674 are engaged on the Panama Canal work chiefly as laborers and minor employés; 204 are temporary employés of the Census Bureau; and 27,464 are unclassified laborers not elsewhere herein enumerated." Of the remaining 22,960, "few important positions are excepted from competitive examination." 32d rep. U. S. Civil Serv. Com., 5.

The numbers differ somewhat in the report for 1917 but the differences are unimportant.

Arthur began the merit system and when he left office there were in the classified service 15,573 places. Cleveland, during his first term, added the railway P. O. service and revived the departmental classification, in number 11,757 places. Harrison classified the Indian service, Fish Commission, Weather Bureau and free delivery offices, having less than 50 men, adding 10,535 places. Cleveland, during his second term, made large additions, including the Internal Revenue, Government Printing Office, Custom House, Life Saving, Light-House services, Engineer Dept. of War Dept., Ordnance Dept., Navy-Yard, rest of Indian service, Pension surgeons, in number, 38,961 places. McKinley added 3261 places.

not necessary here to discuss, the United States Civil Service was on a merit basis except for 10,690 presidential appointees. It is true that these are the most important officers in the civil service, the postmasters, the collectors, the marshals and district attorneys bearing the largest emolument and wielding the greatest political influence.

On March 31, 1917 President Wilson by an executive order took a step toward the application of open competitive examinations to filling vacancies occurring in the positions of first, second and third class postmasters; but as these officials are appointed "with the advice and consent of the Senate," they cannot be transferred to the classified service unless by the Senate's direction.¹

A contrast of the civil service between 1869 when Grant was inaugurated and now ² will show what a great work has been wrought for the cause of righteousness. The wishers for civil service reform welcomed Grant as a convert and were disappointed at his abortive efforts but the mass of the party did not share their disappointment.

Roosevelt made numerous net additions but the rural free delivery and the classification of fourth-class postmasters were the chief, in number (this does not include Panama canal) 34,766 places. Taft: Assistant postmasters and clerks, navy-yard artisans, fourth class postmasters, numbering 56,868. Wilson: The classified service had a large growth under Wilson amounting on June 30, 1917 to about 40,000. Most of this is probably growth. The above data were communicated to me by D. M. Matteson who wrote: "The figures I give of the additions by the various Presidents are not inclusive of growth; but they do not agree with other figures I have seen and indeed they do not agree from year to year in the reports of the Commission. I have given them mainly for comparison."

¹ Washington despatch to *Boston Daily Herald*, Apr. 1, 1917; 34th rep. U. S. Civil Serv. Com., ix. *Boston Eve. Transcript*, Feb. 6, 1919; R. H. Dana to *Boston Daily Herald* of Feb. 4, 1919; Good Government, Jan. 1919.

² 1917.

Well-meaning people, not reformers, acknowledged that the merit system was based on business principles, but argued that its accomplishment was utopian and that any one who believed that such a civil service could be established was a dreamer of dreams. But Hayes in his letter of acceptance sounded a clarion note and as President wrought with wise efficiency. Then followed the magna carta of 1883. Quietly the work went on, helped by energetic Presidents who had the root of the matter in them and who had at their back a strong public sentiment. It used to be said in the infancy of the reform that the Democratic leaders and Republican rank and file favored it, the Republican leaders and Democratic rank and file opposed it. Slowly, with infinite pains, meeting drawbacks, Cleveland converted a mass of his party from the belief in the practice of their saint Jackson, "To the victors belong the spoils." And when the younger set of Republicans, many of them college-bred men, came forward and assumed leadership they held to their youthful belief in civil service reform. Thus commendable non-partisan action ensued, with leaders and rank and file of both parties shoulder to shoulder. Truly it is a subject of rejoicing that so much in opposition to machine politicians has been wrought in a half century for the cause of good government.¹

Owing to other preoccupations, the tariff question had slept, but it waked up in 1880 before the Republican

¹ Authorities: 1st, 2d, 3d, 25th, 32d reports of U. S. Civil Serv. Com.; Proceedings of Nat. Civil Serv. Ref. League 1914; Richardson, viii; Life of Curtis, Cary; Fish, *The Civil Service and Patronage*; Charles Lyman, *N. A. Rev.*, Nov. 1893; Theodore Roosevelt, *Atlantic Monthly*, Feb. 1891; Miss Lucy M. Salmon, *Amer. Hist. Assoc. Papers*, i.; Ostrogorski, *Democracy*, ii.; *The Nation*, *passim*; Autobiography Andrew D. White, i.

treasure-trove in the declaration of the Democratic platform "a tariff for revenue only." In May 1880 William W. Eaton, a Democratic senator from Connecticut, who may be classed as a moderate protectionist, introduced a bill to refer the subject to a "tariff commission" to be composed of "nine commissioners from civil life" appointed by the President; their duty should be "to thoroughly investigate all the various questions relating to the agricultural, commercial, mercantile, manufacturing, mining and industrial interests of the United States, so far as the same may be necessary to the establishment of a judicious tariff, or a revision of the existing tariff, upon a scale of justice to all interests." The bill was passed by the Senate and the debate previous to the passage shows that it was regarded as a protectionist measure. Dawes of Massachusetts, a fair exponent of the protective tariff principle, said: "I am in favor of a revision and reform of the tariff. Great inconsistencies and incongruities exist in the tariff. A great many excessive duties remain upon the statute-book. Many dutiable articles should be on the free list and many of the provisions of the tariff have become obsolete and inoperative. The present is a favorable time for such a revision owing to the increased prosperity of the country." Coke of Texas strongly opposed the appointment of the Commission by the President. "Who is responsible for the existing tariff," he asked, "a species of class legislation which enriches a few at the expense of the great body of the people? . . . The Republican party. Who is the chief, the official head of the Republican party? The President of the United States [Hayes]. . . . Instead of tariff reform we can expect from such a body of men [a

tariff commission appointed by the President] nothing else than a report whitewashing the present tariff. . . . I am opposed to the bill because it takes out of the hands of Congress, where it legitimately belongs, the tariff question and places it in the hands of those who may be, and I believe will be, enemies of the people's interests." Eaton followed with a clear explanation of the scope of his bill, a statement of his reflections for three years, an exhibition of thorough knowledge of the subject, and a wise view of how such a commission should be constituted. "I would, so far as I could," he declared, "divorce this whole question from politics. It is a great economic question; it is a question upon which hinges the welfare of all our people, agriculturists as well as manufacturers."

The bill was passed by the Democratic Senate¹ but during the Congress it did not go through the Democratic House. Before it was considered by the next Congress Garfield had been elected and assassinated, and the Congress which met in December 1881 necessarily had to take into consideration that the country had declared against "a tariff for revenue only." The Senate was composed of 37 Democrats, 37 Republicans, one Independent [David Davis²] and one Readjuster [William Mahone of Virginia] and the House of 135 Democrats, 147 Republicans, 9 Nationals and 2 Readjusters.³ Congress had before them President Arthur's

¹ Appletons' Ann. Cyc., 1880, 183 *et ante*.

² See my vol. vii. 262 *et seq.*

³ National Conventions and Platforms, McKee, 200; Tribune Almanac. D. M. Matteson has furnished me the following: The Readjuster movement in Virginia was both social and economic in its origin; a local connecting link between the Greenback and Populist agitations. Its avowed

first annual message, in which he told of the excessive revenue, having been 100 millions for the last fiscal year, and said that "if the revenue laws remain unchanged, this surplus must year by year increase."¹ He recommended the abolition of all internal-revenue taxes except those upon liquor and tobacco and a revision of the tariff, giving a qualified approval of a tariff commission such as the Senate had previously enacted. The bill providing for the Tariff Commission was passed during the spring of 1882 by a vote of 151 : 83 in the House, 35 : 19 in the Senate. "All but about thirty" votes for it in the House were from Republicans, all but seven against it by Democrats. Six Democratic senators "voted in the affirmative, two Republicans and Davis in the negative."² While the Republicans were mainly for a protective tariff and the Democrats for tariff reform, party lines could not be distinctly drawn as there were tariff Democrats and tariff-reform Republicans.

Eaton, who was no longer in the Senate, thought that the Commissioners would draw up a tariff which would be adopted by Congress. They would take the question out of politics; they would consider local matters and manufacturing interests from a broad national view; being

purpose was to readjust the State debt, a partial and indirect repudiation. It gained control of the virtually bankrupt State in 1881 and passed the Riddleberger readjustment act which in the end was the basis of an agreement with the State's creditors. The Readjusters were allied with the national Republicans. Mahone became the absolute boss of the party, controlling both the State and federal patronage and shaping it to his personal ends. He (1881) and Riddleberger (1883) were elected to the United States Senate, and were considered after 1884 as Republicans. The party was finally overthrown in 1889, after its original policy had been adopted by the whole State. Pearson, Readjuster Movement; Royall, Va. Debt Controversy.

¹ Richardson, viii. 48.

² Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, ii. 202.

experts, they would construct a well-proportioned, systematical tariff fair to the producer of raw material, to the manufacturer and not forgetful of the consumer. The bill named first in order "the agricultural interests," which in 1882 favored a low tariff and the consumer's point of view. Manufacturers for the most part believed in the Tariff Commission and, though they could not have entirely endorsed Eaton's speech in its support, they regarded the scheme as a revision of the tariff by its friends. The tariff reformers looked coldly upon the project while the body of the public not directly interested in high protection nor caring little for reform gave it their support for the reason that practical men and not politicians were to pass upon a matter that had been a football of party politics. Their idea is expressed by the title of one of Miss Tarbell's chapters in *The Tariff in Our Times*, "The business man takes charge." Eaton and those who sympathized with him attributed more power to the Commission than Congress had any idea of giving it as that body did not propose to abdicate a shred of their authority. The Commission was to investigate, gather facts and report to Congress and on such a report Congress would base their legislation. If the Commission framed a tariff its work would be in the line of suggestion; it had no authority to legislate.

Arthur duly appointed the nine commissioners from civil life;¹ they were a disappointment. The tariff re-

¹ "The commission consisted of John L. Hayes of Massachusetts, Secretary of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers; Henry W. Oliver, Jr., of Pennsylvania, an iron manufacturer; Austin M. Garland of Illinois, a wool grower; Jacob H. Ambler of Ohio, a former member of Congress; Robert P. Porter of the District of Columbia, a statistician and expert of the Census Office; John W. H. Underwood of Georgia, a man of

formers regarded the Commission as a "packed body";¹ the tariff men thought it lacked distinction. It was not the fault of the President that men of greater celebrity had not been selected; they were asked but declined to serve.²

Six and one-half months intervened between the approval of the bill by the President and the final report. The Commission did not organize and fairly get to work until July but it proved to be an ideal body and its manner of working was well adapted to the case in hand. They travelled throughout the country and listened to testimony of various shades of opinion,³ but fully as important were the social conferences, luncheons and dinners where men in intimate conversation presented their views and argued for a proper recognition of the interests

long experience in public life in the South; Alexander R. Boteler of West Virginia; Duncan F. Kenner of Louisiana, a sugar grower; and William H. McMahon of New York, an officer of the New York Custom House. . . . It will be seen that four of the commissioners were themselves personally or officially interested in industries classed as protected. All the commissioners without exception were favorable to the principle of protection, although Porter had been at one time strongly inclined to free trade." Stanwood, ii. 204. "Judge Ambler, an appointment made at the suggestion of McKinley, was an old-fashioned country lawyer, able, learned and honest — a man jealous of the honor of any office he held or trust he handled, full of contempt for greed, extravagance and grafting, shrewd in detecting them, and relentless in punishing them. . . . It was due to President Arthur's knowledge of the Custom House administration that William H. McMahon, for twenty years an officer of the New York Custom House, was put on the board. McMahon had no interest in any phase of the question except administration, but that he knew from top to bottom." *The Tariff in Our Times*, Ida M. Tarbell, 102 *et seq.*

¹ Stanwood, ii. 206.

² "The President wished to make William A. Wheeler, Vice-President of the United States from 1877 to 1881, the chairman of the commission but he declined the appointment. A. A. Low of New York, Hugh McCulloch, former Secretary of the Treasury, Erastus Corning of New York and John S. Phelps of Missouri also declined." Stanwood, ii. 203 *n.*; Appletons' Ann. Cyc. 1882, 777.

³ Stanwood, 204 *et seq.*; Tarbell, 102 *et seq.*

which they served. The basic knowledge and experience of the Commissioners fitted them well for the reception of this information for they could discriminate between self-interest, doctrinaire ideas and an impartial survey. They said in their report with truth: "In performance of the duty devolved upon them, all the members of the Commission have aimed, and, as they believe, with success, to divest themselves of political bias, sectional prejudice, or considerations of personal interest. It is their desire that their recommendations shall serve no particular party, class, section or school of political economy."¹ Their report was a surprise and showed that the President in his selections had builded more wisely than the country knew and that the Commissioners fully justified his choice.

"Early in its deliberations," so ran the report submitted to the House of Representatives on December 4, 1882, "the Commission became convinced that a substantial reduction of tariff duties is demanded, not by a mere indiscriminate popular clamor, but by the best conservative opinion of the country. . . . Such a reduction of the existing tariff the Commission regards not only as a due recognition of public sentiment and a measure of justice to consumers, but one conducive to the general industrial prosperity, and which, though it may be temporarily inconvenient, will be ultimately beneficial to the special interests affected by such reduction. . . . Excessive duties . . . are positively injurious to the interest which they are supposed to benefit. They encourage the investment of capital in manufacturing enterprise by rash

¹ Report of the Tariff Com., i. 4 *et seq.*

and unskilled speculators, to be followed by disaster to the adventurers and their employés, and a plethora of commodities which deranges the operations of skilled and prudent enterprise. . . .

“Entertaining these views, the Commission has sought to present a scheme of tariff duties in which substantial reduction should be the distinguishing feature. The average reduction in rates, including that from the enlargement of the free list . . . at which the Commission has aimed is not less on the average than 20 per cent., and it is the opinion of the Commission that the reduction will reach 25 per cent. The reduction, slight in some cases, in others not attempted, is in many cases from 40 to 50 per cent.”¹

With its report, the Commission suggested a bill which, had Congress been wise and actuated by the greatest good of the greatest number, they would have enacted, disposing of the tariff question in a manner approved by statesmanship and sound economic doctrine. No better authority can be cited than that of John Sherman, whose four years in the Treasury department and long service on the Senate Finance Committee fitted him to speak as he did after Congress had refused the proffered bill of the Commission and made up one of their own. “At the beginning of this session,” he said, “the finance committee of the Senate had before it the tariff commission report which was an admirable and harmonious plan for a complete law fixing the rates of duty on all kinds of important merchandise, and, what was better, an admirable revision of the laws for the collection of duties and for the

¹ Rep. of the Tariff Com., 5 *et seq.*

trial of customs cases. If the committee had adopted this report, and even had reduced the rates of duty proposed by the commission, but preserved the harmony and symmetry of the plan, we would have had a better tariff law than has existed in this country.”¹

It was however too much to expect that Congress would abandon one of its rights and privileges, so, taking the Commission report as a basis of information the Ways and Means Committee of the House and the Finance Committee of the Senate went to work to construct a tariff law. The Senate got around the constitutional provision, “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives” by tacking its measure on to a bill reducing the internal revenue passed by the House at the last session. Both committees reported; the House and the Senate each passed a tariff bill, differing from the Commission report and from each other. Conference was necessary and must be had quickly, as this was the short session. In the actual House, that elected in 1880, the Republicans had a plurality of 23; in the next House, that chosen in 1882, the Democrats outnumbered the Republicans by 78.² It was certain that if the next House revised the tariff, they would revise it downward, therefore it was deemed highly important for the doctrine of protection that a tariff bill should pass before the fourth of March. Hence expedients were adopted that will not bear defence. By a bit of parliamentary

¹ Rec., ii. 854. Be it remembered, Sherman warmly favored a protective tariff.

² Republicans 152, Democrats 129, Readjusters 2, Greenbackers 9 in the actual House. In the House elected in 1882, Republicans 118, Democrats 196, Readjusters 5, Greenbackers 1, Independents 3, Vacancies 2, to which a Readjuster and an Independent were elected.

legerdemain, under the lead of Thomas B. Reed, the House adopted a new rule "wholly unprecedented"¹ anent their participation in the committee of conference the purpose of which was to have this committee decide on all controverted points. As the Republican majority of the House was protectionist and controlled the Speaker, the rule was in the interest of protection, but it was cunningly devised to effect a high tariff or none at all. It realized, so it was said, "the Irishman's dream of a gun which should fire so as to hit the object if it was a deer and miss it if it was a cow."² While "the Democratic members were astounded at the audacity of the programme,"³ they were unable to defeat the rule.

Senators and representatives met in conference, but as the representatives under instructions from the House presented the view of its constitutional rights to originate revenue measures, two Democratic senators, Bayard and Beck, distinguished men and tariff reformers, who had been appointed as two of the Senate conferees, declined to serve on the ground that the conference could not be "full and free." Ten Democratic senators were successively appointed; all declined, whereupon the committee was filled by the appointment of a Republican and the Readjuster Mahone. This conference committee made the bill which was ultimately adopted by Congress. It merits the appellation given it by Miss Tarbell, "the mongrel bill of 1883." It resulted in no material reduction of the tariff. The conference committee, so said at the time Sherman, who was one of their number, "restored nearly all the inequalities and incongruities of the old

¹ Stanwood, 212.² Tarbell, 126.³ Stanwood, 212.

tariff and yielded to local demands and local interests to an extent that destroyed all symmetry and harmony.”¹ But all the protectionists were not satisfied. William McKinley, one of the House members of the committee and who was becoming the arch-apologist of the tariff, would not sign the conference report because it reduced the duty on wool; he also voted against the bill. Ohio was a wool-growing State and he was acting in the interest of his constituents. Sherman for much the same reason regretted that he had not defeated the bill by voting with the Democrats against the adoption of the Conference Report.²

The iniquity of making a tariff bill in committee is seen by the effort of Readjuster Mahone, who was only an eleventh hour substitute, to raise the duty on iron ore because it was a product of his State of Virginia. The Tariff Commission and the Senate bill had made it 50 cents a ton but he clamored for more. Finally he declared he would not sign the report unless the duty was made at least 75 cents a ton; the rest of the Committee yielded and this rate was fixed and enacted by the bill. Lake Superior ore producers told this story gleefully and lauded, Mahone, who so they affirmed, wrought in the interest of all miners of iron ore.³

¹ March 13, Rec., ii. 854.

² But Sherman did not sign the Conference Report. Record, 8722.

³ See Tarbell, 117.

The act made material reductions in the internal revenue taxation.¹

¹ It took off the tax on bank deposits and capital, the 2 cent stamp on bank cheques, the stamp duties on proprietary medicines and preparations, cosmetics, perfumery, etc. : these dated from the Act of 1864. It took off the tax on friction matches, wax tapers and cigar lights, which had been imposed in 1864 and 1866; also the stamp on playing cards imposed by the Act of 1866. It made material reductions in the tobacco taxes imposed by the Acts of 1872, 1875, 1879.

The ordinary receipts and expenditures of the government are shown by the following table. The receipts do not include those of the Post Office Dep't nor do the expenditures include those disbursements or the payment of the principal of the public debt.

FISCAL YEAR	RECEIPTS	EXPENDITURES	SURPLUS
1882-83	398,287,582	265,408,138	132,879,444
1883-84	348,519,870	244,126,244	104,393,626
1884-85	323,690,706	260,226,935	64,463,771

Statistical Abstract for 1916, 681, 682.

CHAPTER VIII

To Arthur's administration belongs the credit of having practically settled the Chinese question. It was one that Arthur could not evade. Brewing for a long while, it came to a point where the nation must act. As it was a vital question for California and Oregon, these States prevailed over enough senators and representatives from the States east of the Rocky Mountains to compel the national Congress to do their bidding. As California was the head and centre of the movement against the Chinese our attention must be directed to that magnificent domain.

With the Chinese question before the Civil War we need have no concern. There were mutterings portending a great storm, there was hostile legislation, for the most part neutralized by Court decisions; but if there had been a wall erected in 1865 around the Pacific States as there had been around China, the Chinese question would not have loomed large enough to attract the historian's attention. And toward the end of the decade, 1860-1870, California, so to speak, shook hands with the Orient across the Pacific. Anson Burlingame, who had been sent as minister to China, had, with the consent of both countries, become Chinese envoy to the United States and in 1868 he, with a Chinese deputation, arrived with power to negotiate a treaty. The Burlingame treaty, one of the eventful steps, opened the door of the

United States to the Chinese, as it permitted their voluntary immigration and declared that they should enjoy the same privileges in respect to residence as "the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation."¹ Burlingame and his associates were received with great enthusiasm and their treaty was ratified with hearty assent [1868]. There is room for a million Chinese laborers on the Pacific coast, Burlingame told the Chinese in Peking. True enough, but little did he suspect that the arrival of a tithe of that number would create a political and social problem of considerable importance. If the "good times" had continued, the absorbing power of California for the Chinese might, in some degree, have equalled that of the eastern part of the country for the horde of Europeans seeking better conditions than prevailed at home;² but the throwing out of employment of a number of laborers due to the completion of the Central Pacific Railroad in 1869 proved for California the forerunner of adversity. The Union Pacific ran from Omaha, Nebraska, to Ogden, Utah: the Central Pacific thence to San Francisco. The building of both was done at high speed and the efficient work on the Central Pacific was performed in great part by Chinese laborers who had been brought to California by the Pacific Mail steamers. The Central Pacific and the Pacific Mail Company were the creatures of California capitalists and the working of the two, together with their adjuncts and other investments made these men immensely rich.

Before the Pacific railway was completed, San Fran-

¹ Treaties and Conventions, 181.

² Matteson suggests that in this statement I have ignored the racial aspect of the matter.

cisco was nearly as far from New York in distance as Liverpool and much farther in time. Even in the early railroad days, when James Bryce visited California, he spoke of it as "cut off from the more populous parts of the Mississippi Valley by an almost continuous desert of twelve hundred miles, across which the two daily trains move like ships across the ocean."¹ California remained on a specie basis during the Civil War and the troublous years that followed it, and looked down upon the paper money of the East with good-natured contempt. For a while fortune attended her material development. The lessened demand for labor consequent on the completion of the Central Pacific should have given her a taste of the evil of over-population, but as if to ward off this misfortune so familiar to other communities, the development of the bonanza mines of the Comstock lode and good wheat harvests occurred, so that prosperity was rampant while the East suffered from the commercial crisis of 1873. Such good luck however could not last. Although not feeling it at first, California could not forever escape the commercial disturbance ushered in by the panic of 1873, especially as, within her borders, this disturbance was accompanied by disastrous local conditions. In 1876, there was a drought causing the failure of the wheat crop; cattle died for lack of pasturage; mines operated then by the hydraulic process shut down for the want of water. Contemporaneously silver declined in value; the production of the mines of the Comstock lode (which were of silver situated in Nevada) decreased in amount. Dividends stopped; values fell.

¹ American Commonwealth ii., 388.

The community had been given over to a wild speculation. Capitalists, bankers, merchants and shop-keepers neglected their proper occupations to buy and "boom" or eagerly watch mining stocks. Mechanics, laborers, men and maid servants, all took a "flyer." All were bulls in the market. Early in 1877, the collapse came and, to a large part of the community, the collapse meant ruin. The bottom seemed to have dropped out of everything. Elation gave way to despair. Suffering such as comes from the rapid transitions of fortune was the lot of most citizens of San Francisco; and the city overflowed with unemployed men.

Political demagogues were on hand to direct the irritation at the loss of money against the unoffending Chinese. Attracted by the lure of gold, as were many other peoples, they had at first worked in the mines, where, as in all other places, they were successful in earning money and getting ahead. As conditions altered they left the mines for domestic service and laundry work, then took to railroad building, agriculture and other out-of-door labor and finally to manufacturing. The negotiation of the Burlingame treaty gave a fresh impetus to the immigration. In California their numbers in 1870, 1880, 1882 (when the maximum was reached) were respectively 55,000, 77,000, 93,000; on the entire Pacific coast 71,000, 105,000, 132,000.¹

The Chinese had a passion for labor. Exacting the utmost cent by bargaining, they did not strike, so that their labor was continuous; this joined to cheap living and frugality made them desirable working men for the

¹ Chinese Immigration, Mary A. Coolidge, 425.

Pacific coast. "In the early settlement of the State," wrote Samuel Gompers in 1901, "there is a general agreement that the labor of the Chinese was a blessing."¹ And this remained true down to the completion of the Central Pacific Railroad in 1869. As one regards their attitude during these days one comes to understand the virtue of patience although in their case exercised to the point of craven submission. "For rent, etc.," wrote Henry George in 1869, then a resident of San Francisco, "they must always pay more than the whites. They are fair game for all sorts of rascals. . . . To rob these timid people . . . is comparatively safe; nor unless a white man happens to witness the operation is there any danger of subsequent punishment, for in the courts of California the testimony of a Chinaman cannot be received against a white."² Nevertheless the Chinese felt that they had "a nation and a history far superior, far higher and far beyond all others on the earth."³ As they thought of their own overcrowded country, they must have regarded with contempt the 567,247 people who, owning a territory that could support at least thirty million Chinese, complained of "hard times."

From the American point of view, the year 1877 was intensified "hard times," and in California the Chinese was the scape-goat. Their number was exaggerated, which was hardly surprising inasmuch as a few Chinamen because of their yellow complexion and peculiar dress⁴ seemed omnipresent in an American community. The

¹ Coolidge, 337.

² New York *Tribune*, May 1, 1869.

³ San Francisco *Alta California*, March 4, 1882.

⁴ "The ordinary blue cotton blouse and white drawers." Bret Harte, *Stories in Light and Shadow*, 94.

Irish who had come to California seeking their fortune and the American "hoodlums" were their aggressors and they charged the Chinese with troubles that were due to their own failings, local disasters and the depression following the panic of 1873. As one may perceive by studying the contemporary railroad strikes in the East, the desire for riot was in the air; the American "hoodlums" could not resist the prevailing tendency and directed their rage against the unresisting Chinese. In San Francisco a riot began on July 23, 1877 with a working-men's mass meeting held to extend their sympathy to their striking brethren in the East. The dregs of the community got control of the movement and, sacking a corner grocery for liquor, gutted laundries, killed two Chinamen and started to attack Chinatown, the segregated residence of the Chinese. This attack was prevented once by the police, at another time by the Committee of Safety, which had been organized on the third day of the riot on the plan of the Vigilance Committee of ante-bellum days, whose whilom leader headed the present organization. The riots lasted a week. The Chinese prudently kept out of the way of the rioters and, though suffering little in person or property, due to the efficient measures of the supporters of law and order, were unquestionably terrorized and made to feel that they were an excrescence on the body politic.

The "hard times" did not abate and during September the Sand Lot party came into being. This derived its name from the first and subsequent Sunday night meetings being held on the Sand Lot, "a large open space not yet built on covered with sand"¹ near the City Hall,

¹ Bryce, American Commonwealth, ii. 391.

then building, now east of the centre of San Francisco. The country was full of "tramps." There were a large number of unemployed in San Francisco, estimated when the winter came on at 15,000, a large number for a city of about 200,000; these were willing converts of Dennis Kearney, the leader of the Sandlotters. Kearney was a drayman of some education who had lost money through speculation in mining stocks and who swayed the crowd by his inflammatory speech. "The Chinese must go," was a favorite declaration and, from attacking the Chinese, Kearney naturally arrived at a denunciation of their employers. "A little judicious hanging right here and now," he said, "will be the best course to pursue with the capitalists and stock sharps who are all the time robbing us." A notable event was a meeting on October 29 (1877) on Nob Hill in front of the railroad kings' wooden palaces. In his speech Kearney demanded that the Central Pacific Railroad discharge all Chinese within three months. "Recollect Judge Lynch," he said, "and that is the judge that the working-men will want in California if the condition of things is not ameliorated." Kearney was arrested for incendiary language and when released reiterated his refrain, "The Chinese must go," and exhibiting to the Sand Lot meeting four feet of rope with a noose declared that that was their platform. With the new year (1878), Kearney began to lose his hold and soon disappeared from the scene leaving behind him a reputation for inconsistency, since in spite of his vehement attack on the Chinese it was rumored that his shirts were washed by Sam Lee.

David M. Matteson, whose recent thorough study of the subject has been enlightened by his youthful recol-

lections, writes: "The Chinaman in California had but one ideal in those earlier days: to make enough money to return and live comfortably and die peacefully at home, so that his spirit might be properly worshipped by his descendants. So he lived to labor and resented with quiet obstinacy all things which stood in the way of this consummation. When he allowed himself any pleasure it was of a kind usually quite distinct from that of his occidental neighbors and one often on a different if not lower plane of morality. So he herded and was herded in a segregated portion of the place in which he lived, and where he lived was likely indeed to become, if there were enough of his race, a sore. Such was the Chinese quarter of San Francisco." This unsanitary place furnished an argument for the Sandlotters and anti-Chinese, and the existence of such a plague spot in a growing city was immeasurably condemned. It was natural, however, that these Orientals should congregate together and live in crowded quarters as they did at home. Edward S. Morse, with his keen power of observation, was thus impressed with the Chinese quarter of Shanghai: "Everybody was dirty and the surroundings were dirty and old. The city looked as though it had never been swept or cleaned, and it never had. Mediæval microbes and prehistoric odors were always in evidence." Shown through the house of a well-to-do citizen he wrote: "The most serious matter was the very primitive and objectionable features connected with the sanitary arrangements. . . . In these respects the Chinese are degraded to the last degree and one wonders . . . how the nation should number four hundred millions." "Such dirty booths as we passed with such dirty food for sale!" In Canton Morse was

similarly impressed. "The sanitary arrangements were simply abominable," he wrote. "In the three thousand years and more that the Chinese has been a nation, natural selection has rooted out all those who could not survive these flagrant violations of all sanitary laws, the survivors being evidently immune against microbes that would kill a European outright."¹

The Chinese of Chinatown in San Francisco, writes Matteson, "burrowed underground, lived in subterranean dens that were choked with fumes. These dens underground were very characteristic of Chinatown even as late as 1890. I went into many of them in company with an insurance inspector. The congressional committee [1877] reported that there were some 35,000 adult Chinese in San Francisco living in filthy dwellings, upon poor food, crowded in narrow quarters, disregarding health and fire ordinances."² "Yet personally," Matteson says, "the Chinaman was cleanly; as a domestic servant then as now he kept himself and his food up to the required standards and the clothes he washed, though they might have a slight and complex smell, were clean. . . . I can testify that the Chinese always looked clean and invariably smelled clean." Bret Harte, whose remarks on the Chinese in the early days of California represent the acute perceptions of a genius, speaks of "that singular medicated odor — half opium, half ginger — which we recognize as the common 'Chinese smell.'"³

The vices of the Chinamen residing in San Francisco

¹ *Glimpses of China* (1902), 14, 20, 80, 128.

² "For his unsanitary quarters he paid a large rent and he also paid his taxes."

³ *Stories in Light and Shadow*, 94.

supplied the Sandlotters with a congenial topic. Instead of alcohol, they stimulated themselves with opium, but the smoking of opium did not seem to affect them as deleteriously as it did the Caucasian. They gambled, but so did their persecutors. Bret Harte has illustrated this in his poem, "Plain Language from Truthful James,"

"Which I wish to remark,
And my language is plain,
That for ways that are dark
And for tricks that are vain
The heathen Chinees is peculiar,
Which the same I would rise to explain."

The poet tells of a game of euchre between Ah Sin, Bill Nye and himself, a game which Ah Sin pretended not to understand.

"But he smiled as he sat by the table,
With the smile that was childlike and bland."

The story relates how Nye's sleeve was "stuffed full of aces and bowers," but Ah Sin cheating the cheater continually got the better of the Americans.

"Till at last he put down a right bower,
Which the same Nye had dealt unto me"
When Nye "rose with a sigh
And said 'Can this be?
We are ruined by Chinese cheap labor'
And he went for that heathen Chinees."

The assault disclosed that "Ah Sin had been hiding, in the game 'he did not understand,' twenty-four packs in his long sleeves."

Much was said about the vice of prostitution which, owing to the small number of women and the conditions

under which they were brought to California, was undoubtedly true, while "Oriental vices" peculiarly obnoxious to the Anglo-Saxon and Irishman, must have prevailed. A charge of the Sandlotters was that the Chinese would not embrace Christianity. Henry Ward Beecher has described this phase: "We have clubbed them, stoned them, burned their houses and murdered some of them, yet they refuse to be converted. I do not know any way except to blow them up with nitro-glycerine, if we are ever to get them to heaven."¹

To the Westerner the "Heathen Chinees" was peculiar in his contradictory traits. Although honest in business he had no regard for the truth and would perjure himself unblushingly in an American court. The facial resemblance to one another was irritating. Bret Harte tells of an "evasion of the Foreign Miners' Tax, an oppressive measure aimed principally at the Chinese, who humbly worked the worn-out 'tailings' of their Christian fellow-miners. . . . See Yup, having paid his tax himself to the collector, at once passed the receipt to his fellows so that the collector found himself confronted in different parts of the settlement with the receipt and the aimless laugh of, apparently, See Yup himself. Although we all knew that there were a dozen Chinamen or more at work at the mines, the collector never was able to collect the tax from more than *two* — See Yup and one See Yin."² Their taciturnity puzzled the Caucasian. "The expression of the Chinese face in the aggregate is neither cheerful nor happy," wrote Bret Harte. "In an acquaintance of half a dozen years, I can only recall one

¹ Coolidge, 445.

² Stories in Light and Shadow, 101.

or two exceptions to this rule. There is an abiding consciousness of degradation, — a secret pain or self-humiliation visible in the lines of the mouth and eye. Whether it is only a modification of Turkish gravity or whether it is the dread Valley of the Shadow of the Drug, through which they are continually straying, I cannot say. They seldom smile, and their laughter is of such an extraordinary and sardonic nature — so purely a mechanical spasm quite independent of any mirthful attribute — that to this day I am doubtful whether I ever saw a Chinaman laugh.”¹

The conduct of the Sandlotters toward the Chinese merits severe condemnation. But there was a good reason why their immigration should be prohibited and the public sentiment of the community was decidedly in favor of such prohibition. No one need seek political preferment in California unless opposed to Chinese immigration. “We are ruined by Chinese cheap labor,” the cry of the working-man, contained the essence of truth. The Chinese laborer was superior to the Caucasian in that he could live more cheaply and would work unremittingly. No Caucasian could stand such competition. “It is not the present thousand of whom we complain; it is the future million,” was a statement whose economic truth could not be gainsaid. An overcrowded country with 350 millions on a surface of 1,500,000 square miles could not fail to look covetously upon the fair land of California, so resembling France in its fertility, which could certainly subsist in comfort at least 30 million Chinese.

¹ The Luck of Roaring Camp, 242.

Nor was "California for the Americans" an unnatural claim, as they had developed this fair domain. A striking chapter of material development is the last edition of Richard H. Dana's "Two Years before the Mast." Visiting California when under Mexican rule he gave a graphic account of prevalent conditions; and when he revisited the country in 1859 he was struck with the contrast. "How strange and eventful," he wrote, "has been the brief history of this marvellous city, San Francisco! In 1835 there was one board shanty. In 1836 one adobe house on the same spot. In 1847, a population of four hundred and fifty persons, who organized a town government. Then came the *auri sacra fames*, the flocking together of many of the worst spirits of Christendom; a sudden birth of a city of canvas and boards, entirely destroyed by fire five times in eighteen months, . . . and as often rebuilt until it became a solid city of brick and stone, of nearly one hundred thousand inhabitants, with all the accompaniments of wealth and culture, and now (in 1859) the most quiet and well-governed city of its size in the United States." To make the picture of the progress complete, his son added an account of San Francisco in 1911. "The contrast," he wrote, "from 1859 to 1911 is hardly less striking. San Francisco has now grown to over four hundred thousand inhabitants, has twelve daily trains bringing mails and passengers from across the continent and beyond." He added an interesting account of the development of the metropolis of Southern California, Los Angeles.¹

Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court,

¹ Pp. 485, 503.

when holding court on his circuit in California, declared a certain ordinance of the San Francisco government ¹ to be without authority, saying it was "special legislation imposing a degrading and cruel punishment upon a class of persons who are entitled . . . to the equal protection of the laws."² Field is reported to have said in a private conversation, after rendering the decision: "I am of the opinion . . . that no good can come from a resort to small vexations against the Chinaman. . . . To subject them to inconveniences and petty annoyances is unworthy a generous people and will result in no practical benefit. . . . This question cannot be solved by San Francisco, nor by California; nor is it a local one, nor are its consequences to be confined to this side of the continent."³

This opinion was expressed during the summer of 1879. The Californians had already come to feel that it was a matter beyond their control and through pressure exerted in various ways had succeeded in influencing Congress to pass in 1879 a bill "to restrict the immigration of Chinese." This was vetoed by President Hayes,⁴ although he sympathized with the policy that led to it. "The present Chinese invasion," he wrote in his diary, "(it was not in any proper sense immigration — women and children did not come) was pernicious and should be

¹ The ordinance required the cutting of the queues.

² *Ho An Kow v. Nunan*, 5 Saw. 562.

³ *Argonaut*, Aug. 9, 1879. My main authority for this study of the Chinese question is a thesis prepared for me by David M. Matteson during a stop in California. "I was born and brought up in the agitation," he wrote, "so that I knew beforehand what material there was on the question." Next to his thesis, I have found Chinese Immigration, Mary R. Coolidge, the most useful. I have consulted Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, ii.; H. H. Bancroft, xix.; Sparks, *National Development*, Hart's American Nation Series.

⁴ March 1, 1879.

discouraged. . . . We should oppress the Chinamen and their presence would make hoodlums or vagabonds of their oppressors. I would therefore consider with favor suitable measures to discourage the Chinese from coming to our own shores." But "our treaty with China forbids me" to approve the bill passed by Congress. "The treaty was of our seeking. It was proposed by our minister to China — Mr. Burlingame. He became the ambassador of China to this country, and in Washington negotiated it with Mr. Seward. It was first ratified by our Senate and sent to China for ratification there. It was applauded by all parts of this country. The Pacific Coast joined in this. It is now claimed that it has proved unsatisfactory and pernicious and the bill in question seeks to prevent the mischief complained of by a measure which violates its most important provisions. . . . Our countrymen on the Pacific Coast, with great unanimity and with the utmost earnestness, desire a change in our relations with China. They are entitled to have, and they should have, our sympathy in this matter. If we could put ourselves in their places, it is absolutely certain that we should think and feel as they do. We should at once devise appropriate measures to give them assurance of relief. This can be done long before there is any material increase of their present difficulties without any violation of the national faith and without any real or substantial departure from our traditional policy on the subject of immigration." ¹

Later Hayes wrote in his diary: "The veto of the anti-Chinese bill is generally approved east of the Rocky

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 213.

Mountains and bitterly denounced west of the mountains. I was burned in effigy in one town! No doubt a population without women — without wives and mothers — that can't assimilate with us, that underbids our laborers, must be hateful. It should be made certain by proper methods that such an invasion cannot permanently override our people. It cannot safely be admitted into the bosom of our American society.”¹

Hayes was as good as his word. Pursuant to direction by Congress, he appointed three commissioners to endeavor to secure a modification of the Burlingame treaty. These were James B. Angell, President of the Michigan State University, John F. Swift of California and William H. Trescot, who went to Peking and accomplished what the President desired, negotiating a treaty that gave the United States the right to “regulate, limit or suspend but not absolutely prohibit” the immigration of Chinese laborers.²

In 1882 Congress passed another bill suspending the immigration for twenty years. This, President Arthur vetoed on the ground that good faith required the suspension for a lesser period; furthermore he hinted in his veto message that such legislation would receive his approval.³ Congress then passed the Act of May 6, 1882, suspending the immigration of skilled and unskilled Chinese laborers for a period of ten years.⁴ This enactment was signed by the President and proved the high-water mark of anti-Chinese agitation. It inaugurated the exclusion of Chinese labor. Other legislation that

¹ Life of Hayes, Williams, ii. 217 *n*.

² Treaties and Conventions, 182.

³ Apr. 4. Richardson, viii. 117.

⁴ MacDonald, 323.

followed was in the line of definition, greater stringency and a more effective method of enforcement.

The sentiment of the Pacific Coast and the action of Congress showed high political sagacity. To shut out the millions of Chinese desiring to escape from the crowded and unsanitary condition of their native land, from the fertile, unpeopled country of the United States seemed cruelty. Nevertheless such exclusion was far-seeing statesmanship. It was a case of survival of the fittest and, in a fierce competition, the Chinese would survive, as they could exist when the Caucasians would starve.¹ It is a tribute to the high character of the American Executive that President Hayes and President Arthur were not carried away by an insistent public sentiment but guided the country to this desirable end in a dignified manner.

¹ See a careful discussion by M. J. Dee in the *North American Review*, May-June, 1878.

CHAPTER IX

IN writing of the reduction of postage in 1851 under Fillmore, who had reached the presidency through Taylor's death, I said that "it has become a governmental axiom that the increase in the revenue of the post-office department and the decline of rates of postage is a true mark of growth in civilization."¹ From Fillmore to Arthur there had been no change in rates except that in 1872 one-cent postal cards had been authorized, so that on Arthur's accession, first-class mail paid three cents for half an ounce. For the year ending June 30, 1882 there was in the post-office department a surplus of receipts over cost of service, the first since the reduction in 1851. Referring to this the President said in his message of December 1882: "It has been the policy of the Government from its foundation to defray as far as possible the expenses of carrying the mails by a direct tax in the form of postage. It has never been claimed, however, that this service ought to be productive of a net revenue."² The President warmly recommended a reduction in letter postage. Congress agreed with the President and found in the surplus of the general revenue an additional impetus to foster letter correspondence by making it cheaper. A member of the House undoubtedly expressed the view of many when he declared that the reduction was a great

¹ History, i. 216.

² Richardson, viii. 141.

educational measure. On March 3, 1883, the measure became a law, fixing letter postage at two cents a half-ounce;¹ and one of the last bills that the President signed [March 3, 1885] increased the weight of letters carried for two cents to one ounce and reduced second-class mail from two cents to one cent a pound.² The reduction of second-class postage was in the interest of newspapers and magazines and was one reason why the department has generally shown a deficit since the reductions of 1883 and 1885. But the reduction of letter postage, the increase each year of free delivery cities and the establishment of free rural delivery must also be taken into account.³

Arthur's veto of the River and Harbor bill [August 1, 1882] must be spoken of. It may have been one of the influences that cost Arthur the support of the Massachusetts delegation in the Republican national convention⁴ and it did not suit Congress as the bill was passed over it but the veto was popular in the country and should receive the approval of posterity for it was determined by a high sense of public duty. There were appropriations in the bill that he favored; some of these he had himself recommended; but he felt obliged to say

¹ To take effect Oct. 1, 1883. The rate on drop letters was unchanged.

² This went into effect July 1, 1885.

³ My main authority for this account is a thesis based on official reports prepared for me by David M. Matteson.

⁴ Andrew D. White, *Autobiography*, i. 203; George F. Hoar, *Autobiography*, i. 405. But in vol. ii., Hoar wrote: The bill "cost the Republican Party its majority in the House of Representatives. A large number of the members of the House who had voted for it lost their seats." Hoar gave a graphic account of the condemnation that the bill received in Massachusetts and in the country, 113 *et seq.* A. B. Hart wrote in 1887 that it was "the worst River and Harbor bill that has ever been passed," *Practical Essays*, 210.

in his message: "My principal objection to the bill is that it contains appropriations for purposes not for the common defence or general welfare and which do not promote commerce among the States. These provisions, on the contrary, are entirely for the benefit of the particular localities in which it is proposed to make the improvements. I regard such appropriation of the public money as beyond the powers given by the Constitution to Congress and the President." We may translate the next paragraph of this dignified message into political parlance: the bill is objectionable as it is a case of log-rolling to secure a share of the pork barrel.¹

The President made good appointments to the United States Supreme Court, naming Horace Gray of Massachusetts and Samuel Blatchford of New York; and he offered places on this bench to Conkling and to Edmunds,² either of whom would have adorned it; both of whom declined, although both were admirably fitted for the position. He loyally carried into execution the provisions of the Civil Service act and in other ways proved himself a friend of the Reform.³ "He had not used the patronage," wrote George William Curtis, "upon the theory that the whole civil service is a 'bread and butter' brigade of which he is the brigadier."⁴ No more striking instance in our history can be found of the office dignifying the man than in the case of President Arthur. It is related that one of his New York political cronies came to see him, slapped him on the back with "Hello, Chet!"

¹ Richardson, viii. 121; Sparks, 294.

² Badeau, Grant in Peace, 536; Life of Roscoe Conkling, Conkling, 676.

³ Sparks, 327.

⁴ *Harper's Weekly*, Jan. 5, 1884.

when he received a look that reminded him he was speaking to the President of the United States, not to a ward politician of New York. The familiar salutation was never repeated.

Arthur desired a renomination but he never forgot that he was President of the whole people and whatever there was of political work was done by his office-holders and friends, not by himself. He did not swerve an inch from his duty in order to conciliate the leaders of his party. We have seen how he antagonized Blaine, whose support might have been had. The feeling of enmity between him and Sherman was natural; but it was surprising that he could not count on the support of Conkling, Platt and Grant. He alienated them by his refusal to remove Robertson, but with Grant there were further points of difference and the friction between them was serious for the man aspiring after the Republican nomination. Grant as President had appointed Arthur Collector of the Port of New York but thought him little fitted for the Vice-Presidency. At that time however Arthur was subservient to Grant. Badeau related that during the campaign of 1880 he went one evening in company with Jesse Grant to Delmonico's café where he found at one of the tables Arthur, who in reply to their congratulations on his nomination, said to young Grant: "I wish you would tell your father that I went to Chicago to work for his nomination. I was a Grant man and a third term man to the last; and whatever occurred there was no compensation to me for my disappointment." After Arthur became President, Grant visited him at the White House but the visit seemed to strain their relations as the President could not or would not make the ap-

pointments that Grant desired. Next to Blaine, Grant was the most potent factor in the Republican party and his support was well worth having but whatever effort Arthur made, he failed to secure it.

On February 16, 1882, Grant wrote in a private letter : "The President has seemed averse to making any removals, no matter how offensive the parties in place have been to him and friends. I hope this will not continue." A little over a year later [February 28, 1883] he wrote : "Arthur seems more afraid of his enemies, and through this fear more influenced by them, than guided either by his judgment, personal feelings or friendly influences. I hope he will prove me wrong in this judgment." On March 3, 1884, Grant wrote, still confidentially : "The President is now openly a candidate for the nomination in June next, and knows well that I am opposed to it. . . . I would not like to ask a favor from a President whose Administration I have been free to criticise and have no doubt but what my words have been reported to him very much exaggerated." A little over a month later Grant wrote in a private letter : "The Administration has seemed to me to be a sort of *ad interim* one endeavoring to offend no one and to avoid positive action which would draw criticism. Probably the Administration has fewer enemies — outspoken ones — than any preceding it. It has fewer hearty positive friends than any except Hayes possibly. But Arthur will probably go into the Convention second in the number of supporters when he would not probably have a single vote if it was not for his army of officials and the vacancies he has to fill." ¹

¹ Badeau, *Grant in Peace*, 334, 335, 337, 538, 549, 556, 558; T. B. Connery, *Cosmopolitan Magazine*, June, 1897, 162.

The Grant of these letters is the stalwart resourceful politician, a leader of the Republican party, proud of his position, never forgetting that he had been its chosen President for two terms. A special partner of Grant & Ward, to which he contributed \$100,000, he owned a handsome house in a fashionable quarter of New York City, and lived in good style, associating with men of wealth, of whose society he had become exceedingly fond. Receiving \$15,000 a year from a trust fund subscribed for him by New York financiers as well as generous dividends from Grant & Ward, possessed of a reputation as a great general, having been President for eight years,¹ and being now but sixty-one and in good health, he was apparently a man to be envied. But on Christmas Eve, 1883, after getting out of a cab, he slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk injuring the muscles of a thigh and was never afterwards a well man. At the time he wrote the March and April [1884] letters cited in the text he was hobbling about on crutches. But he was in good spirits and little fancied that the good fortune which had generally attended him since 1862 had now left him forever.

The Grant of the Grant & Ward was Ulysses, a son whose rich father-in-law contributed to the capital of the firm. Ferdinand Ward, called the "Napoleon of Wall Street," for a while seemed to merit that reputation; associated closely with him in his operations was his father-in-law, Fish, President of the Marine Bank of Brooklyn and a silent partner of Grant & Ward. The firm was supposed to make large money out of government contracts secured for them through the powerful

¹ His presidency was regarded differently by himself and his New York friends from the account I have given of it in vol. vi. and vii. of my History.

influence of ex-President Grant, which was pure deception on the part of Ward, as Grant had "expressly stipulated" that the firm should have nothing to do with anything of the sort.¹ Grant's financial honor was above reproach but his sense of propriety was never keen; in financial matters he was simple as a child and he honestly thought that the large profits he derived from Grant & Ward were natural and legitimate. Nor is this surprising as he was surrounded socially by men who made money fast and spent it freely. Thus Grant was living in a fool's paradise until Sunday evening, May 4 [1884], when he received a call from Ward.

Ward said: The Marine Bank is in trouble. Four hundred thousand dollars must be raised or the Bank must close its doors on Monday morning, tying up Grant & Ward's deposit of \$660,000, which might mean ruin. I have raised \$250,000 but can do no more. You must raise the balance. On Ward's suggestion, Grant went to W. H. Vanderbilt and obtained his cheque for \$150,000 as a personal loan which he turned over to Ward. On Tuesday morning, May 6, as he limped into the office of Grant & Ward on Wall street, he was met by his son Ulysses who said: "Father, you had better go home. The bank has failed." Still he remained at the office telling Badeau at noon: "We are ruined here. The bank has failed. Mr. Ward cannot be found. The securities are locked up in the safe and he has the key. No one knows where he is."

Grant was in despair. Mortification followed as he thought of the loan of honor he had secured from Vander-

¹ Coolidge, 557.

bilt. His trophies of war and other property were made over to the capitalist, but Vanderbilt was generous and accepted the transfer only to save Grant from the creditors of Grant & Ward.¹ By concerted arrangement, the trophies during January 1885 were offered to the Washington government and their schedule may be read in the eighth volume of Richardson: "swords and medals, paintings, bronzes, portraits, commissions and addresses, and objects of value and art presented by various governments in the world to Ulysses S. Grant."²

The failure of Grant & Ward and of the Marine Bank caused other rotten financial institutions to succumb and produced a panic in Wall Street so that the banks were forced to issue clearing-house certificates on the usual plan. Legitimate business throughout the country was affected for the moment but nothing resembling in any way the financial crises of 1857 or 1873 ensued; and the reason why the Wall Street panic was not followed by a financial crisis is not far to seek. The flush times of the last half of 1879, all of 1880 and the first half of 1881 received a check in the assassination of Garfield in July 1881. Up to that time everything would sell. There was never such a bond market, said a promoter. Issues of all sorts were put out and snapped up by investors with fat bank accounts. Banks encouraged their customers to buy. But the President's death made a great dif-

¹ Grant being only a special partner was not liable for the debts of Grant & Ward although some of the creditors attempted to make him so.

² My account is derived from Badeau, *Grant in Peace*, 416 *et seq.*: *Life of Grant*, Coolidge, 555 *et seq.*: *The Nation*, 1884; Richardson, viii. 270. I have once changed the third person to first. "For their conspiracy to defraud, Fish was sentenced to seven years in prison, Ward to ten," Coolidge, 560. See correspondence between General and Mrs. Grant and Vanderbilt, Jan. 10-11, 1885. *Boston Evening Transcript*, Jan. 12, 1885.

ference. Men took stock of their paper obligations and discovered that all promises to pay were not equally good. Contemporaneously there was in 1881 a failure of the wheat and Indian corn crops because of a severe drought. The export of bread-stuffs largely diminished.¹ Exchanges were disturbed; gold was exported and food-stuffs were imported from Canada and Europe; also potatoes from Scotland. Following the check of 1881 there was a liquidation which went on gradually and was continuing when the failures of Grant & Ward and of the Marine Bank shocked the community. But the country had been so prosperous that the liquidation had gone on without violence and was so well completed that the stock panic of 1884 created only a temporary disturbance in legitimate business. It did not affect the result of the Republican national convention. While the failure of Grant & Ward entirely eliminated Grant's political influence this is a factor of no great importance, as he preferred Blaine to Arthur² and his candidate was successful.

If Arthur had had a chance for the nomination, the Wall Street panic might have turned the scale against him as he was preëminently the business man's candidate. Business was a larger political factor then than

¹Wheat crop: 1880, 499 million bushels; 1881, 383 million bushels; 1882, 504 million bushels; 1883, 421 million bushels; 1884, 512 million bushels. Indian corn crop: 1880, 1,717,000,000 bushels; 1881, 1,195,000,000 bushels; 1882, 1,617,000,000 bushels; 1883, 1,551,000,000 bushels; 1884, 1,796,000,000 bushels. Price of No. 2 spring wheat at Chicago: Nov. 1880, 101½ to 112; Sept. 1881, 121¼ to 140¼; Oct. 1881, 131 to 143¼. Export of wheat: 1880-81, 151 million bushels; 1881-82, 95 million bushels. Export of flour: 1880-81, 7,946,000 barrels; 1881-82, 5,916,000 barrels. The exports of Indian corn, beef, pork, bacon and ham, and lard showed a similar falling-off.

²Badeau, 345, 552; Coolidge, 553; Stanwood, 266.

now.¹ The terms Big Business and *la haute finance* were not created and mentioned with suspicion; yet if the business men could have chosen the President in 1884, Arthur would have been the man. Looking upon his succession with misgiving, they had come to admire him in his conduct of the office. He has pursued a manly course, was the usual verdict. Dignity and good cheer characterized the White House. Arthur was fundamentally a gentleman and was simply his better self during his occupancy of the presidency. George William Curtis wrote: "It is his general conformity to the sound opinion both of the country and of his party and the quiet and unsensational character of his administration which have gained him the standing in public esteem which he holds. This sentiment indeed is one of placid approval and perhaps of gratified surprise; certainly not of enthusiastic personal preference as in the case of Mr. Blaine."² Arthur endeared himself to all lovers of English literature by a refusal to remove James Russell Lowell as minister to England in favor of a man of political influence or financial means.³ Shortly before the Republican national convention Arthur was called upon by two men who suggested to him that, if he would make a definite personal effort, he might bring about a combination that would defeat Blaine and result in his own nomination. To this he replied: I desire the honor greatly, but I will make no personal effort to get it. I will accept it if nominated, but even that I ought not to do as I am far from well and it is not likely that I shall

¹ 1917.

² *Harper's Weekly*, Jan. 5, 1884.

³ Lowell was commissioned to Spain June 11, 1877; to England, Jan. 26, 1880.

survive the new administration.¹ Arthur's forebodings were justified. In less than a year and nine months from March 4, 1885 he had passed away.

Politically the objection to Arthur was serious. His past career of machine politician, his attitude toward Garfield could not be forgotten; and the assassin had killed Garfield expressly to make Arthur President. Ohio was devoted to Garfield's memory and regarded Arthur unfavorably. It was thought that he could not carry the State.² Regard for Garfield and factional troubles rendered his own State of New York exceedingly doubtful. It was idle to nominate a candidate who had not a sure hold on Ohio and more than a fighting chance in New York.

It will be "a close and exciting campaign . . . of men not measures" wrote an experienced journalist in December.³ The power of the Independents was realized by both parties; and, to a man, they were opposed to Blaine. George William Curtis, who may be regarded as their spokesman, asserted that the movement for Blaine's nomination divided the party as dangerously as did Grant's candidacy; multitudes of Republicans everywhere "do not hesitate to say openly that they would not vote for him"; while the secession of the bulk of the Independents was assured. It was absolutely necessary that the Republicans should nominate "candidates on whom 'the fierce light' of searching and exhaustive scouting will reveal no positive and fatal defects."⁴

¹ Paine, *Life of Nast*, 483. I have changed the third person to first.

² *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 25, 1884; J. Sherman, *Rec.*, ii., 845; Wayne MacVeagh, *N. Y. Times*, May 20, 1884.

³ E. V. Smalley, *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan., 1884.

⁴ *Harper's Weekly*, March 29, April 28, 1884.

There was no well-defined issue between the Republican and Democratic parties and there were no differences of principle within the Republican party itself. The dominant aim seemed to be the selection of a man strong enough to defeat the Democratic candidate, who would undoubtedly be Grover Cleveland. In 1882 Cleveland had been elected Governor of New York by 192,854 majority over the Republican candidate; he had made an admirable Governor, stood high in his own party, outside of Tammany Hall, and had won the approval of independent thinkers among both Republicans and Democrats.

In the end, the Convention which met in Chicago on June 3 nominated Blaine, but the result came not of self-seeking and manipulation on his own part; on the contrary, the nomination sought him. He was the choice of the majority of the Convention and undoubtedly of the majority of his party. "I neither desire nor expect the nomination," he said. "But I don't intend that man in the White House shall have it."¹ He was entirely sincere when in writing to one of his most active supporters he said: "My first, last, constant injunction is, spend no money. I never want it [the nomination] unless it be the unbought, unbiassed will of the nominating power. *I enjoin this upon you with special emphasis.*"² The chief reason however of Blaine's indifference was that he feared that he could not carry New York and, as the Democrats would have the solid South, the electoral vote of that State was necessary to Republican success. He shrank from the canvass and, like many other Republicans, cast

¹ Feb. 22, 1884, Writings of J. J. Ingalls, 437.

² To Elkins, May 8, Stanwood, 270. Elkins was his "volunteer campaign manager."

about for a candidate who might win. His eye lighted on General Sherman, to whom he imparted his views in a private letter written on May 25. But General Sherman would not listen to the suggestion. "I will not in any event," he wrote, "entertain or accept a nomination as a candidate for President by the Chicago Republican convention or any other convention, for reasons personal to myself. I claim that the Civil War, in which I simply did a man's share of work, so perfectly accomplished peace, that military men have an absolute right to rest and to demand that the men who have been schooled in the arts and practices of peace shall now do their work equally well. Any senator can step from his chair at the Capitol into the White House and fulfil the office of President with more skill and success than a Grant, Sherman or Sheridan, who were soldiers by education and nature, who filled well their office when the country was in danger but were not schooled in the practices by which civil communities are and should be governed. . . . Therefore I say that 'patriotism' does not demand of me what I construe as a sacrifice of judgment, of inclination and of self-interest. . . . I would account myself a fool, a madman, an ass, to embark anew, at sixty-five years of age, in a career that may at any moment become tempest-tossed by the perfidy, the defalcation, the dishonesty or neglect of any one of a hundred thousand subordinates utterly unknown to the President of the United States, not to say the eternal worriment of a vast host of impecunious friends and old military subordinates." ¹

John Sherman, now Senator, had the support of a part

¹ Gail Hamilton, 624. General Sherman published these letters in the *North American Review*, December, 1888

of the Ohio delegation but had doubts of Republican success. In two confidential letters to his brother, the General, he showed plainly his position: "A nomination is far from being equivalent to an election. The chances are for the Democrats but for their proverbial blundering. . . . I would gladly take it [the nomination] as an honorable closing of thirty years of political life, but I will neither ask for it, scheme for it, nor have I the faintest hope of getting it."¹ On May 4 he wrote to the General: "It is certain that if Blaine is not nominated in the early ballots a movement will be made for your nomination, and if entered upon you will go like wild fire. Some one should be authorized to make a definite and positive refusal if you have concluded to decline the nomination if tendered. My own opinion is still that while you ought not to seek, or even beforehand consent to accept the nomination, yet if it comes unsought and with cordial unanimity you ought to acquiesce. I believe it would be best for the country, honorable to you and your children and far less irksome than you have thought. It would be the safe result of what is like to be a severe contest."

But neither Blaine's advice nor his brother's could move the General. His final word sent to John B. Henderson who became permanent chairman of the Convention was: Prevent if you can the mention of my name; should a break occur after the first ballot and "my name be presented as a compromise" decline for me; lastly "If in spite of such declination I should be nominated," decline with emphasis. For "I would not for a million

¹ Jan. 29, March 7.

dollars subject myself and family to the ordeal of a political canvass and afterwards to a four years service in the White House.”¹

While the absence of Conkling and Senators Hale and Frye [Blaine leaders in 1880] was conspicuous there were many able men among the delegates. Massachusetts sent Senator Hoar, William W. Crapo, John D. Long and Henry Cabot Lodge as delegates at large and, as district delegate, Edward L. Pierce: 25 of her 28 votes, including these five, were given to Edmunds. From New York, came Theodore Roosevelt and Andrew D. White as delegates at large, and, as district delegate, George William Curtis, who was made chairman of the delegation. These three supported Edmunds while Thomas C. Platt, a district delegate, the former lieutenant of Conkling, had separated from the Stalwarts and was strongly in favor of Blaine. Robertson, lacking the sense of propriety that obtains among politicians, was an enthusiastic Blaine delegate. Three of the delegates at large from Ohio were Foraker, William McKinley and Mark Hanna, this being the first appearance of Hanna on the stage of national politics. The warm friendship which existed between him and McKinley until McKinley's death had already begun although McKinley desired the nomination of Blaine, while Hanna was an earnest and faithful worker for John Sherman. The following of Blaine must not be regarded as entirely of the Thomas C. Platt stripe; some of the best men of the party, like McKinley and William Walter Phelps, were advocates of his nomination.

¹ Sherman Letters, 357-361.

In the Convention harmony prevailed. The reports of the Committees on Credentials and on Resolutions were unanimously adopted; the majority report of the Committee on Rules, without a call of the roll. Nevertheless a contention occurred on the first day when Lodge, Curtis and Roosevelt resisted the choice of the National Committee for temporary chairman — Powell Clayton, an eleventh-hour supporter of Blaine — and carried by a majority of 40 the election of John R. Lynch, a colored man who was for Arthur. Urging Lynch's election, "up from the midst of the Empire State delegates," wrote a reporter speaking of Roosevelt, "rose a slight almost boyish figure. It was that of an active, nervous, light-haired, gray-eyed man who had just thrown off a straw hat and scrambled to his perch in the chair with juvenile activity. Everybody knew the man, for there is not a State headquarters which he has not visited in his canvass for Edmunds and scarce an influential delegate with whom he has not conversed in a straightforward, manly way. He was greeted with a burst of rousing applause."¹ The division in the main was between the Blaine and Logan delegates [Logan was a candidate, receiving on the first ballot 63½ votes] on the one side and the Arthur, Edmunds and Sherman forces on the other, but it failed to reveal the entire Blaine strength, as a number of his supporters had a personal preference for Lynch over Clayton. On the second day owing to a premonition of the "Mugwump bolt" against Blaine, a resolution was offered that every member of the Convention was bound in honor to support its nominee. This was opposed by

¹ *N. Y. Times*, June 4, 1884.

Edward L. Pierce and an animated discussion followed, ending with an impassioned speech by George William Curtis against the resolution, as a result of which it was withdrawn.

Although it is now evident that it was a Blaine convention, it was not clear at the time to those opposing his nomination — at any rate not until the fourth day when the balloting began. The objection to Blaine was presented under different aspects. A number of the delegates believed that he had prostituted his high office of Speaker of the House in an effort for pecuniary gain. Others denying that the charge had been proved, felt that the suspicion was so strong as to render him a vulnerable candidate. Others were apprehensive of his supposed jingoism. And all these were at one in the conviction that he could not carry New York. In the balloting Arthur was the next strongest candidate, but to unite in his favor the opposition to Blaine was impossible; indeed it was thought that, owing to party dissensions he could not carry New York, his own State. Those opposed to both Blaine and Arthur endeavored to bring the other jarring elements together. Roosevelt and Mark Hanna tried to induce the Edmunds delegates to divert their strength to John Sherman, hoping that other accessions might follow; this combination they failed to effect. Then efforts were made in another direction. Although it was known in the Convention that General Sherman had written a letter to Blaine, declining to be a candidate and had sent a telegram of the same tenor to Henderson, a belief was held in some quarters that if he were nominated, he would not decline. Senator Hoar and George William Curtis sharing this belief, endeavored

to win an important number of delegates from their respective States to their way of thinking. They thought they had succeeded and were intending at the proper time to announce these votes for General Sherman, thereupon it was believed delegates from one or two other States would follow, but, before the announcement could be made, each was met with this objection from their associate delegates — "Our people do not want a Father Confessor in the White House," the reference being to the religion of General Sherman's wife. Thus they were forced to abandon their attempt.¹

On Friday, June 6, the fourth day of the Convention, the balloting began. On the first ballot when 411 were necessary to a choice Blaine had 334½; Arthur, 278; Edmunds, 93; Logan, 63½; John Sherman, 30; Hawley, 13; Robert Lincoln, 4; General Sherman, 2. Blaine gained steadily on the second and third ballots; on the fourth nearly all of the Logan delegates by Logan's direction voted for him and there were other changes sufficient to give him 541 votes and the nomination. The majority of the Convention, representing the majority of the party, regarded the allegation of Blaine's venality as a calumny. Logan was nominated for Vice-President.²

¹ Hoar's Autobiography, i. 407.

² My account of the Convention has been based on a thesis written for me by David M. Matteson.

CHAPTER X

BLAINE'S nomination was certain to be followed by Grover Cleveland's. Here was a Democrat who would receive the support of the Independent Republicans; and, indeed, at the Democratic convention, meeting in Chicago on July 8, he was nominated on the second ballot. The opposition to him came from Tammany Hall and Benjamin F. Butler and, though noisy and vehement in its declaration that Cleveland could not carry New York State, it showed no important strength in the balloting. "We love him most of all for the enemies he has made,"¹ declared the seconder of Cleveland's nomination; and the sentiment to which this declaration gave rise dominated the delegates. On the second ballot Cleveland received 683 of 820 votes, considerably more than the two-thirds necessary to effect a nomination.²

Students of politics may read the lengthy and dreary platforms of both conventions which have been faithfully reproduced by Edward Stanwood in his valuable book;³ they may go further and read the letters of acceptances

¹ *The Nation*, July 17, 1884.

² During June Samuel J. Tilden, who was physically unable to make any sort of a campaign, declined the Democratic nomination in a dignified letter. He received a graceful reference in the Democratic platform in which his martyrdom was kept before the public. *The Nation* in a brief article of June 19, p. 515, states Tilden's case, according to my view, with truthful accuracy.

³ A History of the Presidency.

of both candidates ; but in truth the campaign turned on neither the one nor the other. The newspapers of the time and the minds of men generally were filled with considerations affecting the personal characters of Blaine and of Cleveland. I have already analyzed the charges against Blaine,¹ arriving in 1905 at the conclusion that he had probably prostituted his position as Speaker of the House for the purpose of making money. Considerable reading and much conversation since that year² have failed to shake my conviction. Now these charges were pushed with vigor. Boston began the crusade by the organization of a committee of one hundred prominent Republicans who prepared a pamphlet showing on grounds of "human evidence" that Blaine had not acted with the straightforwardness and honesty demanded of a man in his high office of Speaker. Pledges were asked for and received from Republicans that they would not vote for their party's candidate for President. The Boston committee was largely assisted by men of their way of thinking in New York ; and this great city together with Boston constituted the headquarters of the movement against Blaine. The "bolters" assumed with pride the name of "Mugwump"³ which was given them in derision and their work is known in history as the "Mugwump revolt" and the canvass of 1884 as the "Mugwump campaign."⁴ The daily talk of these men in social gatherings, in clubs, in noonday meetings in lunch rooms, had a profound influence on undecided Republicans and this talk was powerfully enforced by the daily writing in journals that

¹ History, vii., 194.

² To 1917.

³ The New York *Sun* made it a national nickname.

⁴ So called by Stanwood.

had been Republican but could not uphold their party's choice.¹

Nothing could be said against Cleveland's public record. He had been Sheriff of his County and had been elected mayor of his own city of Buffalo, a Republican city, because of his excellent character in public affairs. His record as mayor won him the Democratic nomination for Governor of New York in 1882, when he was elected by a majority of 192,854 over an excellent Republican candidate. As Governor he had won the approval of educated men and independent thinkers; and this approval being cogently expressed had permeated the mass of Democrats. The criticisms hurled at him endeared him to the Independents: this point is well put by Andrew D. White, who as an educator and literary man had the ear of the country. Cleveland, he wrote, "seemed utterly incapable of making any bid for mob support; there had appeared not the slightest germ of demagogism in him; he had refused to be a mere partisan tool and had steadily stood for the best ideals of government." What seemed to the political workers an irreparable error was his veto of a bill reducing the fare on the elevated railroads of New York City; and, indeed, this veto, executed by a man with political aspirations and hence with a desire to please the working classes, was an act of undoubted courage. White was a man of inde-

¹ *The Nation* of June 12 wrote: "The list of the Independent and Republican journals which are openly committed against Blaine stands now: *New York Times*, *Herald*, *Harper's Weekly*, *Puck*, *Evening Telegram*, *Brooklyn Union*, *Rochester Post Express*, *Rochester Herald*, *Syracuse Herald*, *Flushing Times*, *Boston Advertiser*, *Boston Transcript*, *Boston Herald*, *Springfield Republican*, *Philadelphia Record*, *Philadelphia Times*, *Chicago Times*, *Chicago News*, *New Haven News*, *New York Evening Post*." There were also a number of other journals.

pendent means, with large political and diplomatic experience. He knew Europe's public men almost as well as he knew those of his own country, and was able, by turns, to take the view of the proletariat and Big Business although devoted to neither. Thus he wrote of the motive which dictated this veto: Cleveland asserted "that whatever his sympathies for the working people might be, he could not, as an honest man, allow such a bill to pass, and come what might, he would not." White, as a New York State man familiar with her politics, also admired Cleveland because he would not do the bidding of Tammany Hall. "He had also dared quietly but firmly," proceeded White, "to resist the chief 'boss' of his party in New York City."¹

If the canvass had been confined to the public careers of the candidates, Cleveland would have been triumphantly elected. Realizing this certainty as time went on, the Republican managers decided to attack a phase of Cleveland's private life — a stratagem which had never before figured in a presidential campaign. He was a bachelor and his relations with women were not always strictly platonic; following the custom of the day, he ordinarily drank at bars before the noonday meal. From these two undoubted facts, stories were constructed placing the Democratic candidate in an unfavorable light. It mattered not that honest investigation showed Cleveland to be a loyal friend and in at least one affair actuated by a high sense of honor. Mud was thrown and some of it stuck. Women by their indirect influence and ministers by their power of persuasion were effective in leading

¹ Autobiography, i. 207.

many voters to believe that Cleveland was a "notorious libertine and profligate" unfit for the presidency.¹ His friends could not aver that he was a Joseph and a teetotaler or that his revels were of a refined character; so there existed this much of basis for what, in the words of Andrew D. White, was "the vilest political campaign ever waged."² Cleveland might indeed have said

"The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices
Make instruments to plague us."³

"Party contests," said *The Nation* on October 23, "have never before reached so low a depth of degradation in this . . . country." In a previous article which might have been written by Godkin himself it said: "We are not defending incontinence. Chastity is a great virtue, but every man knows in his heart that it is not the greatest of virtues, that offences against it have often been consistent with the possession of all the qualities which ennoble human nature and dignify human life and make human progress possible."⁴

It is a commonplace to say that we have derived our palladium of liberties from England. In the canvass of 1884 we might have drawn from her a further lesson especially as our religious and moral standards are substantially the same. No hard and fast line can be drawn,

¹ Bryce, who was here in 1884 on one of his visits, was impressed with the sensitiveness of American opinion on a candidate's relations with women. "Nothing damages a man more," he wrote, "than a reputation for irregularity in these relations." *American Commonwealth*, ii. 211.

² *Autobiography*, i. 209. White's statement is made with some qualifications. From memory I can make it without any so far as concerns this country.

³ Or

"Boundless intemperance
In nature is a tyranny."

⁴ Aug. 7.

but specific instances reveal to some extent the British procedure in similar cases. That Lord Palmerston was not scrupulous in observance of the seventh commandment was well known in society and the Clubs but, so far as I know, no hint of his dereliction ever got into the newspapers although he was a prominent figure in political life for fifty-eight years, being twice Prime Minister and dying while in that office. On the other hand Sir Charles Dilke, despite his extraordinary ability, was debarred from public life because of the particulars of a wild orgy becoming openly known through the newspapers and proceedings in Court. Accompanied by a stinging leader from the *London Times* he was sent packing from England. There was nothing in Cleveland's private morality to prevent a man of like character from aspiring to the highest political office in Great Britain, although he would have been unfitted for the place by reason of his ponderous and commonplace oratory. And a Blaine might have held the premiership if corruption had not been brought home to him. It may be urged, and I suspect truly, that men no more scrupulous nor principled than Blaine have reached high positions in England, but the difference is that, unlike Blaine, they were not publicly condemned out of their own mouths — in other words, by letters over their own hands. The judgment may be hard, but it has been arrived at by a nation of high civilization and morality, after years of fruitful experience, as best adapted to the democracy of to-day which is powerless to alter human nature. "I do not feel that I shall prove a dead-head in the enterprise"; "It will be in my power to 'cast an anchor to the windward' in your behalf"; "Burn this letter," are among

the utterances of Blaine which, in view of the surrounding circumstances, cannot be explained away.

To women and clergymen, the contrast between Cleveland's and Blaine's private life was a strong Blaine argument. As disclosed by the familiar letters printed by Gail Hamilton, the relations between Blaine and his wife and children were wholly admirable. His devotion to them was unremitting; and his inordinate desire for money implied no expectation of luxurious living or ostentatious display. Apart from necessary political expenses he desired money for the comfort of his wife and for the education and establishment of his children. This devotion was repaid by a loving regard which is reflected even in the jokes based on the "family chief's" care of his body and excessive fear of illness — this reached the verge of hypochondria. At all events Blaine's family life is a charming picture and was not unappreciated by the Cleveland advocates.

The address of the National Conference of Republicans and Independents held in New York during July was written by George William Curtis and began, "The paramount issue of the Presidential election of this year is moral rather than political." "The proceedings of the Conference were characterized by great enthusiasm," wrote Moorfield Storey in a relation communicated to me and printed with his permission, "and we adjourned thoroughly well satisfied with the day's work, but as we were leaving the hall there were placed in our hands copies of a Buffalo newspaper containing the story about Mr. Cleveland's relations with Mrs. Halpine which afterwards played so important a part in the campaign.

"A number of us went to the University Club and dined

together, and among them was Carl Schurz who sat at the head of the table, next to him was a man from Chicago and I sat next. Just as we were finishing dinner the door opened and George William Curtis, Charles R. Codman, Theodore Lyman and General Barlow with possibly another, whom at this moment I do not recall, came in. Mr. Curtis's face was the picture of woe and he asked us whether we had seen this Buffalo paper. We said that we had and he said: 'What are we going to do? We have begun by saying that the issue of the present campaign is moral, not political, and here we are confronted with this scandal. How can we possibly continue our support of Mr. Cleveland?' It was pointed out to him in reply that, since the occurrences described had taken place, Mr. Cleveland had been elected mayor of Buffalo and afterward Governor of New York by an unprecedented majority and that during the campaigns which preceded these elections no allusion had been made to any story of the sort. It was suggested that had this story been true something would have been said about it in these campaigns, and it was also suggested that it was not safe to believe everything that we saw written in the newspaper during a political campaign, especially when feeling ran as high as it did at that time.

"Mr. Curtis however was not entirely satisfied and the discussion was proceeding when the gentleman on my left, who, I think came from Chicago and who had been silently listening spoke up. He said 'Do you want to know how this matter strikes me?' We answered, 'Yes.' 'Well,' said he, 'from what I hear I gather that Mr. Cleveland has shown high character and great capacity in public office but that in private life his con-

duct has been open to question, while, on the other hand, Mr. Blaine in public life has been weak and dishonest while he seems to have been an admirable husband and father. The conclusion that I draw from these facts is that we should elect Mr. Cleveland to the public office which he is so admirably qualified to fill and remand Mr. Blaine to the private life which he is so eminently fitted to adorn.'"

Some Democrats believing that the Devil must be fought with fire trumped up a story to the discredit of Blaine's ante-marital relations. This drew from him a dignified letter¹ telling a truthful story with no attempt to twist in the slightest degree the facts in the case. The historian must regret that a marplot interfered to give a new bias to the Democratic conduct of the campaign.

Now, the only debatable State holding an election in October was Ohio and both parties made strenuous efforts to carry it. The speaker of greatest weight on the Cleveland side was Carl Schurz who had stumped the State for Governor Hayes and honest money in 1875, had been a member of Hayes's cabinet and a supporter of Garfield and now speaking in both English and German persuaded wavering voters by his distinguished oratory to follow his example in forsaking the Republican party because it had united its fortunes to Blaine. The Republican managers of Ohio became alarmed and insisted that Blaine should come thither to rouse enthusiasm. With considerable reluctance he set off on a stump-ing tour, confining his attention mainly to Ohio until the October election should take place. His statements re-

¹ *The Nation*, Sept. 25.

garding his ownership of stock in the Standard Coal and Iron Company were uncandid and he failed to efface an unfavorable impression existing in the minds of many of his supporters. Still these men favored a protective tariff and gave their support to Blaine because their interests were bound up in the Republican party and he was their standard-bearer. On the mass of voters he undoubtedly exercised much influence; he was an effective campaigner and resembled Henry Clay in the magnetic influence that he exercised over a political gathering. His visit to Ohio brought out a large vote which was much desired by the Republicans who carried the State by over 11,000 plurality, a result gratifying to Blaine and his supporters.

After the Ohio election, Blaine travelled through Michigan, Indiana and Illinois, and, though suffering from fancied physical disabilities and some real discomfort that was trying to one of his nervous temperament, spoke well and undoubtedly gained voters. His campaign tour was successful until on his return, he reached New York City when fortune which had so frequently failed him, forsook him again.

Blaine's campaign was cleverly managed. It was early recognized that the election turned on New York as the pivotal State and that the candidate who secured it would be chosen President. At that time New York was always closely contested, and the "Mugwump" defection meant a transfer of Republican votes to the Democratic candidate sufficient to give him the State. This loss must somehow be counterbalanced, and the Republican managers made an adroit bid for the Irish Catholic vote which was always Democratic and generally controlled by

Tammany Hall. Tammany had opposed Cleveland's nomination but in September decided to support him owing, it was said, to a personal appeal to the "boss" by Hendricks, the candidate for Vice-President; ¹ the returns however, would seem to indicate that no positive influence was exerted in favor of the Democratic candidate. Now the Republicans' appeal to the Irish was readily comprehensible. Although Blaine was of Scotch-Irish ancestry, his mother was a Roman Catholic and this consideration proved to be of great weight, enforced as it was by his consistent action during his public career in favor of the Irish. Cleveland's character was peculiarly obnoxious to them and scandal was busy in propagating stories which still further affected his hold, while on the other hand the use of public position to feather one's nest was not regarded by the Irish as so grievous a sin as irregular sexual relations.

But the astute efforts of the Republican politicians were neutralized by a tactless remark of Reverend Dr. Burchard, the spokesman for a number of clergymen whom Blaine received at the Fifth Avenue Hotel [October 29]. "We are Republicans," Burchard declared, "and don't propose to leave our party and identify ourselves with the party whose antecedents have been *rum, Romanism and rebellion*." ² If Blaine heard the remark he did not fully comprehend its import and rebuke it with the readiness of which he was a master. It is easy to see how Irish Catholics might be turned from the support of a man who was supposed to listen with approval to words implying that they were addicted to rum and to an expression of contempt for their religion.

¹ Sparks, 348; *The Nation*, Sept. 18.

² *The Nation*, Nov. 6.

Governor Cleveland applied himself faithfully to the duties of his office but, during the last days of the campaign he visited a few cities and made some excellent speeches. Schurz was everywhere a tower of strength but the inclusion of Henry Ward Beecher among the speakers for Cleveland was a mistake. His speech had "the true Beecher ring," declared *The Nation*. "One blast upon his bugle horn is worth ten thousand men."¹ And so it would have proved had not his public appearance revealed one of the most unfortunate incidents of American life. About ten years before Beecher had been accused of improper relations with the wife of a parishioner and friend;² a public trial had resulted, the jury had disagreed and no one could truthfully aver that he had been vindicated. From the position that he occupied as pastor of a large congregation, a great orator, a widely known teacher of religion of unbounded influence,

¹ October 23.

² Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote to Motley July 26, 1874: "The most odious, repulsive, miserable, dragging piece of scandal this country has ever known. . . . Here is the most popular Protestant preacher, I think, that ever lived, a man whose church would be filled, if there was a bull-fight in the next street — who gets a salary of twenty thousand dollars and is worth it to his church — who, as a lecturer, is handled by his impresario as if he were a prima donna, — who has done more sensible effective, good-natured talking and writing to the great middle class and the 'unknown public' than any man we ever had in this country — with a good deal of Franklin's sense and humor, with a power of holding great assemblies like Whitfield, — the best known and most popular private citizen, I suppose, we have ever had, — a saint by inheritance and connections of every kind and yet as human as King David or Robert Burns — here is this wonderful creature, popular idol, the hope of liberal orthodoxy, accused of reading the seventh commandment according to the version that left out the negative. There is no doubt that he has compromised himself with unsafe persons and brought grave suspicions on himself, but the hope is universal that his defence, yet to come, will show that he has been slandered, and that his own assertions of innocence will be made good by a thorough sifting of the testimony that is brought against him." *Life of Holmes*, Morse, ii. 209.

he ought to have been above suspicion; yet the country liked him for his liberality of belief and power of statement and respected the quasi-seclusion he had maintained since the great trial. His appearance on the side of Cleveland in such a campaign gave rise to ribald jests especially annoying to friends of Cleveland and of Beecher.

The first volume of Blaine's "Twenty Years of Congress" appeared during the campaign. It is impossible to say whether the book gained him voters but it is fully evident that a Democrat could not say with show of reason, "My desire is that mine adversary had written a book."

The Republican party was stronger than the candidate. Many voted for Blaine on account of the tariff and financial record of the Republicans as contrasted with that of their opponents. Everybody had confidence in Cleveland for his belief in sound money and attitude toward a correct financial administration, but not the same faith in his party. The protective tariff men were strongly opposed to both Cleveland and the Democrats and were honestly convinced that the well-being of the nation depended on the continuance of the Republican party in power. This view was cogently represented by John Sherman, who urged frequently Blaine's election in public speech; and in private conversation he laid stress on the danger of committing the business interests of the country to the safeguard of the Democratic party.¹ There were Republicans too who could not divest themselves of the feeling that the country could not safely be entrusted to the "solid South" assisted by a few Northern

¹ Sherman, Rec. ii. 886; *The Nation*, Sept. 4.

States, some of whose voters had opposed the war for the Union. Such considerations undoubtedly saved Blaine from a more decisive defeat, especially as the contentions of the New York and Massachusetts Mugwumps evoked a response in many Northern States.

“The best laid schemes o’ mice and men
Gang aft a-gley.”

So must the Republican managers have thought as they reviewed the incidents of Blaine’s visit to New York City. On the evening of the day on which Burchard had pronounced against “*rum, Romanism and rebellion*” there was held what has gone down into history as the “millionaires’ dinner at Delmonico’s.” Blaine was escorted to his place by Cyrus W. Field and William M. Evarts; among the guests were Jay Gould,¹ Russell Sage, Henry Clews, and John Roach, a self-made man, a builder of ships and a strong protectionist. The speeches of Blaine and Evarts were given out to the Associated Press, but if *The Nation’s* plausible account be accepted,² the banqueters held a secret meeting after dinner. Any one familiar with political affairs may guess that the purpose of this conclave was to raise the necessary funds for the closing six days of the campaign.

During these last days the eyes of the country were upon New York City which had the predominant voice in the election. During the afternoon between Dr. Burchard’s slip and the imprudent procedure of the millionaires, there was a business man’s parade. “They were organized by profession or occupation: the lawyers 800 strong forming one battalion, the dry-goods men

¹ For character of Jay Gould, see my *History*, vi. 247.

² Nov. 6.

another, the Produce Exchange a third, the bankers a fourth, the brokers a fifth, the jewellers a sixth, the Petroleum Exchange a seventh and so on *ad infinitum*." Marching from Bowling Green through Broadway, they were reviewed by Blaine at the foot of the Worth monument in Madison Square. "Rain fell incessantly and the streets were deep with mud but neither rain above nor mud below damped the spirits of this great army, which tramped steadily along chanting various campaign refrains, such as

' Five, Five, Five cent fare '

but most frequently

' Blaine, Blaine, James G. Blaine
We don't care a bit for the rain,
O-O-O-O-HI-O ' ''¹

Later in the week there was another Blaine parade, numbering, according to Bryce 60,000, while the *Nation* put it at 30,000, and on Saturday [November 1] the business men's parade in honor of Cleveland took place. "It was the most tremendous political demonstration ever seen in this country," declared *The Nation*. "It was not the numbers so much," continued this enthusiastic supporter of Cleveland, "as the character of the turnout that made it grand, imposing, prophetic. . . It was a thrilling sight. . . . It was like the uprising of the people at the firing on Fort Sumter and the reason for it was the same: it was born of a determination to vindicate American honor and to avert a national catastrophe." ²

¹ Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, ii. 202; *The Nation*, Nov. 6.

² *The Nation*, Nov. 6; *American Commonwealth*, *l. c.*

On Tuesday November 4 over 10,000,000 voted. New York decided the election for Cleveland by a plurality of 1149 in a vote of 1,167,169. Many who looked forward to the result hoped, most of all, that it would be decisively one way or the other — that there would be no repetition of a disputed presidency such as had happened eight years previously after the Hayes-Tilden contest. Now New York was the pivot and the vote was extremely close. Two days were necessary to decide which of the two candidates should receive her electoral vote. On Thursday evening a mob paraded the streets of New York City singing “Hang Jay Gould to a sour apple tree”; they thought that from his command of the Western Union Telegraph Company, due to his large ownership, he had control of the telegraph, dominated the Associated Press and was manipulating the returns in favor of Blaine.¹ On Friday morning [Nov. 7] Gould telegraphed to Governor Cleveland heartily congratulating him on his election. Early on Saturday a bulletin of the Associated Press indicated the same result and the New York *Times*, giving the vote of counties carefully verified, showed that Cleveland had carried the State.²

A plurality of 1149 was the result of a spirited, excited and bitter canvass in which ten million voters took part. That the presidency is well worth the utmost effort is seen in the aspiration for it by our best and ablest men and that the result of this campaign was calmly and peaceably accepted is a striking proof of the love of

¹ *Boston Evening Transcript*, Nov. 7, 1884. Melville E. Stone wrote “There was a close alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Associated Press and the Western Union Tel. Co.” *Century Magazine*, lxx. 305.

² *The Nation*, Nov. 13.

order and rare good sense that so impressed de Tocqueville as being characteristic qualities of the American people. Considering that the final scene was in our largest city where the greatest number of dangerous and turbulent spirits existed, two distinguished English men of letters, had they been living, might have perceived that up to the present their prophecies had not been realized. We had not shot Niagara as Carlyle predicted; no more were the Huns and Vandals of Macaulay's fancy, engendered in our own country by our own institutions, plundering and laying waste our republic.¹

Besides Burchard and the millionaires' dinner three other circumstances conspired against Blaine. Conkling held aloof. An unusually large number voted for the Prohibition candidate; many of these were Republicans who could not vote for Cleveland and would have been loath to vote for Blaine. And finally it rained on election day, which undoubtedly diminished the Republican vote in the country districts of New York State where the party was strong. On November 16 Blaine wrote in a private letter: "I feel quite serene over the result. As the Lord sent upon us an Ass in the shape of a Preacher and a rain storm to lessen our vote in New York, I am disposed to feel resigned to the dispensation of defeat which flowed directly from those agencies."²

Blaine regretted that he had made the canvass. He wrote confidentially to an intimate friend: "The whole campaign was a disaster to me — personally, politically

¹ Carlyle, pamphlet "Shooting Niagara and After," reprinted from *Macmillan's Magazine* for August 1867; George O. Trevelyan, *Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay*, ii. 453.

² Stanwood, 295.

and pecuniarily. I ought to have obeyed what was really my strong instinct against running. My regrets do not in the least take the form of mourning over defeat in the election, but over my blunder in ever consenting to run. It was the wrong year and gave to my enemies their coveted opportunity.”¹

Blaine's biographer was justified in writing that the mugwump defection was the chief cause of the Republican defeat.² Thus praise is due the country for refusing to accept as chief executive one with a tarnished public record. Moreover Cleveland's two terms in the presidential office have become, for the American people, a priceless possession. Nevertheless the mugwump vituperation of Blaine's supporters is a blot on their successful campaign. Some of the best men of the country were at his back;³ they did not believe that he had been proved corrupt; and their support was a guarantee that the country would come to no harm should Blaine be chosen president.⁴

The interregnum between Cleveland's election and

¹ Stanwood, 292.

² Ibid., 293.

³ Among the supporters of Blaine were Andrew D. White, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Sherman, E. R. Hoar, George F. Hoar, William M. Evarts, John Hay, John D. Long, William McKinley, William Walter Phelps, Mark Hanna, W. D. Howells, Charles Dudley Warner, J. R. Hawley. For the last three see Mark Twain's Letters, ii. 443, *et seq.* But Mark Twain was for Cleveland. Mr. White wrote: "Mr. Blaine was certainly the most fascinating man I have ever known in politics. No wonder that so many Republicans in all parts of the country seemed ready to give their lives to elect him. The only other public man in the United States whose personality had ever elicited such sympathy and devotion was Henry Clay." Autobiography, i. 214. For the reason that determined White see 208.

⁴ My authorities are *The Nation*, 1884; Life of Blaine, Stanwood; Life of Blaine, Gail Hamilton; Sparks, National Development; Stanwood, History of the Presidency; Bryce, American Commonwealth, ii.; John Sherman, Rec. ii.

inauguration was not characterized by buoyancy of trade. The Blaine supporters would have it that the depression was owing to the change of administration, but this was indeed only a slight influence. There were some Republicans who regarded with unaffected dismay the restoration to power of a party chosen by the "solid South," three Eastern States whose Democratic population was not considered to be of the best, and Indiana whose record during the Civil War had left much to be desired. Nothing was feared by those who believed in sound finance, as Cleveland unquestionably shared their views; he was also the kind of man in whom the general business interests of the country had confidence. "No harm," he declared, "shall come to any business interest as the result of administrative policy so long as I am President. I intend to surround myself with the best and broadest minds in the party and then bend all my energies towards making an administration that shall at least assure every element that a transfer of executive control from one party to another does not mean any serious disturbance of existing conditions." The mass of the people felt that the party which had cast nearly five million votes, or as many as had been cast by Republicans, could be safely trusted to rule the country. And Cleveland was regarded as the representative of the young Democracy, so designated because they were in no way identified with the issues of the Civil War and Reconstruction. But those who believed a continuance of the protective tariff policy to be essential to their very livelihood were deeply perturbed. They had supported Blaine and, apart from the discomfiture of defeat, felt that what they regarded as a splendid economic system was

in danger from Democratic and mugwump hands. The existing House of Representatives¹ was Democratic and during its first session its Committee on Ways and Means, through their chairman, William R. Morrison of Illinois, had reported a bill making a material reduction of tariff duties. He had a struggle to get it even considered by the House when the enacting clause was struck out by forty-one Democrats, under the lead of Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania, uniting with the Republicans.² During the interregnum Randall made a protection crusade throughout the South and although Randall himself was deemed sound as any Republican on this question, the ultra protectionists viewed with alarm the Democratic majority in the House and lacked full confidence in the Republican dominance in the Senate.³

Bankruptcies, stoppage of factories, reductions in wages were real facts in this interregnum, but the change of administration and threatened danger to the tariff policy had little to do with the existing commercial depression.

The "boom" of 1879 held, until the assassination of Garfield in July 1881 checked all financial and mercantile operations. This check was intensified by a disastrous failure of crops owing to a severe drought. Pig iron was then the barometer of trade and since March 1, 1882 there had been a steadily declining market. The so-called "Grant & Ward panic" of May 1884 added a momentary financial stringency. The *Financial Chron-*

¹ Elected in the autumn of 1882.

² May 6, 1884. Stanwood's Tariff Controversies, 221.

³ The Democratic plurality in the House elected in 1882 was 78; in that elected in 1884, 43; the Republican majority in the Senate during the xlviii Congress (House chosen in 1882) was 4; in the xlix Congress, 7.

icle said that “for the greater part of two days it was impossible, except through favor, to get money at any price on any security. We know a party who went to fifteen of our associated banks to borrow on governments, offering twenty-five per cent margin, or more if required, and could obtain nothing.” The banks issued Clearing House certificates as they did in 1873 but there was no suspension of payments. Yet the Wall Street panic did not, as I have before stated, usher in a commercial crisis. The failures occurred when the business decline had nearly touched bottom and not during a period of extravagant inflation as was the case in 1873. But, referring again to our barometer, pig iron continued its downward course and bountiful crops failed to arrest the prevailing tendency. Being engaged at that time in the mining of coal and manufacture of pig iron I wrote in a trade circular under date of October 1, 1884: Within the past month the Indian corn crop has reached maturity and we may certainly rejoice in a yield of not less than 1,800,000,000 bushels which is the largest crop we have ever grown. We also have 500,000,000 bushels wheat and the same amount of oats. The yield of cotton cannot now be exactly determined but enough is known to be able to say that the cotton crop will be larger than it was last year.¹ Surely this is a fine showing for our agricultural

¹ Crops 1884

Wheat	512,765,000 bushels
Corn	1,795,528,000 bushels
Oats	583,628,000 bushels
Cotton, 1883	5,713,200 bales
Cotton, 1884	5,682,000 bales
Cotton, 1885	6,575,691 bales

Statistical Abstract for 1906, 1916, 545, 709, 710.

industry. Nevertheless from present appearances the question as to what we should do with our surplus wheat is a serious one. The two great importing countries are France and Great Britain, both of which countries have likewise had good crops. France will probably not import a large amount of grain or flour; the *Mark Lane Express* estimates that Great Britain will require the equivalent in wheat and flour of only 128,000,000 bushels of wheat. Our own surplus will be considerably more than that but Great Britain will draw a portion of her supplies from Russia so that the present prospect of marketing our whole surplus is not good. It is this condition of the grain trade that induces the pessimists to say that not only have we too much pig iron but we have too much wheat and that this boasted large crop is no blessing whatever. Never was there made a more specious statement and, as some may be misled for a moment by its plausibility, it is worth our while to inquire whether there can be, from the nature of things, any such parallel between manufactured and agricultural products. We maintain that in the long run there cannot possibly be any over-production of grain or staple articles of food. There is practically no limit to the production, for instance, of pig iron or steel rails. When the consumption has increased beyond the production, we have seen during the past five years how soon American ingenuity and enterprise could supply the deficiency and how little while it was before the capacity for production had increased to a point clear beyond any possible actual consumption. It is obvious however that no matter how many acres may be tilled or how many men may be engaged in farming, there is a natural limit to agricultural production.

From seed time to harvest is a period varying from four to nine months and the fruits of the farmer's labor are dependent on causes over which the most diligent and foresighted man can have no control. Frosts too late in the spring or too early in the autumn, too much or not enough of rain may practically mar a season's work. It is bad weather that causes the failure of a crop in Europe or the United States and not the lethargy or idleness of the tiller of the soil. These are trite and self-evident truisms but have been in some degree lost sight of, as for the last three years the grain growing world has produced large crops of wheat and wheat to-day is lower in London than it has been for one hundred years. Keen-sighted, rather than far-sighted men, jump at once to the conclusion that there is a big over-supply of wheat and that there can be no relief without a curtailment of production. Pessimistic philosophers assert that one important occupation of this country is gone; that it was a large part of our business to feed Europe with wheat and flour; that for this were our railroads constructed, our steel works erected and our blast furnaces built. We do not believe that there is sufficient ground for any such gloomy forebodings. Malthus, eighty years ago, published his book wherein he demonstrated that "Population has a constant tendency to increase beyond the means of subsistence." His doctrines have been accepted by most of the modern school of political economists, and any one familiar with the crops of the world, and the course of the grain markets for one or two decades, cannot fail to see that Malthus announced an immutable truth that three years of great plenty cannot contravene. It follows then that the average common

sense of the people is correct when it always welcomes a bountiful agricultural yield and refuses to see that anything can be so disastrous as a short crop.¹

Shortly before Cleveland's inauguration the Minnesota and Dakota farmers had hardly realized cost for their

¹ This point can be illustrated by statistics of crops and average prices of cereals during, before and after 1884 :

CALENDAR YEARS	WHEAT	AVERAGE VALUE DEC. 1	CORN	AVERAGE VALUE DEC. 1	OATS	AVERAGE VALUE DEC. 1
	bushels	cents	bushels	cents	bushels	cents
1880	498,549,868	95.1	1,717,434,543	39.6	417,885,380	36.0
1881	383,280,090	119.2	1,194,916,000	63.6	416,481,000	46.4
1882	504,185,470	88.4	1,617,025,100	48.5	488,250,610	37.5
1883	421,086,160	91.1	1,551,066,895	42.4	571,302,400	32.7
1884	512,765,000	64.5	1,795,528,000	35.7	583,628,000	27.7
1885	357,112,000	77.1	1,936,176,000	32.8	629,409,000	28.5
1886	457,218,000	68.7	1,665,441,000	36.6	624,134,000	29.8
1887	456,329,000	68.1	1,456,161,000	44.4	659,618,000	30.4
1888	415,868,000	92.6	1,987,790,000	34.1	701,733,000	27.8
1889	490,560,000	69.8	2,112,892,000	28.3	751,515,000	22.9

The export of domestic wheat as wheat or flour during the *fiscal* years corresponding was as follows :

BUSHEL		BUSHEL	
1880-81	183,321,514	1885-86	94,565,888
1881-82	121,893,389	1886-87	153,804,969
1882-83	147,811,316	1887-88	119,624,344
1883-84	111,534,182	1888-89	88,600,742
1884-85	132,570,366	1889-90	109,430,467

Statistical Abstract 1906.

For the seven years, 1883-1889 inclusive the United States produced 20 per cent of the world's crop of wheat. For the eleven years from 1880 to 1890 inclusive Great Britain bought 45 per cent of her wheat and 70 per cent of her wheat flour from the United States.

The 1884 crop was not equalled during the decade, nor did the price fall as low. The 1885 crop was the smallest during the decade.

The area of wheat, in spite of the low prices continued about the same. Evidently the farmers were not sufficiently dismayed by the low prices and talk of over-production to abandon the cultivation for other crops.

wheat and in Kansas Indian corn was burned because it was the cheapest fuel. The iron and steel trade was stagnant, and most other manufacturing industries were depressed.

CHAPTER XI

CLEVELAND was inaugurated on March 4, 1885 and delivered his carefully prepared, patriotic and fitting address without referring to his manuscript or notes.¹ Great interest was taken in the announcement of the first Democratic cabinet that had been selected since 1857. Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware, who had had an honorable career in the Senate for sixteen years, was appointed Secretary of State and he filled the place to the satisfaction of the public. At his death [1898], Cleveland, having retired permanently to private life, said, "I have never come into contact with a man who, at all times and under all circumstances, was the equal of Mr. Bayard in high and noble qualities, in singleness of purpose and in that honesty which, while it never obtruded itself, never wavered."² Others who were associated with him, would have heartily endorsed this tribute: considering his service as Senator and Secretary and later as Ambassador to England it may be said of him as of Bayard, the French knight, that he was "without fear and without reproach."

The appointment of Daniel Manning of New York Secretary of the Treasury was due to Tilden's influence. Tilden might have had the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1880 but he declined to have his name

¹ Parker's Rec. 74.

² Ibid., 793.

considered by the Convention on account of his ill health ; and even in 1884 it was considered desirable that he should write a letter refusing to be a candidate in order to insure the nomination of Cleveland. Tilden was the martyr and saint of his party and the election of Cleveland being regarded as the continuation of his dynasty, he was supposed to have great influence with the new administration. Nevertheless Cleveland did not desire to appoint Manning who in turn did not want the place.¹ "Manning was coerced into the Treasury," wrote Tilden in a private letter ;² and the relations between the President and Secretary were never cordial. "I am living in an atmosphere that is full of mischief," wrote Manning to Tilden before he had been a year in office.³

William C. Endicott as Secretary of War, the choice of the Massachusetts Independents, an "able, liberal and high-minded man,"⁴ of dignity of manner, a friend and supporter of Harvard College, an agreeable and useful man in council, and William F. Vilas of Wisconsin as Postmaster-General, were excellent appointments and advantageous sectionally, one representing New England and the other the Northwest. Both came from States that had voted for Blaine. Cleveland disregarded a strong protest from Connecticut, New Jersey and Indiana [all three had voted for Cleveland] against the appointment of Judge Endicott or any Massachusetts man,

¹ See Tilden, Letters, etc., Bigelow, ii. 675 *et seq.*

² To Henry Watterson, March 26, 1885.

³ Dec. 21, 1885. My authority for this episode is John Bigelow's Life of Tilden, ii. 64-316. Manning broke down from overwork ; "a small blood-vessel burst at the base of the brain" during March 1886. He left Washington never to return to his Cabinet duties. *Ibid.*, 317; Tilden, Letters, etc., Bigelow, ii. 713 *et seq.*

⁴ *The Nation*, March 5, 1885, p. 192.

urging that their claims should be considered.¹ The appointment of William C. Whitney as Secretary of Navy was criticized by the Independents as was that of Manning because they were looked upon as machine politicians. It was further objected that New York was given an undue prominence, that the President should not have chosen two Secretaries from his own State; for neither was a man of transcendent character or ability.² Whitney as an administrator turned out better than was expected; moreover he proved an efficient aid to Bayard and Endicott in developing the social side of the new administration.

Naturally the South, the old Confederate States, must be recognized in making up the Cabinet, and, as Cleveland's acquaintance with public men outside of his own State was small, he made his selections from the Senate. Lucius Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi was appointed Secretary of the Interior. A true son of the South, he had won the North by his eulogy on Sumner.³ He had commended himself to the believers in sound finance by vot-

¹ *The Nation*, May 7, 1885, p. 376.

² See Dewey, *National Problems*, Hart's *American Nation*, 24. "In a letter of March 2 to Lamar, Schurz expressed his dissatisfaction without reserve. The selection of Manning he declared to be a terrible load for the Independents to carry, because Manning was without standing in national affairs and had the reputation of a mere machine politician. Whitney would complete the discrediting of the administration with those who were expecting an era of reform and of high-minded government. Schurz was not personally acquainted with Whitney and admitted that he might be honest and clever; but found that the only public reputation he had achieved was that of being the son-in-law of Senator Payne and of having contributed \$25,000 to the Democratic campaign fund." *Reminiscences*, iii. 409. Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1897, "They [the reformers] had stared to see him make Mr. Daniel Manning Secretary of the Treasury, not because Mr. Manning lacked ability, but because he was notoriously a politician of the very 'practical' sort, and seemed to those who did not know him the very kind of manager Mr. Cleveland ought to have turned his back upon." *Atlantic Monthly*, lxxix. 293.

³ See my vol. vii. 100.

ing against a free silver bill and also the Bland-Allison act, and in acting thus against the instructions of his legislature had gained the regard of those who admire the display of manly independence in political life. He was likewise a Civil Service reformer.¹ On these scores he must have attracted the attention of Cleveland and his appointment gave general satisfaction. A. H. Garland, senator from Arkansas, was appointed Attorney-General. He had come to the front during the reconstruction of his State and having displayed effective leadership was one of the prominent Southern men of the new era. He was eager for the place and bespoke the influence of Tilden who however advised him to stick to the Senate. It would have been well had he followed this advice, for he lost in the Cabinet the reputation that he had gained as Governor and senator.²

The unanimous confirmation by the Republican Senate of Lamar and Garland as well as of the rest of the Cabinet is evidence that the Republicans conceded that the time had come when Southerners should have their share

¹ Lamar wrote in a private letter on July 11, 1885: "Every day that I meet the President I am more deeply impressed with . . . his determination to carry out the principles of reform to which he had pledged his administration. . . . I cannot blame the feverishness of our people for a change under such circumstances. If however it is yielded to; if the opportunity is lost under this administration of establishing the great principle that the offices and honors of this government are not the mere rewards and spoils of party victories but great public trusts to be administered for the benefit and highest and best interests of the country, I believe American liberty will be lost with it." Mayes, *Life of Lamar*, 473, 485, 487.

² *Life of Tilden*, Bigelow, ii. 289; House Misc. Doc., 49th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 355. The report of the House was made June 30, 1886, House Reports, 49th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 3142. See letter of J. M. Forbes to Jones of New York *Times*, Jan. 1886, Report, 6. New York *Tribune*, *Sun*, *World*; *The Nation*, Oct. 15, 1885, Feb. 4, 1886; Rec. of Cleveland, Parker, 304. Contrariwise see A Record of Friendship, Gilder, 203.

in the direction of the government. Such a concession was more difficult to make when they came to pass upon other appointments. Of seventy of various degrees in the diplomatic and consular service thirty-eight were from the North and thirty-two from the "solid South."¹ This infusion of "Confederate brigadiers" into the service made the text for many partisan speeches, which were pointed by the sending of the so-called "Copperheads" Edward J. Phelps and George H. Pendleton as ministers to England and to Germany.²

The greatest public interest lay in the question what would Cleveland do about the offices generally regarded as party spoils. Under the Pendleton act, correctly enforced by Arthur, with the intelligent aid of Eaton, the head of the Civil Service Commission, 15,573 office holders had been placed in the classified service. Everybody knew that Cleveland would faithfully enforce this law and this expectation was fully realized. But what would he do with the offices to which the Pendleton act did not apply?

When Cleveland was inaugurated there were about 5000 presidential offices whose incumbents were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and there were also, in round numbers, 49,000 fourth-class post-offices to which appointments were made by the Postmaster General who, of course, is under the authority of the President. While some of the Democratic leaders had warmly advocated Civil Service Reform, the rank and file of the party believed that "to the victors belong the spoils" was good Democratic doctrine, and

¹ *The Nation*, June 11, 1885; Dewey, *National Problems*, 26.

² Dewey, *National Problems*, 26.

after the inauguration ceremonies were over, they expected the turning-out of Republicans to begin and the faithful and long-suffering, who had waited twenty-four years for their share of the good things of the government, to be rewarded.¹ Though aware that Cleveland was a so-called Civil Service Reformer, they failed to realize either the meaning of the doctrine or the sincerity of its champion; for, as one of their senators [Eustis] expressed it, they felt that the civil service reform for which they had voted at the presidential election meant the turning-out of office of Republicans and putting honest Democrats in their places.² Visiting Washington during the spring of 1885, soon after the inauguration, Andrew D. White met Vice-President Hendricks, who "seemed sick and sore." He was especially bitter against the reform in the civil service.³ In truth he represented the old Democracy, many adherents of which wished at this time that he was in the White House instead of Cleveland.

Before his inauguration, however, Cleveland had gone on record. In his Christmas Day (1884) reply to a letter of the National Civil Service Reform League, which he had invited, he said that he should enforce the Pendleton law "in good faith and without evasion," and he outlined his proposed course with regard to offices which, though not within the letter of the law, were at the same time unrelated to the political policy of an administration. Reference was here made to district attorneys, collectors and surveyors of customs and other specified civil officers who, by an act passed in 1820, had a four years' tenure of office; a later statute (1836) placed

¹ See Grover Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*, 39.

² *North Amer. Rev.*, Oct. 1885.

³ *Autobiography*, i. 215.

under this rule the first, second and third class postmasters of the present classification. These Cleveland said he should not remove until the expiration of their terms unless they had failed to be "decent public servants" and had proved "offensive partisans."¹ In his inaugural address he repeated in more general terms this outline of his administrative policy. George William Curtis, the President of the National League, at their annual meeting (August, 1885) made a plea for the repeal of the four-year tenure law, in which he undoubtedly represented an opinion largely held among reformers; and while this law may later have proved obstructive of the effort to extend the merit system to the class of offices that it covers, yet, in the change of party control from Republican to Democratic in 1885, it was a help to Cleveland in his effort for good administration. At that time according to both theory and practice of Democrat, Whig and Republican since Andrew Jackson, practically every office except the 15,573 in the classified service, belonged, by the decision of the people in the preceding November, to the Democratic party. Cleveland's construction of the four year tenure law gave him time to inquire, to investigate and to reflect before he made a large number of new appointments, and this opportunity for leisurely proceeding was of immense advantage, as is evident when we consider Lincoln's, Pierce's and Taylor's trials on their accession to office.

When the Democratic politicians and party-workers, who had waited twenty-four years for an inning, came to understand the construction which Cleveland put upon

¹ Writings and Speeches (1892), 41.

his own words, they were grievously disappointed and disappointment was soon followed by rage. Within two months from his inauguration he had lost popularity and standing in his party. The President, said the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, has not, so far as I know, a friend among Democrats except perhaps some one whom he has appointed to office. Nor were men of the Democratic rank and file who had no desire for place, especially pleased. They would have liked him to put in force "the good old Democratic doctrine" of Andrew Jackson; but now having exuberantly rejoiced over their victory in November they were puzzled that no effort was made to gather its fruits. Senator Vance, of North Carolina, was indignant at the indifference and even disrespect with which he was treated by the President with regard to the patronage of his own State, but he saw the humorous side of the situation well enough to be reminded of one of his own legal cases which concerned a small estate left by an old man to his two sons. The settlement was repeatedly put off by the Court to the disgust of the heirs, until at last the elder son broke out, "Durned if I ain't almost sorry the old man died."¹

"In the first year and a half of my administration," said Cleveland to a New York *World* reporter, "the same battle was fought day after day." A study of the conditions enables us to realize this and to sympathize with the President. At first the reformers were pretty well satisfied. The reappointment of Henry G. Pearson, the efficient Republican postmaster of New York City, and the reinstatement of Silas W. Burt, another Republican,

¹ Clement Dowd, Vance, 220, 222.

in the naval office, were considered excellent moves as showing high regard for the merit system; and such selections were evidence of resistance to an enormous amount of pressure from political friends and supporters. The appointments of a Democratic business man¹ for collector of the port of New York and of a Democrat, who had declared for reform, as surveyor, and the advancement to the appraisership of a deputy and expert, were also proof of the President's sincerity. When Eaton tendered his resignation as Civil Service Commissioner (July 28, 1885) he gave testimony of the faithful enforcement of the Pendleton law and of the rules made in accordance therewith.

Many changes however both good and bad were made in the Treasury department. As consistent a reformer as C. S. Fairchild was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and "a bad specimen of the ward politician," Eugene Higgins, as appointment clerk of the Treasury department. Higgins it was said brought "disgrace and shame upon the administration and the cause of civil-service reform and decent politics"; and *The Nation* found a germ of truth in the remark of a distinguished Republican politician of New York. That appointment "will destroy the Cleveland administration, because it takes away the moral superiority that carried the election."²

No President could reform at once the Post-Office Department, which since Jackson's time had been a happy hunting ground for spoilsmen. Vilas had not been long

¹ The collector turned out to be a poor selection; he was unbusiness-like in his administration.

² *The Nation*, March 19, 1885, p. 252, Sept. 22, 1887, p. 228.

in office before he devised a plan for removing Republicans and rewarding faithful Democrats.¹ During the first six months of Cleveland's administration 524 out of 2300 presidential post-offices had received new postmasters and 6309 changes among 49,000 fourth-class postmasters had been made, so that the Civil Service Record said with truth, "This is something of a sweep though far from a clean sweep."² Working on the theory that as fast as vacancies occurred or could be made, Democrats should replace Republicans, it was natural and easy for a zealous Democratic Secretary or Postmaster-General to regard a Republican office-holder as an unworthy official and offensive partisan, and, helped by Democratic senators and congressmen, to wield with considerable effect the political axe. There was much available administrative talent in the United States, which was by no means confined to the Republican party, and competent Democrats might have been had for the lucrative positions, had senators and representatives based their recommendations on merit instead of on personal fealty and party work. They followed instead the custom which had been in force since Andrew Jackson's time, with the result that many bad appointments were made. The Indianapolis post-office under the management of the new Democratic postmaster was an example of offensive partisanship.³ Senator Gorman, of Mary-

¹ Circular of Apr. 29, 1885, Civil Service Record, iv. 102.

² Sept. 1, 1885, v. 29, 32.

³ Theodore Roosevelt (*N. A. Rev.*, Oct. 1885, 390) severely criticised this appointment. The Civil Service Commission investigated the management of his office and found that he had not violated the law but had come close to it and, in his removals and appointments, had been guilty of rather "offensive partisanship." Civil Service Record, v. 25-28. A committee of the National Civil Service Reform League, Curtis, Schurz,

land, was one of the evil geniuses of the Cleveland administration; his influence was potent and his recommendations were generally bad. The federal service in Baltimore was filled with spoilsmen and ward-heelers, and it is charged that even criminals found places, so that Maryland became the worst blot on the President's record as a civil service reformer.¹

Cleveland complained bitterly of having been deceived by "lying and treacherous representations." For instance, after his appointment of a certain territorial judge wherein he had been influenced largely by a petition in the man's favor, he was surprised to receive a letter from one of the signers, a politician, saying that the community and especially those who had put their names to the petition had received advice of the appointment with "astonishment and regret if not pain." I signed the petition, he went on to say, "thinking it would never be considered and not for one moment believing the appointment was possible."² For the man was utterly unfit for the place. A story went the rounds that the President asked the sponsor for a criminal, whom he had unwittingly appointed, "Well, do you want me to appoint another horse-thief?"³

The enthusiastic approval of the civil service reformers during the first few months of the administration was

MaeVeagh, Bonaparte, Codman, Allen and Potts said in their report of March 16, 1887, the Indianapolis postmaster has shown "a partisanship which unless disproved demands his removal as imperatively as that of any officer who has been removed for that reason."

¹ Civil Service Record, vi. 14, 15; Civil Service Reformer, iii. 127, 132 with a reprint of the year before.

² Grover Cleveland; Writings and Speeches. Parker, 536.

³ Anent Cleveland being deceived by his advisers see *The Nation*, May 14, June 4, 1885.

succeeded by criticism which Cleveland felt keenly. As early as September 1885 he showed his irritation in a letter to Eaton, in which he spoke of "the supercilious self-righteousness" of certain civil service reformers who "discredit every effort not in exact accord with their attenuated ideas, decry with carping criticism the labor of those actually in the field of reform, and, ignoring the conditions which bound and qualify every struggle for a radical improvement in the affairs of government, demand complete and immediate perfection."¹ In his annual message of December 1886 he returned to the subject again and spoke of "the misguided zeal of impracticable friends."² This brought forth an emphatic letter from Carl Schurz, who had been a warm supporter of Cleveland and was now a sympathetic coadjutor of Curtis. "Until recently," he wrote, "the worst things laid to your charge were construed as mere errors of judgment. . . . But . . . this confiding belief has been seriously shaken. Your attempt to please both reformers and spoilsmen has failed. I warned you more than once that your principal danger was to sit down between two chairs. [Schurz obviously meant stools. "Fall between two stools" is our common expression.] I am afraid you are virtually there now."³ This letter and the persistence of the two men in their opposite views caused a break in the intimate relations between Cleveland and Schurz which had existed since the year of his candidacy for President. The President's exasperation

¹ Civil Service Record, v. 32.

² Richardson viii. 528. "'These fool friends of Civil Service Reform' as Mr. Cleveland sometimes called them." Parker's Rec., 259.

³ Reminiscences, iii. 413.

was so great that he forbade a prominent custom house official to attend the annual meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League in 1887. He afterward apologized for this order, confessing that, when he sent it, he was greatly irritated.

Doubtless reformers should hold steadfast to their highest ideals — an obligation which probably justifies the criticism by Curtis and Schurz, who were broad-minded men. Schurz moreover had a rather good comprehension of Western sentiment, now so important a political force. Nevertheless Cleveland had both a better knowledge and saner view of the conditions. He felt that for enduring results he must educate the people to a belief in the practicability of the reform. Like Lincoln, although in a much less degree, he understood the plain people. Living for a number of years as a young man at a hotel in Buffalo, a favorite resort for drovers and farmers, he learned from them the same lesson that Lincoln got from the loungers in the country taverns of Illinois. The history of the progress of civil service reform shows that Cleveland was right in his belief that in 1885 the doctrine was so unfamiliar to the public mind that its application must be gradual, cautious and moderate. If the whole constituency had been that which Curtis and Schurz represented, the educated and cultivated men of the country, he might well have pursued a different course. It must also be borne in mind that Cleveland was a sturdy Democrat, and felt that the education of his own party, difficult as it was under the circumstances, was necessary to sustain him in the work of reform.

James Russell Lowell, who, as he himself said, "*did* divine Lincoln earlier than most men of the Brahmin

caste" had now a just appreciation of Cleveland. He was our minister to England at the time of Cleveland's election and was willing to stay on, but the President naturally desired to give his place to a Democrat. On his return home he went to Washington (August 1885) and paid his respects to Cleveland, drawing forth a hearty laugh by saying, "I come to you like Saint Denis, with the head you have cut off under my arm." "Don't you think," Lowell asked at a dinner to Dorman B. Eaton (December 1885) "it would be better and make for the progress of civil service reform if equality — I mean numerical equality — could be introduced into the public service before President Cleveland's term expires? I am very strongly of that opinion. I certainly never objected to my own removal. It was certainly necessary." At the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Harvard College (November 1886) Lowell, looking directly at Cleveland, ended his oration: "'Justum ac tenacem propositum virum,' who knows how to withstand the 'civium ardor prava jubentium.' He has left the helm of State to be with us here and so long as it is intrusted to his hands we are sure that, should the storm come, he will say with Seneca's pilot, 'O, Neptune you may save me if you will; but whatever happen I shall keep my rudder true.'" The audience knew that "civium ardor prava jubentium" meant in this case "politicians yelling for spoils" and gave orator and President their hearty applause.¹ It may be that Lowell had in mind the emotion Cleveland betrayed at the time of this felicitous reference when he wrote in a private letter,

¹ Prose Works, vi. 180.

"To me Cleveland's personality is very *simpactico*. He is a truly American type of the best kind — a type very dear to me, I confess." ¹

Let us now sum up the progress of civil service reform under Cleveland's first administration. The Pendleton law was much strengthened and may be said to have been firmly established. While the sections of the law regarding political assessments might be easily evaded, the assessment of office-holders in Washington had wholly ceased and the practice had elsewhere largely disappeared. Through extensions as well as in the ordinary course of national growth, Cleveland left 27,380 places in the classified service against the 15,573 which he found there when he took his seat. His work in the unclassified service shows that in becoming a reformer he had not ceased to be a Democrat. In the presidential post-offices he had made practically a "clean sweep"; and, taking no account of appointments due to decease or "vacancy," he had made changes in nearly one-half of the other presidential offices. Moreover, almost all of the fourth-class post-offices had been filled by Democrats. There were likewise inconsistencies in his displacements; mistakes were made and, in some cases, injustice was done. Yet it is true, as Curtis said in his frankly critical annual address of 1887, "Under this administration much has been gained for reform." ² And Charles F. Adams wrote judiciously, "Upon the issue of a reformed civil service, Cleveland showed himself as much in advance of both parties as it was wise or prudent for the recognized leader of one of those parties to be." ³

¹ Gilder, G. Cleveland, 3. ² Proc. of the N. C. S. R. League, 1887.

³ *The Forum*, July 1892.

CHAPTER XII

CLEVELAND was sound on the money question; and in 1885 this meant being opposed to the further coinage of silver dollars provided for in the Bland-Allison act of 1878. His position was well known, and the country was surprised that, eight days before his inauguration he should write a public letter favoring the "present suspension of the purchase and coinage of silver."¹ The publication of Parker's Recollections in 1909 solved the mystery. The letter was written at Tilden's suggestion by Manton Marble and signed by Cleveland. Cleveland regretted this action, not that he did not fully agree with the sentiments expressed in the letter, but because he had signed a declaration of public policy that was not indited by himself.²

As Tilden had accepted the rôle of saint and martyr of the Democratic party, he doubtless thought that he ought to be the guide of the new Democratic administration. Being a man of wealth, he looked at the money question from a rich man's point of view and, without taking into account the general sentiment of the country, thought the coinage of silver should be stopped because it created a genuine disturbance of sound financial conditions. On February 26, 1885 the House voted by 152 to 118 against suspending the further purchase of

¹ To A. G. Warner *et al.* Feb. 24, 1885, Writings and Speeches, 363.

² Parker's Rec. 340.

silver:¹ after this rebuff Cleveland felt that henceforward he had better manage affairs in his own way. Samuel J. Randall, then chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, was apparently devoted to Tilden and opposed to the further coinage of silver; yet he warned him on February 17 that "The silver interest is much more aggressive than I anticipated it would be."²

Before his election to the presidency Cleveland looked upon himself as a follower of Tilden, while the older man had a profound sense of the risk people would run by electing a man of Cleveland's limited administrative experience.³ After the election Tilden thought he could supply this lack and attempted to guide the new President's action in many important matters—an impossible undertaking with so unyielding a subject. Cleveland used to tell with glee how, when some one asked Tilden, "What sort of a man is this Cleveland?" Tilden replied "in that thin squeaky voice which characterized his later years, 'Oh, he is the kind of man who would rather do something badly for himself than to have somebody else do it well.'"⁴

Cleveland did his own thinking and, in the argument in his first annual message, gave evidence of some study of the great moulders of the American Commonwealth. He thus quoted Daniel Webster: "The very man of all

¹ Dewey, *National Problems* (Hart's American Nation), 79.

² Letters, etc., S. J. Tilden, Bigelow, 680.

³ Life of Tilden, Bigelow, ii. 281.

⁴ Parker's Recollections, 341. "What about this man Cleveland?" asked James J. Hill of Tilden in 1884. "He is all right," was the reply. "He is absolutely honest, is not afraid of anything."

"But has he backbone?"

"Backbone!" replied Tilden. "He has so much that it makes his stomach stick out in front." Life of James J. Hill, Pyle, i. 426.

others who has the deepest interest in a sound currency and who suffers most by mischievous legislation in money matters, is the man who earns his daily bread by his daily toil." Sound currency to Cleveland meant the gold standard and, to preserve this standard, the coinage of silver dollars must be stopped. Already the coinage up to December 1, 1885 was 215 millions of silver dollars. Neither the banks nor the people wanted them. "Instead of being used in reducing this interest-bearing burden" [the public debt] so Laughlin wrote, "our surplus¹ was used in purchases of silver which not only could not be got out of the Treasury but prevented gold from coming in."² Cleveland was undoubtedly justified in writing, "I recommend the suspension of the compulsory coinage of silver dollars."³ In his next message he repeated the recommendation.⁴

During his first administration he was unable to get such a measure passed, but his high regard for the public faith was reflected in the action of his Secretary of the Treasury who held firmly to the traditional policy of paying gold in all cases when asked for. In June 1885 the issue of greenbacks of a lower denomination than \$5 was stopped,⁵ which ultimately forced some of the silver out, and, by the act of Aug. 4, 1886 silver certificates of \$1, \$2 and \$5 were authorized, which so helped the baser metal that Laughlin wrote that after 1889 practically all

¹ The surplus for the year ending June 30, 1885 was 63 millions and Cleveland estimated that for next year it would be 70 millions. It turned out to be nearly 94 millions.

² Bimetallism, 246.

³ Dec. 8, 1885. Richardson, viii. 346.

⁴ Dec. 6, 1886, *ibid.*, 513.

⁵ By order of the Secretary of the Treasury, who had control (Rev. Stat. § 3571) over the denominations issued.

the silver bought and coined passed into circulation either in the shape of the dollars themselves or in silver certificates, issued upon the basis of silver dollars lying in the Treasury. The value of bullion in the silver dollar on November 30, 1886 was 78 cents¹ and, as people accepted the coined dollars and the silver certificates because they knew that, if need were, they could get gold for them from the government, the government was losing money on every silver dollar coined. This Cleveland knew as well as we do now but he hardly realized that the surplus, of which he with great reason complained, enabled us to run risks, as Taussig wrote, "without coming to grief."

The story left Grant broken in health, in fortune and in spirit. Then like a good angel, the editor of the *Century Magazine* appeared before him. Through Badeau, he had previously inquired if Grant could be induced to write an account of one or more of his campaigns for their series of articles on the Civil War. At this time however Grant was supposedly rich and, though lame and rheumatic from the effect of the fall on the slippery sidewalk, — not having had his "clothes on since Christmas Eve,"² he had no desire to embark on a literary career and on January 21, 1884 wrote to Badeau, "I have no idea of undertaking the task of writing any of the articles the *Century* requests."³ He had been gradually improving in health when on May 6, 1884 he received the greatest shock of his life; instead of being wealthy, he learned that he was bankrupt. The account of the

¹ Richardson, viii. 512. ² At the time he wrote the letter of Jan. 21.

³ Grant in Peace, 555.

straits to which he was reduced for the lack of money to meet ordinary household expenses, as related by Badeau, is a pitiful tale of what should never have befallen one who had been Lincoln's right arm in saving the Republic. But the adversity supplied another occasion for the splendid energy that Grant had shown as a general in the field. Listening now with willingness to the editors of the *Century* because of the pecuniary inducement they offered, he wrote in June 1884 an article on the battle of Shiloh,¹ which had so much merit that he was asked for more. The result was articles on Vicksburg, Chattanooga and the Wilderness. Meanwhile, as he found this literary work congenial, he decided to write his Memoirs, incorporating therein, with perhaps some modifications, the papers which had been printed in the magazine. Between June 1884 and July 1, 1885 he wrote four magazine articles and two volumes of nearly 600 pages each — a remarkable example of literary fecundity. This is the story of Grant's literary career undertaken for the large amount of money it brought to him and his family. The magazine papers were absorbing; the two volumes published in 1885 received the very highest contemporary praise. The greatest literary success of the season, said John Hay, is a book not written by an author and not published by a publisher.² It is a work, which, in spite of manifest errors due to haste and inseparable from personal memoirs, cannot be neglected by the historian of the Civil War.

¹ Published in February 1885.

² Charles L. Webster & Co. were the publishers, of whom Mark Twain was the principal and responsible partner. It is to him that Hay referred. See *Life of Mark Twain*, Paine, ii. 799.

This, however, is not the whole story of Grant's last days when people of all sorts were drawn to him by an affectionate sympathy which a writer has rarely to record. During the summer of 1884 he began to have pains in the throat and, on his return to New York in the autumn, he consulted physicians who discovered that he had a malignant cancer and that his days were numbered. The struggle with Death of the conqueror of Johnston and Lee became known to the entire people who followed the progressive course of the disease with intense interest and sympathy. All the while, except when utterly incapacitated for work, he was writing his *Memoirs*, the profit of which was to furnish bread and meat to his family. Mental depression over his financial misfortunes would have aggravated the malady but for his sturdy determination to finish his book, before he should pass through the dark shadow. Once his usual depression was succeeded by a gleam of hope and later he was buoyed up by the action of the Democratic House in passing the Senate bill that restored his rank and placed him upon the retired list of the Army.¹ The bill was passed amid hearty cheers on the last day of the session. Arthur signed it and at once made out the nomination which was confirmed with enthusiasm by the Senate. President Cleveland signed the commission — the second act of his administration. Grant's telegram of acceptance to the adjutant-general was in his own hand and his

¹ Mark Twain wrote to his wife under date of March 4, 1885: "We were at General Grant's at noon and a telegram arrived that the last act of the expiring Congress late this morning retired him with full General's rank and accompanying emoluments. The effect upon him was like raising the dead. We were present when the telegram was put in his hand." Mark Twain, *Letters*, ii. 451.

eagerness for his first month's pay was touching in the evidence of his struggle to repair his shattered fortunes. In June 1885 he was taken to Mount McGregor near Saratoga Springs for the sake of cooler and purer air than he could get in the city; there he died on the 23d of July. Three weeks earlier he had finished his book, writing on the last two pages of the second volume: "I feel that we are on the eve of a new era when there is to be great harmony between the Federal and Confederate. . . . The universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last seemed to me the beginning of the answer to, 'Let us have peace.' . . . The expressions of these kindly feelings . . . came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations — the Protestant, the Catholic and the Jew; and from the various societies of the land — scientific, educational, religious. . . . Politics did not enter into the matter at all. . . . It is a significant and gratifying fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move."¹ Here was the noble ending of a great career. The country mourned the Grant of Donelson, Vicksburg and Appomattox.

It was noteworthy that the first Democratic President since the Civil War should announce to the people the death of "that illustrious citizen" and should say in his proclamation, "The President is impressed with the magnitude of the public loss of a great military leader who was in the hour of victory magnanimous, amid disaster serene and self-sustained. . . . The entire country

¹ Grant's Personal Memoirs, ii. 553, 554.

has witnessed with deep emotion his prolonged and patient struggle with painful disease and has watched by his couch of suffering with tearful sympathy." He directed that on the day of his funeral all public business should be suspended.

New York City gave him an imposing funeral. On the Riverside Drive stands a solid mausoleum of white granite known as Grant's Tomb, owing its existence in great part to the efforts of Horace Porter, one of Grant's military staff; this monument was dedicated with appropriate ceremonies by President McKinley and remains a tribute to the manner in which a gentleman educated at West Point can fight a foe. And the genuine sorrow of those against whom he strove ennobles them, as magnanimity on the part of the vanquished is a trial of soul which the victor does not know.¹

On November 25, 1885 the death of Vice-President Hendricks called public attention anew to the danger inherent in the existing provision for the presidential succession. Thoughtful men, however, had this danger in mind since 1881 and it was much to the point that Senator George F. Hoar shared this concern. In June 1882 he introduced a bill into the Senate to correct the existing practice but failed to get it considered. Under his constant pressure, however, the Senate in 1884 passed such a bill but the House failed to adopt it.

After providing that, in the event of the death of the President, the Vice-President should succeed to the office, the Constitution left the further succession to

¹ Authorities: Grant in Peace, Badeau; Grant's Personal Memoirs; Richardson, viii.; Life of Grant, Coolidge; *The Nation*, 1885.

Congress which in 1792 enacted that the succession after the Vice-President should be first the president *pro tem* of the Senate and then the Speaker of the House. But in 1881, owing to the quarrel between President Garfield and Conkling, the Senate failed to choose a president *pro tem* and as the old House expired March 4, 1881 there was no Speaker after that date. Consequently when Garfield died and Arthur became President there was nobody in the line of succession. After the death of Hendricks in November 1885 the Senate met in December and Hoar again pressed his bill which passed the Senate before the month was out and in the following month the House. This provided that after the Vice-President, the succession should exist in rotation in the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Attorney-General, Postmaster-General, Secretaries of the Navy and the Interior. The bill passed the Senate with few dissenting votes although vigorously opposed by Senator Edmunds and the House adopted it by 186:76, 62 not voting. Thomas B. Reed objected to it appealing to the Republicans with the question if they would prefer Bayard, then Secretary of State, to John Sherman, then president *pro tem* of the Senate, for President of the United States.¹

As I have more than once intimated, Cleveland in becoming a reformer did not cease to be a Democrat. In his "Presidential Problems," published seven years after he had laid down the responsibilities of office, he con-

¹ George F. Hoar, Autobiography. ii. 168; Sparks, Nat. Development, 192; MacDonald, 342. The bill became a law Jan. 19, 1886. It required a meeting of Congress in extraordinary session within twenty days. Senator Edmunds's arguments in the Senate were mainly for retaining the provision in the old law requiring an immediate election.

sidered as presumably his most important work during his first administration, his contest in 1886 with the Republican Senate over the suspensions of officials. In this affair, he resembled the clergyman who, throwing his black coat upon the ground said, "Lie there, divinity," and took part in his shirt sleeves in a justifiable fist fight. In this contest he had his party at his back as he had not in his effort to reform the civil service nor, during his first administration, in his work for a lower tariff. Like many who resembled him he probably looked upon the Republican party as containing many kid-gloved aristocrats and he enjoyed the bout with them especially as he came out victor and was essentially a democrat in thought and action. Such he was in his recreations. One does not read of his indulgence in five-point rubber whist but may find a mention of his playing the good old democratic game of Old Sledge from breakfast to bedtime.¹

The contest between the President and the Senate was about the offices — presidential appointments. The Republicans of the Senate attempted to read into the actual statute the provision of the Tenure of Office act of 1867 which had been passed to curb Andrew Johnson. President Grant had desired the whole act repealed and the House at once met his wish but the Senate, jealous of its power, refused to go that length: the difference between the two Houses was settled in a committee of conference and the result was the Act of 1869. On this act Cleveland planted himself and seemed to have strict construction on his side. During the interval between his inauguration and the meeting of the Senate on the first

¹ Cleveland, J. L. Williams, 57.

Monday of December 1885 the President suspended 643 officials.¹ "I have no disposition to evade the fact," wrote Cleveland, "that suspensions of officials holding presidential commissions began promptly and were quite vigorously continued; but I confidently claim that every suspension was made with honest intent. . . . By far the greater number of suspensions were made on account of gross and indecent partisan conduct on the part of the incumbents. . . . Certain phases of pernicious partisanship seemed to me to deserve prompt and decisive treatment."² When the Senate convened, it demanded the reasons for the suspensions: these Cleveland steadfastly refused to give, although perfectly willing to furnish any information in his possession regarding the new appointees. Edmunds, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was the leader of the Senate Republicans and the battle between him and the President was one of giants. But, according to Hoar, a fellow member of the Judiciary Committee, Edmunds's constitutional argument was regarded "as a mere ingenious device to protract the day when their political fate should overtake the Republican officials."³ Cleveland had not only the letter of the statute on his side but the prevailing practice down to Andrew Johnson, before whose administration Presidents had made both suspensions and removals without regard to the Senate. He appealed with telling force to

¹ 278 postmasters, 28 district attorneys, 24 marshals; among those who held office for no specified term, 61 internal revenue officers and 65 consuls and other persons attached to the foreign service. *Presidential Problems*, 45.

² *Pres. Problems*, 41-43.

³ "The people, both Republicans and Democrats, expected that the political control of the more important offices would be changed when a new party came into power." *Autobiography*, ii. 143.

the authority of Grant, "the great general and patriotic citizen."¹ As Grant and the Senate were both Republican the ancient and reasonable practice was restored, but now that a Democrat had succeeded to the presidential office the Republican senators saw an opportunity to make an issue. In Cleveland's words, "After an existence of nearly twenty years of almost innocuous desuetude these laws are brought forth — apparently the repealed as well as the unrepealed — and put in the way of an Executive who is willing, if permitted, to attempt an improvement in the methods of administration."² The Republican senators intimated that if Cleveland would say that the suspensions were made for party reasons, they would cease their objections; but such an admission would clash with his utterances and actions in favor of Civil Service reform and of course was not made. It was easy to see that their design was to involve the President in a scrape, and as the tendency is to side with an honest individual in a fight with a body all the Democrats rallied enthusiastically to his support and so did a large number of Republicans. Curiously enough, many Civil Service reformers looked upon the Senate cause with favor owing to their desire for publicity in all matters connected with appointments and removals. "It was not certain," wrote Woodrow Wilson, "that the moral advantage lay with the President."³

George F. Hoar, senator from Massachusetts, soon afterwards came to the front. Although he acted with

¹ Richardson, viii. 380.

² Special message to the Senaté, March 1, 1886. Richardson, viii. 381.

³ *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1897, 289; Proceedings of the C. S. R. League.

his party, he probably did not sympathize with it in the fight over the appointments. As statesman Hoar showed constructive ability of a high order and left many excellent marks on the statute book. He was moreover a good lawyer and a lover of learning and literature. It used to be said that his favorite reading, when he travelled between Worcester and Boston, was Thucydides in the original; at all events, that author permeated his being so that his frequent references were always natural and never forced. Attached to Harvard University, he served her many times with love and veneration. Intensely partisan, the mugwump defection of 1884 exasperated him and he never lost an opportunity to refer to the Mugwumps with sarcasm, which, as he was endowed with humor, was employed with significant force. The Mugwumps "who like to call themselves 'Independents,'" he wrote, "have commonly discussed the profoundest and subtlest questions with a bitter personality which finds its parallel only in the theological treatises of the dark ages." "The independent newspapers welcomed any opportunity to support their theory that American public life was rotten and corrupt."¹ But on another occasion, stating his belief in what the history of the country shows, namely that "the masses of the people are always pure and incorruptible," he spoke of the duty of men in high places, "Let scandal and malice be encountered by pure and stainless lives."² And Hoar was not one to point out "the steep and thorny way to Heaven" while treading "the primrose path of dalliance," himself; he lived up to his precept but without

¹ Autobiography, ii. 101, 113.

² Ibid., i. 307, 309.

pharisaical narrowness; being of a sunny disposition he could enjoy life as he found it. His Autobiography, though hastily written, is a charming book and shows him "in his habit as he lived." He may indeed be ranked among the notable men that Massachusetts has contributed to our national life.

As we have seen his bill dealing with the Presidential succession showed that he was especially admirable when in a non-partisan mood. He now compassed the entire repeal of the Tenure of Office Act [March 3, 1887]. In the Senate only three Republicans voted with him. Edmunds opposed it vigorously and John Sherman remonstrated with Hoar for acting in opposition to the feeling of Republicans in the Senate.¹ But the House passed the repeal by 172:67; Governor Long made "an able speech in its favor" but Thomas B. Reed voted against it.²

It was fortunate that Hoar was an American and a member of the American Congress rather than of the British House of Commons. John Sherman as a result of his long public experience remarked, "The great body of the questions we have to decide are non-political. Upon these we divide without feeling and without question of motives."³ This point of superiority of con-

¹ But see Sherman's position in Nov. 1877 when Secretary of the Treasury. *The Nation*, Mar. 25, 1886, 252.

² Autobiography, ii. 143. The Senate vote on Dec. 17, 1886 was 30:22, 24 not voting. For, 26 Democrats, 4 Republicans (Chace of R. I., Hoar, Ingalls, Mitchell of Oregon). Against, 22 Republicans. Not voting, 16 Republicans, 8 Democrats. Record 248.

In the House the bill was taken up under suspension of the rules on March 3, 1887. The vote was 172:67, not voting 80. Two-thirds in the affirmative were required. For, Democrats 137, Republicans 34 (9 of them from Massachusetts), 1 Greenbacker. Against, 65 Republicans, 2 Democrats; not voting, 39 Republicans, 40 Democrats, 1 Greenbacker.

³ Rec. ii. 1080.

gressional to parliamentary government was favorable to Hoar. As an M. P. he would on the floor of the House have been a partisan; as member of the House and the Senate he was able, a great part of the time, not to work merely for the ascendancy of his party but for the safety and well-being of the republic.

"The year 1886 is likely to be noted as a great strike year," wrote F. W. Taussig in an article composed shortly after the strike on the Southwestern railroads had alarmed the country.¹ The Missouri Pacific system combined a number of railroads and these together with the Wabash and Texas Pacific, were controlled by Jay Gould who, in his railroad operations, always had an eye to Wall Street; whatever there was of efficiency in their management was due to the local men who bore the brunt of their working. No writer who desired to extol the railroads of the United States would point to the Gould system as a striking example of merit.

Owing to the depression of 1884 a general reduction of wages had been made in September of that year which was so readily submitted to that another reduction was announced in March 1885. This was resisted by the shop-mechanics in a strike that stopped the freight traffic of the whole Southwestern system. Public opinion was on the side of the strikers, as were the Governors of Missouri and Kansas, who recommended to the railroad managers that wages be put back to what they were in September 1884. This was done and the elation of the

¹ The Southwestern strike of 1886. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January 1887, 184. In my account of the strikes, this article will be referred to as Taussig.

strikers at their easy victory made them exacting in their demands upon the railroads in their many points of contact when they assumed to dictate an operating policy. The strike of 1885 was not specifically of the Knights of Labor but the complete victory of the men stimulated the formation of their lodges and assemblies so that the affair which now concerns us was emphatically a strike of the Knights of Labor. Yet it was not ordered by T. V. Powderly, the Grand Master Workman of the order, but by Martin Irons, the chairman of the executive board of a District Assembly, without consultation with the Eastern headquarters. It was not a strike for an advance of wages or against a reduction, or for the redress of grievances, but it was a contest for power, to determine whether the railroad company or the Knights of Labor should have control, and the two were typified in H. M. Hoxie, the managing Vice-President of the Missouri Pacific, and Martin Irons.

Irons was a vulgar labor agitator who had nevertheless great influence over the class of working-men whom he led. The Committee of the House of Representatives [appointed April 15] who visited St. Louis, where the general offices of the railroad company were situated, called him "a dangerous if not pernicious man, who was the leading spirit of the strike."¹ Hoxie impressed Taussig as being "an able, straightforward and humane man, imbued with a strict sense of duty and discipline but disposed to just treatment of his subordinates."² Contemporaneous material and recollections amply justify Taussig's view which was based on a brief personal intercourse.

¹ House Reports, 49th Cong. 2d Sess. i. xiv.

² Taussig, 217.

The immediate cause of the strike was the discharge of a Knight of Labor on the Texas Pacific. This railroad was in the hands of receivers who refused to reinstate the man. On an order from Irons, the whistles blew at three o'clock on the afternoon of March 1st and all the Knights of Labor quit work. The movement of the trains was at once interfered with. In expectation of a sympathetic response Irons decided to call out the men on the Missouri Pacific system and on March 3 he sent a telegram ordering them to stop work three days later. And on the appointed day all the Knights struck. These were the shopmen, switchmen and yardmen, in number 3717, or about a quarter of the employés. The engineers, firemen, conductors and brakemen did not strike; they had their separate organizations and were not in sympathy with the Knights; in fact the antagonism of P. M. Arthur, the chief¹ of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, was undisguised. On March 8th, however, the Knights employed by the company that owned and maintained the bridge leading across the Mississippi river into Illinois struck and thus severed all communication with the East. While the other workmen did not sympathize with the strike they were, to the number of over 6000, thrown out of work by the action of the Knights. The mail trains were not interfered with, nor in general were the passenger trains, but the freight traffic from March 8 to 29 was, with a few exceptions, completely suspended. "It has been the greatest reproach of Trades-Unionism," wrote Charles W. Eliot who has made a profound study of the subject, "that it does nothing to

¹ Grand Chief Engineer.

prevent the use of violence in industrial disputes.”¹ Martin Irons encouraged violence. It was confined almost entirely to the rolling stock of the lines, although a few bridges were burned, but there was no such rioting as accompanied the strike of 1877. The Knights disabled locomotives,² pulled pins from the trains, ditched them by displacing rails, broke into round houses and machine shops, opened water tanks, tore up tracks and intimidated and assaulted employés willing to work.

The strike was so ill advised that even Martin Irons would not have precipitated it had it not been on the Gould lines and had there not been the expectation that public sentiment would approve of any movement against Jay Gould³ — “the giant fiend, the money monarch” as he was called by Irons. “Fellow workmen,” he declared, “Gould must be overthrown; his giant power must be broken, or you and I must be slaves forever. The Knights of Labor alone have dared to be a David to this Goliath.” Gould was remarkably fortunate in having such a representative as Hoxie. His shrewd policy, wrote Taussig, was one of “masterly inactivity.”⁴ At first public opinion was on the side of the strikers. Knowing this, Hoxie made no serious attempt to run his freight trains. Nor could he get the proper police defence from the City of St. Louis or the State of Missouri; when he applied to the police commissioners for protection they said they had no men to spare. “He told them

¹ Future of Trades-Unionism and Capitalism, 47.

² Of 598 locomotives in service, 434 were disabled at one time or another during the strike. Taussig, 200.

³ For a popular estimate of Gould see Harry T. Peck, *Twenty Years of the Republic*. 47.

⁴ Taussig, 202.

he could wait as long as they could; and he waited.”¹ But his position was in no way enviable. The boycott was used remorselessly. There were “secret and invisible acts of terrorism,” wrote an intelligent correspondent of *The Nation*.² The names of business men who called on Hoxie at his office were set down in order that the boycott might be applied to them; the result was that instead of the usual rush of visitors to the manager of a great railway system, no one came.

Hoxie’s policy of “masterly inactivity” bore fruit. The pecuniary loss and daily inconvenience to the public from the cessation of freight traffic were great. The manufactories suffered from the lack of coal which came from the Wabash Railroad and was now shut off by the strike of the employés of the Bridge Company. Public opinion turned against the strikers. On March 24, the Governor of Missouri issued a proclamation declaring that the movement of freight had been suspended for seventeen days; he also called upon the railroad officials to move it, pledging the whole power of the State to sustain the Company in such resumption and to punish all who opposed it. Next day, the Governors of Kansas, Texas and Arkansas took similar ground. “We are now in the third week of the most serious business disaster that has ever befallen our State,” wrote the Governor of Kansas. “The forcible stoppage of transportation along the line of railroads touches the interests of a third of the people of Kansas, several hundred thousands in number. Supplies of food and fuel are cut off in many localities. Farmers, mechanics and manufacturers are prevented

¹ Taussig, 202.

² Apr. 1 issue Apr. 15, 315.

from selling and shipping their stock and goods and from paying thousands of laborers hitherto in their employ. Thus the strike of a few railroad men cripples and stops the business and industry of great masses of our people. . . . The rights of the many cannot be yielded to the claims of the few. The men engaged in this strike may have their just grievances; they may be victims of corporate greed and power, but this fact does not justify lawlessness or turbulence, or the destruction of property, or the forcible stoppage of the transportation lines of the State and the resulting loss or wrong to hundreds of thousands of people in no wise responsible for the controversy between the railway company and its employés." Public opinion in St. Louis manifested itself in the action of the Merchants' Exchange and Merchants' Transportation Committee condemning the strike and in a mass meeting the opinion of which was "that the blockade on the commerce of the city shall and must be raised — peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary. . . . The trains must be run." The sentiment of business men in other communities on the line of the railroad was expressed in similar words.

"Hoxie," said Taussig, "judged it was time to move." ¹ The police officials of St. Louis found they had the men to spare and the authorities elsewhere also discovered that it was possible to protect the movement of trains, and from March 24 on, progress in this direction was continuous although it took some days to get the railroad fairly in operation. This movement irritated the strikers who resorted to further acts of extreme violence; the strike however was lost.

¹ Taussig, 205.

Unfortunately Gould, in New York, decided to take a hand. Being impatient and perhaps rather scared he had a conference with Powderly on Sunday, March 28, from which there resulted nothing but a misunderstanding between him and the Grand Master Workman of the order. Powderly deemed himself justified in sending a despatch to Irons saying Gould "has consented to our proposition for arbitration and so telegraphs Hoxie. Order men to resume work at once." Hoxie first learned of the telegram through a newspaper and must have felt that his cautious policy was in danger of being invalidated through the ill-considered action of his chief. Luckily further correspondence, the misunderstanding between Gould and Powderly, the strife between Powderly and Irons,¹ and the probable insistence of Hoxie enabled Hoxie to continue the policy which he had inaugurated and which had worked so well. On April 4 the operation of the railroad was almost normal, and a month later the strike was declared off by the recognized Missouri officials of the Union. The Knights of Labor were beaten and gradually disappeared as a labor organization. Powderly's later action cannot fail to inspire regret. Up to the meeting with Gould his course had been conservative, but afterwards, possibly because of irritation caused by the misunderstanding, it was influenced by the radical sentiment of the order. His published letters during April reveal nothing but desperation in view of the defeat of the Knights of Labor.²

¹ An engineer began to repair a disabled locomotive. He was told to desist. "But Powderly has called the strike off." "Never mind Powderly; Martin Irons hasn't called it off." Taussig, 214 n.

² My main authority for this account is a thesis prepared for me by D. M. Matteson and based on the testimony taken by the committee

For three weeks Irons had enjoyed great notoriety. But during the strike he had the misfortune to lose his wife and after it he had a succession of troubles. His furniture was seized for debt. Through the aid of a lecture bureau he attempted the platform but utterly failed. Keeping a lunch counter in a small basement saloon in Kansas City, selling candy, peanuts and the like at a stall in the Old French Market in St. Louis were some of his occupations before his death in Texas in 1900.¹

Hoxie passed away before the end of the year [1886]. A prey to disease, his death was hastened by his work and anxiety during the strike. His epitaph was written in *The Nation*: "He has fallen a martyr to high duty and

of the House of Representatives during the last days of the strike and their report; also on the Official History of the Great Strike of 1886 by Oscar Kochtitzky. Furthermore I have found of great use F. W. Taussig's article in the *Quar. Journal Economics*, Jan. 1887. *The Nation* for the first half of 1886 has been helpful; also Dewey's National Problems; Carroll D. Wright's article on the Knights of Labor, *Quar. Journal Econ.*, Jan. 1887.

Perfect harmony among the labor unions did not exist. In 1888, a strike of engineers ordered by P. M. Arthur, the Chief of the Brotherhood, occurred on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad; they were joined by the firemen. Under the wise management of Charles E. Perkins, the President of the C. B. & Q., the strike utterly failed. It was broken up by the Knights of Labor, retaliating for the attitude of the engineers during the Southwestern strike. Powderly, Master Workman of the Knights, said that the Brotherhood had stabbed the Knights in the back in 1886 and had caused the failure of that strike. "It is to the eternal shame of the Brotherhood men that they stoop to such acts [another strike is also referred to] of meanness and treachery. . . . If these actions were taken with the sanction of the Chief of the Brotherhood, he too is mean and dastardly. . . . But no Knight of Labor should belittle his manhood by stooping to such dirty work"; he should "stand back and allow this struggle to go on." (*New York Herald*, Feb. 29, 1888.) But the Knights did not follow Powderly's advice. There is no doubt that they worked the C. B. & Q. engines. (*New York Herald*, Feb. 26, March 3: Arthur's testimony before the Industrial Com. (Report, iv. 123); *The Nation*, first half of 1888.)

¹ *New York Herald*, March 25, 1888; Appletons' Ann. Cyc. 1900.

his name and example will be long cherished by his countrymen as those of a true hero.”¹

The President was perturbed by the Southwestern Railroad strike and on April 22 sent a special message to Congress suggesting a scheme of voluntary arbitration for the settlement of similar disputes; in the next annual message he repeated this suggestion. In 1888 Congress enacted a law with such a purpose in view. It is almost unnecessary to add that these acts of the President and of the Congress did not settle the conflict between capital and labor.²

The American people admire courage and the brave words of Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut uttered in the Senate deserve a record. General Logan desired to increase the army from 25,000 to 30,000 men, and in opposing the measure Senator Van Wyck of Nebraska insinuated that those who favored this addition “wanted to use the soldiers to ‘put down the people’ and to sustain Jay Gould and his confederates as the army used to be employed to sustain slaveholders.” Hawley said: “There are times when I would be with the laboring man for a strike and I would strike to the end of the contest. I would not work sixteen hours a day for any man, with half an hour for my dinner. I would strike; I would organize; I would work for a better day; but I would not permit the thieves of the city of New York to rush out when I was striking, to destroy the property of the company from which I expected to get my living; and if the Sheriff could not do anything with them, if they were too strong for him and too strong for the police I

¹ Dec. 2, 1886.

² Richardson, viii. 395, 526; Dewey, 47; 25 Stat. at large, 501.

would have the Sheriff do what I saw done in New York once myself, call out the old Seventh Regiment and shoot the defiant wrong-doers down." ¹

The general strike on May 1 for an eight-hour day produced results in Chicago of national significance. Some while previous there had been a local trouble at the McCormick Reaper Works which at this time was operated by men who had not joined the strikers, "scabs," as they were called in derision. The large number of idle men consequent upon the eight-hour strike was the cause of the mischief that ensued. Many of them on the afternoon of May 3 gathered about the McCormick works, listened to an incendiary speech by an anarchist and attacked the so-called "scabs" as they emerged from the works on their way home. Police came to their defence, charged the rioters and, using their revolvers freely, overpowered the mob of whom a number were hurt but no one killed, although one died later from injuries received during the conflict. Reporting that six men had been killed the anarchists called a meeting of working-men for the next evening "to denounce the latest atrocious act of the police"; one of their circulars was headed "Revenge! Working-men to Arms! ! !"

From this time forward the story has nothing to do with the eight-hour movement or with diligent working-men striking for a better day. We have now to do with a contest between the anarchists on the one hand and society on the other as represented for the moment by the Chicago police. In the words of one of the anar-

¹ *The Nation*, Apr. 22, 1886, 330; Cong. Record, Apr. 7, 1886, 3183. I heard this debate.

chistic leaders they desired "to arouse the working people who are stupid and ignorant to a consciousness of the condition they were in."¹ Under the screen of high regard for the laborer the anarchists used his supposed grievances to propagate their ideas and support their overt acts. "The real passions at the bottom of the hearts of the anarchists were envy and hatred of all people whose condition in life was better than their own, who were more prosperous than themselves."² The misery in the world, they argued, "arises out of the institution of private property":³ it must therefore be abolished. Had they confined themselves to writing and to preaching they would have been left unmolested, but they advocated "a destruction of the existing order of society by rebellion and revolution"⁴ and proposed to bring this about by the use of an explosive which had been adapted to peaceful pursuits. "Dynamite!" declared one of their newspapers. "Of all the good stuff this is the stuff." A bomb can be made by putting some pounds of this "sublime stuff" into a gas or water pipe cut to desirable lengths, plugging up both ends and inserting a cap with a fuse attached. "A pound of this good stuff beats a bushel of ballots all hollow." "One man with a dynamite bomb is equal to a regiment of militia."⁵ It is hardly surprising that such preaching constantly repeated was soon translated into action.

The evening of May 4 was fixed for the meeting. At that time a crowd assembled near Haymarket Square

¹ Anarchy and Anarchists, Michael J. Schaack.

² Joseph E. Gary, the judge who presided at the trial of the anarchists. *Century Magazine*, April 1893, 809.

³ *Ibid.*, 818.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 812.

⁵ Gary, 815 *et seq.*; Schaack, 311.

but, owing to delays in the programme, a number left, so that when the speaking began there were not more than a thousand in the audience which was made up of anarchists, laborers and mechanics, mostly German. A German harangued the crowd in English from a truck-wagon improvised as a speaker's stand and he was followed by an American. Mayor Carter Harrison had come to the meeting prepared to order its dispersal should the speeches be of a character to endanger the safety of the city, but he heard nothing to warrant such action, and therefore went home. After he had left, however, an English anarchist mounted on the wagon and made an incendiary speech that roused the crowd to a high pitch of excitement. "You have nothing more to do with the law," he declared, "except to lay hands on it and throttle it until it makes its last kick. . . . Throttle it. Kill it. Stab it."¹ Inspector John Bonfield at the police station near by was carefully following the proceedings through officers who listened intently to the speeches. After receiving a number of reports of the inflammatory talk and excited audience he decided to wait no longer; in command of a hundred and eighty men he marched toward Haymarket Square. "Here come the bloodhounds," exclaimed the speaker. Approaching the truck a police captain said, "I command you in the name of the people of the State of Illinois to immediately and peaceably disperse." The speaker stepped from the truck to the sidewalk and shouted "We are peaceable."² Almost instantly afterwards an anarchist threw a dynamite bomb which made "a terrific explosion,"

¹ Gary, 829.² Schaack, 144, 404, 483.

and this was followed by pistol shots from the anarchists directed at the police. Officer Degan was almost instantly killed; seven more policemen died from their wounds and sixty-seven others were wounded, some of whom made a good recovery while others were incapacitated for life.

An attack with a dynamite bomb was then almost unknown, but after the first shock Inspector Bonfield rallied his men who obeyed orders like veterans and, firing their revolvers, charged and dispersed the mob, whose killed and wounded remain unknown. The action of Bonfield's men that evening was an exhibition of nerve and courage that forms a heroic chapter in the annals of the American police. During the following days the authorities managed shrewdly the detection and arrest of the accessories to the crime. Yet they committed one flagrant error. Twice they arrested the man who had thrown the bomb but, apparently from lack of evidence, released him; subsequently when of all men they wanted this one they found that he had fled.

Eight anarchists were indicted for the murder of Degan. Under the statute of Illinois an accessory to a crime was as guilty as the principal; it was not pretended that any of these men actually threw the bomb but they had procured the "murder to be done."¹ Twenty-one days were consumed in selecting the jury; "981 men were sworn and questioned before the dozen who tried the case were accepted."² Joseph E. Gary, the judge, had risen from the carpenter's bench to the judicial; having been accustomed to manual labor he

¹ Gary, 832.

² Ibid., 804.

could sympathize with men who gained their living by work with their hands. On the other hand he was not in the least intimidated by the large number of threatening letters he received and was fully prepared to vindicate the majesty of the law. He must have been an excellent lawyer. He was obliged to make many rulings in the face of the adroit counsel for the defence, and in these he was thoroughly sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court that in a careful review of the case could find in them no error. The State's Attorney Julius S. Grinnell had thoroughly mastered the case and made an ideal prosecutor.

The trial began on June 21; the evidence closed on August 10. Eight days were consumed in the pleas of counsel. On Thursday afternoon, August 19, the judge read his charge to the jury. In less than three and one-half hours the jury agreed on their verdict and delivered it to the Court next morning, two months after the commencement of the trial; they found seven anarchists guilty of murder and fixed their penalty as death; the eighth, also found guilty of murder, was to be imprisoned for fifteen years. This was in accordance with the Illinois statute which laid upon the jury the duty of fixing the penalty in trials for murder. A motion for a new trial was made but by agreement of counsel the discussion of it was postponed to the October term. On October 7 this motion was overruled by the judge. Each of the defendants then spoke, occupying three days. When the last one had concluded [October 9] the judge sentenced seven of the anarchists to be hanged on the third of December next.

Procuring a stay of execution, the indefatigable counsel

for the prisoners appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Illinois who after hearing the arguments, took the matter under advisement for nearly six months, finally rendering a unanimous decision on September 14, 1887. The full bench of seven affirmed the judgment of Judge Gary's court. The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court and argued by eminent counsel. This Court was also unanimous and the writ of error prayed for was denied in a decision read by Chief Justice Waite. The Governor of Illinois was besieged for clemency. He commuted the sentences of one of the Germans and of the Englishman to imprisonment for life. One German committed suicide in his cell. Three Germans and one American were hanged on November 11, 1887.

There can be no question that the punishment meted out to the anarchists was legally just. "In law the anarchists were rightly punished," wrote Judge Gary, "not for opinions but for horrible deeds."¹ Judge, jury and two Supreme Courts after careful and impartial consideration were at one. Henry George, who at this time better represented the working-men than any other man in the country, was brought to a similar view by reading the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court but, desiring confirmation, he asked a lawyer friend in California to read the papers in the case, and received from him the finding that the condemned anarchists were "all guilty of wilful, deliberate, premeditated murder."²

The historical judgment confirms the legal. The anarchists attacked Society and Society defended itself under due forms of law; the anarchists then took every

¹ Gary, 837.

² Life of H. George, 501 *n.*

advantage of the quirks and quiddities of the law which they had derided. All thoughtful citizens must have been interested to note that six out of the eight who stood trial were Germans, as was also the thrower of the bomb. This fellow had lived in this country not more than two years and could not speak English; he might however have emulated the courage of the American anarchist and, instead of fleeing from the country, surrendered himself to justice. Why did not these Germans advocate their theories and commit their overt acts in their own country? The answer is easy; because in Germany the punishment would have been sure and swift. A German official would have ridiculed the many and various chances for life that our Courts and practice afforded the anarchists.

When the German anarchists came to America they translated liberty into license; they could not understand the saying of our fathers that there are only three generations between shirt sleeves and shirt sleeves. And it would have been well for the country if they could have appreciated the ideas of another immigrant and workingman, J. O. Fagan, who came to the United States in 1881. "Since then," he wrote, "my opportunities have been great; my gratitude is still greater. I have inhaled the democratic atmosphere, absorbed what I considered to be its spirit and appropriated to my own use what I could of its splendid lessons. In my opinion it is no mean privilege to be even heir-at-law to such a heritage."¹

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1911, 591. I have changed third person to first. See also J. O. Fagan's *Autobiography of an Individualist* (1912). My main authorities for this account of the Chicago anarchists are: *Anarchy and Anarchists*, Michael J. Schaack, and Judge Gary's article in the *Century Mag.*, Apr. 1893. I have consulted *Decisive Battles of*

There is no direct connection between the Chicago anarchists and the Henry George movement but it is doubtful if this movement could have taken place but for the unrest of 1886 which as we have seen had manifested itself in serious strikes, chief of which was that on the South-western railways. George had attained celebrity by his brilliant book "Progress and Poverty" which, after the usual struggle of an author with no money, he had succeeded in getting Appleton to publish in 1880.¹ As a complete remedy for the misery of the poor he advocated raising all money for the support of the government from taxation on land. Although opposed to private property in land he wrote, "It is not necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent."² He fully believed that the whole expense of government could be met by this single tax.

George's nostrum was attractive to those who thought there was an unequal distribution of wealth and privilege, to some reformers and to some rentiers and idlers who drew their living from the dividends and interest on their stocks and bonds and were willing to see all taxation shifted to the land. Yet for the United States with her broad acres it was seen to be impracticable and it had the defect of increasing the burdens of the agricultural

the Law, F. J. Hill; 123 U. S. Reports, 131; The Story of a Labor Agitator, Buchanan; Life of Henry George; Life of Henry D. Lloyd, i.; Dewey, National Problems; H. T. Peck, Twenty Years of the Republic; Frank Harris, The Bomb (1909), a romance based on facts. In 1893 Governor Altgeld pardoned the three anarchists who were in the penitentiary. A pamphlet giving his reasons is in the Boston Athenæum.

¹ The dedication is dated March 1879 and copyright was taken out in that year but the book was not published until after the Christmas holidays. Life of Henry George, H. George, Jr., 325.

² Progress and Poverty, 364.

class, the growers of the nation's food, whose welfare should be a prime concern of any American government. Realizing the force of this objection George attempted to show that his scheme would be a good thing for the farmer and, as he believed that the tariff was a tax, he proposed the removal of all custom duties as well as of all taxes on personal property. It was the belief of the free-traders that the farmer was unjustly taxed and, in so far as George took this ground, his reasoning was not ineffective. The book had a moderate success by reason of its fascinating method and style but it was easy to see that, owing to the wide uncultivated domain in America in 1880, the plan virtually to confiscate all the land could not be upheld as a sound economic policy. But when George crossed to the "tight little island" where land is not plenty and is owned by a few, he seemed, through the cheap edition of his book and his attractive lectures, to be preaching a gospel that would elevate humanity; he was bringing good tidings to those of the world whose life was thought to be one of dumb despair.

The reputation that George gained in England reacted upon his countrymen and when he returned to New York he was, to use his own words, "pretty near famous."¹ Labor Unions crowded a meeting at Cooper Union to bid him welcome. The bench, the bar and prominent clergymen joined with men in politics and trade to give him a banquet at Delmonico's. His son and biographer in his interesting book tells his story by the headings of his chapters: "Starting the Revolution in Great Britain"; "Kindling the fire at home."

¹ 1882. Life, 400.

Somewhat later George received an invitation to deliver lectures in Great Britain, going thither when, according to his biographer, he was "at the moment next to Gladstone the most talked of man in England."¹ On his return again to the United States "he was recognized as a leader among the restless laboring classes — to be with the House of Want rather than with the House of Have."² Nominated for mayor of New York City in 1886 by a combination of the trade and labor unions he made a good fight against Abram S. Hewitt, the candidate of Tammany and of the County Democracy and Theodore Roosevelt nominated by a Citizens' committee of one hundred and the Republicans. Hewitt received 90,552 votes, George 68,110 and Roosevelt 60,435. Hewitt made a good mayor. Roosevelt afterwards exhibited excellent administrative qualities as President and either were a better mayor than George. But as we look at it now, the "Haves" were unnecessarily alarmed by George's large vote. Hewitt, restless and energetic, maintained during the canvass that Henry George arrayed one class against all other classes, and *The Nation*, after the result of the election was known, intimated that his vote was made up of boycotters, socialists, anarchists and cranks. These may indeed have swelled his vote; nevertheless he stood "as the incarnation of a demand that the world should be made a better place to live in than it is to-day" and as the apostle of discontent among industrious working-men. "The greater the prosperity, the greater the discontent" is a saying as old as Sanscrit and it was this natural discon-

¹ 1884. *Life*, 419.² *Ibid.*, 442.

tent that gave George his large vote. But he was a better man for mayor than many a one that Tammany has put in the place. "Progress and Poverty," although advocating a policy that would not have answered for the United States of 1880, was the work of an honest and sincere man. George was neither socialist nor anarchist. "I would preserve order and enforce the law," he declared. Recognizing "the shocking contrast between monstrous wealth and debasing want" in New York City, he showed himself imbued with a true American principle in his speech formally accepting the nomination: "I believe and have long believed that through politics was the way and the only way, by which anything real and permanent could be secured for labor."¹

The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act [approved February 4, 1887] was one of the notable legislative acts during Cleveland's first administration. The West and the South had been bitter in their criticism of the railroads, largely because of the favoritism they showed to large shippers and friends through the medium of rebates and special facilities. The different State acts had proved ineffective as remedies for the evils complained of and the people now looked to Congress who, by a decision of the United States Supreme Court, had exclusive power to regulate commerce among the States. The popular desire was well represented by John H. Reagan of Texas, ex-Postmaster-General of the Southern Confederacy, who, during his long service in the House of

¹ Life, 467, 469, 475. My main authorities have been Life of H. George, by H. George, Jr., and Progress and Poverty (1884). I have also consulted *The Nation* for the last half of 1886.

Representatives, devoted himself to securing an act to regulate interstate commerce. He had the House with him but ran up against a wall in the Senate. Aid however was at hand, although he would have preferred that the Senator who took up the cause had been swayed by more radical ideas.

Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois took his seat in the Senate in 1883. He had a profound reverence for Lincoln, whom in personal appearance he was supposed to resemble, and, like most Illinois statesmen, respected Douglas's mental powers. Although not possessed of extraordinary ability, he had the persistency of purpose that accomplishes results and this, together with his ardent patriotism and high personal character, won him the regard of his associates. As Governor of Illinois he had studied the railroad system, so that when he came to the Senate he had the basic knowledge necessary for what turned out to be his mission. The Senate proceedings, wrote Woodrow Wilson in his brilliant book on Congressional Government, "bear most of the characteristic features of committee rule."¹ Therefore the new Senator is anxious in regard to his committee assignments which are influenced by the leading members. Cullom did not think that he had been properly treated in this respect; and in the Republican caucus he gave vent to his disappointment. He was however placed upon the Committee on Railroads, which had always been a "non-working committee," but he determined to make its influence felt. Full of the idea of regulating interstate commerce, he wrought with a zeal that at first gained so little con-

sideration that he decided to appeal to his friend, Senator Allison, for guidance. Allison suggested the appointment of a committee to travel about, see all sorts of people, take testimony and report to the Senate at the next session. In accordance with the advice of the more experienced senator, Cullom offered a resolution to this end, secured its adoption, was made chairman of the committee and on January 18, 1886 submitted on behalf of the committee, an elaborate report with a large volume of testimony. With this for a basis he pressed the matter so urgently that during the May following a bill for the regulation of interstate commerce passed the Senate.

The House did not accept this bill but under Reagan's leadership passed on July 30 a more radical measure and the two went to a committee of conference in which Reagan headed the House and Cullom the Senate conferees; they wrangled from the adjournment of Congress on August 5 until the beginning of the regular session. Reagan gave up many of his contentions but would not yield the prohibition of "pooling."¹ Following the advice of Allison and other leaders on the ground that the country demanded a bill and that it were better to accept Reagan's anti-pooling provision rather than enact no measure whatever, Cullom yielded this point and, on December 15, 1886 reported the agreement of the conferees to the Senate where it encountered strenuous opposition. Provoked at this he declared to his brother senators, "It has just come to a point where you have got to face the music and vote for an interstate commerce bill or vote it down." The long contest, which

¹ "Pools" divided the traffic or "earnings on a basis of agreed-upon percentages." Dewey, 92.

was a typical instance of government by discussion, resulted in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.¹

Cullom gives an excellent statement of its provisions: "It was partly declaratory of the common law, its essential features being that railroad charges must be reasonable; that there must be no discriminations between persons and no preference between localities; railroads were prohibited from charging less for a long haul than for a shorter haul, 'under substantially similar circumstances'; pooling was prohibited; and a commission was established with power to hear and decide complaints, to make investigations and reports and generally to see to the enforcement of the Act." "Considering the abuses that existed," continued Cullom, "the Act of 1887 was conservative legislation but in Congress and among the people generally it was considered radical."² The bill went to the President. It was the first attempt of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and Cleveland gave it the consideration that this new departure required. He had doubts in regard to government by Commission and indeed Reagan did not at first believe in a Commission for regulating interstate commerce; he had incorporated no such provision in his own measure. Cleveland "felt that there were abuses and grievances, which demanded correction if they could be so reached that the remedy would not be worse than the disease." "After a careful study of the question," he said, "and in spite of reservations, I signed the bill."³ As the Commission would administer the Act its make-up was of

¹ Approved February 4.

² Fifty Years of Public Service, Cullom, 325-327.

³ Parker, 296.

the highest importance. Accordingly the President appointed as its chairman Judge Thomas M. Cooley, Professor of American history in the University of Michigan, an eminent jurist, who was recommended by Cullom and who had a good knowledge of railroad conditions and management.¹

"The railroad system of the United States is the marvel of the world," said Cullom in his report. At the close of 1886 the mileage was 133,000. The regulation of it by Congress, the first attempt at which was now being made, was an enormous task demanding great wisdom. The history of this regulation, the work of the Commission, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and the subsequent legislation by Congress may be reviewed to better advantage in connection with the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt.

Another non-partisan measure was the Electoral Count Act approved February 3, 1887. Edmunds, who had played a prominent part in the settlement of the disputed presidency of 1876-77, must have brooded over the risk of civil war that the country had then incurred and he now brought his keen legal mind to bear upon legislation which should take the place of such a remedy as the Electoral Commission. Remarkable in history as a thorough-going partisan and extraordinary lawyer he could on occasions lay aside his partisanship: he deserves high praise for his conduct at the time of the disputed

¹ Authorities. Fifty Years of Public Service, Cullom; National Problems, Dewey; Reagan's speech, Cong. Record, Dec. 2, 1884; Report of Senate Committee, Jan. 18, 1886, Reports, 49th Cong. 1st Sess.; Report of the Interstate Commerce Com. 1887; *The Nation*; John Sherman's Rec. ii.

presidency and he followed it up by pressing a law which should in the future obviate such a danger. Hence the Electoral Count Act of 1887 which, together with the Presidential Succession Act, marks true progress in constitutional government. It stipulated: that each State may provide by law for the determination of any contest concerning the appointment of electors and such determination shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes by Congress. If there be objection to the vote of any State, the Senate shall withdraw from the joint convention as provided for in the Constitution and the two Houses acting separately shall consider the matter. If there is but one return it shall be rejected only by the concurrent action of the two Houses. If there be more than one return and the question shall arise, which is the legal one, "those electors, and those only, of such State shall be counted whose title as electors the two Houses acting separately, shall concurrently decide is supported by the decision of such State so authorized by its laws. . . . But if the two Houses shall disagree . . . then, and in that case the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been certified by the Executive of the State under the seal thereof shall be counted." ¹

Edmunds was a faithful public servant. "I shall go on manfully," he wrote in 1885 in a private letter, "and try, as I have always done, to do my duty in the Senate. . . . My only ambition is that the honest and intelligent men of Vermont and of the country shall think that I am brave enough to walk according to the light that I have, and not to worry about consequences." ²

¹ MacDonald, 347, *The Nation*, Feb. 19, 1885.

² *The Nation*, Nov. 25, 1886.

"He was one of the most courteous and amiable of men," wrote President Cleveland of him when speaking of the sharp contest about the offices between the two, "at least when outside of the Senate."¹

Down to 1879 the public mind was pretty well satisfied with the pension system. While a service pension was introduced in 1818 for revolutionary veterans, the principle of wounds or disabilities contracted in the service of the United States obtained for the pensions of the Civil War. A limited service-pension act was passed in 1871 for the soldiers of the War of 1812, but the amount of money involved in both this and the act of 1818 was small and, as these wars were popular, the public, if it took any notice of them at all, approved these laws. The pension-grabbers began their work during Grant's administration and in 1875 succeeded in passing a bill which was certain to prove a "drain on the Treasury" and which is known as the "Equalization of Bounties Bill." This President Grant did not approve; and, though not necessary under the circumstances, wrote a brief veto message, which shows what a skilful and brave soldier thought of this scheme to deplete the Treasury. His first objection was on the score of economy. His second was expressed in his pointed words: "I do not believe that any considerable portion of the ex-soldiers who, it is supposed, will be beneficiaries of this appropriation are applicants for it, but rather it would result more in a measure for the relief of claim agents and middlemen who would intervene to collect or discount the bounties

¹ Presidential Problems, 67.

granted by it.”¹ The annual payment for pensions in 1878 was somewhat short of 27 millions, being less than for the four preceding years. The Commissioner was hopeful that the high-water mark had been passed. Lincoln’s admonition, “to bind up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan” had been carried into effect by what Hall, who served as chaplain during the Civil War, termed “an eminently fitting and generous provision.”²

In 1879, however, the Arrears of Pensions Bill was enacted by the Democratic House and the Republican Senate by large majorities and was signed on January 25 by President Hayes.³ This law was retroactive, applying both to pensions already granted and those about to be granted.⁴ A supposable concrete case will illustrate its working. A private soldier was killed at the battle of Bull Run in 1861. His widow, being tolerably well-to-do and not caring to go to any trouble for a small amount did not apply for the eight dollar a month pension that was her due. Having three children, five, four and two years of age when the father was killed, she was entitled, after the passage of the Arrears Act, to arrears up to August 1879, amounting to \$1728 for herself and \$528 for her now grown-up children. If the stricken soldier had been an officer of the \$30 per month grade she could now claim \$7000. The Commissioner of pensions testified

¹ Rev. E. H. Hall, *Mass. Hist. Soc.*, Feb. 1909, 116; Richardson, vii. 320.

² *Ibid.*, 114.

³ In a private letter of Dec. 14, 1881 Hayes gives his reasons for signing the bill. *Life, Williams*, ii. 338 *n.*

⁴ See analysis by William Henry Glasson, *Studies in History etc.*, Columbia Univ., *Military Pension Leg.*, 95.

before a Congressional committee on February 16, 1880 that the great increase of original claims filed after the passage of the Arrears Act was not due to any unusual percentage of fraudulent claims, although there were many such, but, because before the act was passed, many veterans not badly wounded, or not very ill, or in comfortable circumstances, actuated by patriotic pride, did not think it worth while to make an application; but when they could get a pension dating from their discharge and giving them in a lump a large sum,¹ it is easy to see why they should decide, even if not in want, to take a hand in the grab game.

By a provision of this law, attorneys were forbidden to receive fees for obtaining arrears on pensions already existing, but the rush of original applicants gave them a veritable harvest. "This period," wrote Matteson who made a study of the subject, "was the heyday of pension attorneys." The pension bureau was well administered under Hayes, Arthur and Cleveland and the frauds on the government were small, but the Arrears Act was a costly piece of legislation; an estimate to the effect that it cost the government 254 millions was not far out of the way.² The desire for pelf, less probably in the United States than in any other large country, is repugnant to the moralist, especially when he sees it exhibited by the veterans of the Civil War.

We now reach 1885 with an annual outlay for pensions of 65 millions. A favorite mode of Congress was to pass a bill giving a pension to some applicant whose claim had been disallowed by the vigilant Commissioner. With the

¹ House Reports, 46th Cong. 3d Sess., No. 387, 10, 11.

² Senate Reports, 48th Cong. 1st Sess., No. 432, 35.

log-rolling that obtains in legislative bodies it is not difficult to believe that many ill-considered acts might be passed. Cleveland during his first administration vetoed 228 private pension bills, 175 of them because the injuries in question were not received in the service. His veto messages furnish a sad commentary on the impulse that drives so many men and women to depths of deceit in order to get money from the commonwealth to which they are in no way entitled. Congress must have been glad of the sober second thought represented in the vetoes of the President, as it passed only one of its bills over his veto.

In 1887 the Dependent Pension bill, popularly known as the "Pauper Pension," passed the Democratic House by 180:76 and the Republican Senate almost unanimously.¹ In general the purpose of the act was to provide a pension for disabled veterans and indigent widows of veterans without reference to the source of the veteran's ailment or of his death in the case of pension for the widow. General Boynton, a soldier and intelligent newspaper correspondent, declared that it was "a scheme engineered in the main by pension attorneys." General J. D. Cox, whose noble service is recorded in my volumes on the Civil War, protested against it.² In February, 1909 Rev. Edward H. Hall read a paper before the Massachusetts Historical Society, in which he said: "I have at my side, as I write, a letter from a Washington attorney informing me that there is money due me from the Treasury on account of my services in the Civil War and

¹ Hall, 118. Not voting 63, Record 742. The Senate vote was without division, Record 1067.

² *The Nation*, 1887, 136, 175.

offering to prosecute the claim in my behalf. This is not the only missive of the kind that I have received. Not a year passes but these unknown friends at Washington, with touching solicitude for my temporal welfare, promise to make all the investigations necessary to secure for me the payment of this debt. . . . How is it that I am an object of such interest to these almoners of the nation's bounty? As a matter of record I acted as chaplain of the Forty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry during its term of service, receiving as pay and allowance a sum quite equal to the average salary of my fellow clergymen who remained at home, retiring unwounded, as it happened, and with my general health quite unimpaired, to survive the war for more than forty years with no serious sign of illness. Let me add that I was aware at the time and have been increasingly conscious ever since of having received from the country, not in pecuniary compensation alone, but in opportunities of service and in the gratitude and distinctions that a great nation only can bestow, tenfold more than I was able to contribute to her welfare."¹

The Grand Army of the Republic took no part in the furtherance of the Arrears Pension, but between 1879 and 1887 it became an active advocate of pensions and was strongly in favor of the Dependent Pension bill. Dr.

¹ M. H. S. 113. After the bill had passed Congress and before the President vetoed it, *The Nation* said, "Practically all the men who were either wounded in battle or incurred disability, which a conscientious person could attribute to army service, are already pensioners. We are now to deal with a class which includes all the shirks who tried to keep out of harm's way, all the men who entered the army not from motives of patriotism, but because they were either attracted into it by the great bounties offered or were forced into it by draft — in short all of what that gallant Union soldier Gen. Bragg called in the House the other day 'the rubbish of the army.'" *The Nation*, Feb. 3, 1887, 92.

Glasson, who has made a special study of our pension system, wrote in his intelligent paper, "The passage of the Arrears Act, instead of satisfying the pension attorneys and claimants, resulted in a demand for further legislation;" and he quoted with pertinency one of the speakers in the Congressional debates, "This appetite for pensions doth increase by what it feeds on."¹ It is curious to recall how public sentiment was manufactured to demand such legislation from Congress; however it is well known that a small body of men, if sufficiently persistent, can often bring a legislative body to adopt their views, provided they have the semblance of a good cause. Everybody at the North believed that the volunteers who went to the front and fought to save the Union should be provided for with unprecedented liberality. "All that a man hath will he give for his life" was taken by Lincoln to imply that since any one who shouldered a musket risked his all, he was entitled to loving care from a grateful government. But the liberal pensioning of bounty jumpers, substitutes hired at a great price, drafted men, skulkers, cowards and deserters was quite another matter. The pension attorneys, proceeding skilfully and with purely sordid motives, managed to confuse the two classes of beneficiaries so effectually that an almost indiscriminate granting of pensions came to be regarded as a sacred duty. Thus the Grand Army of the Republic was deluded and imposed upon and any one who opposed liberal pensions was looked upon as little better than a traitor to the Union; hence the enthusiasm that attended the passage of this Pauper Pension bill.

¹ Glasson, 108.

In his Annual Message of 1886 Cleveland had said, "The American people, with a patriotic and grateful regard for our ex-soldiers, too broad and too sacred to be monopolized by any special advocate, are not only willing but anxious that equal and exact justice should be done to all honest claimants for pensions;"¹ and more to the same effect. Whatever may have been expected, the President vetoed the bill and sent to the House a message which showed to the people that they had chosen a wise guardian of their country's welfare. "This is the first general bill that has been sanctioned by the Congress," he writes, "since the close of the late civil war permitting a pension to the soldiers and sailors who served in that war upon the ground of service and present disability alone, and in the entire absence of any injuries received by the casualties or incidents of such service."² Toward the end of his veto message, he said, "The race after the pensions offered by this bill would not only stimulate weakness and pretended incapacity for labor, but put a further premium on dishonesty and mendacity."³

The veto message went to the House where the bill had originated. The Committee on Invalid Pensions, composed of eight Northern and one Southern Democrats and five Northern and one Southern Republicans nevertheless unanimously recommended the re-passage of the bill, but the House of Representatives sustained the

¹ Richardson, viii. 524.

² Ibid., 549. "On the 1st day of July, 1886, 365,763 pensioners of all classes were upon the pension rolls of whom 305,605 were survivors of the War of the Rebellion and their widows and dependents. For the year ending June 30, 1887, \$75,000,000 have been appropriated for the payment of pensions and the amount expended for that purpose from 1861 to July 1, 1886 is \$808,624,811.51." — Cleveland's veto message.

³ Richardson, viii. 555.

veto.¹ Thus the country was for the present spared this objectionable legislation through the intervention of the President.² Thirteen days before this veto the President had made a tactical mistake in signing a limited service pension for veterans of the Mexican War. He might easily have planted himself on the ground of opposition to all further pensions; the historian however must remember that he is dealing with a sincere sturdy patriot whose conclusions were reached by logical methods and ought not in his opinion to be modified by any appearance they might have of inconsistency.³ The mischief was that the law admitted ex-Confederate soldiers under certain limitations to the Mexican pension roll and thereby gave an additional handle to those who desired to convince the country that danger was imminent with a Democrat in the White House. In truth, the first Democrat to occupy that position since the Civil War must walk circumspectly if he would justify his election by the "solid South" and a few Northern States. John Sherman in a "bitterly partisan" speech during a heated political campaign said: "Thirty-eight members of Congress and of the electoral college are based upon the six million of colored people in the South.... In this way in some of the Southern States every white voter possesses the political power of two white voters in the Northern States. The colored people have practically no voice in Congress and no voice in the electoral col-

¹ House Reports, 49th Cong. 2 Sess., no. 4126.

² This consideration of pensions is mainly based on a theme prepared for me by D. M. Matteson; but I have been greatly helped by W. H. Glasson's *Hist. of Milt. Pension Legislation* in the Columbia University Studies and by D. R. Dewey's *National Problems*, in Hart's *American Nation* series.

³ Richardson, viii. 549.

lege." Therefore "Mr. Cleveland is now President of the United States instead of James G. Blaine."¹ "Is the white man in the South," asked Thomas B. Reed, "alone of mortals to eat his cake and have it too?"²

It must be remembered that we are taking count of the sentiment of 1885-1887 and not of that of a generation later which is convinced that the "solid South" is the result of the Reconstruction legislation of the Republican party and not of the Civil War when a people fought bravely and honestly for a cause out of tune with the nineteenth century. In his non-partisan moods Sherman was candid, declaring, "We have striven in various ways to assist the South in managing their local affairs; and I must confess that although I participated in that kind of business I am afraid it did not turn out very well. . . . It is now conceded on all hands that, under our system of government, we cannot by external force manage or interfere with the local affairs of a state or community, unless the authorities of the state call for aid to resist domestic violence."³ But when the partisan mood struck him, his tone was different. "I do not see," he declared, "how the arraignment of election methods that confessedly destroy the purity or sanctity of the ballot box . . . can be ignored or silenced in a republic by the shoo-fly cry of 'bloody shirt.'" "What are you going to do about it?" he was asked. "I do not exactly know

¹ Sept. 1885. Rec. ii. 929.

² Dewey, 167. Hayes wrote in his diary under date of Sept. 11, 1885: "Major McKinley visited me. He is on a stumping tour and came from Sandusky last evening and spent the night with us. . . . I criticised the bloody shirt course of the canvass . . . the people are weary of it. It is a stale issue." Life, Williams, ii. 341.

³ April 1886. Rec. ii. 953.

how we are going to do it," he replied, "but with the help of God we are going to arrange that the vote of the man who followed Lee shall no longer have, in national affairs, three times the power of the vote of the man who followed Grant. The tendency of events guided by a growing popular opinion will, I believe, secure this condition."¹ It is evident that the practical aim of John Sherman and of most of the Republicans of the time was to "fire the Northern heart" so that they should secure the doubtful Northern States which had voted for Cleveland.

The North desired to love Lamar,² Secretary of the Interior, but received a shock when in the words of John Sherman it saw "the Union flag at half-mast floating over the Interior Department in sign of honor and mourning for the death of Jacob Thompson."³ Thompson had been Secretary of the Interior under Buchanan and this was an ordinary way of recognizing the death of one who had been the head of the Department. The North was shocked, not because Thompson had been a Confederate but because he had been engaged in nefarious transactions.⁴ For its sentiment was well expressed in John Sherman's declaration at Birmingham, Alabama: "I would trust the patriotism of an ex-Confederate in Alabama as readily as an ex-Unionist in Ohio."⁵

Cleveland encountered another trouble in the return-of-the-battle-flag order. The Adjutant-General of the Army, in a wise and graceful letter to William C. Endicott, Secretary of War, proposed the return of Confederate flags which had been captured during the Civil War

¹ 1885, 1887. Rec. ii. 930, 987.

² See my vol. vii. 100.

³ In 1885. Rec. ii. 926. See *Life of Lamar*, Mayes, 477, 478.

⁴ See my vol. v. 341 *et ante*.

⁵ 1887. Rec. ii. 978.

to the respective States whose regiments had borne them in array of battle. President Cleveland approved the recommendation and by his action created a tumult. Senator Sherman declared it was a "recognition of a lost cause." So great an uproar was excited that the President revoked the order for the return of the flags. He "quailed like a whipped spaniel," declared Foraker with rhetorical partisanship, before the outraged public opinion of the North. Yet Cleveland, like Sumner in 1872, was simply in advance of his time. In 1905 the House and the Senate passed, without a call for the yeas and nays, in other words unanimously, a resolution directing the return of the Confederate flags to the respective States. This resolution was signed by President Roosevelt and under its authority 195 captured flags were returned to the several States of the Southern Confederacy.¹

¹ Richardson, viii. 578; Dewey, 165; Sherman Letters, 375; my vol. vii. 99. 100 *n.* 198 flags were returned but two went to Missouri and one to Kentucky.

CHAPTER XIII

CLEVELAND was not as successful in his effort to reform the tariff as in his work for the reform of the civil service. The former task could be accomplished by executive action; for the other he had to depend upon Congress and he was not entirely happy in his influence on legislative action. No sooner was he established in office than he found himself confronted with a formidable surplus lying in the treasury. The excess of revenue over expenditure for the year ending June 30, 1885 was sixty-three millions and for the following year ninety-four millions. In his first two annual messages he called the attention of Congress to this surplus and urged a reduction in the revenue from customs but Congress did not heed his recommendations. More money than was needed for the administration of the government continued to be collected and the hoard in the treasury grew. During the summer of 1887, Cleveland was so perturbed by the menace of financial derangement arising from the constantly accumulating surplus, that he determined on the unprecedented course of devoting the whole of his annual message to the one subject, supported as he was by the fact of a third excess of revenue over expenditures of one hundred and three millions. He presented his views to Congress in one of his most notable State papers [December 6, 1887], the most remarkable message Senators and Representatives had heard since

Lincoln's. During the three years ending June 30, 1887, one hundred and thirty-eight millions had been contributed to the sinking-fund by the calling in of outstanding three per cent bonds, these being payable at the option of the Government; in addition to the sinking-fund requirements, nearly eighty millions of the surplus had been applied in the same manner. Since June 30, 1887 nearly nineteen millions, which retired the remainder of the three per cent bonds, had also gone into the sinking-fund. In the current fiscal year about twenty-eight millions had been used in the purchase of four and four and a half per cent bonds not yet due. Still the excess of revenue would, it was estimated, reach one hundred and thirteen millions and the surplus in the treasury on June 30, 1888, one hundred and forty millions. "Financial disturbance" was threatened; "schemes of public plunder" were invited. After dismissing some measures that had been suggested for disposing of the surplus Cleveland argued that the people ought to have relief by a reduction of taxation, but that the internal revenue taxes being confined to tobacco and spirituous and malt liquors not "strictly speaking necessities" should not be touched. The relief should come therefore from a reduction of the tariff. Care should be taken not to injure in any way the working-man and not to sacrifice any proper interest of the manufacturer. It is not a question of "protection and free-trade," he said; "it is a *condition* which confronts us, not a theory."

The message with its direct and pertinent argument was certain to appeal to the plain people, yet the singling out of wool from among the raw materials for "a removal or reduction" of duty, though strictly logical from the

free-trader's standpoint was a political mistake. This is much to be regretted, as Cleveland's courage, in clearly defining an issue and standing forth as a leader of his party, is entitled to the large measure of commendation which it received at the time. But his intelligence did not equal his courage. As he himself had said in a previous message, "our farmers and agriculturists number nearly one-half of our population"; to carry a measure of tariff reform they must be his chief reliance, and the Western farmers already favored it. Yet his recommendation of free wool made of every farmer who owned a sheep a protectionist. It does not appear that he took counsel with anyone on the policy of such a message. A conference of Independents in New York, among whom were George William Curtis, Carl Schurz, and E. L. Godkin, all three tariff reformers, sent him word that they thought it inexpedient to urge a reduction of the tariff until after the presidential campaign of 1888; such a recommendation would imperil his own re-election and would be more politic at the beginning than at the end of a presidential term.

The expedient, however, did not appeal to Cleveland; the right did. He believed that there should be a reduction of the tariff and that he would be recreant to duty if he did not urge it. "Do you not think that the people of the United States are entitled to some instruction on this subject?" was his question to the emissary of the Independents.¹ "The breath of affairs was at last in his lungs," wrote Woodrow Wilson, "and he gave his party a leader, of a sudden, in the plain-spoken, earnest,

¹ *Century Mag.*, Aug. 1909, 485.

mandatory tariff message of December 1887. It was such a stroke as no mere politician would have hazarded, and it sadly disconcerted the men who had supposed themselves the leaders of the Democrats. Mr. Cleveland had not consulted them about his manifesto. He had made the issue of the next presidential campaign for them before they were aware of it, and that campaign was immediately at hand. . . . It was bravely done. The situation produced was even dramatic; and yet the calmest man anywhere touched by the business was Mr. Cleveland himself. It was not a trick or impulse. It was a steadily delivered blow of a stalwart and thoughtful man, thoroughly sick of seeing a great party drift and dally while the nation's finances suffered waste and demoralization." ¹ "The presidential chair," declared Lowell, "has a MAN in it and this means that every word he *says* is weighted with what he *is*." ²

If there was any leader of the Republican party at this time, it was Blaine. He at once took up the gauntlet. Travelling in Europe for health and recreation he gave, while in Paris, an interview to George W. Smalley, the veteran London correspondent of the New York *Tribune*. Blaine said: I have been reading extracts from the President's message and the comments on it of the London newspapers: these construed it as a free-trade manifesto that might be expected to enlarge the market for English fabrics in the United States. Perhaps this expectation stamps the character of the message more clearly than any words of mine can do. I do not mean to say that the message meant actual free-trade, neither

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1897, 294.

² *Prose Works*, vi. 184.

do the London journals, but the President has recommended a tariff for revenue, rejecting the protective feature as an object. . . . The general effect of the President's message should be to bring the country where it ought to be brought, to a full and fair contest on the question of protection. The President himself makes it the one issue by presenting no other in his message. I think it well to have the question settled. The Democratic party in power is a standing menace to the industrial prosperity of the country. That menace should be removed or the policy it foreshadows should be made certain.¹ There "came from over the sea," wrote John Hay to Blaine, "the clear blast of the trumpet, declaring battle and bringing the fighting men into well-ordered ranks. You have given us our platform for next year."²

The Democratic national convention was held in St. Louis on June 5. A platform was adopted favoring a reduction of the tariff and Cleveland was nominated for President by acclamation.³

There was an animated contest for the Republican nomination for President. Blaine could have had it by merely saying that he was a candidate but this he declined to do. From his several public and private letters and from Mrs. Blaine's, it is not difficult now to arrive at his precise position although at the time it was somewhat of a puzzle to both his friends and his opponents. Had there been a unanimous and spontaneous

¹ The Blaine-Paris interview, Dec. 7, *N. Y. Tribune*, Dec. 8. I have partly paraphrased this interview reducing in some cases the third person to first.

² Gail Hamilton, 645.

³ Stanwood, *Hist. of the Presidency*, 468.

demand giving him the nomination by acclamation he would have accepted it as a bounden duty; the onus of the campaign would then have been on the party, and he would have been spared the trial of soul and large expenditure of money that had fallen to his lot four years before. There was a good deal of "I dare not wait upon I would" in his makeup but the discernible inconsistencies in his public and private letters may be largely referred to his state of health. The hypochondria that was in evidence during his personal campaign of 1884 returned while he was in Europe, and, together with a probably real ailment, detracted from his energy and showed itself in a vacillation of mind when weighty matters were to be decided. While in Italy, he feared paralysis and his days and nights were full of concern about his physical condition, an indication of which was his eagerness for the visits of his Florence doctor, who grew "dearer and dearer day by day."¹

Blaine's letter of declination [January 25, 1888], from Florence, to the chairman of the Republican National Committee was regarded as leaving the field open to the other candidates who, personally and through their friends, redoubled their efforts to secure the nomination. All this preliminary work is politically interesting, but the votes each candidate received on the several ballots show the trend of the affair in no uncertain terms. The contest was really John Sherman against the field, with Blaine's friends in the background ready to spring his nomination on the convention at any time when Blaine would consent to be a candidate in the ordinary way or if,

¹ Mrs. Blaine, ii. 183.

in case of a deadlock, the convention should turn with one accord to him to help them out of the strait. Of all the candidates Sherman was the best fitted man for the presidency and he had a capable manager in Mark Hanna and loyal support from McKinley, both of whom were delegates from Ohio. The reason why he was not nominated was because he had antagonized New York State or rather the influential men in the delegation, chief of whom was Thomas C. Platt. If he could have secured New York, that large addition to his vote together with the votes certain to be influenced by the action of the Empire State would have nominated him. But to secure this was beyond his power or the power of his manager.

The convention came together in the Auditorium at Chicago on Tuesday, June 19. Governor Joseph B. Foraker was chairman of the Ohio delegation, all of whom were pledged to Sherman and gave him their votes. Foraker had gained national celebrity by his despatch at the time President Cleveland had approved a recommendation to return the captured Confederate battle flags to the Southern States: "No rebel flags [*i.e.*, those in the State House at Columbus, Ohio] will be surrendered while I am Governor." Called "an ideal partisan," "a younger Blaine," he was urged to speak at the evening session of the second day during a tedious wait for the report of a committee. Reluctantly mounting the platform he made a speech, which was commonplace when reduced to print but which created unbounded enthusiasm in the galleries. Next day Thursday, William McKinley as chairman of the Committee on Resolutions reported the platform and read in his most eloquent tones: "We are uncompromisingly in favor of the

American system of protection. . . . We condemn the proposition of the Democratic party to place wool on the free list." The national revenue should be reduced "by repealing the taxes upon tobacco . . . and the tax upon spirits used in the arts and for mechanical purposes" and by a revision of the tariff laws with full protection to American industry; and should these reductions not be sufficient "we favor the entire repeal of internal revenue taxes rather than the surrender of any part of our protective system."

The balloting began on the Friday. On the first ballot Sherman received the full vote of Ohio, 29 from Pennsylvania, 9 from Massachusetts, 6 from other Northern States and territories and 139 from the South, making a total of 229 while 416 were necessary to a choice; he received no votes from the four doubtful States. On the second ballot he gained 24 from Pennsylvania but, owing to a loss at the South, his total strength did not show this gain, amounting to only 249. This was the highest number he ever received. It was evident that he could not secure the nomination but his Ohio friends stuck to him to the last. As each candidate had been named, Sherman among the rest, the crowded galleries had responded with perfunctory applause, but every reference to Blaine created genuine enthusiasm.

The delegates at large from New York, Hiscock, Depew, Miller and Platt were called "the Big Four" and the influence they exercised fully justified this designation. During the first day of the convention, New York had given Depew all but one of her votes; his candidacy however was not generally regarded as a serious one and toward the close of Friday's session he withdrew his

name. On Saturday's first ballot these four with fifty-four other New York delegates gave their votes for Benjamin Harrison of Indiana and continued voting for him to the end. But during the recess of this Saturday and the intervening Sunday, New York took into account Allison, but after full consideration decided to stick to Harrison. On Monday's first ballot he obtained her whole vote of 72; and on the third, being the eighth ballot of the Convention, he received 544 votes, being considerably more than the number necessary to a choice, and was therefore nominated.

William McKinley, who was thought by some to look like the first Napoleon while to others his resemblance to Daniel Webster was striking, made a fine appearance as he read the platform with telling emphasis and aroused considerable enthusiasm. If Sherman had withdrawn in his favor and if Hanna had been willing to transfer his allegiance, McKinley would have been nominated. During the Saturday recess the veteran journalist Halstead telegraphed to Sherman, who was in Washington: "Blaine will certainly be nominated unless the movement can be checked by placing McKinley in nomination and concentrating the anti-Blaine forces. Can we afford to lose this opportunity of securing a nomination for the State? Give us a word and we believe we can pull McKinley through." On the intervening Sunday other despatches came to Sherman advising him to withdraw in favor of McKinley. His invariable attitude was expressed in his telegram to Foraker, "Have declined request of McKinley's friends." And Hanna approved his action. Having a high regard for Sherman's ability, he would not give up the hope of his nomination until the last

ballot; and McKinley's loyalty was unquestioned. Receiving votes on the three first ballots he rose before a ballot was had on the Saturday and said: "I cannot consistently with honorable fidelity to John Sherman who has trusted me in his cause with his confidence, and above all I cannot with my sense of personal integrity permit my name to be used in this Convention. . . . I do request gentlemen of this Convention, aye, I demand, that no delegate in this Convention who does not want to cast reflection upon me shall cast a further ballot for me." McKinley's honest face and frank manner convinced everybody that he meant what he said.

The contemporaneous impression of Sherman's loyal supporters was that Foraker's course had been tortuous and that when he arrived in Chicago, believing that Sherman's chance was almost hopeless, he aimed to put himself forward as the presidential nominee, and, if he could not secure the first place, to steer the nomination of Blaine with himself as Vice-President. No historical student will ignore Foraker's defence, although the criticism will occur in reading its many pages that he "doth protest too much." On the intervening Sunday Sherman telegraphed to him: "There should be a test vote on Blaine before I withdraw. His nomination should be assured before Ohio breaks. Will you accept nomination as his vice?" To this Foraker replied, "I have refused to allow my name to be mentioned by anybody for anything and I do not think it will be mentioned in the Convention, but if it should be it will be without my consent or approval, and if I should be nominated it will be declined unless you should request me to accept." At two o'clock on the Monday morning he was awakened

by a delegation of Blaine men, who, disappointed because their candidate would not make the contest, now offered his whole strength to Foraker if he would accept the nomination. Appreciating the compliment highly, he told them of the telegrams which had passed between him and Sherman and said that it was impossible for him to accept the nomination unless Sherman should request it.¹ The Blaine men then transferred their strength to Harrison.

If desirable to harmonize the contemporaneous impressions with Foraker's defence it may be easily done. Like Blaine he desired a spontaneous nomination, which was impossible as his strength at the beginning of the Convention was less than Blaine's, and because his speech seconding Sherman's nomination contained allusions that antagonized two important coteries, those of Gresham and of Depew. Walter Q. Gresham was an important candidate receiving 107 votes on the first ballot, which was the greatest number next to Sherman's. One of Gresham's seconders had heard the demand for his nomination "in the sighs of heaven that come from harvest-laden prairies waiting the garner's sickle to feed a hungry world." Such talk Foraker ridiculed. "I have not heard," he said, "of any breezes wafting sighs for the nomination of John Sherman as was the case with another gentleman." Less than a minute later he cast a slur at Depew because he had supported Greeley in 1872. "I want a man," Foraker said, "who is not only a Republican from the top of his head to the soles of his feet but who has been one all his life. I don't mean to insinuate anybody

¹ Notes of a Busy Life, J. B. Foraker, i. 368 *et ante*.

has not been that who has been named here." But Depew had been named just before Sherman. It was evident during this intervening Sunday that no combination could effect a nomination of Foraker unless at the end of a bitter contest if, indeed, it could be effected at all.

"The nomination was ours to give," wrote Mrs. Blaine during February, "certainly it was ours to keep."¹ This was still the case at the time of the recess on the Saturday in June and during the intervening Sunday. It was evident that Blaine could be nominated but not by acclamation. Although in Scotland visiting Andrew Carnegie he fully comprehended the situation and, on Sunday and Monday, sent two despatches both of which were received before the Convention assembled, and the second of which declined the nomination in unequivocal terms; both of these despatches were read to the delegates before a ballot was taken. On Monday before the meeting a despatch from Carnegie was received saying, "Too late. Blaine immovable. Take Harrison." Harrison had therefore Blaine's support as well as that of his own friends and of the New York delegation, many of whom were enthusiastic for Blaine. He came moreover from Indiana, a doubtful State, and had the support of all her delegates but one. As has been related, he received the nomination on the eighth ballot. No one of the men of personal magnetism like Blaine, Foraker and McKinley was chosen. The nomination went to a man of "very cold, distant temperament" who became known as the "White House iceberg" and his principal opponent,

¹ Letters, ii. 182.

Sherman was called "the hyperborean icicle." "Sherman won't do; he is too cold," said a delegate. "Why," replied the Ohio supporter, "he is a red hot stove compared to Harrison."¹

Blaine's counsel was "Take Harrison and Phelps." The Convention followed his advice regarding the first place but not the second. On the first ballot Levi P. Morton of New York was nominated for Vice-President, William Walter Phelps receiving 119 out of 826 votes.

Meanwhile Roger Q. Mills, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, had introduced a tariff reform measure into the House, in which the Democrats had a plurality of seventeen.² This was in line with the President's famous message and placed on the free list wool, salt, lumber, tin plates, cotton-ties and other materials, revised the tariff downward and so far as

¹ Authorities. Thesis prepared for me by D. M. Matteson in which through *Public Opinion* he referred to: *New York Times*, *Tribune*, *Sun*, *Evening Post*, *World*, *Herald*, *News*, *Harper's Weekly*; *Philadelphia Times*, *Record*, *North American*; *Chicago Tribune*, *Inter Ocean*, *Times*, *Journal*; *Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette*, *Times-Star*, *Enquirer*; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*; *Springfield Republican*; *Boston Post*; *Washington Star*; *Pittsburgh Commercial-Gazette*; *Indianapolis Journal*, *Sentinel*; *Milwaukee Wisconsin*; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*; *Salt Lake Herald*; *San Francisco Examiner*; *Omaha Republican*; *Memphis Appeal*; *Charleston News & Courier*; *Chattanooga Times*; *Minneapolis Tribune*; *Leavenworth Times*; *Utica Herald*; *St. Paul Press*; *Atlanta Constitution*. Also (most of which books were referred to by Matteson), *Official Proceedings Rep. Nat. Convention, 1888*; *Notes of a Busy Life*, J. B. Foraker; *Life of Hanna*, Croly; *B. B. Kendrick, McKinley and Foraker*, *Pol. Sci. Qua.*, 1916; *Gail Hamilton's Blaine*; *Letters of Mrs. Blaine*, ii.; *Stanwood, Life of Blaine*, *History of the Presidency*; *Autobiography of George F. Hoar*, i.; *John Sherman's Rec.*, ii.; *Autobiography of T. C. Platt*; *Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service*; *Life of McKinley*, Olcott; *Life of Sherman*, Kerr, ii.; *Life of Sherman*, Burton; *Conversations with Mark Hanna*.

² 169 Democrats, 152 Republicans, 3 Laborites, 1 Independent.

possible substituted ad-valorem for specific duties. The bill was thoroughly discussed; the chairman of the Committee of the Whole said, "as long as our government shall endure it will be known as 'The Great Tariff Debate of 1888.'" The Democratic National Convention approved the measure while McKinley, in reporting the Republican platform, read in scathing tones, "We denounce the Mills bill." The bill did not come to a vote until after the adjournment of both conventions when on July 21, those voting in favor of it were 162 and those opposed 149.¹ It became a feature of the presidential campaign and the Democrats were courageous in presenting a schedule as well as advocating, in general terms, a reduction of the tariff.

The Mills bill went to the Republican Senate which did not act upon it until after the election and then passed a substitute of its own. The two Houses could not agree and the session ended without any tariff legislation.

In his letter accepting the Democratic nomination, Cleveland followed logically the idea of his celebrated message and put the tariff question to the fore. Intimating that the tariff was a tax and that the present duties were substantially those imposed in time of war, he argued that the "surplus of more than one hundred and thirty millions"² showed "that the people are exor-

¹ Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies*, ii. Not voting, 14. For the vote see John Sherman's *Rec.*, ii. 1009; Curtis, *Republican Party*. Randall was paired with a Democrat from Virginia, who would have voted for the bill.

² Senator Sherman totally disagreed with the President. "The surplus revenue," he wrote, "whatever it might be could and ought to be applied to the reduction of the public debt. . . . Full authority had been

bitantly taxed." "Unnecessary taxation," he declared, "is unjust taxation." He favored a reduction of the tariff but did not intend "abrupt and radical changes which might endanger" industrial enterprises. With greater discernment than he had shown in his December message he did not single out wool as the raw material which should come in free but advocated generally "freeing from duty imported raw materials." For "relief from the undue and unnecessary burden of tariff taxation now resting upon" the people, the Republicans offer them, he said, "free tobacco and free whiskey."

Harrison was the grandson of William Henry who was the Whig candidate in the rollicking campaign of 1840; he had served with credit during the Civil War rising to the rank of General, had achieved a national reputation in 1876 through his contest for governor against "Blue Jeans Williams," and had been United States Senator for six years. In the course of a public speech delivered before his nomination in advocacy of a protective tariff

given to the Secretary of the Treasury to apply surplus revenue to the purchase of United States bonds." *Rec.*, ii. 1005, 1007.

The surplus money was deposited in the depository banks; nearly thirteen millions at the close of 1885, "on the last day of March 1888, these deposits had increased to \$61,231,647, and they had risen nearly twenty millions within four months." This recourse was unpopular with the community. "As a last resort therefore in April 1888, formal authority was wrung from Congress to devote the surplus to bond redemptions at a premium." A. D. Noyes, *Forty Years of American Finance*, 124, 125, who wrote further: "During 1888, the Government four per cents ranged on the open market from 123 to 129; yet at these high prices the Treasury bought, within seven months, upwards of \$50,000,000. The 4½s, ruling, because of their near maturity, between 106 and 109, were redeemed, meantime, in the amount of \$33,000,000. During 1888 and the two ensuing years, \$45,000,000 was actually paid out in premiums; within four years, the enormous sum of \$235,000,000 was expended for bond redemptions in excess of the annual sinking-fund requirement." *Ibid.*

he made a statement that attracted attention from both friends and opponents. "I cannot find myself," he said, "in full sympathy with this demand for cheaper coats which seems to me necessarily to involve a cheaper man and woman under the coat."¹ Between his nomination and letter of acceptance, he spoke to many visiting delegations laying great stress upon the tariff issue of the campaign, so that the ground he would cover in his formal reply was pretty well known. "The issue cannot now be obscured," he wrote in his letter of acceptance [September 11]. "It is not a contest between schedules but between wide-apart principles. . . . The Mills bill is only a step" toward a tariff for revenue only. The tariff reformers "are students of maxims and not of the markets." But "the Republican party holds that a protective tariff is wholesome and necessary." In this letter and in his various speeches, the argument is the familiar one that protection was necessary to insure higher wages to the American working-men in competition with the pauper labor of Europe.

The Republican campaign was well managed. The literary presentation of the cause received careful consideration and Harrison requested Lew Wallace to write the campaign biography. Wallace was a citizen of his own State, a general in the Civil War, and the author of a remarkably successful novel. The publishers cleverly backed the new book "Life of Ben Harrison by the author of Ben Hur" as in 1888 it was safe to say that hundreds knew the author to every one that knew the general. The speech-making was well calculated to insure political

¹ March, 1888. Speeches compiled by Charles Hedges (1892), 23.

support. Blaine arrived from Europe during August; two letters from literary men denote his powerful influence. "I wish it were possible for me to be in New York next week," wrote John Hay, "and mix my feeble fife with that vast roar of welcome that awaits him. I fancy he will himself be appalled at the fury of affection and regard with which he will be welcomed home. The country has had a year to think it over, and it concludes that it likes him and is glad to get him back." After the enthusiastic reception, Whittier wrote: "I was much disappointed by Mr. Blaine's letter of declination but when I see the great heart of the nation warmed and stirred to meet him, I think he, at least, has lost nothing by his choice of a private station. This grand ovation is worth more than a dozen presidencies. It is only a ripple of the great wave of popular sympathy and love."¹ Blaine threw himself into the campaign with ardor and proved an effective persuader of a mass of voters. To another element Senator John Sherman appealed with equal force. But the greatest influence was wielded by Harrison himself. Many and various delegations from different States visited him at his home in Indianapolis and he spoke to them all in fitting terms. During the campaign, he made ninety-four speeches without a slip. At the outset he declared that the contest should be one of principle and not of personal defamation. This was magnanimous, since his own character was above reproach; unwittingly perhaps he struck a popular note as nearly everybody recalled with disgust the campaign of 1884. He preached devotion to the Constitution and flag with a thorough-

¹ Aug. 3, 14. Gail Hamilton, 648.

going Americanism and argued that a protective tariff was the true American policy. To a Republican already believing in the tariff nothing could be more persuasive than Harrison's brief, pithy speeches, made from day to day to men calling upon him and pledging their support. They insured a full Republican vote and, joined to the high character and ability of the candidate, brought to the polls in November many waverers.

Probably more money was used on the Republican than on the Democratic side. Manufacturers were led to believe that a protective tariff was necessary for their bread and butter and were accordingly levied upon freely for contributions to the Republican party fund. Yet *The Nation*, which strongly supported Cleveland, spoke of "two pathetic appeals for 'fat'" and reasoned from them that "the protected manufacturers are still refusing to be 'fried.'"¹ A letter said to have been written by W. W. Dudley, treasurer of the National Republican Committee, had a damaging effect. Indiana since at least 1880 had been considered a venal State and this was Dudley's instruction to her party leaders: "Divide the floaters into blocks of five and put a trusted man with the necessary funds in charge of these five, and make him responsible that none get away and that all vote our ticket."² The Republican outlay was estimated at between one and three millions, *The Nation* inclining to the higher figure. The popular mind exaggerated the amount

¹ Aug. 16, 121. In a contemporary letter this may be found, "If I had my way about it I would put the manufacturers of Pennsylvania under the fire and fry all the fat out of them." *Sixty Years of American Life*, E. P. Wheeler, 135.

² *Boston Globe*, Oct. 31; Dewey, *National Problems*, 144; *The Nation*, Nov. 22, 406; see *Sixty Years of American Life*, E. P. Wheeler, 194.

of money used in the actual purchase of votes; indeed an electorate of over eleven millions is too large to warrant much buying by the National Committees save in the doubtful States. The legitimate expenses of a presidential campaign, meetings, speeches, travelling expenses, bands and processions generally consume a large part of what the National Committee could raise.

The Democrats were earnest in putting their policy before the people. Their ablest speaker was their candidate for Vice-President Allen G. Thurman, whose twelve years in the Senate had made him conspicuous as one of the sound constitutional lawyers of the country. His service on the Judiciary Committee had been highly useful and his personal friendship with Edmunds ennobled them both. Thurman spoke throughout the West showing that the noble old Roman as he used to be called, though in his seventy-fifth year, had lost none of his political fire.¹

An incident of the campaign endangered the friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States. This arose from an ill-considered act on the part of the British Minister, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, who was accredited to Washington because no scrupulous European court would receive him and his illegitimate daughters (the fruit of an intrigue with a Spanish dancer who however had died about ten years before he came to the United States). He fell into a trap which would have been apparent to any intelligent schoolboy. A man purporting to be a naturalized citizen of English birth wrote

¹ Authorities. Speeches of Harrison, *Hedges* (1892); *Life of Ben Harrison*, *Lew Wallace*; *The Presidents of the United States*, iv.; *The Nation*, 1888 *passim*; *Gail Hamilton*; *The Republican Party*, *Curtis*, ii.; *Dewey*.

to him from Pomona, California, asking if he ought, all things considered, to vote for Cleveland. The letter should of course have gone into Sackville-West's waste-paper basket but he, being an uncommonly dull man,¹ answered it to the effect that, taking everything into account, Cleveland would be the better President for Great Britain. Although he had no acquaintance whatever with the correspondent, he thought that marking the letter "private" would prevent its contents from being divulged; but in point of fact he was the victim of a Republican ruse and the correspondence was given to the press in October. It created a sensation and, as the Republicans had charged the Democrats with catering to the British manufacturers by their tariff reform policy, it proved a powerful lever in their behalf. An example of this is seen in an edition of the New York *Tribune* in which a facsimile of Sackville-West's letter appeared, together with the following comment, "The British Lion's paw thrust into American politics to help Cleveland." The British Minister advised his correspondent "that President Cleveland should be supported by naturalized Americans of British descent." The London *Times* asserted that Sackville-West's indiscretion was "indisputable and indefensible" but it misconceived the con-

¹ James B. Angell, President of the University of Michigan, was a member of the Canadian Fisheries Commission of 1887-1888, thus associated with Secretary Bayard and Sackville-West. Angell wrote in his *Reminiscences* (175): "Sackville-West, during our three months' discussions, never said anything except to move to adjourn. In reply to my inquiry, if in his official relations with the Secretary he ever volunteered any remarks, Mr. Bayard said, 'No; he simply communicates to me in writing a message from Lord Salisbury and acknowledges in writing my reply. That is all.' And then he added 'I can hardly understand why the British government keeps a minister on a salary of \$25,000 and then reduces him to the function of a postage stamp.'"

ditions of the American presidential campaign when it called this noble contest for principle "the demoralizing quadrennial struggle for the spoils of office."

As Sackville-West by his interference in a political contest in the country to which he was accredited, became forthwith *persona non grata*, the President promptly directed Secretary of State Bayard to telegraph to our Minister in London that as Sackville-West "in his correspondence and in frequent interviews intended to be published has impugned the motives of the President and the Senate in regard to Canadian questions,¹ his usefulness in this country is at an end"; and as "a strong public sentiment has been aroused" Lord Salisbury who was both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary should "understand the necessity of immediate action." This of course was equivalent to asking Sackville-West's recall. Salisbury would not recall his minister without knowing his precise language and his own explanation of it because a recall would end his diplomatic career, while this "would not necessarily be the case if he was dismissed by the Government of the United States." The President acted on this intimation and on October 30 through his Secretary of State dismissed the British minister. His place was not filled during the remainder of Cleveland's administration.²

There were no longer any "October States." Pennsylvania, Indiana and Ohio used to be the great battle-ground apt to foretell the result, but Pennsylvania held her last State election preceding the presidential in 1872, Indiana

¹ These will be considered at a future time.

² Foreign Relations, 1888; conversation with J. B. Angell; Enc. Brit. 11th ed.; Dict. of Nat. Biog., Supplement 2; Stanwood, Hist. of the Presidency.

in 1880 and Ohio in 1884. All now voted for State officers on the same November day as the presidential election, so that the usual surface indications of the trend of opinion were now lacking.

Harrison was elected, receiving 233 electoral votes to Cleveland's 168; he carried the two doubtful States of New York and Indiana. New York was necessary for his election; had Cleveland carried it, he would have been elected. As Harrison's plurality in New York was 13,000 and Hill the Democratic candidate for Governor was chosen by a plurality of 19,000 it was at first charged that the Democrats had traded votes to Harrison. Harrison sent this characteristic despatch to Warner Miller the defeated Republican candidate: "I am greatly grieved at your defeat. If the intrepid leader fell outside the breastworks, the column, inspired by his courage, went on to victory."¹ Thomas C. Platt, who was familiar with all the elements involved, asserted that it was "Quay's² masterful conduct of the campaign" that carried the State for Harrison. Platt did not like Miller and wrote that he "defeated himself for governor by making what I regarded as a very injudicious speech on the liquor question."³ As Grover Cleveland said in 1906 that he had "no idea or impression that the Presidential ticket was the victim of treachery in New York in the election of 1888"⁴ the historical student must conclude that the popular contemporaneous belief is not proved.

¹ Speeches, 189.

² Matthew S. Quay, senator from Pennsylvania and chairman of the Repub. Nat. Com.

³ Autobiography 207, 210. The brewers and saloons supported Hill. *The Nation*, Sept. 13, Nov. 22; also *N. Y. Tribune*.

⁴ Parker, 342.

Cleveland had a small plurality of the popular vote. As a result of the election the Republicans had a plurality of 17 in the House, a majority of 10 in the Senate.¹

¹ McKee, 259; Stanwood, Hist. of the Presidency, 483; Dewey; *The Nation*. McKee's figures are elaborated and to some degree modified by Tribune Almanac, McPherson's handbook and the Biog. Cong. Directory.

CHAPTER XIV

PRESIDENT Harrison read his inaugural address [March 4, 1889] to thousands of people who stood in the driving rain eager to hear the pronouncement of him who signaled the return of the Republican party to power. Like all his public utterances it was excellent, containing a suggestive outline of the various matters that would have his own and his party's attention. Impressed with the day being the centenary of the establishment of the Federal government, he drew a contrast between the now "thirty-eight populous and prosperous States" and the thirteen States of Washington's first inauguration, "weak in everything except courage and the love of liberty." He recognized however that we had "not attained an ideal condition" for "not all of our people are happy and prosperous. But on the whole, the opportunities offered to the individual to secure the comforts of life are better than are found elsewhere and largely better than they were here 100 years ago." For, "The masses of our people are better fed, clothed and housed than their fathers were." Even the spread-eagle portion of the Address may be read without throwing a "chill over our political imagination."¹ "No other people," he declared, "have a government more worthy of their respect and love, or

¹ John Morley, *Compromise*, 14.

a land so magnificent in extent, so pleasant to look upon and so full of generous suggestion to enterprise and labor. God has placed upon our head a diadem and has laid at our feet power and wealth beyond definition and calculation. But we must not forget that we take these gifts upon the condition that justice and mercy shall hold the reins of power." Harry Thurston Peck, in his interesting History, has well described the President's personal appearance, saying, "If he was not particularly impressive, his bearing was nevertheless the bearing of a gentleman and he was one with whom not even an intimate friend would have dreamed of taking liberties."¹

Blaine naturally became Secretary of State; William Windom of Minnesota was appointed Secretary of the Treasury.² Thomas C. Platt of New York ardently desired this place and thought that he had President Harrison's "positive pledge" for it, but he unquestionably misconstrued the assurances of some friends, as in a private letter written in 1900 Harrison denied positively that he had ever promised a Cabinet office to Platt.³ It was thought that Warner Miller's claims for the Treasury were considered, owing to the splendid fight that he had made in New York State, but Platt opposed that appointment with vigor.⁴ In view of the silver question, which again loomed large, it was probable that personalities were disregarded in the search for a Treasury Sec-

¹ P. 169.

² For the remaining Cabinet officers see Dewey 146.

³ Platt's Autobiography, 206; Letter of Harrison to W. H. H. Miller of Indianapolis, Aug. 22, 1900, *Boston Daily Advertiser*, March 11, 1910. Miller was Harrison's law partner and Attorney-General in his Cabinet. See also Halford, Harrison's private secretary, writing in 1912, *Century Mag.*, N. S., lxii. 305.

⁴ Platt's Autobiography, 207.

retary who would not offend New York City and yet be satisfactory to the West. When Windom was Senator from Minnesota he resigned the position to take the Treasury Department under Garfield in which Windom acquired some cheap glory. Going back to the Senate when Arthur became President, he failed of reelection in 1883 and went to New York City to take up the practice of law or to become a promoter of financial enterprises. Apparently he was deemed suited to the exigencies of the situation.

Harrison said in his inaugural address: "Heads of departments, bureaus, and all other public officers having any duty connected therewith, will be expected to enforce the Civil Service law fully and without evasion. Beyond this obvious duty I hope to do something more to advance the reform of the civil service. The ideal or even my own ideal, I shall probably not attain." We are able to make the retrospect which, he added, "will be a safer basis of judgment than promises." What the President stated was carried out to the letter; the popular mind however has not done him justice owing to some of his earlier appointments. One of these affected New York City which was then as often before and since the cynosure of attention. Henry G. Pearson, its efficient postmaster appointed by Garfield, reappointed by Cleveland, was now replaced by another man when his term expired and this action of the President was severely condemned by Civil Service reformers. Pearson died during April and it was then given out that it had been known as early as February that a fatal malady was fastened upon him. It does not appear however that this was urged at the time as a reason for his displacement

which was therefore ascribed to a wish of the President's to reward a party worker with a fat office.¹

The President appointed J. S. Clarkson of Iowa, an avowed opponent of Civil Service Reform, as First Assistant Postmaster-General. Clarkson began at once the decapitation of Democratic fourth-class postmasters. George William Curtis said in his address before the National Civil-Service Reform League in Philadelphia on October 1st: "A few weeks ago, a hilarious administration-party organ at the capital of New York, one of the most influential and representative party journals, exclaimed, 'Fifteen thousand fourth-class postmasters have been removed to date and Mr. Clarkson remains in Washington with his coat off and his shirt sleeves rolled up. Go it, Clarkson! Out with the whole fifty-five thousand by January 1st.'" ² He was unable to carry out literally the injunction of his journalistic friend, but he made good progress in that direction as, during the following February, he declared: "I have changed 31,000 out of 55,000 fourth-class postmasters and I expect to change 10,000 more before I finally quit. I expect before the end of the month to see five-sixths of the Presidential postmasters changed. Then I can paraphrase old Simeon and say, 'Let thy servant depart in peace.'" ³

¹ *The Nation*, Apr. 11, 25, 1889; *N. Y. Times*, Apr. 6, *Eve. Post*, Apr. 8; *Public Opinion*, viii. *passim*; *N. Y. Tribune*; *Springfield Republican*, Apr. 8. A mystery appears to be connected with Pearson's illness. His successor was appointed April 5; he died on April 20 of cancer of the stomach — a malady ordinarily of long duration and suspected by friends and acquaintances; yet the public generally knew nothing of it until his death.

² Curtis, *Orations and Addresses*, ii. 401.

³ *The Nation*, Feb. 27, 1890. Clarkson denied having made the statement. He resigned Sept. 1, 1890, having made 32,335 changes in fourth-class offices. *Civil Service Record*, ix. 107, 124, x. 21.

A most unfortunate appointment was that of Corporal James Tanner as Commissioner of Pensions. Harrison had said in one of his speeches before his nomination that it "was no time to be weighing the claims of old soldiers with apothecary's scales."¹ And this sentiment was translated by Tanner into action. He early announced his policy. Referring "to 33,871 men upon the pension roll who receive not over \$3.75 per month," he said: "For twenty years I have been able to only plead, but now I am thankful that at these finger-tips there rests some power, and as that power is mine, I broadly say that I propose, just as soon as possible to call in every one of the certificates of pension the figures of which I have just named, and reissue them on the basis of the truth that no man ought to be down on the pension roll of the United States for less than the miserable pittance of one dollar per week, though I may wring from the hearts of some the prayer 'God help the surplus.'"² Tanner's re-rating of pensions increased as the weeks went on until in a public speech to some veterans in Chicago he declared, "I tell you frankly that I am for 'the old flag and an appropriation' for every old comrade who needs it."³ Tanner's hold on the Grand Army of the Republic was largely due to his having lost both legs at the second Battle of Bull Run, but his conduct of the Pension office was no credit to the Harrison administration. Finally a difference between him and his chief, the Secretary of the Interior, an honest and capable man, caused his removal during the month of September.

Moreover Harrison was justly charged with nepotism;

¹ Dewey, 184.

² *The Nation*, May 30.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1.

also with giving many desirable offices to newspaper men in order, as his enemies declared, to curry favor with the press.¹

Let us now look on the other side. The President appointed Theodore Roosevelt a member of the United States Civil Service Commission. Roosevelt thoroughly believed in the reform and brought to the office keen intelligence, wide knowledge and a requisite amount of aggressiveness. He characterized Clarkson's attack on the Civil Service Commission as "loose diatribe equally compounded of rambling declamation and misstatement."² No one was better fitted to answer the practical men who with Lord Melbourne feared that this "damned morality will ruin everything."³ "The merit system," wrote Roosevelt in the *Century Magazine* for February 1890, "is the system of fair play, of common sense and common honesty; and therefore it is essentially American and essentially Democratic." At a dinner given in his honor at Boston during 1889 by the Cambridge and Boston Civil Service Reform Associations he said: "At Washington we still have to face the active and envenomed hostility of an immense mass of politicians. We have not only to make every advance in the teeth of the fiercest opposition but we have to fight every hour to keep the ground that we have gained. . . . There is no danger of the mere brute force of a repeal. There is danger of the law being killed in some way by indirection and probably very few people understand that the vote on the appropriation is one of the test votes that shows how the Congressmen stand toward the reform." I am encour-

¹ *Civil Service Record*, viii. 83, ix. 116, x. 34.

² Dewey, 149.

³ Curtis, ii. 447.

aged, said James Russell Lowell, who was at the dinner, that we have a man on the Civil Service Commission "so energetic, so full of zeal and, still more, so full of fight."¹ That Roosevelt remained in office during the four years of Harrison is a credit to his administrative power and tactfulness, and a testimony to the President's genuine support of the reform.²

"The President has selected an admirable Civil Service Commission," declared Curtis. "Every member of it is a sincere believer in the necessity and practicability of reform."³ George William Curtis retained his presidency of the National Civil Service Reform League until his death in August 1892, so that he covered nearly three and one-half years of Harrison's administration. It is no exaggeration to call him the high-priest of the reform. His annual addresses make excellent political literature; his power of statement and graceful bearing commanded for him a large hearing. No higher compliment can be

¹ *Civil Service Record*, ix. 67-69. Under date of June 26, 1889 Senator George F. Hoar wrote: "A very large majority of the American people are not yet convinced of the soundness of the principle which lies at the bottom of what is called civil service reform. They think that it is better to have the party in power appoint men who have shown activity and zeal in its service to executive positions, to hold the party responsible for them, and that in that way we shall get, on the whole, a more honest, zealous and efficient service than by selecting public agents in any other way. It is not necessary to say that I do not myself concur with that opinion. . . . I believe that President Harrison agrees with me in this matter." *Ibid.*, ix. 13, 14. In a letter written on request of this journal on Oct. 18, 1889, Henry Cabot Lodge said, "The system of political patronage, which is as old as the government, is deeply imbedded in the political habits and political thought of the people; and in large sections of our country and among great masses of the voters, any other system still seems strange and of doubtful expediency." ix. 52.

² Roosevelt's associates were Charles Lyman, President, and ex-Governor Hugh Thompson of S. C., a Democrat and ex-Confederate soldier.

³ *Orations and Addresses*, ii. 408. "The Commission as now constituted is the best we have had." *The Nation*, May 9.

paid the administration than to contrast his address of 1889 with that of 1891. The first was a virulent attack by a Cleveland Democrat on Harrison;¹ that of 1891 was a calm review of what had been accomplished, optimistic in tone. He declared that during "the ten years of the existence of this league" [be it noted that one quarter of the period was under Harrison] Civil Service reform had made a "prodigious advance both in public opinion and in practical application."² With the candor which was one of Curtis's distinctive traits, he thus recognized what had been done. The United States Civil Service Commission in their report for 1892 said: "The Civil-Service Law went into effect in 1883, about 14,500 employés being then included within its provisions, while in that year the total number of employés was in round numbers 131,000. In 1891 the classified service [that under the Civil Service rules] embraced some 34,000 places while the entire public service included in the neighborhood of 183,000. The growth of the public service had been over 39 per cent, a much faster growth than that of the population in the same time. . . . The classified service has grown even faster in the same space of time, increasing at the rate of about 130 per cent, so that whereas only 11 per cent of the public service was removed from party politics in 1883, nearly 19 per cent in 1891 was so removed."³ In April 1892 Curtis declared,

¹ "Mr. Curtis's arraignment of the administration was in parts almost blasting in its severity." *The Nation*, Oct. 10.

² *Orations and Addresses*, ii. 474.

³ House Exec. Docs., 52d Cong. 2d Sess. 10. In their report for 1890 the U. S. Civil Serv. Com. said: "In the departmental service at Washington the figures show that the question of politics has been practically eliminated in making removals, and for the last seven years the law, as a whole, has been

"The reform law has been as faithfully observed as by the preceding administration and the scope of the reformed service has been greatly enlarged."¹

The Act of 1883 stipulated, "that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations to con-

faithfully and honestly observed in the departments although having been subjected to the strain of two changes of administration." *Ibid.*, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., 3.

¹Orations and Addresses, ii. 504. David M. Matteson, who has made a thorough study of this subject for me, writes: "Harrison recognized that the classification act was a law of the land and as such one of the things he had sworn to administer to the best of his ability; and he did so. Having made the Commission a living body, he did not interfere with its activities. Outside the classified service, in the presidential and post-office appointments he adhered to the old spoils methods; made a clean sweep in the end and made it rather early. While pretending, as did Cleveland, to observe the four year tenure he violated it more than Cleveland did. Cleveland's Commission was largely dead-wood; he himself was about the only living reform element of his administration. Harrison observed the letter of the law faithfully; the reformers condemned him for not observing, as they insisted he had promised to, the spirit of the reform."

In June 1889 the *Civil Service Record* said: "The pressure for office is greater than ever. Republicans and especially Southern Republicans are clamoring that there are not enough offices to go round and they want the Civil Service Law abolished." "What the spoils pressure has been for these small places may be judged from the experience of one post-office in New York State, where there were forty positions to dispense when the present administration came in, and some eight hundred applicants among whom to choose." *Good Government*, xii. 77. The *Kansas City Times* (Democratic) in the spring of 1889 said, "Civil-service reform suggests alluring possibilities to the 'outs.'"

Matteson further writes: "Harrison's appointments were on the whole unusually high class; that they were so is in part due to his resistance of reckless congressional patronage, as his resistance of that was the reason of many of the politicians being at odds with him. . . . There was little choice, after all is said, between the records of Cleveland and Harrison. Cleveland's action outside the law had been better than Harrison's, though less consistent. Harrison's upholding of the law and its advance was superior to Cleveland's. And his reform measures outside the scope of the law, in the matter of the navy-yards and also the promotions within the Post-Office Department had, I think, no counterpart in Cleveland's administration. Like Cleveland, Harrison made his most important addition to the scope of the classified service after his defeat for re-election."

For the changes made see *Civil Service Record*, x. 99.

tribute to any political fund or to render any political service and that he will not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so." Political assessments therefore bulk large in any discussion of this subject. "The system of party assessments in the Civil Service," said Curtis in his address of 1891, "and the kindred evil of the interference of office-holders in elections, are now so effectually stigmatized by public opinion that, although not abandoned, they have become disgraceful."¹

People who rejoiced in anything evil said of the Republic were fond of quoting Senator Ingalls' words: "The purification of politics is an iridescent dream. . . . The Decalogue and the Golden Rule have no place in a political campaign."² Those who loved the Republic could point to such a host of earnest efforts on the part of senators and representatives as should have dispelled this pessimism, but for present purposes the mention of two prominent members will suffice. McKinley, the leader of the House of Representatives, protested against Clarkson's "contemptuous words and despoiling deeds" and, opposing the amendment to strike out the appropriation for the execution of the Civil Service law declared that "if his party is pledged to one thing more than another it is to the Civil Service reform law which is sustained by the best sentiment of the whole country, Republicans and Democrats alike." "He was seconded by Henry Cabot Lodge," said Curtis, "who stated with force and lucidity the principles of reform."³ McKinley

¹ Orations and Addresses, ii. 462. See also U. S. Civil Serv. Com. reports of 1890 and 1892.

² Dewey, 152; Writings of J. J. Ingalls, 393. The remark was made in a newspaper interview toward the end of Sept. 1890.

³ Orations and Addresses, ii. 442.

further said, "The merit system is here, and it is here to stay."¹

Few will begrudge Blaine the little triumph that he won in the closing years of his checkered and, on the whole, sad life. He was eager for better commercial and diplomatic relations with the Central and South American republics and, while Secretary of State under Garfield and under Arthur, had tried to bring about a conference for the furtherance of this end but without success. President Cleveland, under authority of a resolution by Congress, had invited the independent powers of America to send delegates to a Conference in Washington and it fell to Blaine to welcome the delegates on October 2 in the diplomatic room of the State Department, on which occasion he made an excellent address. Between this day and the one set for assembling for serious business, the delegates journeyed about the country and were entertained at many banquets, the most notable of which was the one in Cleveland for the reason that Senator Sherman, one of the wisest statesmen of the country, here tentatively announced what he believed to be the nation's true policy. "I do not know," said he, "but that I would be for free trade for all America."² What was hinted at was a Zollverein which would have been a sound policy, as the potent argument for a protective tariff was the greater dearness of labor and capital than

¹ McKinley, *Speeches and Addresses*, 396. Here are printed the exact remarks which Curtis has partly paraphrased.

² The speech in his *Rec.*, ii. 1007, which was printed next morning in the *Cleveland Leader* was not the one actually delivered. Sherman could speak well extempore and on this occasion outdid himself in a masterly speech.

obtained in Europe and neither of these applied to intercourse between the different nations in America, which, in this respect, were subject to similar conditions. Blaine undoubtedly would have gone far in this direction, but the difficulty lay with the Republican party and the circumstances under which it had regained power. The manufacturers and producers who had contributed to its success were exacting in their demands and they had a sincere, able and comprehending representative in William McKinley; their claims proved an effectual bar to such a desirable policy.

On November 18 the first Pan-American Congress reassembled in Washington, chose Blaine as its President, held seventy sessions, completing its labors in April 1890. Besides freer commercial relations another object of the Congress was to prevent war between the deliberating countries; if difficulties could not be settled by ordinary diplomacy it was proposed to have recourse to arbitration. As subsequent events gave both these aims of the Congress a blow, it was at one time the fashion to sneer at it, but we can now see in it the beginning of more friendly relations between the United States and the countries of Central and South America. It was well worth while to bring men of Spanish and Portuguese culture in contact with Anglo-Saxons; holding frequent social intercourse through the common medium of the French language, they came to understand one another better and to comprehend what each had contributed to the common stock of civilization. It may not be alleged that the fear of the Big Brother was entirely allayed in the minds of the South Americans but many of them came to place a firmer trust in the sincerity

of our people. It is likewise true that the upholders of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, those who believed in the expansion of the United States to cover the whole of America, became fewer and less blatant in view of the nobler aims pronounced by Secretary Blaine.¹

¹ Gail Hamilton; Life of Blaine, Stanwood; *The Nation*; Enc. Brit., 11th ed.

CHAPTER XV

PUBLIC attention then and historical attention now centres on the action of the Fifty-first Congress assembling on the first Monday of December 1889. When Harrison read his inaugural address, the President, Senate and House, for the first time since 1875, were of the same party¹ and, although it was a subject of consideration, the President decided not to call an extra session. Naturally the first business of the Republican majority was the selection of a Speaker of the House. After an animated contest in the Republican caucus between Reed and McKinley, Thomas B. Reed of Maine was chosen and was of course elected Speaker; he appointed McKinley chairman of the Committee on Ways and

¹ *The Nation* wrote on Dec. 5, 1889: "On Monday [Dec. 2] for the first time since December 1874 a President greeted a Congress having in each branch a clear majority of his own party. When President Grant sent in his message fifteen years ago the 'tidal wave' [autumn of 1874] had already swept over the country and insured the Democrats the control of the succeeding House of Representatives, and Hayes confronted an opposition majority in the lower branch throughout his term, and a Democratic Senate during the last two years. In 1880 the Republicans elected a majority of the Representatives but the Senate was equally divided when Mahone voted with the Republicans and David Davis with the Democrats. By 1883 the Senate had become Republican but the House was Democratic during the last two years of Arthur's incumbency. Cleveland had a Republican Senate to deal with throughout his term. It is consequently nearly half the lifetime of a generation since the last occurrence of such conditions as exist to-day." McKee classifies Congress: Senate, 37 Democrats, 47 Republicans; House, 156 Democrats, 173 Republicans, 1 Independent, 259. For an account of Mahone, see C. C. Pearson, *Amer. Hist. Review*, July 1916, 740.

Means, thus making him leader of the House. A large amount of legislation was marked out, but as the Republican majority in the House was not large¹ its success depended upon the suppression of filibustering. This Reed determined upon and he had the support of the Republican majority. Most of the public who gave any thought to the question, before it was made a party issue, would have agreed with the inference logically to be drawn from the following remarks of McKinley's. The framers of the Constitution, said he, "never fancied that sullen silence was a statesmanlike way of stopping public business. The later generation of statesmen have inaugurated it. We have done it — all of us. . . . I have sat here and filibustered day after day in silence refusing to vote, but I cannot now recall that I ever did it for a high or a noble or a worthy purpose."² The point at issue was, whether the constitutional quorum of a majority of the House should be determined by the yeas and nays or by the number of members present whether voting or not. Reed decided that actual presence of a majority constituted a quorum, and he soon had an opportunity of putting his theory into practice. In January 1890 a vote was taken on a contested seat to which, according to the committee report, a Republican was entitled, and, as the Republicans could not muster a majority of the whole House, their yeas fell two votes short of a quorum,³ whereupon Reed directed the clerk to record certain Democrats whom he named as "present and re-

¹ There were a number of contested seats which were afterwards decided in favor of the Republicans.

² Jan. 30, 1890. Speeches and Addresses, 387.

³ A quorum was 165; 163 members answered to their names. Life of Reed, McCall, 167.

fusing to vote." This ruling created much excitement and was resisted by the Democrats. "I deny your right, Mr. Speaker," one declared rising with a book in hand, "to count me as present and I desire to read from the parliamentary law on that subject." "Reed raised a hearty laugh by coolly saying in reply and with his customary drawl: 'The chair is making a statement of fact that the gentleman from Kentucky is present. Does he deny it?'"¹ Besides the strenuous opposition in the House, Reed encountered a good deal of ridicule outside. He was called a "Czar" and it was said that he counted members in the cloak room and barber shop as present.² "Say, Tom, did you count a hat?" he was asked by a wit from his own State of Maine.

In the face of abuse in the House and raillery from outside Reed pursued an unwavering course. Calm and witty as he appeared in public, he was often beset with private doubts as to the possibility of success in this wise policy of his that ran counter to precedent. Could he indeed retain the full support of the Republican majority? In the end however he triumphed and saw his rulings crystallized in two rules and adopted by the House, that actual attendance should determine a quorum, and that no dilatory motion should be entertained by the Speaker [February 14, 1890]. The important matter lay in Rule XV which determined how a quorum to transact business should be constituted: this was decided to be valid by the United States Supreme Court in an opinion of Justice Brewer.³ "The principle," said Miss Follett in her thorough study of the subject, "that no dilatory motion

¹ Life of Reed, McCall, 167.

² Dewey, 155.

³ Feb. 29, 1892, 144 U. S. 5.

should be received by the Speaker was virtually conceded by the Fifty-second and Fifty-Third Congresses," in both of which the Democrats had a commanding majority in the House.¹ "The adoption of the quorum rule in the Fifty-third Congress practically ended the discussion over the methods of preventing obstruction in the House of Representatives. . . . Both parties now seem agreed that members may no longer reap any advantage by refusing to vote ; it is practically acknowledged that the day of dilatory motions is past."²

Reed had to choose between precedents, his own declarations, and a wise, though novel, construction of the Constitution. Cutting loose from precedents, he made a new rule and modified the procedure of the House of Representatives in the direction of a sane method. To him is due the end of obstruction in the House. It was work possible only to a man of good humor, great nerve and rare administrative power : these were qualities possessed in proper combination by Thomas B. Reed.

The adoption of the Reed rules cleared the way for legislative action. The Republicans, having demanded liberal pensions in their platform of 1888, received during the canvass the support of the Grand Army of the Republic and a large majority of the men who had seen service during the Civil War. These were especially bit-

¹ Fifty-second Congress, when organized, House 235 Democrats, 88 Republicans, 9 Farmers' Alliance or Populists. Fifty-third, House, when organized at special session, 217 Democrats, 126 Republicans, 11 Populists and Independents, 2 vacancies. *Tribune Almanac*; *McPherson*; *Biog. Cong. Directory*.

² The Speaker of the House of Representatives (1896), 214, 216. Besides authorities already mentioned, I have used D. S. Alexander's *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives*.

ter against Cleveland for his vetoes of private pensions and the Dependent Pension bill and expected pensions in recompense for their support. The President and his party, taking the same point of view as did the veterans, were prepared to pay the price. Harrison in his inaugural address and first annual message had spoken for adequate pensions and now the surplus in the Treasury offered the means. "A surplus," so Colonel Frederick Grant truly said, "is easier to handle than a deficit."¹

The Dependent Pension Bill, similar to the one which President Cleveland had vetoed, became a law on June 27, 1890. It provided that all veterans of ninety days' service in the Civil War who suffered from any mental or physical disability which was not the result of their own vicious habits and which incapacitated them for manual labor to such a degree as to render them incapable of earning a support should receive a pension ranging from six to twelve dollars a month, according to incapacity. Present pensioners might apply but no man could receive more than one pension. Rank should not be considered. Widows and minor children of those who had served ninety days, if the widow had no other means of support than her manual labor, might, on proof of her husband's death and without reference to whether death was due to service in the war, receive a pension of eight dollars a month during widowhood, and two dollars in addition for each minor child of said soldier. The widow must have been married to the veteran at the time of the passage of the act.

The number of pensioners increased from 489,725 in

¹ H. T. Peck, 197.

1889 to 966,012 in 1893 and the amount of money from 89 millions to 157 millions; but the appropriation fell next year to 140 millions and ran along at about that sum until 1908.

The Act of 1890 was the last great piece of pension legislation prompted by the Civil War, until 1906 when age pensions were introduced; later, widow pensions and others were increased and length of service was taken into consideration.¹

The Presidential campaign had been fought out on the tariff issue. A new tariff was now demanded and the need of it was set forth by the President in his message to Congress of December 1889. "I recommend," he said, "a revision of our tariff law both in its administrative features and in the schedules." Into no better hands than McKinley's could this business be intrusted. He first carried through a customs administrative act which provided for "the honest collection of the revenue and an honest administration of the laws." This it undoubtedly effected, but it was none the less a merit in McKinley's eyes that it also enhanced the tariff. This was, however, but the prelude to the McKinley Bill.

McKinley was sincerely devoted to a protective tariff. He concluded his speech on his bill on May 7, 1890 with: Protection "is a deep conviction, not a theory. I believe in it and thus warmly advocate it because enveloped in it are my country's highest development and greatest prosperity; out of it come the greatest gains to the people, the greatest comforts to the masses, the widest

¹ This account is based largely on a thesis prepared for me by D. M. Matteson. See also Glasson, *History of Military Pension Legislation in the U. S.* Written previous to Jan. 1, 1918.

encouragement for manly aspirations, with the largest rewards, dignifying and elevating our citizenship, upon which the safety and purity and permanency of our political system depend.”¹ In a campaign speech during the previous year he had said: “They say ‘everything would be so cheap’ if we only had free trade. Well, everything would be cheap and everybody would be cheap. I do not prize the word cheap. It is not a word of hope; it is not a word of comfort; it is not a word of cheer; it is not a word of inspiration! It is the badge of poverty; it is the signal of distress.”² When a Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, holding such a belief, went to work framing a tariff bill, no revision downward such as the situation really demanded could be expected. - McKinley’s associates on the Committee were able men and as thorough believers in the system as himself.³ It is extraordinary that men of such ability should have matured and induced Congress to pass such an Act. Its greatest merit was its symmetry. McKinley and many of his fellow committee-men understood the tariff system thoroughly and knew how to apportion the protection so that no single industry or section should get too much benefit and another too little. Helpful to this end were the open and full hearings given by the Committee to manufacturers, laborers, consumers and farmers, both free-traders and protectionists.

Undoubtedly the demands of manufacturers who had contributed liberally to the campaign fund of 1888 were

¹ Speeches and Addresses, 430.

² Ibid., 376.

³ “It was one of the strongest committees ever constituted.” Among the Republican members were: J. C. Burrows of Michigan, T. M. Bayne of Pennsylvania, Nelson Dingley, Jr., of Maine, Sereno M. Payne of New York. Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies*, ii. 259.

troublesome and would have been distasteful to McKinley had not his thorough belief in protection inclined him to listen sympathetically to any one representing a worthy interest that seemed to need an increased duty. The mental attitude of the manufacturers was curious; they seemed to think that if they could get an increase of duty on any article of theirs, they would obtain an increased price and profit. The result of the claims of manufacturers and of the deliberations of the Committee was an average increase of a tariff, already too high, of four per cent ¹ — “a tariff at which,” so George William Curtis said, “as many Republicans think, even Henry Clay would have blushed.” ²

As the bill left the House it increased the duty on tin plate; ³ this increase remained when the bill was finally approved and developed the manufacture of tin plate in the United States. A certain feature of the bill revealed the clever politics of its framers. Before 1890 the farmers of the West were generally in favor of lower duties and the party or faction favoring revision downward had their allegiance. But after 1890 they became good high tariff Republicans and this was due to the protection given them in this bill. “It was,” wrote Stanwood, “the first tariff act to contain a complete schedule of protective duties upon products of agriculture.” ⁴ But the increase of the duty on raw wool was no partisan scheme. In Ohio McKinley was looked upon as the apostle of the wool growers and he took pleasure in being

¹ Noyes, *Forty Years of American Finance*, 134.

² *Orations and Addresses*, ii. 435.

³ “Tin plate is simply sheet iron or steel, coated with tin.” *Life of McKinley*, Oleott, i. 170.

⁴ *Amer. Tariff Controversies* ii. 263.

their representative. Let us "cheerfully lend legislative assistance," he said, "to the million farmers who own sheep in the United States."¹

McKinley believed in letting in free non-competing foreign products and laying a duty on those which competed with American manufacturers; stretching a semblance of the truth to the utmost, he thought that if the tariff was a tax such a policy would compel its payment largely by the foreigner.²

The surplus troubled McKinley as it had Cleveland and Harrison and he reduced it by making raw sugar entirely free but, to recoup the native producers of sugar, he gave them a bounty of two cents a pound, "a sum equal to the duties upon foreign sugar imported into this country."³

McKinley did not then believe in reciprocity, which accordingly had no place in the bill as it left the House. "We have been beaten," he declared in his speech on the bill, "in every agreement of reciprocity we have ever had with any nation of the world."⁴ But Secretary Blaine, full of the spirit of the Pan-American conference, had so keen an eye to trade with the South American countries that one must regret his impaired health and reputation. "Entre nous," wrote Bayard to Schurz on March 9, 1889, "having seen Blaine (for the first time in seven years) I am compelled to think him a very en-

¹ Life of McKinley, Olcott, i. 167.

² Ibid., 163; Speeches and Addresses, 294.

³ Life of McKinley, 166. The Committee estimated that its recommendations would reduce the revenue from imports 61 millions, from internal revenue 10 millions; an aggregate of 71 millions; but the great part of the reduction, or 56 millions, came from making sugar free. The estimated cost of the bounty was 7 millions. Ibid., 164.

⁴ Speeches and Addresses, 408.

feebled man.”¹ But some of the old fire was left. “Dear Mr. McKinley,” he wrote on April 10, 1890, “it is a great mistake to take hides from the free list where they have been for so many years. It is a slap in the face to the South Americans with whom we are trying to enlarge our trade. . . . Pray stop it before it sees light. Such movements as this for protection will protect the Republican party into a speedy retirement.”²

The bill passed the House on May 21, 1890. In the Senate the tariff Republicans had the effective leadership of Nelson W. Aldrich, senator from Rhode Island. Blaine continued his efforts for reciprocity. “I do not doubt,” he wrote to his friend, Senator Frye of Maine, “that in many respects the tariff bill pending in the Senate is a just measure and that most of its provisions are in accordance with the wise policy of protection. But there is not a section or a line in the entire bill that will open the market for another bushel of wheat or another barrel of pork.” Later he wrote: “The value of the sugar we annually consume is enormous. Shall we pay for it in cash or shall we make a reciprocal arrangement by which a large part of it may be paid for in pork, beef, flour, lumber, salt, iron, shoes, calico, furniture and a thousand other things? In short, shall we pay for it all in cash or try friendly barter in part? I think the latter mode the highest form of protection and the best way to promote trade.”³

The bill was amended in the Senate by the addition of a reciprocity section which was concurred in by the House and the bill became a law on October 1. The reciprocity provision gave the President power to sus-

¹ Speeches, etc., of C. Schurz, v. 18.

² Hamilton, 683.

³ July 11, 26. Stanwood, Amer. Tariff Controversies, ii. 278.

pend the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides provided he should be satisfied that the country exporting these products imposed on products of the United States unequal and unreasonable duties or other exactions. Blaine, properly called the "Father of Reciprocity,"¹ at once commissioned John W. Foster to initiate reciprocity negotiations with the countries affected by the bill. He, the President and Foster wrought together in harmony and made treaties with several countries so that Foster was enabled to write, "The reciprocity measure proved a success . . . and Secretary Blaine was greatly elated." "The results," added Foster, "proved highly satisfactory, during the period they were in force." But the election of Cleveland and a Democratic Congress in 1892 "brought about the repeal of the reciprocity provision and with it all the treaties or agreements with other nations."²

The Republicans in their platform condemned the policy of the Democratic administration in its efforts to demonetize silver. They were willing to believe with McKinley that Cleveland "during all his years at the head of the Government was dishonoring one of our precious metals, one of our own great products. He endeavored even before his inauguration to office to stop the coinage of silver dollars and afterward and to the close of his administration persistently used his power to that end. He was determined to contract the circulating

¹ Burrows and the Rep. Party, Orcutt, i. 279.

² John W. Foster, Diplomatic Memories, ii. chap. xxv. The citations are on 16, 17. On the tariff of 1890 see also Burrows and the Rep. Party, Orcutt, i., chap. ix., x.; Life of Nelson Dingley, Dingley; Fifty Years of Public Service, Cullom.

medium and demonetize one of the coins of commerce, limit the volume of money among the people, make money scarce and therefore dear. He would have increased the value of money and diminished the value of everything else — money the master, everything else its servant.”¹ Silver, however, was in no way an issue during the campaign of 1888, although after the election it demanded recognition.

Financial and business men generally regarded the question as settled by the Bland-Allison act of 1878. As no Secretary of the Treasury had gone beyond the minimum coinage of two millions per month, they had accepted this as a necessary evil not to be increased and for the moment impossible to be diminished. The contention of the monometallists was wisely to the effect that there could be but a single standard of value and that, as the European nations, whose finances were managed by experts, had accepted gold as the standard, it was the true interest of the United States to fall into line. The monometallists thoroughly believed that as the bulk of all business is done with paper money, checks, bills of exchange and the like, the amount in circulation of the standard of value is not so important as that this standard be a stable one and generally recognized by law. Against this truism, the silver men fought with determination. The fight was natural on the part of the silver mine owners, as their product was declining in value and they thought that if free coinage of silver was secured like free coinage of gold, it would mean a higher price for

¹ Speeches and Addresses, 492. This speech was made in Toledo Feb. 12, 1891, but it expressed McKinley's view in 1890. See *The Nation*, June 15, 1893, 433; also May 21, 1896, 390.

their product and greater prosperity for their communities, who were interested in a high price for silver just as Pennsylvania and Ohio were interested in a high price for pig iron.¹ It is surprising however that they won so great a popular support, but they accomplished this by playing upon the string of cheap money, the inauguration of which would help the debtor class and cater to those who had always favored inflation. As a Kansas Republican newspaper stated it, "The business of the country needs more money and the people want as much of it as possible made of silver."² There was a third class called by their brilliant leader, General Francis A. Walker, the "convinced bimetalists"³ and in their ranks might be found able business men, statesmen and theorists. These objected to the free coinage of silver without an international agreement yet, when the question of a single standard was put precisely, they opposed the gold monometallists and, in the contest from now on to the early part of 1896, gave aid and comfort to the silver party.

While the majority of business and financial men reposed in the illusion that the worst had happened, men in politics knew the strength of the silver movement and were not surprised when Windom, the Secretary of the Treasury, came out in his report of December 1889 with a plan of doing something for silver although he seriously alarmed all believers in the single gold standard. After describing the result of the act of 1878 with accuracy and good judgment⁴ he proceeded to declare that he did not

¹ F. A. Walker, *Bimetallism*, 218.

² *Topeka Capital*.

³ *Bimetallism*, 219.

⁴ Windom said in his report: "Since the passage of the act of Feb. 28, 1878 to Nov. 1, 1889, there have been purchased 299,889,416 standard ounces of silver, at a cost of \$286,930,633 from which there have been

believe in the obvious remedy for the evil, which was to stop the further coinage of silver, because "an overwhelming preponderance of public sentiment demands that both silver and gold be utilized"¹ as money. His remedy was to issue Treasury notes against deposits of silver bullion at its market value. The President, who had not mentioned silver in his inaugural address, said in his December message that he had had time only to give the plan a hasty examination — an indefensible abdication of an important executive power.

The question came before Congress where the silver interest had been increased in the Senate by the admission of the new States, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washington. The Senate was for the free coinage of silver and on June 17, 1890 registered its vote of 42 to 25 in favor of it² but the House stood out against

coined 343,638,001 standard silver dollars. There were in circulation on Nov. 1, 60,098,480 silver dollars, less than one dollar per capita, the remainder, 283,539,521, being stored away in Government vaults, of which 277,319,244 were covered by outstanding certificates. . . . No proper effort has been spared by the Treasury Department to put in circulation the dollars coined under this law. . . . The silver dollar has been maintained at par with gold, the monetary unit, mainly by the provisions of the law which make it a full legal tender. . . . In foreign trade the silver dollar possesses only a bullion value. . . . Starting in 1878 with no stock of silver dollars, this country standing alone of all important nations in its efforts to restore the former equilibrium between gold and silver has in eleven years added to its stock of full legal tender money 343,638,001 dollars of a depreciated and steadily depreciating metal. . . . On March 1 the bullion value of the silver dollar was 93 cents while to-day its bullion value is 72 cents in gold." Report of Sec. of Treas. Dec. 2, 1889. House Ex. Docs. 51st Cong. 1st Sess., xix., lx., *et seq.*

¹ *Ibid.*, lxvii.

² Record, 6183. Five of the eight new senators voted in favor of the bill, two against, and one was absent. Allen of Washington and Casey of North Dakota voted against the bill. Neither spoke. Allen voted for the free silver bills at the next session and next Congress and said that he supported the legislation of the previous session. Casey was opposed to free silver. He voted against the free silver bills of the second session and

it being guided by the stubborn opposition of Speaker Reed. Finally a compromise was reached and the silver act of 1890 was passed [July 14]. This directed the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion per month and issue in payment therefor United States Treasury notes which were made a legal tender. Upon demand, the Secretary of the Treasury might redeem them "in gold or silver coin at his discretion, it being the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio or such ratio as may be provided by law."

The act was a compromise measure of the Republican party. In neither House of Congress did a Republican vote against the bill or a Democrat in favor of it.¹ One of the reasons for its passage was the supposed importance of holding the party together on the tariff issue. The Western senators cared little for the tariff, much for silver, and said to the East, Do something for silver and we will help you on the tariff. Another reason was that if this compromise bill was not passed Congress would vote for the free coinage of silver. "Unless we come to agreement with the 'silver men,'" wrote Senator Orville H. Platt of Connecticut, a true patriot, "a free coinage bill will be passed by both houses by a decided major-

next Congress. Pettigrew of South Dakota who was absent was paired in favor of the bill.

Wyoming and Idaho were not represented in Congress until the second session of the Fifty-first Congress. The senators took their seats on Dec. 1, 29, 1890 and Jan. 5, 1891.

¹ Forty Years of American Finance, Noyes, 151. In the House fourteen more Democrats than Republicans did not vote. Payne of Ohio was paired with Sherman but he told Sherman to vote on this bill. In the Senate the absentees were 11 Democrats, 8 Republicans.

ity.... It would probably be vetoed by the President. The tendency of such action would be to break up the Republican party and, worse than that, to array the West and Southwest against the East."¹ The menace of a disrupted party is one that a political leader has frequently to meet and may often disregard, but to men whose memories of the Civil War were vivid, the array of one section against another appeared as a grave contingency. The West and Southwest felt bitterly toward the East, thinking that the trend of legislation was to give her a disproportionate part of the good things of life.

The Act of 1890 was commonly called the "Sherman silver law," a misnomer, as Senator Sherman had little to do with this legislation until it reached the Committee of Conference when, finding as he thought, the situation critical, he acted the part of the great compromiser. He feared that if some such legislation was not effected an act for the free coinage of silver would be passed which the President could not be depended upon to veto, his surmise of Harrison's attitude toward this question being different from that of his brother senator, Platt. "I voted for the bill," Sherman wrote, "but the day it became a law I was ready to repeal it, if repeal could be had without substituting in its place absolute free coinage."²

The *Financial Chronicle* considered it a far better bill than had been anticipated and the New York *Evening Post* called it a "very happy termination to a bitter controversy."³ The business interests applauded Sherman for his part in the transaction but, as we survey the question at our present distance, it is not difficult to see that

¹ *The Nation*, May 8, 1890; Dewey, 226.

² *Rec.*, ii. 1070.

³ *Public Opinion*, ix. 335.

the tremendous strength of the silver faction had alarmed the monometallists and clouded their reasoning. Nor is it necessary to agree with the construction put upon the evidence by Alexander D. Noyes to the effect that there was little danger of free coinage¹ although he is backed by a considerable public sentiment at the time.² But it is more accurate to adhere to the bulk of contemporaneous opinion and the impression of all writers except Noyes with whom I am acquainted, which was that, if the Silver Purchase Act had not been passed there would have been a serious risk of free coinage. Nevertheless the act of 1890 was at variance with sound economic principle inasmuch as it was an endeavor of the United States, single-handed, to bolster up a product that was declining in value. In 1889 the price of silver was 93½¢ per ounce; July, 1890 \$1.04; on September 3, 1890 \$1.21; but before Congress assembled in December, 1890 it had fallen below 98¢.³ In 1890 the ratio of silver to gold was 19.76 to 1; in 1891, 20.92 to 1; in 1893, 26.49 to 1.⁴ Naturally this great decline in value could not have been foreseen and the business interests honestly believed that the Act of 1890 would restore the waning fortune of silver. But they could not fail to see that it meant more silver than the existing legislation and practice and that any compromise tending to the increase of the Government's burden was dangerous.⁵

¹ Forty Years of American Finance, 148.

² *Public Opinion*, ix. *passim*.

³ Noyes, 153.

⁴ Dewey, 228.

⁵ I answer the natural question — if justifiable to compromise with slavery in 1850 why not with silver in 1890? — by two citations. On "compromise" John Morley cited Burke: "All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent art is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; — we remit some rights that we may enjoy others"; and added: "What

This Congress passed at this session what is known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 [July 2]. First introduced by Senator Sherman in an explanatory speech, the bill found its way to the Judiciary Committee, whence in due time it was reported to the Senate by Edmunds, the chairman, and passed by a vote of 52:1. After conference over certain disagreements it was enacted by the House and signed by the President. "The Sherman Anti-Trust Act," wrote Senator Cullom, "was one of the most important enactments ever passed by Congress. . . . It was never seriously enforced until the coming in of the Roosevelt administration. . . . It bears Senator Sherman's name [but] my own opinion is that Senator Edmunds had more to do with framing it than any other one Senator."¹ Consideration of the question involved by this act will come properly in a history of the Roosevelt administrations.

The election of Cleveland in 1884 proved to the Republicans that to be sure of retaining their control of the

Burke means by compromise and what every true statesman understands by it, is that it may be most inexpedient to meddle with an institution merely because it does not harmonize with 'argument and logical illation.'" — On Compromise, 228, 331. General Francis A. Walker wrote in 1896: "That it was necessary to make this concession [the Silver Purchase Act of 1890] to the free coinage party, I, for one, do not believe. I am so little of a doctrinaire that I should hesitate to say that, in all matters political, flat and contemptuous resistance to unreasonable demands and evil measures is always a safe policy. But my study of financial history creates an increasing conviction that the only good policy in dealing with financial crazes is to fight them, without asking or giving quarter. The men of 1890, to whom the people had intrusted their powers of legislation, did not deal with the matter in this spirit." — Bimetallism, 224.

¹ Fifty Years of Public Service, 254; MacDonald, 395; John Sherman, Rec., ii. 1071; Dewey, 198; Autobiography of George F. Hoar, ii. 22. The Senate concurred in the report of the Conference Committee on June 18, the House on June 20.

national government they ought to have a fighting chance in some of the Southern States, and this they could secure only through the negro vote. It was well known that, since the restoration of home rule at the South, the negroes had been largely prevented from voting by intimidation and force or, when they did succeed in casting their votes, they failed through fraud on the part of the white judges of election to have them fairly counted. It was estimated that through the suppression of this vote the Republicans lost twenty-four seats in the House and thirty-eight votes in the electoral college. In 1886, the five Southern States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, having 38 representatives, cast an average of 7432 votes to a district while the five Northern States, Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas and Connecticut, having likewise 38 representatives, cast an average of 35,848 votes to a district. "Oregon," declared the *Philadelphia Press*, "casts in the election of a single representative more than twice as many votes as Georgia does in the election of ten. . . ."¹ The elections in the South are farcical, and, if we are to have a free government there must be an end put to this sort of thing as far as the National elections are concerned."² Harrison, in his inaugural address and in his message of December, 1889 suggested the necessity of a Federal Election law for the Congressional districts; and such a law was demanded of Congress by a majority of the Republican party.

¹ In 1886 Georgia cast for her ten representatives 27,553; Oregon for her one, 54,954.

² Sept. 10, 1889; Dewey, 163, 166; researches made for me by D. M. Matteson.

The House responded to the popular will and represented the country well, having a majority, though by no means an imposing one, in favor of some such measure. The Federal Election Bill, wrote Samuel W. McCall in his "Life of Thomas B. Reed," "was strongly resisted even in the Republican caucus [House] and after a contest lasting three days was finally adopted only by a majority of one."¹ On June 19, 1890, almost a month after the McKinley Tariff Bill had passed the House, the bill for the Federal control of Congressional elections was reported from the committee and a week later Henry Cabot Lodge, then a member of the House, made an able speech explanatory of its provisions. "The bill," he said, "is a national bill, intended to guard Congressional elections in every part of the country where it may be demanded." But later on he emphatically stated the specific point at issue. "It is believed," he said, "by a very large portion of the American people that there are districts in the South where fraud in some form controls despotically the verdict of the ballot-box." Toward the end of his speech he struck a popular note in his words: "We have clothed the negroes with the attributes of American citizenship. We have put in their hands the emblems of American sovereignty. Whether wisely or unwisely done is of no consequence now; it has been done, and it is irrevocable. . . . The Government which made the black man a citizen of the United States is bound to protect him in his rights as a citizen of the United States and it is a cowardly Government if it does not do it."²

The bill was popularly known as the "Force bill" and

¹ P. 175.

² Cong. Record, 6540, 6541, 6543.

that this was no misnomer is evident from the remarks of McKinley, on the day that the bill was passed, to the effect that if the peaceful machinery provided in the bill was resisted, the President had the power to use the Army and Navy to execute it. I tell you Democrats, he declared, "the people of the North will not continue to permit two votes in the South to count as much as five votes in the North." On July 2 the bill passed the House, by 155 yeas, 149 nays, not voting 24.¹

The bill never passed the Senate. One reason why it failed was stated by Don Cameron, senator from Pennsylvania, in an Associated Press interview. "I shall vote against the Federal Election bill," he said. "Whatever form it may assume I am opposed to it in principle and in its details. . . . The South is now resuming a quiet condition. Northern capital has been flowing into the South in great quantities, manufacturing establishments have been created and are now in full operation, and a community of commercial interests is fast obliterating sectional lines, and will result, in the not far distant future, in forming one homogeneous mass of people, whether living in the North, South, East, or West. The election law would disturb this desirable condition and produce ill-feeling between the North and South."²

On August 12 Matthew S. Quay, Cameron's brother senator from Pennsylvania, introduced into the Senate a resolution postponing the consideration of the Federal Election bill until the next session and providing that the debate on the tariff should be limited to the end of

¹ Cong. Record, 6933, 6941. 14 of the 24 were Republicans. Two Republicans also voted against the bill.

² Interview of Aug. 9, *Pittsburg Post*, Aug. 11. *Public Opinion*, ix. 428.

August. The purpose of this resolution is clearly indicated in a private letter of Senator O. H. Platt of Connecticut. On August 18 he wrote: "With no rule in the Senate by which we can limit debate, the Democrats can discuss the Tariff bill till the first day of the next session, and they intend to do it unless we will bargain with them not to take up the Elections bill. . . . Quay's resolution which indicates the bargain . . . has I presume Republican votes enough behind it, added to the Democrats, to pass it. . . . It will probably give us a Tariff bill — but acquired at what a sacrifice!"¹

Quay's resolution did not come to a vote, but, by tacit agreement, the Federal Election bill was side-tracked for this session in favor of the McKinley tariff. It never became a law, Republican influences contributing largely to its defeat. The project was thoroughly ventilated in the press and widely discussed on every side.² "Let the press speak for the people," demanded the Springfield *Republican* and it gave its own opinion with no uncertain sound: "It should be called, 'A bill to promote sectional strife.' . . . It will solidify the whites and the blacks against each other."³

It is not difficult to understand why Federal control of Congressional elections was not enacted. Representative Lodge had a majority of his party at his back but he had to encounter a powerful minority. The small majority for the bill is an indication,⁴ and even this was secured,

¹ Life of Platt, Coolidge, 232.

² D. M. Matteson has collected for me a large number of newspaper citations taken from *Public Opinion*.

³ July 7.

⁴ Vote in the House on Federal Elections Bill, 155:149. On McKinley Tariff, original bill, 164:142. On Conference report, 151:81. On Silver Act of 1890, original bill, 135:119. On Conference report, 122:90.

according to McCall, only by rigid party discipline¹ and, I may add, by the coöperation and hearty support of Speaker Reed. Senator O. H. Platt has left a contemporary record of the various shades of opinion in the Senate,² which relate largely to senatorial procedure; and the sentiment of Congress and the country on the merits of the project is easy to classify. There were Republicans who believed that the reconstruction policy of their party was right; others, deftly appealed to by Lodge in his speech, thought that the XV Amendment whether right or wrong should be enforced because it was a part of the Constitution. On the other hand, some doubted the expediency of the legislation, while there were also Republicans who believed that negro suffrage was a failure, holding the view which thirteen years later was publicly stated by Secretary Root. "I fear," said he in 1903, "we are compelled to face the conclusion that the experiment [of giving the negro citizenship and suffrage and equal rights] has failed.... The country has to face the failure of the plan formulated at the close of the war to elevate the black man by conferring the suffrage upon him."³

These underlying opinions must be taken into account in any survey of the parliamentary expedients that defeated the bill—expedients suggested by the Republicans in their eagerness to enact the Tariff bill at the existing session of the Fifty-first Congress and by the imminence of Free Silver at the next. On January 5, 1891 eight Republican senators, owing probably to a bargain (for some of them at least) hinging on the free coinage of silver, voted with the

¹ Life of T. B. Reed, 175.

² Coolidge, 232.

³ Boston *Herald*, Feb. 8, 1903.

Democrats to remove the bill from its place in the calendar, and three weeks later six Republicans voted with the Democrats indefinitely to postpone the consideration of it. This ended the attempt to control elections in the South by Congressional action.

On January 14, 1891 the Senate by 39:27 voted for the free coinage of silver.¹

¹ Authorities not specifically named are George F. Hoar, *Autobiography*, ii.; W. M. Stewart, *Reminiscences*; *The Nation*, *passim*. *Public Opinion* has been of much use to me.

CHAPTER XVI

THE McKinley tariff became a law on October 1. Congress adjourned on the same day and on November 4th, the autumn elections, largely for Congressmen, took place. The bill, said McKinley, is "protective in every paragraph and American in every line and word."¹ The people passed upon it, giving it an utter condemnation. Mills, the leader of the Democratic tariff reform party in the House, closed his speech against the bill with, "When you leave this House and Senate with this enormous load of guilt upon your heads and appear before the great tribunal for trial, may the Lord have mercy on your souls."² Protectionist literature has much to say about the expedients of the tariff reformers to discredit the bill before the people. Peddlers were sent through the rural districts offering 5¢ tin cups for twenty-five cents and 25¢ tin pails for one dollar and asserting that the advance was due to the McKinley Bill.³ On account of the duty on tin plate it was asserted that the working-man's dinner pail would be heavily taxed. "In hundreds of cases," said in a newspaper interview Speaker Reed who was a loyal supporter of this legislation, "the 'drummers' were, intentionally or unintentionally, missionaries to preach Democratic doctrine. They went all over the country with the stories of advances in prices that were to be made next week or next month on account of the

¹ Olcott, i. 179.

² Life of Dingley, 323.

³ Life of Burrows, Orcutt, i. 274.

McKinley Bill. But I am inclined to think that the most important factor in the result of this election was the women of the country. It is the women who do the shopping, who keep the run of prices, who have the keenest scent for increased cost. They heard in every store the clerks behind the counters explain how this article or that could not be sold hereafter at the former price because of the McKinley Bill; they went home and told their husbands and fathers, and their stories had a tremendous effect at the ballot-box."¹ In short it was generally believed that the McKinley Bill had raised the cost of living. Referring to the various devices for this appeal to the consumer Edward Stanwood wrote with urbanity from the protectionist standpoint, "To-day, say what we may of it from the point of view of political ethics, it moves chiefly one's sense of humor."²

It is undoubted that the McKinley Bill was very unpopular. The increases of duty went into effect at once.³ "The one great boon of free sugar," wrote Stanwood, . . . "was withheld for six months."⁴ The Republicans in vain tried to rouse enthusiasm for "Bill McKinley and the McKinley Bill." The argument of the "free breakfast table" could not be used, as, while tea and coffee were free, sugar was not yet on the free list. Michigan, Massachusetts, Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas and Ohio, previously Republican, generally by large majorities, returned a majority of Democratic Congressmen. The New England States chose more Dem-

¹ Peck, 215 *n.*; *The Nation*, Nov. 20, 393.

² American Tariff Controversies, ii. 292.

³ That is, nearly all. The duty on tin plate did not go into effect until July 1, 1891.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 287.

ocrats than Republicans.¹ The next House would number 235 Democrats, 88 Republicans, 9 Farmers' Alliance or Populists. The Republican majority in the Senate was 8 but it required the senators from Idaho, Wyoming,² States recently admitted, Montana, North Dakota, Washington and the pocket-borough of Nevada. We may paraphrase a story told by Joseph H. Choate and make of it an entirely different application. "What," was said to a man who refused his support at the polls of the McKinley Bill, "have you deserted, have you apostatized, have you lost your pride and abandoned your principles, are you no longer a Republican?" "Abandoned my principles?" was the reply, "I am a better Republican than ever, but I don't see why, because I am a true-blue Republican, I should be a darned fool *all* the time."³ Whatever may have been contributing causes in certain districts the paramount cause of this overturn was the devotion of the Republican party to a high protective tariff. McKinley himself was defeated, but this was due to a gerrymander by a Democratic legislature which took his county out of a reasonably certain Republican district and joined it to counties which made up a Democratic one. Personally very popular, he nearly won, being beaten by only 303 in a strong Democratic district, the plurality in which had been estimated at 3,000. Undoubtedly had his tariff bill been popular, he would have been elected. In spite of the adverse verdict of the country he did not lose faith in his bill or in the

¹ American Tariff Controversies, ii. 294.

² Idaho and Wyoming were admitted in 1890; the senators from Wyoming took their seats the same year and those from Idaho in Dec. 1890 and Jan. 1891.

³ Curtis, Orations and Addresses, ii. 424.

principle on which it was based, writing on the night of election: "A conspiracy between importers, many of whom were not even citizens of the United States, and the free-traders of this country, to raise prices and charge it upon the McKinley Bill was successful. . . . The trick has won this time. . . . But the people who have been duped will not forget. Nor will the friends of protection lower their flag." ¹

It may be difficult to connect the Baring panic in London with the prevailing unrest in the Western and Southern States except for the indirect effect from its profound influence on Eastern financiers. "The regularity with which Lombard street goes into wild foreign speculations," said *The Nation*, "and loses its money is one of the striking phenomena of British history." ² In this case it was the Argentine Republic; loans to that country for every conceivable purpose had been underwritten by Baring Brothers. The failure of the wheat crop in 1889, a political revolution, a financial panic in Buenos Ayres warned the astute of the inevitable. In the spring of 1890 the Barings made an ineffectual attempt to secure themselves by insisting on more favorable conditions. On the failure of these negotiations, apprehension ruled in financial London and late in the summer it began to market their large holding of American stocks and bonds. In October the rumor ran in Paris that the Barings were in difficulties and during November, unable to sell their Argentine securities or borrow on them, they would have defaulted on their one hundred

¹ Olcott, i. 85, 187. I have also used *Life of Platt*, Coolidge; *Life of T. B. Reed*, McCall; *John Sherman's Rec.*, ii. ² Nov. 20, 1890, 392.

million dollars of home liabilities had they not been saved from failure by the Bank of England and other London financial institutions. London felt that a repetition of the Overend-Gurney panic of 1866 must be avoided and during one week of intense strain the Bank of England borrowed £4,500,000 gold from the Bank of France and the Imperial Bank of Russia. "The masterly conduct of the Governor of the Bank," wrote Francis A. Walker, "saved England and the world from a terrific catastrophe."¹

An avalanche of American securities was forced upon the market in the eagerness to sell something that would fetch money. It leaked out in New York that financial trouble had hit the Barings, who were regarded next to the Rothschilds in financial stability, and the excitement in Wall street was intense. A stock panic ensued. The New York banks had recourse to their operations of 1884 and 1873 and issued fifteen million of Clearing-House loan certificates. Money on call rose as high as 186 per cent. But financial recovery was speedy owing to the exports of agricultural produce from the large crops of 1889 and 1891.²

¹ Bimetallism, 215.

² Noyes, Forty Years of American Finance, 157; *The Nation*, Nov. 13, 20.

CROP	WHEAT	OATS	INDIAN CORN	COTTON
	<i>Bushels</i>			<i>Bales</i>
1889 . . .	490,560,000	751,515,000	2,112,892,000	7,472,511
1890 . . .	399,263,000	533,621,000	1,489,970,000	8,652,597
1891 . . .	611,780,000	783,394,000	2,060,154,000	9,035,379
EXPORTS	WHEAT	FLOUR		
1889-90	\$45,275,906	\$57,036,168		
1890-91	51,420,272	54,705,616		
1891-92	161,399,132	75,362,283		

Statistical Abstract, 1906, 1916.

The trouble in Wall street undoubtedly increased the financial stringency in the West and South. Western farmers were heavily mortgaged and the argument was used that it was a hardship to pay loans made when the country was on the basis of irredeemable paper now that gold was the determiner of value. When Senator J. B. Gordon of Georgia declared that the people wanted "cheap money and plenty of it"¹ he represented well the sentiment of these communities. The development of the Farmers' Alliance party was both a symptom and an encouragement of the unrest. One of its tenets was the free coinage of silver and this doctrine had a deep influence on the Congress which met in December 1890 and adjourned on March 4, 1891. The free silver men were dissatisfied with the Act of 1890 and felt that they ought to have free coinage. On January 14, 1891 the Senate by a vote of 39:27² declared for it but the House would not agree to the Senate measure. Had such a bill passed Congress President Harrison would have vetoed it.

Curious as it may now seem, the sound money advocates in public life supported the Act of 1890 as being antagonistic to free silver. Secretary Windom, now that his commodity plan had become law, declared against the "free and unlimited coinage of silver" and shortly before he fell dead at the New York city banquet where he was speaking, quoted with effect the words of the wise man "He that loveth silver shall not be satisfied with silver."³ The state of public sentiment is seen by

¹ *Public Opinion*, xi. 265.

² I am aware that this is a repetition of a statement made at the end of Chap. xv.

³ *Public Opinion*, x. 413; Ecclesiastes v. 10.

the reception of the appointment of Windom's successor, ex-Congressman and ex-Governor Charles Foster of Ohio. Foster was opposed to the unlimited coinage of silver but was a bimetallist and endorsed the Act of 1890 as a proper solution of the silver question.¹ That sound money men should plant themselves on the commodity act of 1890 is significant of the greater strength of the sentiment for silver than during the previous session, but there were a few financial conservatives who began to see the evil proceeding from this large purchase of silver.²

The Fifty-first Congress adjourned March 4 and the Democrats would not have been true to the political instincts of their country had they not reproached the Republicans with their liberal appropriations which went beyond millions for the two years. It is a "billion dollar" Congress they charged. But the United States is a "billion dollar country," was Reed's reply.³

Eighteen hundred ninety-one (1891) was an "off year" but, as in 1875 when Hayes, advocating sound money, fought Allen, the attention of the country was fastened on Ohio. Outside of that State men thought that McKinley had been condemned as well as his bill; but those who understood the Democratic gerrymander, which was contrived to retire him to private life, knew better and had their sentiments well expressed by John Sherman. McKinley, he said, "made a splendid canvass and a magnificent run and defeat is not the proper name for the result." The election "simply means that he will be the

¹ N. Y. *Times*, Feb. 24, 1891; *Public Opinion*, x. 486.

² Boston *Herald*, Feb. 23; N. Y. *Times*, *Eve. Post*, Feb. 24; *Public Opinion*, x. 485, 486.

³ Dewey, 186.

next Governor of Ohio.”¹ Sherman's prophecy in the autumn of 1890 came true; in the following June McKinley was nominated for Governor by acclamation. A vigorous campaign followed. While the tariff was unquestionably an issue it was overshadowed by silver. The Democrats demanded the unlimited coinage of silver while the Republicans stood on the Act of 1890. McKinley met the issue bravely and opposed free coinage with an eloquence that appealed to the mass. Undoubtedly one of his strong arguments was a citation from Daniel Webster whose speeches he studied with care and effect. “A disordered currency is fatal to industry, frugality and economy,” Webster had said. “It fosters the spirit of speculation and extravagance. It is the most effectual of inventions to fertilize the rich man's fields with the sweat of a poor man's brow.”² While McKinley's courage in breasting the popular demand for more money was admirable, it is easy to see from his speeches that he understood the tariff better than finance, dilating on one subject with the ease of a master while on the other he showed the cramming of a student. John Sherman, who was a candidate for United States senator before the legislature that should be chosen, met the question not only with boldness but with consummate knowledge. “No matter what their differences upon the tariff question may be,” he said, “every Republican who wishes the success of his party should be made to understand that there is another and perhaps a graver question to be settled in Ohio this year. . . . We are to-day brought back to the financial problem which we all

¹ Rec., ii. 1090.

² McKinley, Speeches and Addresses, 527.

thought had been settled in 1875 when Hayes won the fight for an honest dollar against Governor Allen, who represented the liberal currency idea. Then it came in the guise of greenbacks and now it comes in the garb of free silver. That conflict made Hayes President of the United States." In opening the campaign at Paulding on August 27, he proposed to confine himself "mainly to a frank and homely discussion of the money question as the most pressing" and he gave a clear exposition of the subject which called to mind his lucid treatment sixteen years previously of what to many had been a recondite subject. He showed the difference between the Act of 1890 and free silver¹ and ended with: "I appeal to the conservative men of Ohio of both parties to repeat now the service they rendered the people of the United States in 1875, by the election of Governor Hayes, in checking

¹ "The one distinctive striking feature of the law of 1890 is that the United States will not pay for silver bullion more than its market value." The advocates of free coinage "are in favor of allowing any holder of silver bullion foreign or domestic, any old silverware or melted teapot, any part of the vast accumulated hoard of silver in India, China, South America and other countries of the world, estimated by statisticians to be \$3,810,571,346, to present it to the treasury of the United States and demand one dollar of our money, or our promises to pay money, for 371 grains of silver [the dollar of the free coinage advocates contained 371 grains of fine silver which with the alloy made 412½ grains their dollar, "the dollar of the daddies"], or any multiple of that sum though this amount of silver is now worth only 77 cents and has for a period of years been as low as 70 cents. . . . But it is said that free coinage will not have the effect I have stated; that the silver in sight is so occupied where it is that it will not come to us. They said the same when the present law was passed, that foreign silver would not come to us. Yet our purchase of 4,500,000 ounces, troy weight, . . . of silver a month, at market price, brought into the United States large amounts of silver from all parts of the world. If that is the effect of limited purchases at one dollar an ounce, the market price, what will be the effect of unlimited purchases at 29 cents an ounce more than market price? It would inundate us with the vast hoards of silver in countries where silver alone is current money, and draw to us all the rapidly-increasing production of silver mines in the world."

the wave of inflation that then threatened the country. You can render even a greater service now in the election of Governor McKinley, in defeating the free coinage of silver."¹ McKinley was elected by 21,500 plurality. A Republican legislature was chosen which returned Sherman to the United States Senate.²

Foreign affairs occupied a conspicuous space in the Harrison administration. The negotiations with Great Britain and the steps toward the acquisition of Hawaii are better deferred for subsequent treatment, while the disputes with Germany and Italy, interesting in themselves, do not seem to fall within the scope of my narrative.³ South America however has for us a peculiar interest and we may not pass by our attitude to the revolution in Chile when the Congressional party revolted against the President, Balmaceda. It is bootless to inquire into the question, who was right or who was wrong and such impartiality should have governed the attitude of our minister, Patrick Egan, who owed his appointment undoubtedly to Blaine's influence, being known as one of the "Blaine Irishmen." A man of character and business ability, he was nevertheless unfitted for minister to Chile. Attracted to the Balmaceda party, he was confirmed in his opinion for the reason that the English residents sympathized with the Congressionalists, as it was enough for an Irishman to know which side the English were on to embrace the other. It is apparent

¹ John Sherman's Rec., 1129-1134.

² McKinley's Speeches and Addresses; Life of McKinley, Olcott; *Public Opinion*, xi.

³ Both Dewey and Peck give an account of these transactions and Dewey also relates clearly the conduct of affairs touching Utah.

from his correspondence that he desired Balmaceda's success, and Egan's open and avowed sympathy distracted our government from the impartial attitude that it should have maintained.

Nor is the zeal of the President and Navy Department to be commended. The *Itata*, a merchant ship loaded with rifles and ammunition for the Congressional party, was seized at San Diego but, while in the custody of an officer of the Court, ignored his control and put out to sea,¹ when the Secretary of the Navy despatched a cruiser in her pursuit. Averse from becoming embroiled with the United States, the Congressionalists surrendered the *Itata*, the rifles and ammunition to her authorities; but afterwards the United States District Court of Southern California decided that the seizure of the *Itata* by our government was unjustifiable.²

The Congressionalists had popular sympathy on their side, won in the contest, and took Santiago, the capital, and possession of the government.³ Balmaceda committed suicide; the Congressionalists assumed full control and their government was recognized by the United States.⁴

Egan's conduct, the seizure and consequent pursuit of the *Itata*, the feeling of our naval commanders against the Congressionalists, developed a bitter animosity to the United States, which manifested itself in a riotous attack

¹ May 6, 1891.

² Appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit where the decision of the District Court was affirmed on May 8, 1893 (56 Fed. Rep. 505). Pending this a petition for writ of certiorari was made to the Supreme Court which was denied without prejudice on Oct. 31, 1892 (149 U. S. 789). No appeal was made from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

³ The last of August, 1891.

⁴ Early in September.

on some petty officers and sailors from the United States warship *Baltimore* on shore leave at Valparaiso. That one American was killed¹ and eighteen severely wounded and only one Chilean hurt, was prima facie evidence that the Chileans were to blame. The President at once demanded redress: his demand was met in an insolent manner by the Chilean minister of Foreign Affairs, who later, when irritated by the President's message of December and the report of the Secretary of the Navy, telegraphed to the Chilean minister in Washington that "the statements on which both report and message are based are erroneous or deliberately incorrect;" and "with respect to the seamen of the *Baltimore*, there is moreover no exactness or sincerity in what is said at Washington." While no direction was given that these words be communicated to our State Department, they were, with the sanction of the Chilean President, read in his Senate and printed in the Chilean newspapers.² The action and words undoubtedly exasperated Harrison who was a sturdy patriot and lover of the truth but, as he waited until January 21, 1892 before he sent an ultimatum, it is a pity that for the coherence of our diplomatic record he had not waited some days longer. For a change of moment on January 1, 1892 had taken place in Chile. The fiery journalist who had conducted the foreign affairs of his government in an insolent manner, had given place to a gentleman who knew and practised diplomatic usage. At once may be noted a complete change of attitude on the part of Chile, indicating that

¹ A number of the accounts affirm that two were killed. The riot took place on Oct. 16.

² Dec. 12.

all which our country demanded could be secured by friendly negotiation.

If Harrison's ultimatum of January 21 and his war message to Congress of January 25 had been sent during December they might be defended, but, issued at the time they were, they simply caused wonderment at his action. The diplomatic correspondence which he transmitted to Congress with his war message, shows plainly enough that, with the change of ministry on January 1, a different spirit was manifest in the control of affairs — a spirit which known as it was to the President ought to have prevented the definite ultimatum of January 21. In this the President demanded a "suitable apology" and "some adequate reparation" for the attack on the sailors of the *Baltimore*; and if the offensive "expressions imputing untruth and insincerity to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy" "are not at once withdrawn and a suitable apology offered" he will "terminate diplomatic relations" with Chile. Without awaiting a reply to this precise demand, he sent his war message to Congress. Nay more, at noon on this same day, January 25, a despatch from the Chilean minister in Washington to Blaine was received and its contents made known to the President late that afternoon, and although not an answer to the ultimatum, it was so friendly in tone that it ought to have stayed his hand. But the ultimatum had gone to Chile and the war message was sent to Congress before he read the despatch of the Chilean minister. On the next day after the war message, there was received in Washington from the Chilean minister of Foreign Affairs an abject apology for the words of his predecessor and "a conciliatory and

friendly treatment of the assault upon the sailors of the *Baltimore*," so that "I am of the opinion," said the President in a message to Congress on January 28, "that there is a good prospect that the differences growing out of that serious affair can now be adjusted upon terms satisfactory to this government by the usual methods." The President told Congress in his annual message of December, 1892, "It gives me now great gratification to report that the Chilean government in a most friendly and honorable spirit has tendered and paid as an indemnity to the families of the sailors of the *Baltimore* who were killed and to those who were injured in the outbreak in Valparaiso the sum of \$75,000."

No American can read with pride the diplomatic and naval correspondence which relate accurately our conduct in this affair. The President seemed to forget that the United States was large and Chile small, one eleventh of our area and one twenty-fourth of our population and that a wide-spread axiom of American fair play was that a big boy should not pounce upon a small one. The action of President Harrison was in the line of a bullying policy. "We have the apology," wrote Professor Hart, "but with it we have the ill-will."

The ill-will still ¹ rankles in the Chilean heart; it is directed against Blaine and Egan. Defence of Egan is impossible, but the accusation against Blaine is probably unjust. "The popular belief," said Professor Hart, a watchful contemporary observer writing not later than 1893, was "that President Harrison took the Chilean affair out of the hands of Secretary Blaine and overruled

¹ 1918.

his counsel." Indirect testimony is a corroboration. Blaine was ill during a large part of the time¹ and the correspondence of the State Department was mainly conducted during 1891 by William F. Wharton, First Assistant Secretary of State, who signed at least three despatches as "acting secretary." And no two occurrences could be more irreconcilable than our attitude to the Pan-American Conference and to Chile during her revolution.

A review of the whole affair can only accentuate Bryce's remark, aptly quoted by Professor Hart, "We do not need a steam hammer to crack nuts."²

¹ "After his illness in New York, May, 1891, he returned to Maine, where he remained until October." Hamilton, 701.

² My main authority for this account are the President's messages, the despatches which he dictated, the Diplomatic and Naval correspondence in House Ex. Doc. 91, 52d Cong. 1st Sess.; also Doc. 91, part 2. I have also used Richardson, ix.; Professor A. B. Hart's Essay on The Chilean Controversy, in Practical Essays on American Government; Dewey; H. T. Peck; *The Nation*, May 1891, Jan. Feb. 1892. There were two other points of dispute which I did not consider worth while to enlarge upon.

CHAPTER XVII

BECAUSE James G. Blaine was an interesting man the Republican nomination for President in 1892 seemed to depend upon his action. Quay and Platt were opposed to Harrison. The President had also alienated Speaker Reed and other workers who would have been helpful in securing a renomination, and largely from personal qualities, could not arouse any enthusiasm among the rank and file of the party. "Blaine," wrote Senator Hoar, "would refuse a request in a way that would seem like doing a favor. Harrison would grant a request in a way which seemed as if he were denying it."¹ It appeared to many shrewd partisans that Harrison meant defeat while Blaine would insure a party victory. He was now strong in New York, so the argument ran, and he was advocated in the Western States by personal attachment and persistency of purpose. Clarkson who at present was the chairman of the Republican National Committee asserted that he would receive a large part of German support and was the only man "who could draw from the Farmers' Alliance the necessary votes to help the party in power in the Northwestern States." But Blaine could not be persuaded to make the contest. "I am not a candidate for the presidency," he wrote to Clarkson on February 6, "and

¹ Autobiography, i. 414.

my name will not go before the Republican National Convention for the nomination." Still the movement for Blaine did not abate. Sincere friends and designing politicians helped it on and it is not difficult to discern his own attitude which was a desire for a spontaneous nomination. But we must take into account a certain wavering of mind due to the increase of hypochondria. "A drug and a doctor had irresistible . . . charms for him," wrote his intimate biographer.¹ Blaine was in no way a well man. The record shows how little he had to do with State affairs in 1891, and the President said to Senator Cullom shortly before the Republican convention [June 7]: I have done the work of the State Department for a year or more. I have prepared every important official document and have the originals in my own handwriting. And yet Blaine is giving out accounts of what was being done in the State Department, taking all the credit to himself. I am perfectly willing to carry a soldier's knapsack when the soldier is sore of foot and tired and all that I want in return is acknowledgment of the act and a show of appreciation.²

The relations between Harrison and Blaine had become cold and distant. The Secretary did not appreciate the indiscretion of being a willing candidate while he remained in the Cabinet, when the President himself avowedly sought a renomination. Owing to continual illness and grief at the death of two children, Blaine was not himself and he harked back to his position of four years previously, eager for the nomination should the Convention tender it to him, but he would not make a

¹ Hamilton, 700.

² Cullom, *Fifty Years*, 252.

contest: and yet the workers knew he could not secure the nomination except after a hard fight.

Thus stood affairs when on June 4 he sent to the President a curt resignation of the position of Secretary of State which with equal curtness the President accepted. A familiar letter written on June 6 indicates the true condition: "About the nomination itself — he [Blaine] did not want it. He never lifted a finger for it — he hated it. Now that the game is on, of course he would be glad to win. . . . He is calm; on June 1 and 2 he was in the depths for the situation into which he had been pushed. Since then he has been more like himself. . . . None of us over confident of the nomination. . . . Understand if we get the nomination I don't think your father [Blaine] any more likely to lose his health than if we don't. Likewise with the presidency. He may be ill, but they will in no wise be cause and effect, judging from the past."¹

The Convention assembled in Minneapolis on June 7 and made William McKinley, now Governor of Ohio, permanent chairman. Although his bill had brought disaster on his party, the party still believed in protection and he remained personally popular. The platform favored a protective tariff but did not in set terms endorse the McKinley Bill. Harrison was nominated on the first ballot, receiving 535 $\frac{1}{8}$ votes to Blaine 182 $\frac{3}{8}$ and McKinley 182. Emmons Blaine was on the ground, a diligent worker for his father, presumably with his connivance; and it was thought at the time that his death eight days after the close of the Convention was due to his hard, exciting work and disappointment. McKinley's friends,

¹ Hamilton, 781. See ante for much material which has led to my account. Also Life of Blaine, Stanwood; Life of Nelson Dingley, Jr.

aware of the undercurrent of disfavor to Harrison, hoped that something might occur to bring their favorite forward but the Harrison legion was too powerful. Of this McKinley was fully aware and he gave no countenance to the efforts in his behalf.

The Democrats either had a better cause or placed it more consistently before the country. Having an enormous majority in the House of Representatives they did not pass a regular tariff measure but satisfied themselves with the adoption of so-called "pop-gun" bills, placing wool and other materials on the free list, but they did not deem it politic to add thereto coal, iron ore and lumber. The "pop-gun" bills were of course never passed by the Republican Senate.

The Democratic Convention assembled in Chicago on June 21 and their committee on resolutions reported a facing-both-ways tariff plank which the full Convention repudiated and by a vote of 564 to 342 declared for a tariff for revenue only and denounced the McKinley Bill as "the culminating atrocity of class legislation." Both Conventions "straddled" on the silver question and by tacit consent made tariff the issue. On the Democratic side this was due to Grover Cleveland, who more than one year previous had declared himself unequivocally opposed to the free coinage of silver. A majority of Democrats favored unlimited coinage and during March 1892 their House came near passing a bill for this purpose. After the adjournment of both Conventions the Republican Senate declared for the unlimited coinage of silver but the Democratic House refused their agreement by 154 : 136. Cleveland was now their nominee and it would have been the height of absurdity to run

him on a free silver platform, which of course he would have promptly repudiated. As Senator Vest said: On silver we believe Cleveland "to be wrong but honestly wrong and he has as much right to his opinion as we have to ours. He can be elected on the issue of tariff reform; every Democrat should be willing to postpone the silver question to prevent Republican success."¹

Theodore Roosevelt who in Washington was a close observer of passing political events said that the silver Democrats by no means abandoned their principles but their sentiment was thus expressed, "Let us beat the Republicans first and then we can tackle silver."²

The Democratic Convention nominated Cleveland on the first ballot; he received 617 $\frac{1}{4}$ votes, being ten more than the necessary two-thirds. His chief opponent David B. Hill obtained 114. Hill received the vote of New York State which he had secured by his well known talent of adroit manipulation but the Democrats all over the country wanted Cleveland, the only Democrat who had occupied the White House since the Civil War and who despite his view on silver coinage was looked upon as a real leader of his party. The opposition to him was noisy and eloquent but the Democratic masses were eager to follow him. William C. Whitney directed Cleveland's cause at Chicago and said: "I can't keep the votes back. They tumble in at the windows as well as at the doors."³

In this campaign a third party must be reckoned with,

¹ Dewey, 243.

² Conversation, 1910.

³ Peck, 291. Authorities besides Peck and Dewey, *Official Proceedings of Tenth Republican Convention*; Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies*, *History of the Presidency*; Noyes, *Forty Years of American Finance*; *Writings of G. Cleveland*.

the Peoples or Populist. Made up of the Farmers Alliance, Knights of Labor, and disciples of Bellamy they held on July 2 a convention in Omaha, declared for the unlimited coinage of silver on the ratio of sixteen to one, demanded a graduated income tax, postal savings banks and governmental ownership of the railroads, the telegraph and telephone, and nominated Weaver of Iowa for President. During the preceding year the Farmers Alliance had shown itself powerful in the South and West and it was hoped that it might prove the wedge to split the solid South but this proved to be an unavailing hope. On election day the color question, perhaps intensified by the Force Bill, determined the electoral votes of the solid South which were all cast for Cleveland; the Populist party hardly made a respectable show in any State but Texas.¹ The disciples of Bellamy were influenced by a captivating romance, "Looking Backward," published early in 1888 which was a dream of a socialistic society, in which all the maidens were fresh and vigorous, the women in magnificent health, the young men stalwart, everybody enjoyed equal wealth and equal opportunities of culture and, as there was no private property and a cartload of gold would not purchase a loaf of bread, poverty and want were unknown. Edward Bellamy in an article in the *North American Review* ² rejoiced at the progress of his ideas and those who had no sympathy with them could readily concede that his reform was advocated in a charming manner.

The Homestead strike operated against the Republicans. The Homestead works were situated on the

¹ Stanwood, Hist. of the Presidency.

² June, 1892

Monongahela River near Pittsburg and were part of the Carnegie Steel Company. Why so momentous a conflict should have come from so insignificant a cause is a mystery to any one who does not comprehend how large a part bluff plays in the contests between labor and capital. Andrew Carnegie, a large owner and one of the projectors of the Carnegie Steel Company, was in Scotland and the management of the affair fell to the chairman Henry Clay Frick, a man of indomitable energy and large ability. The historian of the "Inside History" whose sympathy is with the Company, wrote, "The outstanding differences between the firm and its workmen at this time were truly insignificant"; and, "Most striking of all, however, is the fact that out of over 3800 men employed at Homestead, the wages of only 325 were affected by the new scale"¹ [*i.e.* a lower scale of wage]. On June 23 Frick held a conference with the President of the Amalgamated Association [labor organization] and a committee of about twenty-five men from Homestead, but they failed to make an agreement which in view of all the circumstances ought to have been made. The representatives of labor are generally afraid of their clientele unless they obtain their full demands and Frick, new to his job, may have feared Carnegie if he backed down. But it was probably a contest for dominion and, as nations go to war for less reason, it was in the line of human affairs that, after this fruitless conference, both sides should have prepared for a fight.

The Carnegie Company built a wooden fence around the Steel Works and made preparations to introduce non-

¹ Bridge, *Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Co.*, 206, 209.

Union workmen to take the place of the strikers. Full of the idea which Andrew Carnegie had expressed in an article in the *Forum* in 1885, "There is an unwritten law among the best workmen 'Thou shalt not take thy neighbor's job,'" the workmen prepared to resist this attempt by violence, appointed an Advisory Committee who organized their forces on a military basis. For protection the Company called upon the Allegheny County officials, whose efforts were fruitless, but meanwhile it determined to guard the works and protect from violence non-Union laborers who might be hired. Two barges fitted up for sleeping and cooking, with stores of provisions, rifles and ammunition, containing about three hundred Pinkerton men, accompanied by a deputy sheriff, were towed up the river at night but did not elude the vigilance of the workmen, who at daybreak on July 6 were ready to give them a hot reception. When the Pinkertons attempted to land they were received by shots which they returned, killing two of the strikers and wounding others. The workmen retired behind piles of steel, the Pinkertons to their barges but were largely outnumbered by the laborers and, after the first affray, were thrown upon the defensive. Deserted by their tug, "left helpless in their stranded barges" they were at the mercy of the workmen who attacked them with two small cannon, rifles and dynamite and endeavored to set the barges afire by the use of oil and natural gas. A white flag was displayed on the barges; "no quarter" was the reply and the attack went on. "The Pinkertons were too badly scared to make any effort to shoot," said an eyewitness, "and were crowded like sheep into the barge which lay farthest from the shore." Toward

five o'clock in the afternoon they again displayed a white flag which led to a conference between them and the chairman of the Advisory Committee, and a surrender under the promise of protection from violence. But on landing they had to run a gauntlet of infuriated men and women; finally, however, by special train they reached Pittsburg in safety. The casualties of the day were ten killed and over sixty wounded. The governor of Pennsylvania called out the National Guard numbering 8000 and under their protection the Carnegie Company put in non-Union workmen and broke up the strike, so that in the end it obtained the victory but, considering the whole affair, the victory was worse than a defeat.

At the outset the sympathy of the public was probably with the strikers but the attempted assassination of Frick on July 23 by a Russian anarchist, Frick's heroic resistance and display of physical courage turned the tide for the moment, although the strikers had nothing whatever to do either directly or indirectly with the attempt to kill Frick,¹ whose brave antagonism inspired a certain amount of respect.

There can be no question that the Homestead strike and battle was a contributory cause to Harrison's defeat. The Republican party was more identified with capital than the Democratic and likewise favored strongly a protective tariff, the operation of which had been highly beneficial to the steel and iron manufacture. Now an attempt to reduce wages in the largest steel works of the country, during a period of industrial prosperity, caused men to doubt the soundness of the policy of protection

¹ Frick though wounded by shots and stabs made a quick recovery and returned to his office thirteen days after the attempt.

and induced them to give their votes to Grover Cleveland.¹

It was the first presidential election to be held under the Australian ballot, the system in thirty-three States, in 1892, three-quarters of the whole number. The system that it supplanted was one in which the different parties or candidates paid the expense of printing the tickets and which required no thought on the part of the voter except to deposit the ticket, which contained candidates for many offices, given him by a party worker. In the early days, in Ohio at least, so-called split tickets were printed with the name of some favored candidate in the proper place but, owing to abuses, this mode of substitution was eventually forbidden by law, and if one desired to scratch his ticket one must do so by erasing the party nominee and writing in its place the name of the person desired. Massachusetts was the pioneer State in ballot reform and in 1888 adopted the alphabetical ballot, which required a decision of the voter on each candidate for office by marking a cross in his favor, except for presidential electors which could be voted for in block. The Indiana system was termed the party group, by which the mark of a cross enabled one to vote the straight party ticket.² All the laws permitted the choice for president

¹ Bridge, *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Co.*; *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1892; *The Nation*; Dewey; Peck.

² William H. Glasson wrote in the *South Atlantic Quarterly* for April, 1909, 137: "The Massachusetts law was the pioneer of the Alphabetical blanket ballot. Upon this ballot all candidates for each office were grouped together, and the names were arranged in alphabetical order under the designation of the office. This plan required the voter to select his candidate from each group, putting a premium on intelligence and making independent voting as easy as straight party voting. The Indiana plan, afterwards adopted by New York, was the model of the party group blanket ballot. Upon this ballot the complete list of the candidates of each party

by one cross for the presidential electors in the mass; all provided that the expense of printing the ballots should be borne by the State, whose officials should distribute them and preside at the places of election. This reform beginning in 1888 proceeded with amazing rapidity; it was helped by a speech of Cleveland for ballot reform, and its general adoption so quickly was a surprise to those who had inaugurated it. The Australian ballot secured secrecy and prevented a large part of the bribery and corruption that had obtained.¹

It was a dignified campaign turning mainly on the issue of the tariff. President Harrison, whose personal character was above reproach, gave the note to it when he said, "I desire this campaign to be one of Republicanism and not one of personalities."²

Cleveland carried States that would give him 277 electoral votes while Harrison would have 145 and Weaver 22. Cleveland received the votes of the solid South, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Indiana and also those of Illinois, Wisconsin and California; he obtained one from Ohio and, owing to a legislative device, 5 from Michigan. In some of the Southern States the Repub-

appeared in a separate group or column. The group was designated by the name of the party at the head of the column or by the name of the party together with an official emblem. . . . In the present New York system a circle is placed under the party emblem. A cross mark made within the circle votes the straight party ticket. . . . If the voter wishes to select candidates from different parties, or candidates independently nominated, he must put crosses in spaces provided at the left of the name of each candidate. . . . American ballot laws have tended to conform" to the Massachusetts or Indiana plan.

¹ J. B. Bishop. *The Forum*, Jan., 1892; W. H. Glasson, *So. Atlantic Quar.*, Apr., 1909; A. Ludington, *So. Atlantic Quar.*, Jan., 1910; A. B. Hart, *Actual Government*; Beard, *American Government and Politics*; Bryce, *Amer. Commonwealth*, ii.; *The Nation*, *passim*.

² Peck, 297.

licans made a fusion with the Populists without result; but the Democratic fusion with the Populists was successful in Colorado, Idaho, Kansas and Nevada, giving Weaver 20, and partially successful in North Dakota and Oregon, giving Weaver one vote each. Of the popular vote Cleveland had 5,556,543, Harrison 5,175,582, Weaver 1,104,886; but the Weaver vote was swelled by the fusion with the Democrats. Without such fusion many votes credited to him would have been cast for Cleveland.¹

The Populist strength was in the Western States. While 1892 was a year of industrial prosperity, this was not shared by the farmers and by their votes they showed a desire for change. Their attitude is correctly stated by Frederick J. Turner, the acute and careful historian of the West. "The separation of the Western man from the seaboard," he wrote, "and his environment, made him in a large degree free from European precedents and forces. He looked at things independently and with small regard or appreciation for the best Old World experience. . . . The pioneer had boundless confidence in the future of his own community, and when seasons of financial contraction and depression occurred, he, who had staked his all on confidence in Western development and had fought the savage for his home, was inclined to reproach the conservative sections and classes. To explain this antagonism requires more than denunciation of dishonesty, ignorance and boorishness as fundamental Western traits."²

When the result became known, Cleveland was the

¹ Stanwood, Hist. of the Presidency; *The Nation*, *passim*.

² *Atlantic Monthly*, Sept., 1896. Dewey, 236; see Hamlin Garland, Son of the Middle Border.

most popular man in the country. He had dictated the issue and refused to bargain in any way for votes.

On November 11, 1892, Senator Cullom wrote to President Harrison: "I specially desire to say that the cause of the defeat does not lie at your door personally. Any man in the country standing upon the doctrine of high protection would have been defeated. The people sat down upon the McKinley Tariff Bill two years ago and they have never gotten up. They were thoroughly imbued with the feeling that the party did not do right in revising the tariff up instead of down. They beat us for it in '90 and now again."¹

Harrison scored in his judicial appointments and this received magnanimous appreciation by Grover Cleveland. "I cannot see how he does it," he said. "I thought I realized the importance of the Federal courts, resisting mere party pressure and giving to my appointments the most jealous care, but I must confess that Harrison has beaten me."²

Nevertheless Harrison's administration is not generally accounted a success. The story has told how circumstances and the action of Congress were adverse. But something was due to his lack of personal affability. "An eminent Western senator said to me once," wrote Senator Hoar, "what of course was a great exaggeration, that if Harrison were to address an audience of ten thousand men he would capture them all. But if each one of them were presented to him in private he would make him his enemy."³ The exaggeration lay in the numbers

¹ Fifty Years of Public Service, 259.

² Parker, 247. See Cullom, 248; Hoar, i. 417; N. Y. *Eve. Post*, Dec. 19, 1891.

³ Autobiography, i. 414.

but the essential fact was expressed. Harrison was great on the platform and on the stump ; he was repellent in familiar converse. "He was probably the most unsatisfactory President we ever had in the White House," wrote Senator Cullom, a staunch supporter, "to those who must necessarily come into personal contact with him. . . . Even Senators and Representatives calling on official business, he would treat with scant courtesy. He scarcely ever invited any one to have a chair."¹ But the country had for him unalloyed respect and looked upon him as a ruggedly honest patriot, who was ready to respond to any legitimate call.

¹ Fifty Years, 248.

CHAPTER XVIII

WHEN Cleveland was re-elected President in November 1892 he was the most popular man in the country and during the canvass he had shown that at heart he had the true instincts of a gentleman. The Republican candidate in competition with him for the presidency was President Harrison, whose wife was ill during most of the campaign and was obliged to remain in the Adirondacks; here she had her husband's almost constant attendance. Cleveland was invited to be present at the Columbian anniversary in Chicago in anticipation of the Columbian Exposition on the next first of May. He replied to the invitation: "I am unwilling to take a trip which from beginning to end . . . would be regarded as a political tour made by a candidate for the presidency. My general aversion to such a trip is overwhelmingly increased in this particular instance, when I recall the afflictive dispensation which detains at the bedside of his sick wife another candidate for the presidency." ¹ During January 1893, ex-President Hayes passed away. Despite remonstrance and criticism from bitter partisans of his own party, who deprecated any honor paid to one who was thought by all good Democrats to have owed his election to fraud, Cleveland, now President-elect, took the "tedious midwinter journey" ² from New York to Fremont to attend the funeral.

¹ Hist. of the Last Quarter of a Century, Andrews, ii. 230.

² *The Nation*, Jan. 26.

Cleveland's popularity was not of long duration. His good fortune seems to have deserted him; for he came to the White House during a time of trouble. The financial panic which might have been expected to follow the English Baring panic of 1890 was staved off by an immense crop of grain in 1891 with a large European demand.¹ The year 1892 was a year of business prosperity which fostered extravagance; large importations from abroad hastened the inevitable crash, the main cause of which may be stated in the one word, overtrading.² President Cleveland's inaugural address did not reflect the alarming condition, although a few days previously the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, whose debt was more than 125 millions and which had recently paid 5 per cent on its preferred income bonds had gone into bankruptcy.³ During the first week of May, the National Cordage Company went to the wall. "The failure of this notorious undertaking," wrote Noyes, "was the blow that undermined the structure of speculative credit."⁴ "Notorious" was the proper word. In January, a dividend of 100 per cent on the common stock was declared. The shares began to advance during November 1892 and in three months went up 12 per cent selling during February 1893 at 147. On the first of that month

¹ IMPORTS		EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC MERCHANDISE	
1889-90	\$789,000,000	1889-90	\$845,000,000
1890-91	845,000,000	1890-91	872,000,000
1891-92	827,000,000	1891-92	1,016,000,000
1892-93	866,000,000	1892-93	831,000,000
1893-94	655,000,000	1893-94	869,000,000

² "The crisis itself was a result of complex causes." See the detailed statement of the causes. *Hist. of Crises*, Sprague, National Monetary Commission, Senate Doc. 61 Cong. 2d Sess. xxv. 153.

³ Feb. 26.

⁴ *Amer. Finance*, 188.

the regular quarterly cash dividends on the preferred and common stock were paid; in May the Company was in the hands of a receiver and the stock, for which new certificates had been issued on account of the increase, fell below ten dollars a share.¹ A collapse in the stock market occurred. During May and June nineteen national banks and a greater number of State and private banks suspended payment,² while the mercantile failures were enormous. The country was in the throes of a financial panic.

All eyes were on Washington. What could, and what would the President do? It was generally acknowledged that a law passed in 1882 gave statutory recognition to one hundred millions as the lowest limit of the gold reserve to provide for the redemption of 347 millions of greenbacks: to this burden the silver purchase act of 1890 added about 147 millions of Treasury notes. Moreover, as Cleveland afterwards wrote in his "Presidential Problems," this gold reserve of one hundred million was regarded by the people "with a sort of sentimental solicitude."³ Harrison had left to his successor a depleted Treasury although the gold reserve was slightly above the statutory minimum; but, owing to the drain of gold for the purchases of silver and the daily expenses of the Government, the amount of gold in the Treasury in April was below one hundred millions. A feverish money market and a general decline in securities and advance in foreign exchange foreshadowed the stress of the next month and, to make matters worse, a rumor obtained currency that

¹ Noyes, 188; Sprague, 164; *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*.

² Sprague, 168.

³ P. 126. *Presidential Problems* was published in 1904.

the Secretary of the Treasury would avail himself of his legal option and redeem the Treasury notes issued under the Act of 1890 in silver.¹ On April 20, a well-meant but ambiguous statement made by the Secretary of the Treasury,² with the purpose of denying the truth of this rumor, seemed, on the contrary, to give credence to it; finally, however, the President came to the front in a public utterance and declared specifically that the notes of 1890 should be redeemed in gold. The President and Eastern financiers were convinced that the repeal of the silver purchase clause of the Act of 1890 was absolutely necessary for relief. This required an extra session of Congress and the President was urged to call one at once.

Much now depended upon one man and, although it was not known at the time, this man's life was in danger. About May 5 Cleveland noticed a rough place on the roof of his mouth but did not have it examined until June 18 when Dr. O'Reilly, a Washington surgeon, found a malignant ulcer "as large as a quarter of a dollar, extending from the molar teeth to within one third of an inch of the middle line and encroaching slightly on the soft palate"; he also found some diseased bone.³ Convinced as he was of the gravity of the case, he advised Cleveland to consult Dr. Joseph D. Bryant "long his medical attendant and intimate friend."⁴ Dr. Bryant quickly went to Washington and confirmed in his own mind the

¹ Mr. Horatio G. Curtis of Boston made during the summer of 1893 an examination of the rumor and, somewhat more than three years afterwards, traced it to its source. His examination confirms the statement in the text.

² Carlisle, of Kentucky.

³ The Surgical Operations on President Cleveland in 1893, W. W. Keen, 30.

⁴ Keen.

alarming diagnosis of the Washington surgeon. "What do you think it is, doctor?" asked Cleveland, to which came the reply, "Were it in my mouth I would have it removed at once." Cleveland decided on an operation but, owing to his position and the critical condition of affairs, exacted the utmost secrecy. It would not answer for the country to know that the President was under the surgeon's knife, as he was the sole obstacle to the monetary basis of silver. Stevenson of Illinois, the Vice-President, while an estimable man, believed in silver; moreover he did not share the faith of his chief in a civil service based on merit. "If Cleveland would drop out," said a Southern senator, "and Stevenson was President, we would get along finely."¹ Cleveland, on the other hand, had the entire confidence of the business and financial interests of the country and was felt to be the best man in the country to cope with the grave situation.

Every precaution was taken to insure secrecy. July 1 was the day decided upon for the operation and the place Commodore E. C. Benedict's ² yacht, the *Oneida*, then in New York harbor. Doctors Bryant, O'Reilly, William W. Keen of Philadelphia, an eminent surgeon and sturdy patriot who had been summoned by Bryant, other physicians and a dentist, met their patient on the yacht on the evening of June 30. The President lighted a cigar and sat on the deck smoking and chatting until midnight. Next day, July 1, while the yacht steamed up East River at half speed, the operation was performed. The dentist first extracted the two left upper bicuspid teeth; Dr. Bryant made the required incisions in the

¹ Cullom, *Fifty Years*, 261.

² Benedict was an intimate friend.

roof of the mouth; both of these instrumentations were under nitrous oxide. At 1.14 P.M. ether was administered and Dr. Bryant performed the operation with the aid of his assistant and Dr. Keen, who has well described the work. "The entire left upper jaw was removed from the first bicuspid tooth to just beyond the last molar and nearly up to the middle line," Keen wrote. "The floor of the orbit — the cavity in the skull containing the eyeball — was not removed, as it had not yet been attacked. A small portion of the soft palate was removed. This extensive operation was decided upon because we found that the antrum — the large hollow cavity in the upper jaw — was partly filled by a gelatinous mass, evidently a sarcoma. . . . The entire operation was done within the mouth without any external incision. . . . The retention of the floor of the orbit prevented any displacement of the eyeball. This normal appearance of the eye, the normal voice, and especially the absence of any external scar, which was the most important evidence of all, greatly aided in keeping the operation an entire secret. . . . At 2.55 P.M. a hypodermic of one-sixth of a grain of morphine was given — the only narcotic administered at any time. What a sigh of intense relief we surgeons breathed when the patient was once more safe in bed can hardly be imagined!"¹ On the evening of July 5 Cleveland was able to leave the yacht and walk from the launch to his residence in Buzzards Bay "with but little apparent effort."

The operation itself did not render the surgeons as anxious as did the anticipated effect of the ether. "The

¹ Keen, pp. 38-40.

patient," wrote Dr. Keen, "was 56 years of age, very corpulent, with a short thick neck, just the build and age for a possible apoplexy. . . . He was also worn out mentally and physically by four months of exacting labor and the officeseekers' importunities."¹ Under all the circumstances, the operation was a tribute to the nerve and skill of these surgeons as they fully realized the probable consequences of the least slip of the knife or the least defect in any of the various stages of their work.² For the happy issue let us thank the development of modern surgery and recognize what an important part is played by surgeons and doctors in the complexities of modern life. The public was kept in entire ignorance of the operation.³

Just before leaving for New York to submit to this grave operation,⁴ Cleveland called an extra session of Congress for August 7, that being the earliest day, according to the advice of his physicians, when he should have sufficiently recovered to attend to his duties in Washington. Meanwhile the panic proceeded apace. It had been customary for Western banks during the dull season for

¹ Keen, p. 35.

² "The operation itself was as nothing with scores that Dr. Bryant and I had performed," wrote Dr. Keen; "but on it hung the life not only of a human being and an illustrious ruler but the destiny of a nation. It was by far the most responsible operation in which I ever took part." P. 29.

³ My authority is Dr. William W. Keen's little book, which first appeared on Sept. 22, 1917 as an article in the Philadelphia *Saturday Evening Post*. In this very interesting book, the different methods of secrecy are carefully related. Dr. Keen made copious references to the article of Robert L. O'Brien, editor of the Boston *Herald*, in the *Herald* of Sept. 30, 1917 and told the story of E. J. Edwards's despatch to the Philadelphia Press on Aug. 29, 1893. On July 17 a second and complementary operation was performed: this "was brief and the President recovered quickly." 42.

⁴ June 30,

loans to deposit their surplus funds in New York where they drew interest at the rate of two per cent. The panic was especially disastrous to the West, manifesting itself for one thing, in runs on banks; these therefore rapidly withdrew their deposits in New York. Many of them, however, were unable to save themselves by this means; indeed, out of the 158 failures of national banks during the year, 153 were in the West and South. Meanwhile the New York banks saw their reserve dwindling at such a rate as to compel them to contract their loans, while money on call advanced to 74 per cent. The banks generally issued clearing-house loan certificates for the settlement of balances. The Erie Railroad went into the hands of a receiver and many more railroad bankruptcies were threatened. "Within two years nearly one-fourth of the total railway capitalization passed through the bankruptcy courts."¹ Banks in Chicago, Indianapolis, Louisville and the famous Mitchell Bank in Milwaukee failed. "The season's record of suspensions," in addition to the national banks, wrote Noyes, "comprised 177 private banks, 47 savings banks, 13 loan and trust companies and 16 mortgage companies. The solvency of banks was generally questioned. The ruin resulting in the seaboard cities from the panic of 1893 was undoubtedly less severe than that of twenty years before. But no such financial wreck had fallen upon the West since it became a factor in the financial world."² Currency went

¹ Noyes, 218. 61 per cent received no dividends. "As late as the middle of 1895, receivers were operating 169 railways with 37,855 miles of track — more than one-fifth of the country's total railway mileage and represented on the markets by no less than \$2,400,000,000 stocks and bonds." *Ibid.*, 276.

² P. 193.

to a premium and was difficult to get. Banks requested their depositors to draw their checks, "payable through the clearing-house only." On August 1 the savings banks throughout the country required sixty days' notice of the withdrawal of any deposits.¹

Nothing better illustrates the general condition than the recital of a concrete case from the graphic pen of Henry Adams, who, on reaching Lucerne, July 22, found letters from his brothers "requesting his immediate return to Boston because the community was bankrupt and he was probably a beggar." In Boston "Men died like flies under the strain," he wrote, "and Boston grew suddenly old, haggard and thin." When he went to his bank to draw a hundred dollars of his own money on deposit the cashier refused to let him have more than fifty.²

Thus stood affairs when Congress assembled on August 7 and heard the President's message. He addressed the House and the Senate earnestly and forcibly. He had called them together on account of "an alarming and extraordinary business situation" which he thought was due principally to "the purchase and coinage of silver." One hundred and forty-seven millions of Treasury notes had been issued in the purchase of silver bullion and many of these notes had been paid in gold. The gold reserve of one hundred millions had been encroached upon; more than eighty-seven millions of gold had gone abroad. The country was approaching silver monometallism and should it reach this basis it would lose its place "among nations of the first class." "I earnestly recommend," he concluded, "the prompt repeal of pro-

¹ Noyes; Sprague, *passim*.

² Education, 294, 295.

visions of the act passed July 14, 1890 authorizing the purchase of silver bullion." The House responded at once to his earnest request and, in three weeks after their meeting, repealed the purchase clause of the act by a vote of 239 to 108.

The Senate wrangled over the repeal and did not pass it until October 30. The vote stood 43 to 32; of the yeas 23 were Republicans, of the nays 19 were Democrats and 3 were Populists. This shows the non-partisan character of the issue and the delicate position of Cleveland. In point of fact, the triumphant leader of his party in 1892 was forced less than a year later to beg Democratic senators to unite with Republicans in an enactment which he deemed of vital importance. The support of the Committee on Finance was essential, and a formidable stumbling-block in the President's course existed in the person of Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana, its chairman, who had previously been an advocate of the free coinage of silver. Voorhees and other objecting Democratic senators were won by a discreet bestowal of offices; that the Voorhees "gang" and the Voorhees family were provided for was one of the incidents of the repeal. The President's action seems to have been necessary, but he incurred severe criticism from the civil-service reformers. It was not alleged that he had broken the law, but that he had violated the spirit of the reform and had been recreant to his earlier professions. It is impossible, I think, that Cleveland should have made the defence attributed by Ostrogorski to a certain high official that "a man had never yet been hung for breaking the spirit of a law"; and indeed he said later, "I do not believe that we should do evil that good may come." Undoubtedly

he saw before him a divided duty and believed that he ought to give the preference to the business that admitted of no delay.

Cleveland and the Eastern financiers who agreed with him, were mistaken in attributing the panic chiefly to the operation of the silver purchase provision of the Act of 1890. Undoubtedly this was a contributing cause, but more than that it would be impossible to say. Yet as President of the United States, Cleveland naturally and justifiably laid stress upon what lay in his own province, and there were abundant reasons for the repeal. All the first-class European nations had adopted the single gold standard and it was incumbent on our country to follow their example. An additional reason was furnished by the closing of the Indian mints on June 26 to the free coinage of silver with the result that the bullion in the silver dollar on August 24 was worth only 57¢.¹ Indirectly the repeal of the purchase of silver, as provided by the Act of 1890, helped to check the progress of the panic. At the time of the Baring panic of 1890 Europe sold American securities freely as the best way to raise money and in 1893 the return flow had hardly begun, but whatever tendency there was in that direction was checked by the uncertainty in regard to the basis of value. The repeal of the silver purchase clause showed that the President and Congress favored the gold standard and so furnished an incitement to European investors to purchase American stocks and bonds.

Cleveland displayed boldness and good sense in his action, but fairness demands that the other side be pre-

¹ *The Nation*, 127.

sented, and this may be best done by quoting the words of William J. Bryan who spoke nearly three hours against the repeal in the House of Representatives [August 16]. Bryan so charmed his hearers by "his attractive presence, pleasing manner of delivery, and clear, vibrant and beautifully modulated voice"¹ that the conventional limit of one hour for a speech was extended to unlimited time by unanimous consent. "We often hear our opponents," he said "complain of the 'cupidity of the mine-owner.' Let us admit that the mine-owner is selfish and that he will profit by the increased price of silver bullion. Let us, for the sake of argument, go further and accuse him of favoring the free coinage of silver solely for the purpose of increasing the price of his product. Does that make him worse than other men? Is not the farmer selfish enough to desire a higher price for wheat? Is not the cotton-grower selfish enough to desire a higher price for his cotton? Is not the laboring man selfish enough to desire higher wages? And, if I may be pardoned for the boldness, are not bankers and business men selfish enough to ask for legislation at our hands which will give them back prosperity? Was not this extraordinary session called in order to bring back prosperity to our business men? Is it any more important that you should keep a mercantile house from failing than that you should keep a mine from suspending? . . . The money loaner has just as much interest in the rise in the value of his product — money — as farmers and miners have in the increased price of their products."

To the farmer, from his own point of view Bryan's

¹ Peck, 343.

argument was unanswerable. "The last census," he declared, "shows a real estate mortgage indebtedness in the five great agricultural States — Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Nebraska — of more than one billion of dollars. A rising standard means a great deal of distress to these mortgagors. . . . The mortgage remains nominally the same though the debt has actually become twice as great."

The silver miner "pleads only for the restoration of the money of the fathers. . . . It is safe to say that taking the gold and silver of the world — and it is more true of silver than of gold — every dollar's worth of metal has cost a dollar. We believe that the opening of our mints to the free and unlimited coinage of gold and silver at 16 to 1¹ would immediately result in restoring silver to the coinage value of \$1.29 per ounce, not only here, but everywhere. . . . There is not enough of either metal to form the basis for the world's metallic money; both metals must therefore be used as full legal tender primary money. . . . The nation must therefore either retain the present law or make some further provision for silver. . . . The Sherman law was passed in 1890 [the law of 1890 was popularly called the Sherman law, *vide ante*] as a substitute for what was known as the Bland law [the Bland-Allison]. It will be remembered that the Bland law was forced upon the silver men as a compromise and that the opponents of silver sought its repeal from the day it was passed. It will also be remembered that the Sherman law was in like manner forced upon the silver men as a compromise and that the opponents of silver have sought its repeal ever

¹ The ratio in France was 15½ to 1.

since it became a law. . . . Does any one believe that Mr. Cleveland could have been elected President upon a platform declaring in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Sherman law? Can we go back to our people and tell them that, after denouncing for twenty years the crime of 1873, we have at last accepted it as a blessing?"¹

When Bryan declared that the money question "can only be settled by the great mass of the voters of this country"² he clearly defined the difference between himself on the one hand and Cleveland and John Sherman on the other. Bryan believed that an intricate financial problem could be solved by the people at the polls; his opponents well knew that this was a task for impartial experts. "We need money," said Bryan: his fallacy and that of his adherents lay in the belief that silver could be added indefinitely to the volume of currency without leading to the expulsion of gold in accordance with an immutable financial law; and such expulsion would be a contraction of the currency, while Bryan and his followers thought that their policy would give the country more money. Experts were aware that the country's real need was a standard, as stable as imperfect human conditions would allow, for the vast mass of business transactions that are done by checks, drafts and other paper evidences of value or indebtedness. But the West hated Wall Street and thought that the policy of repeal must be wrong for the simple reason that it was favored by the New York financiers. Truly Wall Street had many sins to answer for although it happened to be right on the silver question. But its unenviable record at the begin-

¹ The First Battle, Bryan, 81 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 113.

ning of the panic of 1893 figured prominently in the contest. Of the National Cordage Company manipulation, the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* remarked: "It may not be possible to prevent such methods altogether but the public should get a clear idea of what terrible disaster is brought to thousands of innocent holders of stocks and bonds, and the parties engaged in this sort of financial operation ought not to be held up as heroes of the day, although they may have personal integrity." ¹

I have coupled Sherman and Cleveland as Sherman was the wise Republican in the Senate who, with a majority of Republican senators, favored the repeal and made a long speech advocating it. He put the question in a nutshell when he said: "If we continue the purchase of 54,000,000 ounces of silver a year, we will eventually bring the United States to the single standard of silver — a constantly depreciating commodity now rejected by the great commercial nations as a standard of value; a commodity confessedly inconvenient by its weight, bulk and value for the large transactions of foreign and domestic commerce, and detach us from the money standard now adopted by all European nations, with which we now have our chief commercial and social relations." ²

"No man now in public life," declared Cleveland, "certainly no Republican, has rendered a greater service to sound finance than John Sherman. . . . He gave nothing but his name to the silver bill repealed in 1893." ³

The "acute spasm" of the panic of 1893 was at an end before the repeal was effected but the early action

¹ Sprague, 164.

² Rec. 1190.

³ Parker, 292.

of the House and the confident belief that the Senate would act likewise had a wholesome effect in allaying the distress. The opinion of Carlisle, the Secretary of the Treasury, who was a theoretical bimetallist, undoubtedly had a powerful influence with his brother Democrats who were friends of silver. "For my part," he said, "I have never been able to understand what is meant by a double standard, a double measure of value, and I have never found any one who could tell me. . . . This does not imply that silver is to have no place in our monetary system. What is to be the ultimate fate of that metal is one of the problems which time and events alone can solve; but for many years, notwithstanding all our legislation in its support, the fluctuations in its value have been so rapid and so great as to demonstrate the fact that it cannot be safely coined without limitations into money of final redemption at the existing ratio or at any other ratio that might be established. It is enough to say at present that we have already on hand a stock of silver . . . sufficient to meet all the probable requirements of the country for many years to come."¹

The repeal, wrote Woodrow Wilson, "was the President's victory . . . and every one knew it. . . . Until he came on the stage, both parties had dallied and coquetted with the advocates of silver. Now he had brought both to the parting of the ways. . . . Such a stroke . . . made it certain that at the end of that term he should either have won his party to himself or lost it altogether."²

¹ Speech before the New York Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 21, 1893. *Public Opinion*, Nov. 30.

² *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1897, 297.

Cleveland entered upon his second term under favorable conditions for civil service reform. Although Harrison, in respect of the unclassified service, had not been as sound as his predecessor, he had, in the classified service, given strength to the movement and had made an important contribution to its progress by the appointment of Theodore Roosevelt as member of the Civil Service Commission. Cleveland was now thoroughly independent. His third nomination had been emphatically demanded by the people and his election was a triumph. His party owed him more than he owed his party. Being the most popular man in the country he seemed to stand in the position of a great leader, needing only to urge a policy to have it adopted. Yet the reformers were not so well satisfied with the first year of his second administration as they had been with the same period in his first. This was due in part to his failure to give the same attention to appointments that he had given eight years previously. He was now occupied with weightier matters and left the disposition of the offices mainly to his subordinates.

The greed of the hungry Democrats was indeed great. Their party had come into its own again and they believed in dividing up the spoils of office. On the night before the operation on his mouth, Cleveland, while talking with the consulting surgeon, burst out with "Oh, Doctor Keen, those office seekers! Those office seekers! They haunt me even in my dreams!"¹ Previous to this he had been forced to issue what *The Nation* called "An Emancipation Proclamation."² He said: "It has be-

¹ P. 33.² May 11.

come apparent after two months' experience that the rules heretofore promulgated regulating interviews with the President have wholly failed in their operation. The time which under these rules was set apart for the reception of Senators and Representatives has been almost entirely spent in listening to applications for office, which have been bewildering in volume, perplexing and exhausting in their iteration and impossible of remembrance. A due regard for public duty, which must be neglected if present conditions continue, and an observance of the limitations placed upon human endurance oblige me to decline from and after this date all personal interviews with those seeking appointments to office, except as I, on my own notion may especially invite them. The same considerations make it impossible for me to receive those who merely desire to pay their respects except on the days and during the hours especially designated for that purpose. I earnestly request Senators and Representatives to aid me in securing for them uninterrupted interviews by declining to introduce their constituents and friends when visiting the Executive Mansion during the hours designated for their reception. Applicants for office will only prejudice their prospects by repeated importunity and by remaining in Washington to await results."¹

Josiah Quincy, who had been regarded as favorable to civil service reform and had received the appointment of Assistant Secretary of State, proved a diligent wielder of the political axe. Indeed Schurz who had become president of the National Civil Service Reform League on

¹ May 8, 1893. Richardson ix. 399.

the death of Curtis said in his annual address of 1894, "No spoilsman in that office had ever turned over the consular service from one party to the other with greater thoroughness and despatch." Quincy defended himself by saying that he had turned out bad and put in good men and Cleveland stood by his subordinate with Grant-like fidelity and tenacity. The Treasury, Interior and Post-Office Departments seemed impotent before the onslaughts of the office seekers and were censured at length by the reformers. The Postmaster-General had their confidence but his assistant so swung the axe among the fourth-class postmasters that, during the first year, he exceeded by 1143 Harrison's record of changes for the same period, — a record established by a master of the politician's art. The number of changes under Harrison was over 24,000; on percentages the Democratic showing is better, 34 to the Republican 37, the difference being due to the increased number of post-offices. During the first year of the new administration Cleveland changed 1720 presidential post-offices to Harrison's 1698 although, because of the increase in the number of offices, his percentage was 53 to Harrison's 65. Yet this large number of displacements makes it sufficiently clear that Cleveland was employing the patronage to advance his financial and tariff policies. During the first nine months of his administration, the reformers were so sharp and persistent in their censure that even the comment of the *Springfield Republican* seemed charitable. "President Cleveland's civil service record to date," said this newspaper, "is a maze of theatrical contradictions."¹ Exasperated

¹ Dec. 2, 1893.

at the continued fault-finding, the President could not withhold a retort; in his first annual message he spoke of "the querulous impracticability of many self-constituted guardians" of civil service reform.

I am not concerned with striking a balance between the reformers' criticisms and the President's defence. Despite Quincy's old-fashioned and ruthless decapitations and the partisan activity of the Treasury, Interior and Post-Office Departments, Cleveland, in both public and private utterances, remained faithful to the principle of civil service reform. It must be remembered that twelve years previously, all these removals and new appointments would have been considered a matter of course and that the quickened public conscience was largely due to the civil service reform associations, to the representative body, the National League, and to Grover Cleveland. The National League was fortunate in its first two presidents, Curtis and Schurz, who in addition to their other strong qualities possessed a remarkable gift of literary expression that gained for them the ear of the entire reading public as well as of the believers in reform.

It is fortunate for Cleveland that the verdict of history need not, in this instance, rest wholly on the written word, for his ponderous and labored utterances in contrast with Curtis's and Schurz's pithy criticisms would surely lose him the case. When good and true men fall out, the lover of righteousness may well be puzzled, but the historian has an advantage over statesman and reformer in his knowledge of the end. The backslidings due to "offensive partisanship" bulk small in comparison with the impetus Cleveland gave to good administration

by his work for the classified service. He retained Theodore Roosevelt as member of the Civil Service Commission; the two worked together in harmony, and the President was keenly sensible of his loss when Roosevelt thought a higher duty called him to New York.

An important event was the World's Columbian Exposition held in Chicago during the late spring, summer and autumn of 1893. Eighteen hundred ninety-two would have been the proper year for the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America, but it was impossible to get ready and the Fair was postponed until the next year, which turned out to be one of financial panic that convulsed the country. The financial failures, the check to enterprises, the difficulty of obtaining actual currency for needed wants were added to the ordinary hindrances of launching so great an enterprise. Resolute men overcame them by their indomitable energy and proved themselves worthy of their remarkable city. In the artistic creation, they builded wisely when they appointed Daniel H. Burnham, an architect of Chicago, Director of Works. Assembling together the best architects of the country, he superintended an architectural display that gave all visitors a supreme delight and has remained in American memory a fond possession. "The grand style," wrote Francis D. Millet, an artist who met a heroic death at the sinking of the *Titanic*, "the perfect proportions and the magnificent dimensions of the buildings of the World's Columbian Exposition, excite a two-fold sentiment in the mind of the visitor — wonder and admiration at the beauties of the edifices and regret and disappointment that they are not to remain as monu-

ments to the good taste, knowledge and skill of the men who built them, and as a permanent memorial of the event which the Exposition is intended to celebrate.”¹ The buildings were of “staff,”² ephemeral material which gave the appearance of white marble, so that it was called and has been known ever since as “the white city.” Seen on a bright day from the approach on Lake Michigan the wish could not fail to arise that the city might endure forever.

The Fair evoked much good literature. Francis Hopkinson Smith, set down in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* as “author, artist and engineer,” whose varied talent and cheery presence made him everywhere welcome, spoke of the Art Palace as “the most exquisitely beautiful building of modern times.” The Court of Honor, in a lagoon whose waters were cleverly diverted from Lake Michigan, along the front of which the Exposition grounds ran for nearly two miles, aroused Smith’s enthusiasm as he found a Venetian gondola manned by a true Venetian. “There is to me,” he wrote, “a seeming fitness in entering the Court of Honor reclining in a gondola and rowed by a gondolier. . . . The launches” [electric], he added, “noiseless as they are, seem out of place here and jar upon your senses; they are too new, too suggestive of progress and revenue and time-saving.”³ But they were more in the spirit of the place than Smith’s “stately water-birds of Venice”; they were an indication of what Electricity could and would do in the future. It required nearly an

¹ *Some Artists at the Fair*, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893.

² “Staff” is fully described on p. 21 of the *Official Guide to the World’s Columbian Exposition*.

³ *Some Artists*, etc., 100, 101, 102.

hour to make the circuit of the lagoon and the canals and, as one glided along under electrical power by day, one might well believe that more than a generation must pass away before there would be such another show; at night the rider in the launch could not fail to fancy himself in fairyland.

For tasteful criticism, regard was paid with one accord to the French. In the *Gazette des Beaux-Arts* may be read that one was swayed by three sentiments. The first, "a spontaneous sincere homage given from one's heart to the breadth of the setting and its general effect which recalls the astonishing conceptions of our great painters who were architectural decorators."

Second, a criticism of details.

Third, "a very keen temptation to forget all criticism in view of the really extraordinary impression produced by this creation so boldly conceived and so clearly and unaffectedly realized." ¹

A writer in the Swiss Bibliothèque Universelle, while saying that in "its sovereign majesty, the white city was admirable," could not fail to draw a political lesson plainly apparent in 1893: "The United States furnishes two examples on which Europe should reflect: this great democracy enjoys at the same time the benefits of liberty and order; this powerful State has no need to ask of war a means of aggrandizement or for obtaining riches; it has found the secret of perpetual peace. What a contrast to our old world armed to the teeth for mounting guard over two conquered provinces! And we reproach the United States with their barbarism!" ²

¹ Nov. 1893, 425.

² Jan. Feb. 1894, 56, 313.

Our great historical writer, Henry Adams, went to the Fair and thus recorded his impressions: "The Exposition itself defied philosophy. . . . As a scenic display, Paris had never approached it." The American "seemed to have leaped directly from Corinth, and Syracuse, and Venice, over the heads of London and New York to impose classical standards on plastic Chicago. Critics had no trouble in criticising the classicism but all trading cities had always shown traders' taste and, to the stern purist of religious faith, no art was thinner than Venetian Gothic. . . . If the people of the Northwest actually knew what was good when they saw it, they would some day talk about Hunt and Richardson, La Farge and Saint-Gaudens, Burnham and McKim and Stanford White when their politicians and millionaires were otherwise forgotten." ¹

¹ Education. Massachusetts Historical Society edition, 337 *et seq.* Authorities other than those specifically named: Official Illustrations from the Art Gallery; Official Views; World's Fair Scrap-book collected by C. P. Greenough, in Boston Athenæum.

CHAPTER XIX

A PRESIDENT less wise and patriotic than Cleveland would have yielded to the temptation to tackle the tariff at once. He and his Congress had been elected on that issue and on it his party was better united than on any other. He was the new apostle of a reduction of the tariff: to recommend that his doctrine be put in practice was easy and natural. But from his point of view, the continued purchase of silver was so at variance with sound economic doctrine and so harmful to business and finance that it must first be considered and stopped. With the repeal of the silver purchase clause of the Act of 1890 the way was made clear to grapple with the question he had made his own. In his annual message to Congress of December 4, he declared, "After a hard struggle tariff reform is directly before us."

The President spoke truly. The elections of 1890 and 1892 had been unmistakable indications that the country demanded urgently a substantial downward revision of the tariff. The President and the House of Representatives were eager to carry out the will of the country, and the House, under the leadership of William L. Wilson and with Cleveland's sympathetic coöperation, passed on February 1, 1894 by a vote of 204 to 140 a bill which though defective in certain details supplied, on the whole, an honest and consistent programme for the reduction of the tariff, but in no radical manner, and deserved a fair

trial. It had the striking and readily comprehensible merit of placing iron ore, coal and lumber on the free list and the more doubtful advantage of free wool; it retained free sugar, the great boon of the McKinley Act to the people, but it repealed the sugar bounties. Nevertheless it was a question whether the revenues of the country could stand free sugar. Wilson placed on the free list cotton ties, binding twine and fresh fish, and retained there hides.

The action of the Senate shows how strongly entrenched was the system of protection. While a majority of the Democratic Senators were willing to agree to the Wilson bill, a number of them were secretly opposed to it and two were open and determined in their opposition. These two, Gorman of Maryland and Brice of Ohio, were as good protectionists as McKinley and so convinced that the bill meant ruin to many manufacturing industries that they preferred no legislation whatever to any that did not safeguard certain interests. Gorman was a good parliamentary leader and, having both avowed and silent support in his party, dictated the policy of the Democratic Senate and eventually that of Congress. "I can afford to oppose this bill and beat the President," he said to Andrew Carnegie, "but I cannot afford to oppose and be beaten by him."¹ The open confidence of Carnegie and other Republican manufacturers in Gorman and Brice ought to have aroused the suspicion and partisanship of the Democrats and Populists who were devoted to tariff reform and incited them to resent dictation by two of their number and to demand that their plurality

¹ *Century Magazine*, December 1908.

of six¹ be employed to register the will of their party as presented in their platform, as declared at the polls, personified in their President and as formulated by the House. That this was not the result was due to circumstances, well illustrated by the remark of the London fish-dealer, "I am in favor of free trade in everything but herring."² The Senators from Maryland, West Virginia and Alabama were against any bill placing coal and iron ore on the free list and they were upheld by well-known Democratic magnates at the North who were largely interested in the production of these minerals. The Senators from Louisiana insisted that her sugar planters should not be sacrificed, and Senator Murphy of New York, who lived in Troy, demanded that the industry of his city be protected and obtained a duty on linen collars and cuffs almost as high as that in the McKinley bill [McKinley bill thirty cents per dozen and forty per cent ad valorem; Wilson bill thirty-five per cent ad valorem; Senate bill thirty cents per dozen and thirty per cent ad valorem]. Gorman worked on these different local interests astutely and with marked success.

Thus far he framed his bill according to Republican precedents but there was worse behind. The words of the President and of William L. Wilson, and a mass of facts supporting their guarded utterances, indicate that the sugar schedule which was rendered unduly favorable to the Sugar Trust was secured by that corporation's method of indirect bribery and corruption.

The Senate made six hundred and thirty-four amend-

¹ These six are Democrats in excess of Republicans. There were also three Populists who favored a reduction of duties.

² Stanwood, 320.

ments to the House bill and on July 3, 1894 passed their bill by 39:34. It went as usual to a conference and the decided disagreement between the House and the Senate was aggravated by a quarrel between the President and the Senate, which came to a head from Wilson's reading in the House a letter from Cleveland, in which he denounced the Senate bill as a disregard of Democratic pledges and an abandonment of principles to the extent of "party perfidy and party dishonor." The letter was not tactful but honest; bad politics, yet, if we take its measure, not at the moment but in the long run, good statesmanship. It gave rise to an angry discussion in the Senate when Gorman had the sympathy of most of his brother Democratic senators and seems to have strengthened his leadership. Had Cleveland understood Congress and possessed the art of facile negotiation that belonged to his successor McKinley, he could undoubtedly have brought the contest between himself and Gorman to a drawn battle and so secured a better bill. He might, it is true, have been more flexible and serene, yet his bold grapple with the opponents in his own party is an inspiration now to those who wish to apply sound economic doctrine to the conduct of our national affairs.

The Committee of Conference wrangled for eleven days but failed to come to an agreement. A second conference was had. Gorman stood firm on the ground that it must be the Senate bill or nothing, and in the end compelled the House to surrender. This chapter of tariff reform ended ignobly. The bill that was passed was, like the old Republican article, differing only in degree, except that wool and lumber were placed on the free list; these two were, in the words of Stanwood, "the only

important survivors of the campaign for free raw materials." ¹ Iron ore and coal went back to the dutiable list. Truly did Cleveland write in a public letter, "the livery of Democratic tariff reform has been stolen and worn in the service of Republican protection." Gorman was the father of the law posing as the conservative protector of American industries against what were regarded as the revolutionary designs of the President and the House. Yet if the history and traditions of the party and platform of 1892 on which the Democrats came into possession of the government, are the test, the faithful Democrat is Cleveland, not Gorman.

The President pursued a dignified course. He could not sign a bill which he had denounced. If he vetoed it the McKinley bill, which he deemed the worse of the two, remained on the statute book. He therefore on August 27, 1894 allowed it to become a law without his signature.²

The best part of the Wilson-Gorman bill was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. A tax of two per cent was levied on incomes above \$4000 annually and its operation would have made up the deficiency arising from the reduction of the tariff duties. A test case was brought to the Supreme Court and a partial decision was rendered on April 8, 1895 but, as Justice Jackson was ill, the case was reargued and the

¹ P. 337. Cotton ties, binding twine and fresh fish were free under the Gorman act. Hides remained free.

² This consideration of the tariff is largely a transcript of my article in *Scribner's Magazine* for October 1911. The article was based on a study made for me by D. M. Matteson of the following authorities: *Public Opinion*, xvii; Cong. Record; Richardson, ix.; J. M. Palmer, *Per. Rec.*; *Century Mag.*, Oct. 1909; *McClure's*, ix. See also Stanwood; Dewey; Peck.

final decision on May 20, 1895, maintained that the tax, being a direct tax, was unconstitutional. With the intricacies and minute technicalities of the case the layman is not concerned. The best legal minds in the country were brought to bear. The Attorney-General, Olney, and James C. Carter argued its constitutionality while ex-Senator Edmunds and Joseph H. Choate were on the other side. The Court divided 5:4 and as one Justice changed his mind from April to May, it is evident that the opinion rendered was by no means a clear legal proposition. Furthermore, the Court had decided fifteen years earlier that an income tax was constitutional and such a tax was collected during the Civil War and until 1872. It follows therefore that it might just as well have been decided constitutional from a legal point of view as otherwise. And politically the decision was a gross error. The tax was demanded by the West and South and would be largely paid by the Eastern States and Illinois and Ohio, as seven States in 1866-67 and 1871-72 paid three-quarters of the tax.¹ It was naturally unequal in its operation but it was an inequality that made for the safety of the State. The West and South believed that the conditions of living were more desirable in the Eastern States than elsewhere and that money was more easily accumulated there than in their own sections. Furthermore a large part of the incomes was derived from railroads and factories which drew their sustenance from the West and South; the evidences of

¹ The seven States were: N. Y., Penna., Mass., N. J., Ohio, Ill., Conn. Reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. In the calendar year of 1914, New York, Penna., Mass., Ill., Mich., Ohio, N. J. and California, eight States, four Eastern, four Western, paid 68 per cent of the Corporation Tax and 80 per cent of the Personal Income Tax.

these were in stocks and bonds largely held in the East. The high limit was just, as it exempted many of the intellectual class, the teachers, professors, writers, artists and the like, who should be fostered by the State. The only valid objection to the tax was that it was a bid for perjury, but England had collected such a tax with a reasonable degree of efficiency and our later experience demonstrated that we could certainly do likewise.¹

In "Presidential Problems" Cleveland spoke of 1894 and 1895 as troublous and anxious years, and a survey of the events falling within this period will fully corroborate his words. During the summer of 1894, while engaged with the tariff question, he was suddenly confronted with the labor disturbance known as the Chicago strike. This began in May at the Pullman Palace Car Company's works, having been brought about by a reduction of wages, due to the depression of business following the panic of 1893. The sympathetic strike of the railroad employes arose from the circumstance that nearly 4000 of the Pullman laborers belonged to the American Railway Union, whose total membership was about 150,000. Before proceeding to action, however, the Union offered to arbitrate the difference, but this offer was refused by the Company on the ground that the dispute was one not pertinent to an arbitration. Thereupon, the strike was declared and it took the form of the railroad men positively declining to handle Pullman cars. It started on June 26 with the refusal of a switchman to attach a Pullman car to a train which was making up and, when this man was discharged, all the switchmen struck. The

¹ Peck ; Dewey ; Stanwood, 359 *n.*

sympathetic strike spread to other branches of the service, causing the partial or complete paralysis of a number of railroads. Although its ramifications were wide throughout the West, it is best studied in Chicago, the most important railroad centre of the country.

The first interference of the national government came from the necessity of moving the United States mails, which were generally carried by the fast trains to which Pullman cars were attached. The President had an able Attorney-General in Richard Olney, who interpreted soundly the laws that applied to the situation, himself acted in strict accordance with them and advised the President that he would in no way overstep the limits set by the Constitution and the statutes in the course that he proposed to follow. Much of the action was based on a section of the anti-trust law of 1890. Olney used the United States District Attorney, a special counsel and the marshal to furnish him accurate information and to carry out his orders. He empowered the marshal to appoint a large number of deputies and directed the attorneys to apply to the courts for injunctions. On July 2 a sweeping injunction was granted against Debs, president of the American Railway Union, and others, restraining them from obstructing the United States mails. It is reported that Cleveland declared that "if it took every dollar in the Treasury and every soldier in the United States army to deliver a postal card in Chicago, that postal card should be delivered."¹ In fact the strike had become a riot. The city police and deputy marshals were unable to preserve order, and the President, who

¹ Agnes Repplier, *Atlantic Monthly*, August 1917.

had been carefully preparing for the emergency, ordered about 2000 United States troops to Chicago. These arrived on July 4, but failed at first to quell the trouble. The outcasts in Chicago swelled the mob who openly defied the injunction of the United States court, demolished and burned cars and railway buildings and obstructed traffic on all of the twenty-three railroads centring in Chicago. The troops were active in dispersing various mobs and where they appeared a semblance of order was restored, but the President and law-abiding citizens were hampered by the attitude of the Governor of Illinois, Altgeld, who was called "the friend and champion of disorder."¹ Anarchy was threatened and the police of Chicago under the mayor, and the militia under the Governor, seemed powerless to avert it. Had the Governor been like the State executives at the head of their States in 1877, he would have called upon the President for troops who would be sent under the constitutional provision; but not only did he decline to make any such requisition, but he even protested against the sending of United States troops to Chicago, and when they came demanded their withdrawal. The President answered him with dignity, stoutly and correctly maintaining that the "Federal troops were sent in strict accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States."

The situation became so serious that on July 8 the President issued a solemn proclamation of warning and as ample reënforcements of regulars were at hand, the riot was checked. On July 10 Debs was arrested upon

¹ *The Nation*, July 12.

an indictment for complicity in the obstruction of mails; three days later the strike was practically broken. One week after his arrest, while he was out on bail, Debs was brought before the court to show why he should not be punished for contempt and, as he saw that the game was up, declined to give bail and allowed himself to be imprisoned as a martyr. On July 20, the United States troops were withdrawn from Chicago.

The action of Cleveland in repressing this alarming disturbance is on a par with the best work of this kind accomplished by our Presidents. In the precedent that it established, it amounts to something more. Olney furnished Cleveland with a powerful weapon in the new use of the injunction and expounded the law under which he was empowered to act after the Governor of Illinois had failed in his duty. When at the height of the trouble a resolution was introduced by a Populist Senator declaring that no Federal process should issue for alleged obstruction of trains unless the interference was with that part of the train essential to carrying the mails, the President of the Duluth branch of the American Railway Union asked Cushman K. Davis, a Republican Senator from Minnesota, to vote for this resolution. Davis replied: "You are rapidly approaching the overt act of levying war against the United States and you will find the definition of that act in the Constitution. . . . You might as well ask me to vote to dissolve the Government."¹

The President's action was deemed so well-advised and opportune that he received approval from all sides. On

¹ *The Nation*, July 12.

July 11 the Senate and on July 16 the House passed resolutions by a very large majority endorsing his action. The Catholic Church, true to her conservative record in our country, was correctly represented by Archbishop Ireland when he said: "I approve President Cleveland's course in the strike. His prompt action brought State and city officials, citizens and strikers to their senses."

Cooley, a distinguished jurist, expressed his unqualified satisfaction with Cleveland's "vindication of the national authority and the restoration of law and order." You proceeded, he wrote, with "caution and deliberation" and gave with "remarkably little bloodshed" a "great and valuable lesson in constitutional construction." Best of all, the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Brewer, declared that the President had acted correctly and within his legal competency. Later Taft, while President, spoke of the great debt which the country owes to Cleveland for the assertion "through him, as its chief executive, of the power of the Federal government directly to defend the Federal jurisdiction through the process of Federal courts and by Federal troops against the lawless invasion of a mob." To Cleveland and to Olney we, in this country of reverence for just decisions, owe a precedent of incalculable value.¹

¹ Authorities: Presidential Problems, Cleveland; Richardson, ix.; *The Nation*, July 1894, *passim*; *Public Opinion*, July 12, 19, 26; U. S. *vs.* Alger, 62 Fed. Rep. 824; *In re Debs*, 158 U. S. 564; see Judge Taft in *Thomas vs. Ry. Co.*, 62 Fed. Rep. 803. The President sent troops to Chicago under authority of Sections 5298, 5299 Revised Statutes; 5298 was enacted in 1861, 5299 in 1871. See also Dewey; Peck.

During 1894 Coxey's "Army of the Commonweal of Christ" attracted attention. Coxey at its head marched on Washington with the demand that Congress should issue 500 millions of paper money to give to the un-

It is clear that had it not been for the repeal of the purchase clause of the Act of 1890, the country would of necessity have adopted the standard of silver monometallism, and yet this action of Congress only brought about by the resolute and persistent work of the President did not wholly avert the danger. On January 17, 1894, as a result of the financial panic, and the deficit occasioned by the expenses of the government being greater than the revenue, the gold reserve was less than seventy millions. If the government ceased to pay gold on demand for greenbacks and for the Treasury notes issued under the Act of 1890, the two together amounting to nearly five hundred millions, it was in the condition of a bank refusing to redeem its bills or of an individual unable to meet his obligations; in other words, it was bankrupt.

Cleveland was keenly alive to the situation and, in order to replenish the gold reserve, sold bonds authorized by the resumption act of 1875. At two different times, January 17, 1894 and November 13, 1894 his Secretary of the Treasury asked for bids in gold for fifty millions five per cent. ten year bonds and, with the aid of New York banks and other moneyed institutions, sold them at a rate that gave the government its gold on a basis

employed work in improving the highways. "The newspapers made much of Coxey's army," wrote Peck. It "straggled into Washington on April 28 . . . reduced to about three hundred men. The mild spring weather had led most of the 'army' to roam off as individuals into the pleasant country valleys, where they could bask in the sunshine and live by begging. On the first of May however Coxey marched his dwindling host into the grounds of the Capitol, bearing aloft some improvised banners of calico and paper muslin." He and some of his followers were arrested by the Capitol Police for walking on the grass. "Such was the farcical end of the Coxey crusade." It "terminated in a short jail sentence served for the violation of a local ordinance" by Coxey. Peck, 373 *et seq.*

of an interest rate of about three per cent. per annum. Twice the gold reserve was raised above the one hundred millions limit, but it did not remain there. Greenbacks and Treasury notes were presented and redeemed in gold, but under the law they must be reissued, and the holders employed them again in the scramble for gold, much of which went abroad. "These obligations," said the President in his annual message of December 1894, "when received and redeemed in gold are not cancelled, but are reissued and may do duty many times by way of drawing gold from the Treasury. Thus we have an endless chain in operation constantly depleting the Treasury's gold and never near a final rest." "Then followed," wrote Cleveland in "Presidential Problems" published in 1904, "a time of bitter disappointment and miserable depression," culminating in the first days of February 1895 when the reserve fell below forty-two millions.

We are now brought to an important event of Cleveland's second administration — one of the four topics which he considered in a calm review of his presidency — the contract with the Morgan-Belmont syndicate. By law the Secretary of the Treasury might redeem the notes issued in payment of silver bullion under the Act of 1890 "in gold or silver coin at his discretion." Carlisle was in effect asked, Why do you not pay these notes in silver coin, of which there is an abundance in the Treasury? To this Carlisle replied: "If that policy had been adopted at the beginning of resumption . . . the policy of reserving to the Government — . . . the option of redeeming in gold or silver all its paper presented — I believe it would have worked beneficially and there would have been no trouble growing out of it. But the Secretaries

of the Treasury, from the beginning of resumption, have pursued a policy of redeeming in gold or silver at the option of the holder of the paper, and if any Secretary had afterwards attempted to change that policy and force silver upon a man who wanted gold . . . and especially if he had made that attempt at such a critical period as we have had in the last two years, my judgment is that it would have been very disastrous. There is a vast difference between establishing a policy at the beginning and reversing a policy after it has been long established and especially after the situation has been changed.”¹ But the Act of 1890 further provided that it was “the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio or such ratio as may be provided by law.” The President construed this provision to mean that gold must be given the holders of the greenbacks and of Treasury notes issued under the Act of 1890, if they demanded it, and he was convinced that the sale of bonds in the usual way would not protect the reserve. Therefore he had recourse to a financial expert.

On the evening of February 7, 1895 there was at the White House an interview between the President, Carlisle and Olney and J. Pierpont Morgan, when after discussing the situation Morgan, who had been coached by Olney, asked, Why do you not buy one hundred millions in gold and pay for it in bonds under authority of the Act of 1862? Cleveland was struck with the wisdom of the suggestion and made a contract on that line with Morgan although for a less amount. Morgan for himself

¹ Testimony before the Com. on Appropriations, Jan. 21, 1895, cited by Peck, 392.

and for August Belmont & Co., representing the Rothschilds of London, agreed to furnish a sum slightly in excess of sixty-five millions¹ in gold in exchange for four per cent. bonds (issued under authority of the Act of 1875) on a basis of $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. interest per annum; but if Congress within ten days would authorize an issue of 3 per cent. bonds distinctly payable in gold, he offered, in lieu of the other agreement, to take such bonds at par. He further contracted to obtain one-half of the gold from abroad and promised that he and his associates would use their efforts and influence, as far as lay in their power, to protect the Treasury against withdrawals of gold.

By special message, Cleveland made a plain statement of the case to Congress, saying that, if he could issue 3 per cent. bonds, payable in gold, he would save sixteen millions, but Congress refused to give him the needed authority. Although he and his friends were disappointed and both at the time and since have severely blamed the legislative body, yet its refusal was undoubtedly wise. If sixty-two millions² of bonds were singled out and made distinctly payable in gold, in what were the other bonds of the Government payable? "Coin" meant either gold or silver and an ugly question might have arisen, leading to the conclusion that if gold were not specified, bonds payable in "coin" might be discharged in silver. What was needed was a declaration, similar to that of 1869 [which pledged the Government to payment in coin of obligations that the "cheap money" advocates believed could be lawfully discharged in greenbacks] that all bonds

¹ The contract was for "ounces of standard gold coin." The exact amount of gold delivered was \$65,116,244.62. Presidential Problems, 158.

² The Morgan contract called for a little less than \$62,400,000.

of the United States were payable in gold ; but no such action could be hoped for from Congress nor would public sentiment have justified it. Morgan and Belmont for the Rothschilds therefore took the loan on the basis of $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. and floated it successfully. They paid $104\frac{1}{2}$ for the bonds. The subscription price was $112\frac{1}{4}$; in twenty-two minutes nearly seven times the amount of the loan was subscribed for in the United States and in two hours more than sixteen times the amount in London. In July the bonds were quoted at 120. It is clear that Morgan, Belmont and others made a handsome profit in the transaction. Yet it is equally clear that Morgan and the Rothschilds taking hold of the loan was an important element in its success. They made it go.

Nevertheless, the President was gravely censured ; and when intimations appeared in the press and in private conversation that he had made a corrupt bargain with Morgan, the censure outstepped the bounds of decency. No one can study Cleveland and his political life fairly without becoming thoroughly convinced of his sturdy honesty and that his conscience was a harder master than Congress or the people. "I know there is a God," he wrote in a private letter ; in Cleveland indeed is found that belief so widespread in America, that when man dies he must face a personal God and give an account of his actions on earth. This religion, the man's antecedents and his native uprightness of spirit made dishonesty of the kind alleged, as impossible to Cleveland as to Lincoln or George Washington.

But for the well-known liability of our public men to become the objects of malignant aspersion, I should have hesitated before devoting a paragraph to the defence of

Cleveland's action in this matter. Whether or not the contract with Morgan was a good trade is another question, as to which opinions differ. Noyes, who bore no enmity to the New York financial magnates, wrote about 1898 that the terms of Morgan and the Rothschilds "were extremely harsh; they measured with little mercy the emergency of the Treasury."¹ Such was the contemporary opinion; that the Government had been taken advantage of by Morgan and his syndicate. Their profit, said the *New York World*, "was not earned by any service or by the taking of any risk. It was gratuitously given to the syndicate by the Administration in a secret conference and will be paid out of the public treasury. Is there any term but 'bunco' with which to describe the transaction between the Government and the syndicate?" The *World* expressed the opinion of the West and South as well as that of many thinking men in the East. The *Boston Herald* said that "the outcry against the contract is based entirely upon the point that the transaction showed an enormous profit to the syndicate at the very moment it was made;"² and the *Springfield Republican*, "There can be not the slightest doubt . . . that the Government, had it invited competing bids for the new issue, could have sold the loan on nearly a three per cent. basis."³ Bryan, in attacking the contract and making his specious plea for bimetallism, did not appear to see that the policy he advocated would bring the country to a single silver standard.⁴

The general feeling among financial and business men during January 1895 was that the preservation of the

¹ *Amer. Finance*, 234.

² *The Nation*, Feb. 28, 1895.

³ *Public Opinion*, xviii.

⁴ *First Battle*, 135.

gold standard was no longer possible. Suspension of gold payments was anticipated and every one who found it possible made arrangements on the expectation of a descent to a silver basis — in other words to that of a depreciated currency. Government bonds could undoubtedly be sold, but it was doubtful at what rate; and there was no reason for thinking that the gold could be furnished in any other way than for the two previous loans — by the withdrawal of gold from the Treasury and setting again in operation the “endless chain.”

This bargain was made between Cleveland, Olney and Carlisle on the part of the Government and Morgan for himself and the Rothschilds. Morgan was in the heyday of power, was a good trader and undoubtedly made as good a bargain for himself and associates as was possible. It would however have been difficult to select three men as capable of coping with Morgan as the three who acted for the Government. Cleveland and Olney, being hard-headed bargainers, undoubtedly got as much out of Morgan as at the time they deemed possible. From Morgan's account of the interview it is apparent that Cleveland appreciated that a deal with financial experts would excite adverse popular comment. Walking up and down the room, a prey to excitement and to the feeling that the Government must not be taken advantage of in its strait, he said, “You are trying to force me into doing what I do not want to do.” But he was certain that he must have the aid of experts who controlled the financial operations of America and England, and this feeling led him to execute the contract.

Of the alternative taking of a three per cent. gold bond at par, Noyes wrote, “This was, on the whole, a safe

proposition for the bankers to make, because express provision for gold payment could not be inserted without an act of Congress and there was not the slightest likelihood that any such act could pass."¹ But the Democratic and Republican managers at the time did not see it in that light or they would not have made the attempt. In fact they thought that there was some chance of carrying the House.²

After the contract was made and seeing its operation, Cleveland had no doubt of its wisdom. "The performance of this contract," he said in his annual message of December 1895, "not only restored the reserve, but checked for a time the withdrawals of gold and brought on a period of restored confidence and such peace and quiet in business circles as were of the greatest possible value to every interest that affects our people. I have never had the slightest misgiving concerning the wisdom or propriety of this arrangement, and am quite willing to answer for my full share of responsibility for its promotion. I believe it averted a disaster the imminence of which was, fortunately, not at the time generally understood by our people."³ He held to this assumption of responsibility nine years later in his "Presidential Problems."

It is true that the Government was within a few days of bankruptcy and only men who had control of the money market could save it. A shrewd merchant does not grudge paying one or two per cent. a month for a limited amount of money to save himself from going to protest,

¹ Amer. Finance, 235.

² The vote in the House was 120 for, 167 against.

³ Richardson, ix. 654.

nor should a rich government regret a sacrifice of a number of millions for the sake of maintaining its high credit. When a financial negotiation has proved a decided success in averting calamity, it is difficult to make the general public recall the state of peril that preceded the solution. To the student of contemporary documents, however, it is given to see things as they were in the time of stress, and because he can, in a measure, enter into the feelings and comprehend the reasoning of Cleveland, Olney and Carlisle, he can have no hesitation in justifying the contract which saved our country from dishonoring its obligations.

In coinciding fully with Cleveland as to the wisdom of the contract, it is not necessary to share his personal view of Morgan, who was unquestionably a man of impelling power and personality and who made a profound impression on Cleveland. "Acting for the Government," he said in 1907 when discussing the contract, "I was put into the position of seller, dealing, almost wholly in the view of the public, with another man who stood in the relation of buyer [Morgan]. . . . I had not gone far however before my doubts disappeared. I found that I was in negotiation with a man of large business comprehension and of remarkable knowledge and prescience. In an hour or two of the preliminary discussion I saw he had a clear comprehension of what I wanted and what was needed, and that, with lightning-like rapidity, he had reached a conclusion as to the best way to meet the situation. I saw too, that, with him, it was not merely a matter of business but of clear-sighted, far-seeing patriotism. He was not looking for a personal bargain, but sat there, a great patriotic banker, concerting with me and

my advisers measures to avert peril, determined to do his best in a severe and trying crisis." ¹

Nearly a year passed before the reserve needed replenishment by another sale of bonds. On January 5, 1896 a call was made for a popular subscription of one hundred million four per cents. This loan was taken at a little over 111, netting the investor 3.4 per cent. The gold from this loan was needed; by the time it had begun to be available, the reserve had fallen somewhat under forty-five millions. Cleveland issued in all two hundred and sixty-two millions of bonds to maintain the gold reserve. With no aid from Congress, with little support from his own party, in the face of trenchant criticism from the Republicans, he preserved his country from financial disaster.

After January 1896 no further issue of bonds was needed. A flash in the pan revival from the panic of 1893 during the spring and early summer of 1895 helped Morgan for a while to carry out his contract; and it is probable that the precursor of a real revival in 1896 made the financial management of the Government easier. But it must not be forgotten that the Morgan-Belmont contract was a step toward recovery. ²

D. M. Matteson has written for me the following account of the rehabilitation of the navy based on the annual reports of the Secretary of the Navy and accompanying papers:

The rehabilitation was begun by Garfield's Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt, who appointed an advisory board. Arthur in his first message strongly urged the needs of the navy and, in almost every annual message after that, each of the Presidents showed an active interest in the matter. Hunt's board presented an elaborate programme,

¹ Parker's Rec., 325.

² Authorities: article in *Scribner's Magazine*, Nov. 1911; *The Nation*, *passim*; Noyes, *American Finance*; Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*; conversation with J. P. Morgan, August, 1912; Dewey; Peck.

which Congress whittled down to a minimum and then, on August 5, 1882, authorized two steel cruisers but neglected to make any appropriation for them. This act provided for another advisory board and on the recommendation of this second body the new navy was inaugurated by the act of March 3, 1883. This law provided for the first four vessels of the White Squadron. The most notable feature of it was that the vessels were to be of steel, the first of that material to be built for the American navy. The act also directed, at Secretary William E. Chandler's¹ instance, that no wooden man-of-war should be repaired at more than twenty per cent of its value (later reduced to ten per cent) and this put a quietus on the "wooden walls."

The four vessels built under this act were the *Dolphin*, an armed despatch-boat of 1500 tons, and three protected cruisers, all with both steam and sailing power.² The three cruisers were the *Chicago* (twin screws, 4500 tons displacement, four 8-inch, eight 6-inch, and two 5-inch guns in the main battery, and a speed of 14 knots) and the *Boston* and *Atlanta* (single screw, 3000 tons, two 8-inch and six 6-inch guns, and 15 knots). John Roach of Philadelphia contracted for the four vessels. Two more protected cruisers with twin screws and two gunboats were authorized in 1885. The cruisers were the *Charleston* with military masts and the *Newark*. These were an advance over the earlier boats in every respect, except that the *Chicago*, which was intended for a flagship, had a greater displacement and a heavier battery.

The *Dolphin* was the first vessel to be ready for her trial. She fell below her contract and Secretary William C. Whitney³ refused to accept her. This forced Roach to assign, and the resulting controversy shows the trials which beset the first years of the new policy. But the despatch-boat was finally commissioned on December 8, 1885 and the *Atlanta*, the first of cruisers, on July 19, 1886.

During Cleveland's first administration this beginning was followed up energetically. In this period, Congress authorized: (a) Six protected cruisers. One of these was the *Olympia*, of almost 6000 tons, 21½ knots, 17,000 horsepower (the *Boston* had 4000), a bunker capacity of 1000 tons (the *Boston* had 500), four 8-inch and ten 5-inch rapid-fire guns, and six torpedo tubes; the contract price was \$1,796,000 (the *Boston's* was \$619,000). Two of these six cruisers were built at navy-yards, the first of the new vessels to be so constructed. (b) Three unprotected cruisers. (c) Four gunboats and a naval cruise practice ship which was virtually a gunboat. (d) A dynamite cruiser, the *Vesuvius*, which was not a success. (e) A torpedo-boat. (f) The completion of five double-turreted monitors begun years before and abandoned. (g) A coast-defence vessel,

¹ Chandler was Arthur's Secretary of the Navy.

² Steam and sails or steam only for the new navy was a much debated question throughout 1881-1897. The result of the discussion was that all of the protected cruisers but two, and all of the gunboats but two, had sails, and the armored ships military masts only.

³ Whitney was Secretary of the Navy during Cleveland's First Administration.

really another monitor. This was the *Monterey*, which went to Manila during the Spanish War. (h) Two second-class battleships, the *Maine* and the *Texas*, which, with the *Monterey*, were the first armored ships authorized. They were built at navy-yards, and were of about 6000 tons, 18 knots, and 9000 horsepower. The *Maine* carried four 10-inch and six 6-inch guns, the *Texas* two 12-inch and six 6-inch guns. Both had torpedo tubes. (i) An armored cruiser, the *New York*. She had a displacement of over 8000 tons, a speed of 21 knots, 17,000 horsepower, a bunker capacity of 1300 tons, six 8-inch and twelve 4-inch rapid-fire guns. She was a commerce-destroyer, but able also to fight. (j) An armored ram. The variety of this list shows that the authorities here as elsewhere were experimenting.

Whitney made an admirable Secretary. When he took office it was not possible to obtain from American manufacturers steel forgings for heavy guns, armor, secondary batteries, torpedoes, or powder for high-power guns. The plans of the *Texas* were those of an Englishman. Whitney bent his energies to reforming these conditions and within the four years of his control the manufacture of all things necessary for the new navy was accomplished or at least assured, and the country made independent of foreign supply. Delays in filling armor contracts remained for some years after this, also there was trouble over the powder supply. Whitney established the great naval ordnance plant at Washington. His successor, Secretary Benjamin F. Tracy,¹ carried on an equally energetic policy.

The most notable feature of the naval administration under Harrison was the construction of the first first-class battleships. Four of these were authorized — the *Oregon*, *Massachusetts*, *Indiana*, and *Iowa*. They were given the heaviest armor then made and were classed as "sea-going coast-line battleships," but the *Oregon* put an unexpected emphasis on the first two words. The first three of these battleships were authorized on June 30, 1890. They were of over 10,000 tons displacement, had a speed of about 16 knots, 10,000 horsepower, 1600 tons bunker capacity, four 13-inch, eight 8-inch, and four 6-inch guns, and torpedo tubes. The *Iowa* was authorized two years later, and was heavier than the earlier ones, but had 12-inch guns, as it was thought then that these were better than 13-inch ones.

In the experimenting that was still going on two super-commerce-destroyers were ordered in 1890 and 1891. The *Columbia* and *Minneapolis* were only protected cruisers of 7000 tons displacement but had triple screws, a speed of 23 knots, and a normal coal supply of 750 tons, which was double that of the other protected cruisers and equal to the *New York's*. Their ordnance was one 8-inch, two 6-inch, and eight 4-inch rapid-fire guns. They were not intended for fighting if they could run away. No other vessels of this class were constructed; naval opinion was crystallizing in favor of battleships and torpedo-boats. An armored cruiser of the *New York* class, a torpedo-boat, three gunboats, and a submarine completed the warships ordered by Harrison's congresses. A second torpedo or dynamite cruiser was authorized but not constructed.

¹ Tracy was Harrison's Secretary of the Navy.

Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama was chairman of the Naval Committee of the House in the Forty-ninth, Fiftieth, and Fifty-second congresses, and a member of the committee in the Fifty-first Congress; therefore he brought sound legislative knowledge of naval affairs with him to the executive office in 1893. When he took the naval portfolio in Cleveland's Second Administration much of the necessary preparatory work had been done. The country had learned how to build, armor, arm, equip, and operate the new vessels, except that torpedoes and torpedo-boats were still in a provisional state, and submarines were in the process of experimentation. In his first report he declared that the military value of unarmored cruisers or commerce-destroyers was easily overrated. When he wrote this, November 11, 1893, the *New York* and two monitors were the only armored vessels in commission, and the *New York* was primarily a cruiser. Six armored battleships were then under construction, also one armored cruiser and four monitors. Eight protected cruisers, an unprotected one, six gunboats, and a torpedo-boat were in service and five protected cruisers, two unprotected ones, four gunboats, a torpedo-boat, and a submarine were under construction or had been authorized. These with the *Dolphin*, the *Vesuvius*, and the ram constituted all the vessels serviceable for war.

In this report Herbert said: "If our Government in the future is to have naval strength enough to command the peace and be in condition to 'enforce the terms dictated by its sense of right and justice,'¹ it must have more battleships, and must build a reasonable number of torpedo-boats. . . . The programme of authorizing the building of at least some vessels at each session of Congress ought not to be interrupted now. I recommend that the construction of at least one battleship and six torpedo-boats be authorized by Congress at the coming session." He got three torpedo-boats only. In 1894 he recommended three battleships and twelve torpedo-boats. Congress responded with two battleships, three torpedo-boats, and six composite gunboats. The battleships were the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky*, the first to have superposed turrets; also they returned to 13-inch guns, and were 1300 tons greater in displacement than the *Oregon* class ships. In 1895, when the House was Republican, Herbert asked for two battleships and at least a dozen torpedo-boats, and Congress gave him three battleships and ten torpedo-boats. In the final session of his administration three more torpedo-boats were authorized.

When Herbert resigned the portfolio to Secretary John D. Long,² the vessels in commission built since 1881 were three first-class battleships, two second-class ones, two armored cruisers, one armored ram, six armored double-turreted monitors, thirteen protected cruisers, three unprotected ones, seven gunboats, a despatch-boat, a dynamite cruiser, and three torpedo-boats. Of these all the battleships, one armored cruiser, four monitors, the ram, five protected cruisers, the three unprotected ones, a gunboat, and two torpedo-boats were commissioned during Herbert's administration. On March 4, 1897 there were building or authorized

¹ The quotation is from Cleveland's message in 1885.

² Secretary of the Navy under McKinley.

five first-class battleships, nine gunboats, eighteen torpedo-boats, and a submarine of the Holland class.

There was nothing spectacular in Herbert's services, and he did not have the opportunity of doing pioneer work, as did Chandler, Whitney, and even Tracy to some extent. He had, however, a clear vision of the needs of the navy. Under him the experimenting ceased and construction was focussed upon battleships and torpedo-boats. The Spanish War came before this settled plan could bear fruit, and the vessels then considered so superior were obsolete before the present (1918) great need came; but his battleships and torpedo-boats were the true predecessors of the present super-dreadnaughts and destroyers. He must have insisted strenuously upon his programme to carry it out to such an extent during a period of depression. The advance in naval manufacture since 1881 had much to do with the greater progress in building during his four years,¹ but a part of the credit seems justly due to the character of his administration. Like Whitney and Tracy, he had trouble with superannuated methods in the department, and, like them, when he could not get Congress to sanction changes, did what he could through departmental orders. His great reform in this respect was to make the Bureau of Construction and Repairs responsible over the other bureaus for the construction and repair of ships. He said in his report for 1894: "It is hoped that this order will accomplish in the matter of ship construction, without the abolition of any bureau, similar results to those secured by the orders of previous Secretaries in the matter of bringing the personnel and the supplies and accounts of the Navy, respectively, under a proper and efficient control."

¹ Sixteen companies offered bids for torpedo-boats in 1897.

CHAPTER XX


CLEVELAND was not as happy in his conduct of Foreign Affairs as he was in domestic matters. The management of the Hawaiian business by himself and his Secretary of State, Walter Q. Gresham, reflected no credit on the country, but it may be better considered when the story reaches the annexation of what were known in our school geographies as the Sandwich Islands.

The Venezuelan controversy belongs entirely to his administration and the conduct of that and the Chicago riots gave him the most satisfaction of all the events of his public life. Again, to his content, he was associated with Richard Olney, who on Gresham's death had become Secretary of State early in June 1895. Any expression of dissent must be stated with diffidence as Cleveland and Olney were powerful statesmen who knew intimately all the relevant facts and conditions and whose conduct of the affair is of itself a presumption in their favor. Doing my best to see things as they saw them I have been unable to agree with their conclusions.

In 1841 a dispute arose between Venezuela and Great Britain concerning the boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana and, though interrupted by thirty years of revolution in the South American country, continued to reassert itself in desultory fashion up to Cleveland's first administration. It had the characteristics of most boundary disputes. Both countries displayed a

shrewd trading instinct and each claimed more than it expected to get. Eventually the thirst for gold influenced the respective demands. The extreme limit claimed by Venezuela took in most of the gold deposits of British Guiana. The extreme limit claimed by Great Britain covered the gold of Venezuela. England's attitude was the usual one of the strong toward the weak; yet while it is difficult to consider this question without prejudice I am led from a careful study of the map and of Cleveland's and Olney's abstracts of the correspondence to the belief that Venezuela made the more extravagant and less justifiable claim. In 1876 she invoked our kind offices and four years later proposed to Great Britain to leave the whole territory in dispute to arbitration. This proposition was at first ignored and afterwards rejected. During his first administration Cleveland offered to England our mediation between the two disputants but was unable to secure the acceptance of his offer. In 1894, he recommended arbitration to her and told in his annual message of the efforts that he was making toward a settlement of the controversy. Congress supported the President and by a joint resolution earnestly recommended that Great Britain and Venezuela "refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly arbitration."¹ Olney, by his despatch of July 20, 1895 to our Ambassador in London, brought our participation in the controversy to an acute stage. His despatch met with the President's complete approval, which is not surprising inasmuch as its clear style and vigorous reasoning supplied the best possible presentation of the case which Cleveland had

¹ Feb. 22, 1895.



deigned to make his nation's own. The sturdy Americanism in every line is singularly persuasive and the logic is hard to resist; it may be approved in many aspects but, devoted as it is to an assertion and exposition of the Monroe doctrine, it has to my mind the fatal defect of applying that doctrine to a mere boundary dispute between a European and American power. A careful reading of Monroe's statement and of Webster's exposition of it convinces me that it did not apply to the controversy in regard to the Venezuelan boundary. The Monroe doctrine is best understood through the concrete example of the French occupation of Mexico, which was a clear violation of it, but the difference is vast between that occupation and this boundary dispute with its extravagant claims and counter claims, its concessions and withdrawals. That they are not in the same category will be evident from a glance at the map of Venezuela and British Guiana, showing the extreme claims of each, the line on which England would probably have settled at any time [Schomburgk] and the line finally determined.

Secretary Olney in his despatch of July 20, 1895, demanded "a definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain will consent or will decline to submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration." Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in his response of November 26¹ argued that the Monroe doctrine did not apply to the controversy, which therefore was one "with which the United States have no apparent practical concern" and their

¹ Not received at the State Department until a number of days after the assembling of Congress on the first Monday of December.

proposal to impose arbitration on one of the disputants "cannot be reasonably justified and has no foundation in the law of nations." He thus plainly refused to submit the case to arbitration. However sound Salisbury's reasoning may be, his despatch was in what Andrew D. White calls the "cynical Saturday-Review, high Tory" style, and, in connection with the general attitude toward Venezuela that had been maintained throughout by Great Britain, it undoubtedly greatly irritated Cleveland. He did not however reply on the spur of the moment but, after reflecting deeply, took the question out of the diplomatic channel and on December 17, 1895 sent a carefully prepared message to Congress. He asserted stoutly that the Monroe doctrine did apply to the case, that Great Britain ought to have submitted the controversy to arbitration, but, as she would not, we must "accept the situation, recognize its plain requirements and deal with it accordingly." It is therefore "incumbent upon the United States to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana." He asked Congress to authorize him to appoint a commission "who shall make the necessary investigation." When its report "is made and accepted," he continued, "it will in my opinion be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility

incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow."

The message made a profound sensation. Congress at once gave the President the authority that he asked for. The press and the public mainly supported his positions, although there were some notable exceptions. The message was sent to Congress on Tuesday. On Friday the stock market reached the verge of panic with the result that Wall Street and certain large business interests condemned the message in terms such as had from the first been pronounced by some of the prominent journals. On Sunday the pulpit thundered against the President, treating his message as a threat of war to England. And the clergymen were right in their construction. No amount of explanation and justification after the event can alter the meaning of Cleveland's uncompromising words. That war was possible, even probable, as a result of the President's ultimatum to England, was the belief of most thoughtful men.

The message was a surprise. Cleveland had hitherto been reasonable though firm in his diplomacy and had shown no Jingo propensities. Of his high and patriotic motives in this action, there can be no doubt, but one may read between the lines of his chapter on "The Venezuelan Boundary Controversy" and find a clue to the sentiment that prompted him to this determined stand.

A close student of history once told me that English diplomacy during the last part of the eighteenth and first part of the nineteenth centuries was, so far as it dealt with this country, "knaveish." I had this in mind when I made my study of the diplomatic correspondence of our Civil War, but in the course of this research I failed

to discern the "knavery" that had so impressed my friend in his earlier investigation. From 1861 to 1864 we were weak and England was strong. Earl Russell's diplomacy was in the main evasive and procrastinating, yet in certain plain cases it showed quick decision, as in the Trent case against us, when we were in the wrong, and in the stoppage of the ironclad rams in our favor. That Cleveland deemed England procrastinating and evasive in her negotiations with Venezuela is indubitable and he may further have thought her "knavish" in that he believed she was encroaching upon and oppressing Venezuela. That idea being in his mind Salisbury's cool reply was sufficient to produce an explosion.

The obvious criticism of Cleveland is that he read the correspondence through South American spectacles and made Venezuela's case our own. Shakespeare showed the nature of a boundary dispute when he made Percy speak to Glendower about the tripartite division of England :

"Methinks my moiety north from Burton here,
In quantity equals not one of yours :
See how this river comes me cranking in,
And cuts me from the best of all my land
A huge half-moon, a monstrous cantle out.
. . . I'll give thrice so much land
To any well-deserving friend ;
But in the way of bargain, mark ye me,
I'll cavil on the ninth part of a hair."

The one-sidedness of a boundary dispute should teach the utmost caution in the espousal of such a cause beyond our own domain. When our own limits are in question the President may have the counsel of our jurists, pub-

licists, historical and geographical experts: for a South American case, these without special arrangement are lacking.

The interval between December 17, 1895 and January 2, 1896 was a gloomy period for Americans who loved their country, peace and civilization. The possible, even probable prospect of war with England was too dreadful to think of. I remember that on the evening of January 2, I asked General Francis A. Walker what way there was out of the situation when each nation had practically given the other an ultimatum. "One or the other," he said, "must crawl, but the news in to-night's paper shows the resolution of the difficulty." This was the report of Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal. Dr. Jameson, an Englishman who represented the aggressive Englishmen in South Africa, was captured by the Boers. The German Emperor sent on January 3 a despatch to President Kruger which has never been forgotten in England. "I express to you," he said, "my sincere congratulations that without appealing to the help of friendly powers you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your country and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression."¹ Though the British government had remained silent since Cleveland's message of December 17, the English press had been bellicose, but now the irritation of the public at the Kaiser's despatch was so acute that Cleveland's so-called offence was forgotten. Chamberlain, then at the height of his popularity, represented

¹ *London Times*.

public sentiment in a speech at Birmingham on January 25. "We do not covet one single inch of American territory," he said. "War between the two nations [England and the United States] would be an absurdity as well as a crime. . . . The two nations are allied and more closely allied in sentiment and in interest than any other nations on the face of the earth. While I should look with horror upon anything in the nature of a fratricidal strife, I should look forward with pleasure to the possibility of the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack floating together in defence of a common cause sanctioned by humanity and justice." ¹

After the Kaiser's despatch to Kruger, things moved steadily to a harmonious settlement. Salisbury said in the House of Lords on the opening of Parliament on February 11: "The mixture of the United States in this matter [Venezuela] may conduce to results which will be satisfactory to us more rapidly than if the United States had not interfered. I do think the bringing in of the Monroe doctrine was controversially quite unnecessary for the United States. Considering the position of Venezuela in the Caribbean Sea it was no more unnatural that the United States should take an interest in it than that we should feel an interest in Holland and Belgium. . . . I have derived an increasing belief during the last few weeks that we shall . . . find some settlement of the question which we shall think satisfactory and that all danger of any conflict between two nations who have so many causes for wishing to be at peace, will be entirely removed." ²

¹ *London Times*.

² *Parliamentary Debates*, 52.

The President appointed a Commission of able jurists and scholars who were assisted by scholarly experts and who addressed themselves to their work in a scientific manner. Meanwhile negotiations went on in Washington and were helped by a legal suggestion of great value from Secretary Olney which disposed of an obstacle to Great Britain agreeing to arbitrate the whole territory in dispute. This was embodied in the first rule of "Heads of proposed treaty between Venezuela and Great Britain for settlement of Venezuelan boundary question as agreed upon between Great Britain and the United States," on November 12, 1896. The agreement provided for an arbitral tribunal and laid down three rules by which they should be governed, the first of which was, "Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title. The arbitrators may deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual settlement thereof, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title by prescription."¹ This agreement led to a treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela, signed at Washington on February 2, 1897, which was identical in substance with the "Heads of proposed Treaty" except that the arbitrators were named. For Venezuela, these were Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court, and for Great Britain, Baron Herschell and Sir Richard Collins. Herschell died and Chief Justice Russell was substituted. These four selected Frederic de Martens² as the fifth

¹ Foreign Relations, 1896, 254; Correspondence between Salisbury and Olney, *ibid.*, 249-253; Morley in *Nineteenth Century*, August, 1896, 322-327.

² Martens was a Russian jurist, an authority and writer on International Law. He acted a number of times as arbitrator in international disputes and was a prominent member of both Hague conferences.

member. A mass of material collected by the President's Commission, filling fourteen volumes and a large atlas, was laid before the Court of Arbitration for its guidance. Finally on October 3, 1899 the Court determined the boundary line between the two countries.

A study of the map and correspondence shows that the claim of Venezuela covered "two-thirds of the colony of British Guiana" and impeached "titles which have been unquestioned for many generations";¹ that the line determined by the arbitral board differed very little from the Schomburgk line, which, at times during the dispute, England was willing to accept as the boundary and which at any time could probably have been secured by sage and fair diplomacy. Reduced to concrete terms, it was not wise to risk a war with England for a difference so small, especially when "to cavil on the ninth part of a hair" was not for our own but for the behoof of a South American country.

Edward J. Phelps said, "No advocate of the President's proclamation has undertaken to point out how it can affect us, whether the line through the jungle of bushes and water which makes up most of the territory really in dispute, is drawn a few miles one way or the other." Andrew D. White, one of the President's Commission, wrote of their first grapple with the subject, "We found ourselves in a jungle of geographical and legal questions with no clue in sight leading anywhither."

Cleveland, in his chapter on the "Venezuelan Boundary Controversy," rates the un-Americans who lauded "the extreme forbearance and kindness of England"; "the timid

¹ Salisbury, Foreign Relations, 1896, 252.

ones who feared personal financial loss" and "those engaged in speculation and stock gambling." The allusion to Wall Street is plain but, although Wall Street has done many wicked things, it has not always been wrong.¹ It stood at Cleveland's back for the maintenance of the gold standard and in December 1895 used its influence for peace between two nations, to whom the thought of war should never come. The reference to Anglomaniacs need trouble no one who allows himself to be guided by two of Cleveland's trusted servants and friends. Thomas F. Bayard, Secretary of State during the first administration and the actual ambassador to Great Britain, wrote in a private letter on May 25, 1895, "There is no question now open between the United States and Great Britain that needs any but frank, amicable and just treatment." Edward J. Phelps, his first minister to England, in a public address on March 30, 1896 condemned emphatically the President's Venezuelan policy.

The words themselves of Cleveland's message give the denial to some of the after-the-event justifications of it. For he is reported to have said, it is a "peace message, the only way to prevent a probable collision between the two nations"; "Thurber,² this does not mean war, it means arbitration." And a supporter has urged that "the message was like a prairie back-fire to prevent Congress doing something very radical when the facts became known." I pass over the defence that it was intended to put the Republican Jingo in a hole, as Cleveland was too great and patriotic to run the risk of involving his country in a horrible war for the sake of partisan ad-

¹ I am aware that this is a repetition.

² Cleveland's private secretary.

vantage. A Jingo vindication is that England will not respect you unless you give her a rap. But such a statement is fully answered by the remark of one of our sane and powerful leaders of public opinion, President Eliot, who said, "We owe it to our self-respect not to give a rap to any nation." But Woodrow Wilson justified the President. In an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* printed at the close of Cleveland's second administration¹ he wrote: "Here he showed himself a strong man but no diplomatist. It was like a blunt, candid, fearless man to say that it was the duty of the United States to ascertain for herself the just rights of Venezuela and resist any encroachment upon her southern neighbor by every means in her power, and to add that he fully realized the consequences that might follow such a declaration of purpose. But only our kinsmen oversea would have yielded anything or sought peace by concession, after such words had been spoken. England presently showed that she would not have taken such a defiance from William of Germany; but good feeling, good temper, good sense soon brought the two governments to a better understanding. . . . The end was a diplomatic triumph for the United States which attracted the attention of the world. . . . What had at first seemed to threaten to mar Mr. Cleveland's fame once and for all turned out in the end its greatest title to honorable dignity. We are at last enabled to read the famous message aright. There spoke a man as desirous and capable of peace and moderation as any in the nation, but accustomed, when he spoke at all, to speak his whole

¹ March, 1897.

mind without reserve, and willing to speak to Europe, if she must hear, as freely as he would speak to his own people. It was the perilous indiscretion of a frank nature incapable of disguises." ¹

After the message of December 17, 1895 the conduct of the President and Secretary merits high praise. While the Venezuelan negotiations were in progress, they agreed with Salisbury on a treaty "for the arbitration of all matters in difference between the United States and Great Britain." ² Although this failed unfortunately of ratification by the Senate, it paved the way for the present treaty and was one of the considerations which has brought the existing cordiality between the two countries.

A final mention of Cleveland's attitude to Civil Service Reform is here pertinent. During 1894, he added 5468 places to the classified service and next year made several extensions and revisions of the rules, all in the line of an enlargement of the merit system. He issued an order which required the filling of vacancies of a certain grade in the consular service by persons of proved capacity and fitness. During his last year, he made a general revision

¹ Authorities: *Scribner's Magazine*, November 1911; Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*; *Foreign Relations*, 1895, 1896; Richardson, ix.; Parker's Rec.; Gilder, *Century Mag.* October, 1909, also his book; Theodore Woolsey, *Forum*, Feb. 1896; J. B. Moore, *Nat. Rev.*, June 1896; various newspapers cited in *Public Opinion*, xix., xx., xxi.; also Senator Gray, von Holst, Hart, Seth Low, *Public Opinion*, xx.; *The Nation*, *passim*; Andrew D. White, *Autobiography*, ii.; Edward Dicey, *Nineteenth Century*, Jan. 1896; Theodore Roosevelt, *Bachelor of Arts*, March, 1896; John C. Ropes, *ibid.*, May 1896; Bryce, *North Amer. Rev.*, Feb. 1896; Salisbury, July 17, 1896, *Parl. Debates*, 4th Ser. xlv. 146, Guildhall Speech Nov. 9, 1896; Sidney Low, *Nineteenth Century*, Dec. 1896; Dewey; Peck.

² President's message to the Senate transmitting treaty, Jan. 11, 1897.

of the rules which added to the classified service 32,095 new places. On his second accession to office he had found 42,928 places under the civil service rules; he left 86,932, of which only 1513 were due to growth. Truly did he say in his last annual message, "A most radical and sweeping extension was made by executive order dated the 6th day of May, 1896, and, if fourth-class postmasters are not included in the statement, it may be said that practically all positions contemplated by the civil service law are now classified." Schurz was almost ready to say *nunc dimittis*.

It may be safely affirmed that Cleveland did more for the cause of Civil Service Reform than any President except Roosevelt, whose work both as commissioner and as President mark him as the chief promoter of this phase of good government; but Cleveland's task in his first administration was the more difficult.

During the last year of Cleveland's administration public attention was absorbed by the nominating conventions of the Democratic and Republican parties, their respective candidates Bryan and McKinley and the heated canvass which followed the nominations. The campaign is closely connected with McKinley and the attitude of the Republican party to the financial question and belongs to the story of McKinley and his presidency.

Before quitting Cleveland, some general considerations are in order. He proved to possess rare executive ability and during his two terms had widely different matters to deal with. In his first term, he had a surplus in the Treasury; in the second, a deficit; and he proved himself

equal to the handling of both. He restored the vanishing gold standard but, by his action for the repeal of the Act of 1890 and by his sale of bonds to maintain gold payments, he alienated his party and lost its leadership. The South and the West were gravitating toward "cheap money," which now meant the free coinage of silver, while his belief and action were diametrically opposed to this sentiment. They thought that his course in the repeal of the Silver Purchase of the Act of 1890 and in the issuance of bonds to maintain the gold standard was simply carrying out the Wall Street programme. At the close of his last administration he thought that he was the most unpopular of all public men in the South, and he grieved, as any Democrat would, that he had lost his hold upon that section, whose influence was so potent in his party. Entirely consistent as regards a civil service based on merit and a reduction of the tariff, he offended certain leaders of the party by the scolding he gave the Senate pending the tariff bill of 1894; he also gave offence to some prominent senators by official appointments other than they had recommended in their respective districts. It was sometimes said that he devoted as much intellectual energy to the appointment of a minor official as he did to the consideration of grave public policy.

Cleveland and Congress did not understand one another. "The air at Washington," wrote Woodrow Wilson, "filled with murmurs against the domineering and usurping temper and practice of the Executive. Power had somehow gone the length of the avenue and seemed lodged in one man."¹ Yet Cleveland said to McKinley

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1897.

on vacating the White House, "Your great difficulty will be to get on with Congress. You will have to look out for those men at the other end of the avenue."

Cleveland was a good party man and regretted keenly his loss of leadership. In a moment of depression, he wrote in a private letter, "I doubt if I shall advise any one to lose the support of party in the hope of finding support among those who beyond partisanship profess a patriotic desire for good government."¹ While the art of facile negotiation might have prevented a certain widening of the party chasm, it is difficult to see how it might wholly have been averted, given the difference between his firmly held ideas and those of the majority of his party on silver.

Carlisle in his report for 1894 recommended a scheme for the reform of the currency which was unqualifiedly indorsed by the President, who was in full sympathy with his Secretary of the Treasury. While the Democrats had been repudiated by the people (the autumn elections of 1894 had resulted in the choice of a Republican House by a large majority), this recommendation went to the Democratic Congress that held over until March fourth; but a recommendation by Cleveland was sufficient to line up the Democrats against it. He returned to the subject in December 1895, but he spoke then to a Republican Congress; nevertheless his recommendations demonstrate his sound ideas. The Government, he said, "was forced to redeem without redemption and to pay without acquittance." His remedy was "the retirement and cancellation of our United States notes commonly

¹ Dec. 26, 1894 to Gilder, *Century Magazine*, Sept. 1909, 701.

called greenbacks and the outstanding Treasury notes issued by the Government in payment of silver purchases under the Act of 1890.”¹

The Republican party was sounder on finance than the Democratic and most of their prominent leaders agreed with Cleveland on the money question; this did not tend to help him with the Democrats. Senator Sherman in an accurate history of this phase wrote: “While distinctly a Republican and strongly attached to that party, I supported, with the exception of the tariff law, the financial policy of the President and Secretary Carlisle. Mr. Cleveland was a positive force in sustaining all measures in support of the public credit. Mr. Carlisle, who as member and senator had not been always equally positive on these measures yet was regarded as a conservative advocate of sound financial policy, readily and heartily supported the President in his recommendations. As these were in harmony with my convictions I found myself indorsing them as against a majority of the Democratic senators. My Republican colleagues, with scarcely an exception, favored the same policy.”²

In his first inaugural address Cleveland spoke of his “supreme and sacred trust” and he consecrated himself to the service of “a great and free people.” He thoroughly lived up to his promise; and time wrought in his favor. He eventually commanded the admiration and respect of

¹ Richardson, ix. 642, 646.

² Rec. ii. 1208. Sherman further wrote: “I was often annoyed by unfounded assertions that I had influence with the administration and especially with Carlisle, that I was in frequent conference with the President and Secretary. These stories were entirely unfounded. Neither of these gentlemen ever consulted me as to the business of their offices, nor did I ever seek to influence them or even to converse with them on political questions.” Ibid., 1215.

independent thinkers all over the country irrespective of party. The opinions of three of his successors may well fix his place in history. "As Civil Service Commissioner," said Theodore Roosevelt while President, "I was much impressed by Cleveland's high standard of official conduct and his rugged strength of character."¹ Cleveland "was a great President," declared William H. Taft while in the White House, "because he was a patriot with the highest sense of public duty, a statesman of clear perceptions, of the utmost courage of his convictions and of great plainness of speech" and "a man of the highest character." And Woodrow Wilson:² Cleveland was "more man than partisan; hardly a colleague of the Houses so much as an individual servant of the country; exercising his powers like a chief magistrate rather than like a party leader. . . . He called himself a party man but . . . deemed his party better served by manliness and integrity than by chicanery. . . . We need not pretend to know what history shall say of Mr. Cleveland. . . . We know only that he has played a great part. . . . He has made policies and altered parties after the fashion of an earlier age in our history and the men who assess his fame in the future will be no partisans but men who love candor, courage, honesty, strength, unshaken capacity and high purpose such as his."

¹ "Mr. Cleveland, I am proud to have served under you," said President Roosevelt.

² *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1897.

INDEX

- Adams, C. F., on civil service under Cleveland, 254.
- Adams, Henry, on panic of 1893, 402; on World's Fair, 417.
- Agriculture, failure (1881), 205; crops (1880-84), 205 *n.*; (1889-1891), 369, 395; question of overproduction, 235-239; prices (1880-85), 238 *n.*; protection in McKinley Act, 348; financial stringency, 370, 406. *See also* Economic conditions.
- Albright, Charles, prosecution of Molly Maguires, 73, 80, 82, 83 *n.*
- Aldrich, N. W., and tariff bill (1890), 350.
- Allen, C. C., civil service investigation, 250 *n.*
- Allen, J. B., and silver, 354 *n.*
- Allen, William, Ohio campaign (1875), 373.
- Allison, W. B., and Hayes-Conkling contest, 91; silver bill, 94; and Interstate Commerce Bill, 290.
- Altgeld, J. P., pardons anarchists, 285 *n.*; and railway strike, 426.
- Ambler, J. H., member of Tariff Commission, 172 *n.*
- American Railway Union strike, origin, 424; federal injunctions, rioting, 425; federal troops, Altgeld's protest, 426; contempt proceedings, injunction as weapon, 427; approval of Cleveland's action, 427, 428.
- Anarchist riot in Chicago. *See* Haymarket.
- Ancient Order of Hibernians, and Molly Maguires, 57.
- Angell, J. B., Chinese negotiations, 195; on Sackville-West, 324 *n.*
- Anthracite coal, rioting of miners (1877), 43-45; mining system, 53; strike (1874), 61-64. *See also* Molly Maguires.
- Anti-Trust Act, 358.
- Arbitration, industrial, Cleveland's message on voluntary, federal law, 277.
- Arbitration, international, of Guiana boundary dispute, 452; general American-British draft treaty (1897), 455.
- Argentine Republic, and Baring panic, 368.
- Army, in railroad riots of 1877, 20, 22, 36-40, 42, 45, 47; riots as an argument for increase, 48, 277; trade-unionism and, 49; compared with militias, 50; in American Railway Union riots, 426.
- Arrears of Pensions Act, 295.
- Arthur, C. A., Collector at New York, removal, 88, 90; vice-presidential nomination, 134; on Indiana State campaign, 136; and Garfield-Conkling quarrel, becomes President, 146; Cabinet, 152; and Chilean-Peruvian War, 153, 155; and Blaine's Peace Congress plan, 157; and civil service reform, 162, 165, 166; on need of tariff reform, 170; appointments to Tariff Commission, 172; Chinese exclusion veto, 195, 196; on reduction of postage, 197; veto of River and Harbor Bill, 198; appointments to Supreme Court, 199; character as President, 199, 206; attitude towards renomination, 200, 206; antagonism of Blaine, Conkling, and Platt, 200, 208; Grant's opposition, 200, 201; opposition and support, 205, 207; retains Lowell, 206; candidacy in convention, 212-214; and generalship for Grant, 260; and new navy, 438.
- Arthur, P. M., antagonism to Knights of Labor, 271, 276 *n.*

- Associated Press, and Western Union, 230 *n.*
- Australian ballot, adoption, systems, 389.
- Ballot, adoption of Australian, 389.
- Balmaceda, J. M., revolt against, 374, 375.
- Baltimore, railroad riots (1877), 20-23.
- Baltimore*, Valparaiso riot, 376.
- Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, rate war, 17; strike and riots (1877), 19-23.
- Bank of England, and Baring panic, 368.
- Bankruptcy, repeal of third federal act, 105.
- Banks, failures (1893), 401. *See also* Finances.
- Baring panic, 368, 369.
- Barker, J. M., and civil service reform plank (1880), 120.
- Barlow, F. C., supports Cleveland, 222.
- Battle flags, Cleveland's return order, 303, 311; final return, 304.
- Bayard, T. F., and tariff bill (1883), 177; Secretary of State, character, 240; on Blaine's feebleness, 349; on American-British relations, 454.
- Bayne, T. M., and McKinley Bill, 347 *n.*
- Beard, Samuel, and arrest of Molly Maguires, 72.
- Beck, J. B., and tariff bill (1883), 177.
- Beecher, H. W., on Chinese and Christianity, 190; scandal, on stump for Cleveland, 226.
- Bellamy, Edward, *Looking Backward*, 385.
- Belmont, August, and Bland-Allison Bill, 96; contract for replenishing gold reserve, 432.
- Belmont, Perry, and Blaine, 158.
- Benedict, E. C., and operation on Cleveland, 398.
- Benner, Samuel, pig-iron prophecies, 107.
- Benner boom, 107.
- Blaine, Emmons, and father's candidacy (1892), death, 382.
- Blaine, J. G., on Hayes's action in Louisiana, "Stalwarts," 8; and Hayes, 92; presidential candidacy (1880), 111, 113; convention enthusiasm for, 119; in balloting, 122-124, 126; congratulates Garfield, 126; and Garfield, Secretary of State, 140, 142; and Garfield-Conkling quarrel, 144; and Arthur, resigns, 152, 157, 200, 208; and Chile-Peru War, 152-155; plans for Peace Congress (1881), 156; House investigation of Chile-Peru affair, 157-159; speculator, eulogy on Garfield, 159; opposition to candidacy (1884), 207; attitude toward nomination, 208; and candidacy of General Sherman, 209; charges against as candidate, Mugwump bolt, 216, 220; private life, 221, 223; hypochondria, 221, 224, 310, 381; on the stump, 223, 224; and Irish, Burchard incident, 224, 225; book, 227; at millionaires' dinner, 228; defeat, 230; conditions affecting result, his acceptance of it, regret for running, 231; historical judgment on campaign, 232; supporters, 232 *n.*; personality, 232 *n.*, 380; interview on Cleveland's tariff message, 308; and presidential candidacy in 1888, 309, 313, 316; promotes Harrison's nomination, 316; in the campaign, 321; State portfolio under Harrison, 329; and first Pan-American Congress, 338-340; feebleness, 349; and reciprocity, 350, 351; and Chilean incident (1891), 378; and candidacy in 1892, 380-382; relations with Harrison, 381; resigns, 382.
- Blaine, Mrs. J. G., on trial of Guiteau, 149; on eulogy on Garfield, 159; on presidential nomination (1888), 316.
- Blaine, Walker, on mission to Peru and Chile, 153-155.
- Bland, R. P., silver bill, 95 *n.*
- Bland-Allison Act, passage, 94-97; results, 257, 353 *n.*; forcing dollars into circulation, notes, 257; minimum coinage, 352. *See also* Silver.
- Blatchford, Samuel, appointed justice, 199.
- "Blocks of five," 322.
- Bloody shirt, waving, 131, 301-303.
- Bolivia, Chilean War, attitude of United States, 152-159. *See also* Latin America.
- Bonaparte, C. J., civil service investigation, 250 *n.*

- Bonds, Sherman's refunding, 98; return of foreign-held (1878), 106 *n.*; redemption and purchase from surplus (1884-88), 306, 318 *n.*, 319 *n.*; sales to replenish gold reserve, 429, 438; Morgan contract, 431-438; Congress refuses to authorize gold bonds, 432, 435. *See also* Debt; Finances.
- Bonfield, John, and Haymarket riot, 280.
- Boston *Herald*, on Morgan contract, 434.
- Boteler, A. R., member of Tariff Commission, 173 *n.*
- Bounties, Grant's veto on military, 294; on raw sugar, 349; repealed, 419.
- Bourne, H. E., acknowledgment to, 16 *n.*
- Boyle, James, Molly Maguire, murder of Yost, 67, 68; trials, 80, 81.
- Boynton, H. V., on Dependent Pension Bill, 297.
- Bradley, J. P., and Guiteau, 151.
- Brady, T. W., and Hubbell letter, 135 *n.*
- Brewer, D. J., on Reed's rules, 343; on Cleveland and railway strike, 428; Guiana boundary arbitration, 452, 453.
- Brewster, B. H., Attorney-General, 152 *n.*
- Brice, C. S., and tariff (1894), 419, 421.
- Brinton, R. M., and railroad riots of 1877, 29-34, 37, 45.
- British Guiana boundary. *See* Venezuela.
- Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and strike on Gould system (1886), 271; revenge of Knights of Labor, 276 *n.*
- Bryan, W. J., speech for silver (1893), 405-407; on Morgan contract, 434.
- Bryant, J. D., operation on Cleveland, 397-400.
- Bryce, James, on isolation of California, 182; on campaign of 1884, 219 *n.*
- "Buckshots," 53.
- Buffalo, railroad riot (1877), 41.
- Burchard, S. D., incident in campaign of 1884, 225.
- Burke, Edmund, on compromise, 357 *n.*
- Burlingame, Anson, treaty, 180.
- Burlingame Treaty, 180.
- Burnham, D. H., and World's Fair, 414.
- Burrows, J. C., and McKinley Bill, 347 *n.*
- Burt, S. W., appointed naval officer at New York, 90, 91; reinstated by Cleveland, 247.
- Business, as political factor, 205. *See also* Economic conditions.
- Butler, B. F., presidential candidacy (1884), 215.
- Cabinet, Hayes's, 3-6, 92; Sherman and Blaine and Garfield's, 139-141; Cleveland's, 240-244; Harrison's, 329, 371.
- California, specie basis, speculation and hard times, 182; goes Democratic (1892), 390. *See also* Chinese.
- Cameron, J. D., and Grant's presidential candidacy (1880), 109; manipulation of Pennsylvania delegation, 111; and unit rule, 114; on Force Bill, 361.
- Cameron, Simon, and Hayes, 92.
- Campaigns. *See* Elections.
- Campbell, Alexander, Molly Maguire, and murder of Jones, 71; arrested, 74; trial, 81.
- Campbellites, in campaign of 1880, 125.
- Carbon County, Pa. *See* Moliy Maguires.
- Carlisle, J. G., and silver basis, 397; on double standard, 409; on redemption in silver, 430; and Morgan contract, 431, 435; plan to retire paper money, 459; Sherman on his financial policy, 460.
- Carnegie, Andrew, and Blaine's candidacy (1888), 316; and Homestead strike, 387.
- Carroll, James, Molly Maguire, arrested, 80 *n.*
- Carter, J. C., income tax case, 423.
- Casey, L. R., and silver, 354 *n.*
- Cassatt, A. J., and railroad riots of 1877, 23, 29.
- Centennial Exposition, and rate war, 15; and hard times, 104.
- Central Pacific Railroad, Chinese labor in construction, 181.
- Chace, Jonathan, and repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268 *n.*

- Chamberlain, D. H., disputed election for governorship, withdrawal, on overthrow, 7.
- Chamberlain, Joseph, and Guiana boundary dispute, 450.
- Chandler, W. E., Secretary of the Navy, 152 *n.*; and new navy, 439.
- Chicago, railroad riots (1877), 42; free silver meeting (1877), 93. *See also* American Railway Union; Haymarket.
- Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad, strike (1888), 276 *n.*
- Chile, Peruvian War, attitude of United States, 152-159; Egan and revolt (1891), *Itata* incident, 374, 375; attack on American sailors, 375; insolence, 376; Harrison's ill-considered ultimatum and war message, 376-379. *See also* Latin America.
- Chinese in United States, before Civil War, Burlingame Treaty, 180; as railroad builders, 181; hard times in California, 181-183; as laborers, 183, 187; impositions on, 184; riots against in San Francisco (1877), Land Lot movement, 185; segregating traits, 187, 190; Chinatown in San Francisco, 187, 188; unsanitary life in China, 187; personal cleanliness, 188; vices, 188-190; and Christianity, 190; sound basis of agitation against, 191, 192, 196; a question for national solution, 193; exclusion bill (1897), Hayes's veto, 193-195; modification of Burlingame Treaty, Arthur's veto, exclusion act of 1882, 195.
- Choate, J. H., story on Republicanism, 367; income tax case, 423.
- Christianity, Chinese in California and, 190.
- Cincinnati, Sherman's speech (1878), 106.
- Civil service, Hayes's inaugural on reform, 2; Hayes's policy and order for reform, 12; Hayes-Conkling contest over New York offices, 88-91; Hayes on his record, 89; Hayes on need of legislation for reform, 92; Republican plank on reform (1880), 120; Garfield's campaign attitude, 130; campaign assessments (1880), 135; Garfield-Conkling quarrel, 142-146; Garfield and office seekers, 145; Grant, Hayes, and reform, 161; effect of assassination of Garfield, 162; reform act, passage and provisions, 162-165; first commission, 165; original classified service, 165 *n.*; growth of classified service, 166, 335, 456, 457; additions made by each President, 166 *n.*, 456; advance in reform and party opinion, 167; classified service and presidential postoffices, 167; Arthur's appointments, 199; Lamar on Cleveland and reform, 243 *n.*; Democrats and spoils (1885), 244; Cleveland's policy on four-year tenure offices, Democratic disgust, 245-247; character of Cleveland's appointments, 247, 278; conduct of his subordinates, 248-250; deceptions by his advisers, 251; criticism by reformers, his resentment, 250, 252; justification of his gradual reform policy, results of his first administration, 252-254; Cleveland-Senate contest over suspensions, 264-266; repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268; spoils under Harrison, 330-332; his nepotism, 332; classified service under him, Roosevelt as commissioner, 333-336; Congress and appropriations for Commission, 333; Curtis and Schurz as reform leaders, 334, 413; continued popularity of spoils system, 334 *n.*; abatement of political assessments, 336; records of Cleveland and Harrison compared, 336 *n.*; spoils pressure under Harrison, 336 *n.*; congressmen and progress of reform, 337; Cleveland's use of patronage, 403, 412; his warning to office seekers, 410; reform in his second administration, 410, 412-414, 457; spoils in that administration, 411.
- Civil Service Record*, on civil service under Cleveland, 249; on spoils pressure under Harrison, 336 *n.*
- Civil War, Grant's articles and Memoirs, 258; Cleveland's return-of-the-battle-flag order, 303, 311; final return of flags, 304. *See also* Pensions.

- Clarkson, J. S., as spoilsman, 331, 337; and Blaine's candidacy (1892), 380.
- Clayton, Powell, in convention of 1884, 212.
- Cleveland, Grover, additions to classified service, 166 *n.*, 456; and Democratic attitude toward civil service reform, 168; as logical Democratic candidate (1884), 208, 215; nominated, 215; public record, 217; charges against private life, 218-221; and Tammany, 218, 225; and Irish, 225; during campaign, 226; elected, 230; and sound finance, 233; inaugural address, 240; Cabinet, 240-244; on Bayard, 240; reformers and Cabinet, 242 *n.*; Lamar on, and reform, 243 *n.*; diplomatic appointments, 244; and four-year tenure offices, 245, 246; struggle with spoilsmen, 246, 247; character of appointments by and under, 247-250, 336 *n.*; deceptions by advisers, 250; criticism of reformers, his resentment of it, 250-252; his gradual reform policy justified, 252; Lowell's appreciation, 252-254, 308; reform results of first administration, 254, 336 *n.*; relations with Tilden, 255; and silver (1885), 255-257; and generalship for Grant, 260; on death of Grant, 261; Democracy and democracy, 263; contest with Senate over Tenure of Office Act, 264-266; special message on labor arbitration, 277; and Interstate Commerce Bill, 291; on Edmunds, 294; private pension vetoes, 297; veto of Dependent Pension Bill, 300; and Mexican War service pension, 301; return-of-the-battle-flag order, 303; and Congress, 304, 458; on surplus and tariff, message of 1887, 305-307; forces issue, 307; renominated, 309; letter of acceptance on tariff, 318; Sackville-West incident, 323-325; defeated, 326, 327; and first Pan-American Congress, 338; nomination (1892) and silver, 383, 384; and ballot reform, 390; elected, 390; popularity, 391; on Harrison's judicial appointments, 392; and Harrison's domestic affliction, attends funeral of Hayes, 394; cancer, secret operation, 397-400; calls extra session, 400; and repeal of Silver Act, message, credit for repeal, 402, 404, 409; use of patronage, 403, 412; on Sherman and repeal of Silver Act, 408; warning to office-seekers, 410; and civil service reform in second administration, 410, 412-414, 457; and tariff of 1894, 418, 420-422; and American Railway Union strike, 425-427; approval of action, 427, 428; sells bonds to replenish gold reserve, 429; message on drain on reserve, 430; Morgan contract, 431-433; censure for it, 433; justification, 434-437; on Morgan, 437; later popular loan, 438; Venezuela-Guiana boundary controversy and message, 444, 447; reception and criticism of it, 448-450, 453-456; British draft general arbitration treaty, 456; loses leadership, 458; plan to retire paper money, 459; Sherman on financial policy, 460; historical judgment on, 460.
- Clews, Henry, at millionaires' dinner (1884), 228.
- Coal. *See* Anthracite.
- Codman, C. R., and civil service reform plank (1880), 120; supports Cleveland, 222; civil service investigation, 250 *n.*
- Coke, Richard, and Tariff Commission, 169.
- Collier, Price, on Irish, 64 *n.*
- Collins, Sir Richard, Guiana boundary arbitration, 452, 453.
- Commerce, disturbance (1881), 205. *See also* Economic conditions; Exports; Imports; Interstate Commerce Act; Railroads; River and Harbor Bill; Tariff.
- Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, on rate war (1877), 17; on panic of 1884, 234; on Sherman Silver Act, 356; on National Cordage Company, 408.
- Compromise, justifiable, 357 *n.*
- "Confederate brigadiers," 244.
- Congress, *Forty-third*: equalization of bounties, 294. — *Forty-fifth*: and Hayes, 8, 11, 12, 90, 92; Hayes-

- Conkling contest over New York offices, 88-91; silver, 94-97; resumption and greenbacks, 97; election investigation, 101; failure to pass appropriation bills, 101; Chinese exclusion, 193-195; pension arrears, 295. — *Forty-sixth*: federal election laws, 101-104; tariff commission, 169, 170.
- Forty-seventh*: Garfield-Conkling quarrel, 142-148; civil service reform, 163-165; complexion, 170, 176 *n.*; Tariff Commission, 171, 172; Tariff Act, 176-178; internal revenue, 179; Chinese exclusion, 195; postage, 197; river and harbor, 198; presidential succession, 262; navy, 438. — *Forty-eighth*: complexion, 176 *n.*, 234 *n.*; postage, 198; tariff, 234; silver, 255; generalship for Grant, 260; presidential succession, 262; navy, 438.
- Forty-ninth*: complexion, 234 *n.*; silver certificates, 257; presidential succession, 263; Senate contest with Cleveland, 264-266; repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268; labor arbitration, 277; interstate commerce, 290, 291; electoral count, 292; pensions, 297-301; navy, 438. — *Fiftieth*: tariff message, 305-307; tariff bill, 317; surplus and bond redemption, 319 *n.*; navy, 438.
- Fifty-first*: Republican Speaker caucus, 341; complexion, 341 *n.*; Reed quorum counting, 342-344; pensions, 344, 345; tariff, 346-349; reciprocity, 349-351; silver, 354-356, 370; anti-trust, 358; Force Bill, 358-364; "billion dollar," 371; navy, 439. — *Fifty-second*: complexion, 344 *n.*, 367; Chile, 377, 378; tariff, silver, 383; navy, 439.
- Fifty-third*: quorum rule, 344; complexion, 344 *n.*; extra session, silver, 400, 402, 403; tariff, 418-422; and railway strike, 427, 428; Venezuela-Guiana boundary, 444; gold reserve, 430, 432; navy, 440; retirement of paper money, 459. — *Fifty-fourth*: navy, 440; Venezuela-Guiana boundary, 447, 448; British arbitration treaty, 456; retirement of paper money, 459. — *Fifty-eighth*: battle flags, 304.
- Congressional government and non-political measures, 268.
- Conkling, Roscoe, contest with Hayes over New York offices, 88-91; on civil service reform, 92; and Grant's presidential candidacy (1880), 109, 110; manipulation of New York delegation, 112; as leader in convention, 116, 119; contest over regularity, 117; and Garfield as dark horse, 118; speech nominating Grant, 121; and vice-presidential nomination, in campaign, 134; Garfield quarrel, 142-145; resignation, 145; loses reelection, 146; refuses justiceship, 199; Arthur alienates, 200; and campaign of 1884, 231.
- Connecticut, goes Democratic (1892), 390.
- Convention. *See* Elections.
- Cooley, T. M., Interstate Commerce Commission, 292; on Cleveland and railway strike, 428.
- Corn, crop and price (1880-82), 205 *n.*; (1884-89), 235 *n.*, 238 *n.*; (1889-91), 369 *n.*
- Cornell, A. B., naval officer at New York, removal, 88, 90.
- Corning, Erastus, and Tariff Commission, 173 *n.*
- Cotton, crop (1883-85), 235 *n.*; (1889-91), 369 *n.*
- Cox, J. D., supports Garfield, 130; on Dependent Pension Bill, 297.
- Coxey's Army, 428 *n.*
- "Crank," and Guiteau trial, 151 *n.*
- Crapo, W. W., in convention of 1884, 211.
- Credit Mobilier, Garfield and, 128-130.
- Cullom, S. M., character, 289; Interstate Commerce Bill, 289-291; on Anti-Trust Act, 358; on defeat of Harrison, 392; on Harrison's personality, 393.
- Cumberland, Md., railroad riot (1877), 20.
- Curtis, G. W., on Grant's candidacy (1880), 112; supports Garfield, 130; and civil service reform, 162, 334, 413; on Arthur's appointments, 199; on Arthur as President, 206; on opposition to Blaine, 207; in convention of 1884, 211-214; and charges against Cleveland, 221, 222; and four-year tenure law, 246;

- on civil service under Cleveland, 249 *n.*, 254; and Cleveland's tariff message, 307; on Harrison and civil service, 331, 334-336; an abatement of political assessments, 337; on McKinley Act, 348.
- Curtis, H. G., on rumor of silver standard (1893), 397 *n.*
- Dana, R. H., on San Francisco, 192.
- Davis, C. K., on American Railway Union strike, 427.
- Davis, David, and Tariff Commission Bill, 170, 171.
- Dawes, H. L., on Robertson and Conkling, 144 *n.*; and Tariff Commission, 169.
- Debs, E. V., American Railway Union strike, arrest, 425-427.
- Debt, public, Sherman's refunding, 98; Readjuster movement in Virginia, 170 *n.* *See also* Bonds; Finances; Paper money.
- Degan, M. J., killed in Haymarket riot, 281.
- De Golyer pavement transaction, Garfield and, 128-130.
- Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad, strike and riot (1877), 43-45.
- Delmonico's, meals for troops on riot duty, 51; Republican millionaires' dinner (1884), 228.
- Democratic party, and civil service reform, 168; and spoils (1885), 244-247. *See also* Congress; Elections; Solid South; and leaders by name.
- Dependent Pension Act, first bill, Cleveland's veto, 297-301; act of 1890, 345.
- Depew, C. M., in convention of 1888, candidacy, 312, 315.
- Depression, after panic of 1873, 13, 99-101, 104-108; in 1884, 233; in 1890, 370. *See also* Economic conditions.
- Devens, Charles, Attorney-General, 5; and Bland-Allison Bill, 96.
- Deweese, F. P., on Molly Maguires, 55.
- Dilke, Sir Charles, private life, 220.
- Dingley, Nelson, Jr., and McKinley Bill, 347 *n.*
- Donahue, "Yellow Jack," Molly Maguire, trial, 84.
- Doyle, M. J., Molly Maguire, murders Jones, 71, 72; captured, 72; trial, 73; appeal, 80.
- Dreher, S. S., trial of Molly Maguires, 73.
- Dudley, W. W., "blocks of five," 322.
- Duffy, Thomas, Molly Maguire, and murder of Yost, 66, 67; arrest, 80 *n.*; trial, 82.
- Eaton, D. B., civil service reform bill, 163; as member of Civil Service Commission, 165; on Cleveland and reform, 248.
- Eaton, W. W., and tariff, 169.
- Economic conditions, depression following panic of 1873, 13, 99-101, 104-107; revival, 107; flush times (1879-81), 204; check in assassination of Garfield, 204; resulting liquidation, 205; decline (1882-84), and great crop of 1884, 234-239; Anti-Truth Act, 358. *See also* Agriculture; Commerce; Finances; Labor; Panics.
- Edmunds, G. F., presidential candidacy (1880), 113, 122, 123; (1884), 212-214; refuses justiceship, 199; and Presidential Succession Bill, 263; and Cleveland and Tenure of Office Act, 265; and repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268; and Electoral Count Bill, character, 292-294; and Thurman, 323; and Anti-Trust Act, 358; income tax case, 423.
- Egan, Patrick, and Chilean revolt, 374, 378.
- Eight-hour day, movement (1886), 278. *See also* Labor.
- Elections, contest over federal laws, 101-104; Electoral Count Act, 292; Force Bill, 358-364. — 1876: Hayes's title, 1; social dangers in dispute, 48; investigation of Hayes's title, 101.
- 1880: senatorial triumvirate and Grant's candidacy, 109; Grant's early and later attitude, 109-113; triumvirate's manipulation of State conventions, 111, 114; General Sherman on Grant's candidacy, 112; opposition to Grant, other Republican candidates, 112, 113; Republican pre-convention contest, unit rule, 114-116, 119; hall, 116; Conkling and Garfield as leaders,

- 116; contest over regularity, 117; Garfield as dark horse, question of his loyalty to Sherman, 118, 123-127; enthusiasm, 118; platform, civil service plank, 120; nominations, speeches by Conkling and Garfield, 120-122; balloting, 122-124; nomination of Garfield, 126; Democratic nomination, 128; attacks on Garfield's record, 128; independents support him, 129; Garfield's letter of acceptance, and civil service reform, 130; issues, 131-134; Maine State election, 132; Indiana and Ohio State elections, Conkling on stump, 134-136; use of money, assessments, 135; Hubbell letter, 135 *n.*; Chinese question, Morey letter, 136; result, factors, 137; Garfield as campaigner, 137; credit due to Hayes, 138.
- 1884: Arthur's attitude toward renomination, 200, 206; opposition and support of him, 200-201, 205, 207; opposition to Blaine, 207; Cleveland as logical Democratic candidate, Blaine's attitude toward nomination, 208; General Sherman and candidacy, 209-211, 214; leaders in Republican Convention, 211; contest over temporary chairman, opposing forces, regularity resolution, 212; opposition to Blaine in convention, effort to combine against him, 213; balloting, his nomination as vindication, Logan for vice-president, 214; Democratic Convention, nomination of Cleveland, 215; character of candidates as issue, 216; charges against Blaine's public record, Mugwump bolt, 216, 220; Cleveland's public record, 217; charges against Cleveland's private life, 218, 219; English precedent on effect of charges, 219-221; Blaine's private life, 221, 223; Mugwumps and charge against Cleveland, 221-223; campaign, speakers, 223, 224, 226; Irish Catholic vote, Burchard incident, 224, 225; influence of tariff and solid South, 227; millionaires' dinner at Delmonico's, 228; parades in New York, 228, 229; result, Gould and returns, significance of calm acceptance of result, 230; conditions unfavorable to Blaine, Blaine on the result, his regret for running, 231; historical judgment on campaign, 232; prominent supporters of Blaine, 232 *n.*; and business, 232-234.
- 1888: Cleveland's message forces tariff issue, 307; Blaine's interview on message, 308; platforms on tariff, 309, 312, 318; Democratic Convention, 309; Blaine and candidacy, 309, 313, 316; Sherman as main Republican candidate, 310; Foraker in convention, 311, 314-316; balloting, 312; McKinley and candidacy, 313, 314; Sherman's refusal to withdraw, 313-315; development of Harrison's candidacy, 313, 316; tariff as issue, 318-320; Republican campaign, Blaine and Sherman on stump, Harrison's share, 321; use of money, "blocks of five," 322; Thurman on stump, 323; Sackville-West incident, 323-325; no October States, 325; result, 326, 327; and silver, 351.
- 1890: McKinley Act and Republican defeat, 365-368. — 1891: in Ohio, silver issue, 371-374. — 1892: Harrison alienates party leaders, 380; Blaine and candidacy, 380-382; Republican Convention, renomination of Harrison, 382; Democratic Convention, tariff, silver, 383, 384; nomination of Cleveland, 384; Populists, 385, 391; effect of Homestead strike, 388; Australian ballot, 389; character of campaign, 390; causes of Republican defeat, 392; silver in campaign, 407.
- Electoral Count Act, 292.
- Eliot, C. W., on violence in strikes, 271; on rapping other nations, 455.
- Endicott, W. C., appointment as Secretary of War, 241.
- Equalization of Bounties Bill, Grant's veto, 294.
- Erie Railroad, rate war, 14; strike and riots of 1877, 40, 42; receivership, 401.
- Eustis, J. B., and spoils, 245.
- Evarts, W. M., Secretary of State, character, 3; and disputed election in Louisiana, 9, 10; supports Hayes's

- Southern policy, 11; and Bland-Allison Bill, 96; at millionaires' dinner (1884), 228; supports Blaine, 232 *n*.
- Expenditures. *See* Receipts.
- Exports (1875-79), 99 *n*., 106 *n*.; of food stuffs (1880-82), 205 *n*.; of wheat and flour (1880-85), 238 *n*.; (1889-92), 369 *n*.; general (1889-94), 395 *n*.
- Fagan, J. O., on American heritage, 284.
- Fairchild, C. S., and reform, 248.
- Farmers' Alliance movement, 385.
- Federal election laws, Hayes's contest with Congress, 101-104. *See also* Force Bill of 1890.
- Field, C. W., at millionaires' dinner (1884), 228.
- Field, S. J., on anti-Chinese agitation, 192.
- Filbustering, Reed's rule, 342-344.
- Finances, obstacles to Hayes's policy, 12; Hayes and Sherman and sound, 97-101, 108; receipts and expenditures (1882-85), 179 *n*.; Wall Street panic (1884), 204, 234; flush times (1879-81), 204; check and liquidation, 204, 205; and election of Cleveland, 233; Baring panic (1890), 368, 369; stringency in South and West, 370, 406. *See also* Debt; Depression; Gold reserve; Panics; Paper money; Receipts; Silver; Surplus; Taxation; Wall Street.
- Fish, J. F., and failure of Grant and Ward, 202, 203; sentence, 204 *n*.
- Flags. *See* Battle flags.
- Flanagan, J. W., and civil service reform, 120.
- Flour, export (1880-85), 205 *n*, 235 *n*.; (1889-92), 369 *n*.
- Folger, C. J., Secretary of the Treasury, 152 *n*.
- Folsom, C. F., on Guiteau, 148.
- Foraker, J. B., in convention of 1884, 211; on return-of-the-battle-flag order, 304, 311; in convention of 1888, and presidential candidacy, 311, 314-316.
- Forbes, J. M., on Republican National Convention (1880), 116, 119.
- Force Bill of 1890, causes, 358, 359; passage in House, Lodge's explanation, 360, 361; reason for name, 361; side-tracked in Senate, relation to tariff and silver, 361-364; public discussion, shades of Republican opinion, 362.
- Foster, Charles, Secretary of the Treasury, and silver, 371.
- Foster, J. W., and reciprocity treaties, 351.
- Four-year tenure offices, Cleveland's policy, 245-247.
- Free list, of McKinley Act, 349; of Wilson-Gorman Bill, 419, 421, 422 *n*.
- Frelinghuysen, F. T., Secretary of State, 152; and Chile-Peru War, 155; and Blaine's Peace Congress, 156.
- Frick, H. C., Homestead strike, assault on, 386, 388.
- Frye, W. P., and Hayes's Cabinet, 92.
- Fuller, M. W., Guiana boundary arbitration, 452, 453.
- Garfield, J. A., and Louisiana election (1876), 2; and defeat of unit rule in Republican Convention (1880), 115, 120; as leader in convention, and contest over regularity, 117; speech nominating Sherman, 122; as dark horse, question of loyalty to Sherman, 123-127; nomination, 126; character, 126, 127, 141, 146; attacks on his record, independents support, 128-130; senator-elect, 129; letter of acceptance, and civil service reform, 130, 161; on issues, 133; and Campbellite vote, 135; and campaign assessments, Hubbell letter, 135; Morey letter forgery, 136; elected, factors, in the campaign, 137; and reappointment of Sherman, 139; and Blaine, 140, 142; Hay's warning, 141; inaugural, 142; Conkling quarrel, 142-146; and place hunters, 145; shot, death, 146; fortitude, 146 *n*.; trial of assassin, 147-151; and war between Chile and Peru, 153; Blaine's eulogy, 159.
- Garland, A. H., mistaken appointment as Attorney-General, 243.
- Garland, A. M., member of Tariff Commission, 172 *n*.
- Gary, J. E., trial of anarchists, on it, 279, 281, 283.

- Gazette des Beaux Arts*, on World's Fair, 416.
- George, Henry, on Chinese in California, 184; and conviction of anarchists, 283; book and single tax movement, 285, 286, 288; mayoral campaign, 287.
- Germans, as anarchists, 284.
- Glasson, W. A., on pension legislation, 299; on Australian ballot, 389 *n.*
- Godkin, E. L., on regular army and riots, 50 *n.*; supports Garfield, 130; and Cleveland's tariff message, 307. *See also* Nation.
- Gold reserve, sanctity, drain, 396, 429; bond sales to replenish, 429; endless chain, 430; Morgan contract, 430-433; censure for it, 433; justification, 434-438; later popular loan, 438. *See also* Paper money; Silver.
- Gompers, Samuel, on Chinese in California, 184.
- Good Government*, on spoils pressure under Harrison, 336 *n.*
- Gordon, J. B., on cheap money, 370.
- Gorman, A. P., as spoilsman, 249; and tariff (1894), 419, 421.
- Gould, Jay, at millionaires' dinner (1884), 225; accused of manipulating telegraph election returns, 230; railway system, 269; and the strike, 275. *See also* Southwestern railroad strike.
- Gowen, F. B., career, 58; movement against Molly Maguires, 59, 73, 80, 83, 86; and strike (1874), 62.
- Grand Army of the Republic, and pension legislation, 298, 344.
- Grant, F. D., on surplus, 345.
- Grant, U. S., presidential candidacy (1880), attitude, 109-113; world tour, return, 109; financial needs then, 113; convention enthusiasm for, 119; Conkling's nominating speech, 121; in balloting, 122-124, 126; in campaign, 135; on Garfield-Conkling quarrel, 144; civil service reform, 161, 167; antagonism to Arthur, 200, 201; period of affluence, accident, 202; and failure of Grant and Ward, 203-204; trophies, 204; political elimination, 205; Civil War articles and Memoirs, 258; cancer, restoration to army rank, 260; death, nation-wide sympathy, 261, 262; Cleveland's tribute to, 261; funeral, tomb, 262; veto of equalization of bounties, 294.
- Grant and Ward, failure, 202-204; resulting Wall Street panic, 204, 205, 234.
- Gray, Horace, appointed justice, 199.
- Great Britain, import of American wheat and flour (1880-90), 238 *n.*; Henry George in, 286, 287; Sackville-West incident, 323-325; American draft arbitration treaty, 456. *See also* Venezuela-Guiana boundary.
- Greenback party, success in Maine (1880), 132.
- Greenbacks. *See* Paper money.
- Gresham, W. Q., presidential candidacy (1888), 315.
- Grinnell, J. S., prosecution of anarchists, 282.
- Guiana boundary. *See* Venezuela.
- Guiteau, C. J., shoots Garfield, 146; trial, 147-151.
- Gwither, Thomas, murdered by Molly Maguires, 69.
- Hale, Eugene, and Hayes's Cabinet, 92.
- Hall, E. H., on pensions, 297.
- Halstead, Murat, and McKinley's candidacy (1888), 313.
- Hampton, Wade, disputed election for governorship, 7.
- Hancock, W. S., and railroad riots (1877), 22, 36, 37, 45; presidential nomination, Hayes on, 128; and Maine State election, 132; on tariff, 133; defeated, 137.
- Hanna, M. A., in convention of 1884, 211, 213; and McKinley, 211; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; and Sherman's candidacy (1888), 311, 313.
- Harrison, Benjamin, and Conkling as orator, 121; and classified service, 166 *n.*, 333-336, 336 *n.*; presidential candidacy in convention of 1888, 313, 316; character, personality, 316, 392; career, 319; on tariff, 320, 346; campaign biography, 320; elected, 326, 327; inaugural, 328; appearance, 329; Cabinet, 329, 371; spoils system outside the classified service, 330-332, 336 *n.*; nepotism, 332; character of appointments, 336 *n.*; and pensions, 345; and

- reciprocity treaties, 351; and silver, 354, 356, 370; and solid South, 359; Chilean incident, 374-379; alienates party leaders, 380; relations with Blaine, 381, 382; re-nomination, 382; and dignified campaign, 390; defeat, responsibility, 390, 392; judicial appointments, 392; Cleveland and his domestic affliction, 394; and depletion of Treasury, 396.
- Harrison, Carter, and Haymarket riot, 280.
- Hart, A. B., on Chilean incident, 378, 379.
- Harte, Bret, on Chinese in California, 188-190.
- Hartranft, J. F., and railroad riots of 1877, 27, 28, 36, 37, 45; Molly Maguires and election, 57 *n.*; refuses appeal of Molly Maguires for clemency, 85.
- Harvard College, Lowell's tribute to Cleveland at celebration, 253.
- Hawley, J. R., and Civil Service Reform Bill, 163, 163 *n.*; presidential candidacy (1884), 214; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; on violence in strike, 277.
- Hay, John, warning to Garfield, 141; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; on Grant's Memoirs, 259; on Blaine's tariff interview, 309; on welcome of Blaine (1888), 321.
- Hayes, J. L., member of Tariff Commission, 172 *n.*
- Hayes, R. B., clouded title, 1; belief in election, difficult position, inaugural, 2; and civil service reform, 2, 12, 89, 161, 162, 167; political aphorism, 3; Cabinet, 3-6, 92; and restoration of home rule in South Carolina, 6-8; and in Louisiana, 8-11; and Woolsey, 9; political effect of Southern policy, 11; and railroad strike of 1877, 20, 22, 36, 47; contest with Conkling over New York offices, 88-91; his resumé of first year of administration, 89, 97; antagonism of Republican leaders, 90, 92; reform instructions to new collector, 91; on need of legislation for civil service reform, 92; veto of silver bill, 95-97; and sound finance, 97-101, 108; investigation of title, 101; contest with Congress over federal election laws, 101-104; on Hancock, 128; on Garfield's nomination, 130; and Republican success (1880), administration characterized, 138; on Garfield, 146; Chinese exclusion veto, 193-195; commissioner to China, 195; and Arrears of Pensions Bill, 295; on bloody shirt (1885), 302 *n.*; Ohio campaign (1875), 373; Cleveland attends funeral, 394.
- Haymarket riot, strike, excitement by anarchists, 278; meeting and bomb explosion, conduct of police, 279-281; trial, 281, 282; appeals, 283; justice of condemnations, 283, 284; pardons, 285 *n.*
- Henderson, J. B., and General Sherman's presidential candidacy, 210.
- Hendricks, T. A., vice-presidential candidacy, and Tammany, 225; and civil service reform, 245; death, 262.
- Herbert, H. A., and new navy, 441, 442.
- Herschell, Baron, and Guiana boundary arbitration, 452.
- Hewitt, A. S., mayoral campaign, 287.
- Higgins, Eugene, appointment, spoilsman, 248.
- Hill, D. B., gubernatorial candidacy (1888), 326; presidential candidacy (1892), 384.
- Hill, J. J., on Tilden, on Cleveland, 256 *n.*
- Hiscock, Frank, in convention of 1888, 312.
- Holloway, W. R., and Hayes's Cabinet, 5.
- Hoar, E. R., supports Blaine, 232 *n.*
- Hoar, G. F., in Republican National Convention (1880), 115, 116, 118; and Garfield's protest against votes for himself, 125; on Civil Service Reform Bill, 163 *n.*; on River and Harbor Bill (1882), 198; in convention of 1884, 211, 213; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; Presidential Succession Bill, 262, 263; on Edmunds-Cleveland contest, 265; character, 266-268; and repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268; on public and spoils system, 334 *n.*; on personality of Blaine and Harrison, 380, 392.
- Holmes, O. W., on Beecher scandal, 226.

- Homestead strike, 385-388; political effect, 388.
- Hornellsville, N. Y., railroad riot (1877), 40.
- Howe, T. O., Postmaster-General, 152 *n*.
- Howells, W. D., supports Blaine, 232 *n*.
- Hoxie, H. M., character, 270, 276; management of Gould system during strike, 272, 274, 275.
- Hubbell, J. A., Garfield's campaign letter, 136 *n*.
- Hubbell letter, 135 *n*.
- Hughes, F. W., prosecution of Molly Maguires, 73, 80, 82.
- Hughes, S. P., and Gould system strike, 273.
- Hunt, W. A., and new navy, 438.
- Hurlbut, S. A., and Peru-Chile War, 152, 155.
- Idaho, admission and silver, 355 *n*, 367.
- Illinois, Republicans and campaign of 1880, 114; goes Democratic (1890), 366; (1892), 390.
- Imports, general (1889-94), 395 *n*.
- Income tax of 1894, declared unconstitutional, 422; political error of decision, 423.
- India, demonetizes silver, 404.
- Indiana, State election (1880), 134-136; goes Democratic (1892), 390.
- Indianapolis, Cleveland's postmaster as spoilsman, 249.
- Industry. *See* Economic conditions.
- Ingalls, J. J., and repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268 *n*.; on civil service reform, 337.
- Ingersoll, Robert, in Republican Convention (1880), 119.
- Injunctions, federal, in American Railway Union strike, 425, 427.
- Internal revenue, Arthur on reform, 171; reductions (1883), 179; reduction or tariff reform, 306, 312, 319.
- Interstate Commerce Act, causes, Reagan's promotion, 288; Cullom's promotion, congressional committee and report, 289; bill in Congress, 290; provisions, 291; Cleveland's attitude, 291; first commission, 292.
- Iowa, goes Democratic (1890), 366.
- Ireland, Archbishop John, on Cleveland and railway strike, 428.
- Ireland, Governor John, and Gould system strike, 273.
- Irish, contempt for law, 64 *n*, 87; and Chinese, 185; in campaign of 1884, 224, 225. *See also* Molly Maguires.
- Iron, pig, as barometer of trade, Benner boom (1879), 106-108, 234, 235.
- Irons, Martin, as leader of Gould system strike, character, 270-272, 275, 275 *n*.; later career, 276.
- Itala* incident, 375.
- Jackson, H. E., and income tax case, 422.
- James, Gomer, murdered by Molly Maguires, 69.
- James, T. L., reappointment as postmaster, 88.
- Jameson, L. S., raid, 450.
- Jenckes, T. A., and civil service reform, 162.
- Johnston, J. E., and Hayes's Cabinet, 5.
- Jones, J. P., murdered by Molly Maguires, 67, 70-72; trial of assassins, 73, 79.
- Kansas, goes Democratic (1890), 366.
- Kansas City *Times*, on civil service reform, 336 *n*.
- Kearney, Dennis, anti-Chinese agitation, 186.
- Keen, W. W., operation on Cleveland, 398-400.
- Kehoe, John, Molly Maguire, office, 56; on Hibernians, 57; and Thomas attack, 64; suspicion of McParlan, plan to murder him, 75-78; arrested, 80; trial and conviction, 83, 84; terror, 85.
- Kelley, Edward, Molly Maguire, murders Jones, 71, 72; captured, 72; trial, 79; appeal, 80.
- Kenner, D. F., member of Tariff Commission, 173 *n*.
- Kerrigan, James (Jimmy), Molly Maguire, and murder of Yost, 66-68; and Jones murder, 71, 72; captured, 72; turns State's evidence, 74; as witness, 81.

- Key, D. M., Postmaster-General, 6; and Bland-Allison Bill, 96.
- Kilpatrick, H. J., and Chile-Peru War, 152; death, funeral, 153 *n.*, 155.
- Knights of Labor, and Populist party, 385. *See also* Southwestern railroad strike.
- Krüger, Paul, Jameson raid, German Emperor's message, 450.
- Labor, Cleveland's message on arbitration, federal law, 277; George's single-tax movement, 285-288; and politics, 288; Coxey's Army, 428 *n.* *See also* next title, and Riots; Strikes.
- Labor unions, and railroad strike of 1877, 19; and standing army, 49; lack of harmony among, 271, 276 *n.*; and violence, 271, 277. *See also* Labor.
- Lackawanna Coal and Iron Company, strike and riot (1877), 43-45.
- Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad, strike (1877), 40.
- Lamar, L. Q. C., Secretary of the Interior, character, 242; on Cleveland and reform, 243 *n.*; and Thompson mourning incident, 303.
- Latin America, Blaine and reciprocity in McKinley Act, 349-351; reciprocity treaties, 351. *See also* Chile; Pan-American.
- Latta, J. W., and railroad riots of 1877, 27-29.
- Lincoln, R. T., Secretary of War, 152 *n.*; presidential candidacy (1884), 214.
- Linden, R. J., and Molly Maguires, 62, 63, 76, 78.
- Laughlin, J. L., on silver glut (1885), 257.
- Lodge, H. C., in convention of 1884, 211, 212; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; on popularity of spoils system, 334 *n.*; as reformer, 337; on Force Bill, 360.
- Logan, J. A., and Hayes, 92; and Grant's presidential candidacy (1880), 109; attempted manipulation of Illinois delegation, 114; presidential candidacy (1884), 212, 214; vice-presidential nomination, 214; and increase of army, 277.
- London *Times*, on Sackville-West incident, 324.
- Long, J. D., in convention of 1884, 211; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; and repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268.
- Louisiana, presidential election (1876), 2; Hayes and restoration of home rule, 8-11.
- Low, A. A., and Tariff Commission, 173 *n.*
- Lowell, J. R., Arthur retains, 206; on Cleveland, 252-254, 308; on Roosevelt as Civil Service Commissioner, 334.
- Lyman, Charles, Civil Service Commissioner, 334 *n.*
- Lyman, Theodore, supports Cleveland, 222.
- Lynch, J. R., in convention of 1884, 212.
- McAndrew, Frank, Molly Maguire, and McParlan, 76-78.
- Macaulay, T. B., on "cabal," 51.
- McCall, S. W., on Force Bill, 360, 363.
- McCormick Reaper Works, strike (1886), 278.
- McCrary, G. W., Secretary of War, 6; and Bland-Allison Bill, 96.
- McCulloch, Hugh, and Tariff Commission, 173 *n.*
- McGehan, Hugh, Molly Maguire, murder of Yost, 67-69; trials, 80, 81.
- McKinley, William, on Hayes, 138; expeditious trial of assassin, 151; additions to classified service, 166 *n.*; and tariff of 1883, 178; in convention of 1884, and Hanna, 211; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; and Grant's Tomb, 262; and solid South as issue (1885), 302 *n.*; in convention of 1888, and presidential candidacy then, 310-314, 318; on civil service reform, 337; and reciprocity, 339, 349; candidacy for Speaker, 341; on filibustering, 342; as protectionist, 346; tariff bill, 347-349; on Cleveland and silver (1888), 351; on Force Bill, 361; defeated, 367; campaign for governor (1891), 371-374; in convention of 1892; question of candidacy, 382.
- McKinley Act, 346-351; and election of 1890, 365-368.
- McKune, R. H., and miners' riots (1877), 43-45.

- McMahon, W. H., member of Tariff Commission, 173 *n.*
- McParlan, James, detective work against Molly Maguires, as a Molly, 59-60; Linden as coadjutor, 62, 76, 78; and attack on Thomas, 65; efforts to prevent murders, collection of evidence, 65, 70, 73; suspected, perils, and escape, 75-79; as witness, appearance in court, 80-82
- MacVeagh, Wayne, civil service investigation, 250 *n.*
- Mahone, William, in Senate, 170; as Readjuster, 171 *n.*; and tariff bill, 177, 178.
- Maine, State election (1880), 132.
- Major brothers, enmity of Molly Maguires, 64; trial of conspirators, 83.
- Malthusian law, 237.
- Manifest Destiny, and Pan-Americanism, 340.
- Manning, Daniel, appointment as Secretary of the Treasury, 240, 242 *n.*; breakdown, 241 *n.*
- Manufactures. *See* Economic conditions.
- Marble, Manton, and Cleveland's letter on silver, 255.
- Marmaduke, J. S., and Gould system strike, 273.
- Martens, Frederic de, Guiana boundary arbitration, 452, 453; career, 452 *n.*
- Martin, J. A., and Gould system strike, 273.
- Martinsburg, W. Va., railroad riot (1877), 19.
- Maryland, railroad riots of 1877, 21-23.
- Massachusetts, goes Democratic (1890), 366.
- Matteson, D. M., on Readjuster movement, 170 *n.*; on Chinese in California, 186-188, 193 *n.*; on pension attorneys, 296; on Harrison and Cleveland and civil service, 336 *n.*; on rehabilitation of navy, 438-442.
- Merritt, E. A., appointed Collector at New York, Hayes's reform instructions, 90, 91; Garfield displaces, 143.
- Mexican War, service pension, 301.
- Michigan, goes Democratic (1890), 366; electoral vote (1892), 390.
- Militia, in railroad riots of 1877, 20-22, 27-34, 36-42, 45, 48; lesson of riots of 1877, and regular army as peace arm, 50.
- Miller, W. H. H., Attorney-General, 329 *n.*
- Miller, Warner, in convention of 1888, 312; gubernatorial candidacy (1888), 326; and Harrison's Cabinet, 329.
- Millet, F. D., on World's Fair, 414.
- Mills, R. A., tariff bill, 317.
- Missouri Pacific Railroad. *See* Southwestern railroad strike.
- Mitchell, J. H., and repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268 *n.*
- Molly Maguires, origin and opportunity, 52-54; murder system, 54-56, 67; corrupt political power, 56; and Ancient Order of Hibernians, 58, 73; Gowen's plans against, 58; beginning of McParlan's work, 59-61; and strike (1874), 61-64; Linden as Captain of Coal Police, 62, 63, 76, 78; attack on Thomas, 64-66; and Irish contempt for law, 64, 87; McParlan's efforts to prevent murders, 65, 70, 73; Yost murder, 66-69; Gwither, James, Sanger, and Uren murders, 69; public arousalment, 70, 72; Jones murder, 70-72; doom impends, lynching, 73; trial of murderers of Jones, 73, 79; arrest of murderers of Yost and Sanger, alarm, 74; McParlan suspected, his peril and escape, 75-79; attitude of the Church, 78, 79; other arrests, 80; trial of murderers of Yost, 80-83; McParlan as witness, 80-82; appeals, 80, 85; trial of murderers of Sanger, 81; and accessories before the fact, 82; other trials, organization shattered, 83, 84; expedition of trials, 84; Hartranft refuses clemency, executions, 85; incident as Irish affair, sexual purity, 86.
- Money. *See* Gold reserve; Paper money; Silver.
- Monroe Doctrine, and Venezuela-Guiana boundary controversy, 446, 447, 451. *See also* Pan-American.
- Montana, admission and silver, 354.
- Morey letter, 137.
- Morgan, J. P., contract for replenishing gold reserve, 431-437; Cleveland on, 437.

- Morgan-Belmont syndicate contract for replenishing gold reserve, 431-438.
- Morley, John, on compromise, 357 *n*.
- Morrill, J. S., and Hayes-Conkling contest, 91.
- Morrison, W. R., tariff bill (1884), 234.
- Morse, E. S., on unsanitary life of Chinese, 187.
- Morse, J. T., Jr., on Molly Maguires, 54, 70, 72.
- Morton, L. P., vice-presidential candidacy, 317.
- Morton, O. P., and Hayes's Cabinet, 5.
- Mugwumps, in campaign of 1884, 216, 221-223, 232; and tariff, 307.
- Mulhall, William, Molly Maguire, 67.
- Munley, Thomas, Molly Maguire, trial for murder of Sanger, 81.
- Murphy, Edward, Jr., and tariff (1894), 420.
- Nation*, on foreign trade (1878), 106 *n*.; on depression (1879), 107 *n*.; supports Garfield, 129, 130; on Sherman and Garfield's Cabinet, 139; on trial of Guiteau, 150, 151 *n*.; on Mugwump newspapers, 217 *n*.; on campaign of 1884, 219; on Beecher in campaign, 226; on parades in New York City, 229; on Cleveland and civil service, 248; on Gould system strike, 273; on George's campaign for mayor, 287; on Dependent Pension Bill, 298 *n*.; on outlay in campaign of 1888, 322; on complexion of Fifty-first Congress, 341 *n*.; on Baring panic, 368. *See also* Godkin.
- National Civil Service Reform League, organization, 162. *See also* Civil service.
- National Cordage Company, manipulation and failure, 395, 408.
- Navy, beginning of new steel, 438; first vessels, 439; types, experimenting, 439; Whitney as Secretary, 440; first battleships, super-commerce-destroyers, 440; advance under Herbert, concentration on battleships and torpedo boats, 441; Herbert as Secretary, departmental reforms, 442.
- Negro, as issue (1880), 111, 131; northern denunciation of repression, 301-303. *See also* Federal election laws; Force Bill; Solid South.
- Nepotism, under Harrison, 332.
- Nevada, Comstock mines, 182.
- New Jersey, goes Democratic (1892), 390.
- New York, railroad strike and riots of 1877, 40-42; Conkling-Platt contest for reelection (1881), 145, 146; in campaign of 1884, 207; in election of 1888, 326; goes Democratic (1892), 390.
- New York Central Railroad, rate war, 14; strike of 1877, 40, 42.
- New York City, and railroad riots of 1877, 41; Hayes-Conkling contest over federal offices, 88-91; Cleveland's veto of five-cent fare bill, 217; in campaign of 1884, 224, 225, 228-230; Cleveland's appointments, 247; mayoral campaign (1886), 287. *See also* Wall Street.
- New York *Evening Post*, on Sherman Silver Act, 356.
- New York Seventh Regiment, and riots of 1877, as model, 41, 50.
- New York *Tribune*, on Hayes, 103.
- New York *World*, on Morgan contract, 434.
- Nicholls, F. T., disputed election for governorship, 10.
- Niebuhr, B. G., on revolutions, 46.
- North Dakota, admission and silver, 354.
- Norton, C. E., on Garfield tragedy, 146.
- Noyes, A. D., on bond redemption, 319 *n*.; on Sherman Silver Act, 357; on National Cordage Company, 395; on panic of 1893, 401; on Morgan contract, 434, 435.
- Oats, crop and price (1884-89), 235 *n*.; (1889-91), 369 *n*.
- O'Connor, Father, and Molly Maguires, 78.
- Oglesby, R. J., and anarchists, 283.
- Ohio, idea of cheap money, 100; and Sherman's presidential candidacy (1880), 123; State election (1880), 134-136; in campaign of 1884, 207; goes Democratic (1890), 366; campaign of 1891, 371-374; electoral vote (1892), 390.
- Oliver, H. W., Jr., member of Tariff Commission, 172 *n*.

- Olney, Richard, income tax case, 423; and American Railway Union strike, 425; and Morgan contract, 431, 435; Secretary of State, 443; Venezuela-Guiana boundary letter, Olney doctrine, 444, 446; later negotiations, 452; British draft general arbitration treaty, 456.
- O'Reilly, R. M., operation on Cleveland, 397-400.
- Pacific Mail Steamship Company, and Chinese immigration, 181.
- Packard, S. B., disputed election for governorship, overthrow, 8-11.
- Palmerston, Lord, private life, 220.
- Pan-American Congress, Blaine's invitation (1881), withdrawn by Frelinghuysen, 156; withdrawal a mistake, 157; of 1889, 338-340.
- Panics, of 1873, depression following, 13, 90-91, 104-108; of 1884, 204, 234; Baring (1890), 368, 369; of 1893, beginning, 395, 409; drain on gold reserve, 396; progress, 400-402; silver and, 402, 404, 408. *See also* Economic conditions; Finances.
- Paper money, attempt to repeal resumption, 97; retirement of greenbacks checked, 98; gold redemption, silver certificates under Bland-Allison coinage, 257; at premium, 401; Carlisle's plan to retire, 459. *See also* Debt; Gold reserve.
- Parliamentary government and non-political measures, 268.
- Parrish, C. W., and strike (1874), 62; and Molly Maguires, 73, 86.
- Patronage. *See* Civil service.
- Pattison, R. E., and Homestead strike, 388.
- Payne, H. B., and silver, 355 *n*.
- Payne, S. M., and McKinley Bill, 347 *n*.
- Pearson, A. L., and railroad riots of 1877, 26-29, 45.
- Pearson, H. G., reappointment by Cleveland, 247; replaced, death, 330.
- Peck, H. T., on Harrison's appearance, 329; on Coxey's Army, 429 *n*.
- Pendleton, G. H., civil service reform bill, 162; minister to England, 244.
- Pendleton Bill, 162-165. *See also* Civil Service.
- Pennsylvania, Republicans and campaign of 1880, 111. *See also* Molly Maguires; Railroad riots of 1877.
- Pennsylvania Railroad, rate war, 17; riots (1877), 23-40.
- Pension attorneys, and legislation, 294, 296-299.
- Pensions, early legislation, Equalization of Bounties Bill, Grant's veto, 294; first grab, Arrears Act, 295, 296; outlay for, 295, 296, 300 *n*, 346; private bills, Cleveland's vetoes, 296; first Dependent Bill, protests, 297-299; attitude of G. A. R., machinations of pension attorneys, 298; Cleveland's veto, 300; Mexican War service, 301; Tanner as Commissioner, 332; Republican policy, 344; Dependent Act (1890), increase under it, 345; later legislation, age, length of service, 346.
- Perkins, C. E., and strike, 276 *n*.
- Peru, Chilean War, attitude of United States, 152-159.
- Pettigrew, R. F., and silver, 355 *n*.
- Phelps, E. J., minister to England, 244; on Guiana boundary dispute, 453, 454.
- Phelps, J. S., and Tariff Commission, 173 *n*.
- Phelps, W. W., supports Blaine, 211, 232 *n*; vice-presidential candidacy (1888), 317.
- Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, bankruptcy, 395.
- Philadelphia *Press*, on farcical elections in South, 359.
- Pierce, E. L., in convention of 1884, 211, 213.
- Pinkerton, Allen, and Molly Maguires, 59.
- Pinkerton men, Homestead strike, 387.
- Pittsburg, Pa., origin of railroad strike and riots of 1877, 23; public sentiment, 24-26; failure of local authority, 26, 33; demoralization of local militia, 27, 28, 31; Philadelphia militia, Twenty-eighth Street crossing affair, 28-31; attack on round house, reign of terror, 31-35; restoration of order, damages, 35; military control, 36, 37; resumption of service, 38.
- Platt, O. H., on Sherman Silver Act, 355; on Force Bill, 362, 363.

- Platt, T. C., and Hayes's Cabinet, 92; "me too" resignation, 145; loses reelection, 146; Arthur alienates, 200; in convention of 1884, supports Blaine, 211; opposition to Sherman's candidacy (1888), 311; in convention of 1888, 312; on campaign in New York, 326; and Harrison's Cabinet, 329; opposes Harrison, 380.
- Political assessments, Hayes's order against, 13; in campaign of 1880, Hubbell letter, 135; forbidden, 164; abatement, 336.
- Politics, and measures under congressional and parliamentary government, 268. *See also* Congress; Elections; Solid South; parties by name.
- Pooling, practice, 18; Interstate Commerce Bill and, 290.
- Populist party, in campaign of 1892, demands, 385; strength in West, 391.
- Porter, Horace, and Grant's Tomb, 262.
- Porter, R. P., member of Tariff Commission, 172 *n*.
- Postage, reduction (1883, 1885), 197.
- Postoffice, movement to classify presidential postmasters, 167; spoils system under Cleveland, 248; under Harrison, 331; changes in Cleveland's second administration, 412.
- Potts, William, civil service investigation, 250 *n*.
- Powderly, T. V., and Southwestern railroad strike, 270, 275; on attitude of other unions, 276 *n*.
- Powell, Morgan, murdered by Molly Maguires, 84.
- Presidency, Electoral Count Act, 292. *See also* next title, and Elections.
- Presidential Succession Act, 262.
- Pullman strike. *See* American Railway Union.
- Quay, M. S., in campaign of 1888, 326; and Force Bill, 361; and Harrison, 380.
- Quincy, Josiah, as spoilsman, 411.
- Quorum counting, Reed's rule, 342-344.
- Railroad riots of 1877, rate war, 14-17; reduction of wages, 17-19, 23; outbreak on Baltimore and Ohio, 19; riot at Baltimore, 20-22; Hayes's proclamations and decisive action, use of regular troops, 20, 22, 36-40, 42, 47-49; origin of trouble at Pittsburg, 23; public sentiment there, 24-26; failure of local authority, 26, 33; demoralization of local militia, 28, 31; Philadelphia militia, Twenty-eighth Street crossing affair, 28-31; attack on round-house, reign of terror, 31-35; restoration of order, damages, 35; military control at Pittsburg, 36, 37; resumption of service through there, 38; spread of strike, Reading affair, 39; in New York, 40-42; in West, 42; in anthracite region, 43-45; lesson, 46-51; and anti-Chinese riots in San Francisco, 185.
- Railroads, depression following panic of 1873, 14; rate war, 14-17; pooling arrangement and reduction of wages (1877), 17-19, 23; receiver-ships (1893), 401. *See also* American Railway Union; Interstate Commerce Act; Railroad riots; Southwestern.
- Rate war between trunk lines (1874-77), 14-17.
- Randall, S. J., as protectionist, 234, 318 *n*.; on silver interests (1885), 256.
- Reading, Pa., railroad riot (1877), 39.
- Reagan, J. H., and Interstate Commerce Bill, 288, 290.
- Receipts and expenditures (1882-85), 179 *n*. *See also* Finances; Surplus.
- Reciprocity, policy and Pan-Americanism, 338; addition to McKinley Bill, 349-351; treaties, 351.
- Reconstruction, failure, 6; Hayes and restoration of home rule in South Carolina, 6-8; and in Louisiana, 8-11; political effect of Hayes's policy, 11; and solid South, 302.
- Reed, T. B., and special rule for tariff bill (1883), 177; and Presidential Succession Bill, 263; and repeal of tenure of Office Act, 268; on solid South, 302; Speaker, 341; quorum counting, 342-344; qualities, 344; and silver, 355; and Force Bill, 363; on McKinley Act and campaign of 1890, 365; on

- billion dollar Congress, 371; and Harrison, 380.
- "Repair his fences," 139.
- Republican party, organization and Hayes, 8, 11, 12, 90, 92, 97, 103, 109, 138; and civil service reform, 168; and silver (1888-90), 351, 355. *See also* Congress; Elections; Solid South; and leaders by name.
- Resumption, attempted repeal, 97; inauguration, 98.
- Revenue. *See* Receipts.
- Riddleberger, H. H., Readjuster movement, 171 *n.*
- Riders to appropriation bills, Hayes's contest, 102.
- Riots, anti-Chinese in San Francisco, 185; Homestead strike, 385-388. *See also* American Railway Union; Haymarket; Railroad riots; Southwestern.
- River and Harbor Bill of 1882, Arthur's veto, 198.
- Roach, John, at millionaires' dinner (1884), 228; and first vessels of new navy, 439.
- Roarity, James, Molly Maguire, arrested, 80 *n.*
- Robertson, W. H., nomination as Collector, 142, 144; Conkling's enmity, 144 *n.*; Arthur retains, 200; in convention of 1884, 211.
- Robinson, Lucius, and railroad riots of 1877, 40.
- Roman Catholic Church, and Molly Maguires, 52, 78, 79; and presidency, 214.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, additions as President to classified service, 167 *n.*; in convention of 1884, 211-213; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; on civil service in Cleveland's first administration, 249 *n.*; mayoral campaign, 287; and return of battle flags, 304; as Civil Service Commissioner, 333; on Democrats and silver (1892), 384; Cleveland retains, 410, 414; on Cleveland, 461.
- Root, Elihu, on negro suffrage, 363.
- Rothschilds, contract to replenish gold reserve, 432, 433.
- "Rum, Romanism, and rebellion," 225.
- Russell of Killowen, Baron, Guiana boundary arbitration, 452, 453.
- Sackville-West, Sir Lionel, incident and recall, 323-325; dullness, 324 *n.*
- Sage, Russell, at millionaires' dinner (1884), 228.
- St. Louis. *See* Southwestern railroad strike.
- Salary Grab, Garfield and, 128.
- Salisbury, Marquis of, and Sackville-West incident, 325; Guiana boundary dispute, 446, 451; general arbitration treaty, 456.
- San Francisco, anti-Chinese riots (1877), Sand Lot movement, 185; Chinatown, 187, 188; material development, 192.
- Sand Lot movement, 185.
- Sanger, Thomas, murdered by Molly Maguires, 69; avenged, 73; arrest and trial of murderers, 74, 81.
- "Scab," as term of reproach, 51.
- Schofield, J. M., and railroad riots of 1877, 36.
- Schomburgk Line, in Guiana boundary dispute, 445, 446, 453.
- Schurz, Carl, Secretary of Interior, character, 4; and Hayes's Southern policy, 11; and Bland-Allison Bill, 96; supports Garfield, 130; on Hayes, 138; supports Cleveland, on the stump, 222, 223, 226; on Cleveland's Cabinet, 242 *n.*; on civil service under Cleveland, Cleveland's resentment, 249 *n.*, 251; and Cleveland's tariff message, 307; on Quincy as spoilsman, 411; as president of Reform League, 413; final judgment on Cleveland and reform, 457.
- Schuylkill County, Pa. *See* Molly Maguires.
- Scott, T. A., on rate war, 17; on reduction of wages, 18; and railroad riots of 1877, 23, 25, 34.
- Seranton, Pa., riot (1877), 43-45.
- Senate, committee rule, 289.
- Sheridan, P. H., and railroad riots of 1877, 43.
- Sherman, John, and Louisiana election (1876), 2; Secretary of the Treasury, character, 3; and Hayes's Southern policy, 11; Hayes's letter on civil service reform, 13; on rate war, 17; and Hayes-Conkling contest, 91; and Bland-Allison Silver Act, 94, 96; on Coinage Act of

- 1873, 95; and attempted repeal of resumption, 97; and sound finance, 97-101, 108; refunding, and success of resumption, 98; cry against, 100; prophecy of good times (1878), 105; presidential candidacy (1880), 113; Garfield's nominating speech, 122; in balloting, Garfield's loyalty, 122-124; congratulates Garfield, 126; on Garfield's character, 127, 146; and civil service reform issue (1880), 130; on tariff as local issue, 133; political *mot*, 139; and Garfield's Cabinet, 139; on Blaine's eulogy on Garfield, 160; on Civil Service Reform Bill, 163 *n.*; on report of Tariff Commission, 175; and tariff of 1883, 177, 178; presidential candidacy (1884), 209, 212-214; on brother's candidacy, 210; in the campaign, 227; supports Blaine, 232 *n.*; and repeal of Tenure of Office Act, 268; on non-political measures of Congress, 268; on solid South, 301-303; on Reconstruction, 302; on veterans, 303; on return-of-battle-flag order, 304; presidential candidacy (1888), 310, 312; refuses to withdraw, Foraker's attitude, 313-315; temperament, 317; on use of surplus, 318 *n.*; in the campaign, 321; on *zollverein* in America, 338; and Silver Bill (1890), 356; and Anti-Trust Act, 358; in Ohio campaign (1891), silver issue, 371-374; and repeal of Silver Act, 408; on Cleveland's financial policy, 460.
- Sherman, W. T., and proposed war portfolio for Johnston, 6; on Grant's candidacy (1880), 112; and candidacy for President, 209-211, 214.
- Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 358.
- Sherman Silver Act, 355, 356; reception considered, 356; demand for repeal, 397; Cleveland's message on repeal, 402; repeal, reason for it, 403, 404, 408; and panic, 404, 408; Bryan's defence, 404-407; credit for repeal, 409. *See also* Silver.
- Silver, act of 1873, the "crime," 93, 95; agitation for free coinage, classes of supporters, 93, 100, 352, 353; decreasing value, 93, 258, 357, 373 *n.*, 404; free coinage bill in House (1877), 94; Bland-Allison compromise bill, 94; Hayes's veto, 95-97; passage over veto, 97; bonanza mines and speculation, 182; Cleveland's position and statement (1885), 255-257; House votes against suspending purchase (1885), 255; effect of Bland-Allison Law, 257, 353 *n.*; forcing into circulation, notes, 257; effect of surplus on problem, 258; and selection of Harrison's Secretary of the Treasury, 329; professed attitude of Republicans (1888), 351; minimum coinage under Bland-Allison Law, 352; standard money versus cheap money, 352, 407; Windom's commodity plan, 353; free coinage bills (1890-92), 354, 364, 370, 383; passage of compromise (Sherman) commodity act, its political and sectional importance, 355; Sherman and the bill, reception of act by business interests considered, 356; Harrison's attitude toward free coinage, 356, 370; and Force Bill, 363; agitation and agricultural stringency, 370; Windom's last speech against free coinage, 370; attitude of his successor, 371; as issue in Ohio campaign (1891), 371-374; party attitude (1892), 383, 384, 407; fear of standard, 397, 435; demand for repeal of Sherman Act, 397; danger in operation on Cleveland, 398; his message for repeal, 402; repeal of Act, 403; and panic of 1893, reason for repeal, 404, 407-409; Bryan's argument against repeal, 405-507; Carlisle on double standard, credit to Cleveland for repeal, 409; Carlisle on payment of notes in, 430; question alienates Democrats from Cleveland, 458; Carlisle's plan to retire notes, 459.
- Single-tax movement, 285.
- Smalley, E. V., on campaign of 1884, 207.
- Smalley, G. W., Blaine tariff interview, 308.
- Smith, F. H., on World's Fair, 415.
- Smith, Goldwin, on anthracite coal strike, 62.
- Socialism, Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, 385.

- Solid South, as issue in 1880, 111, 131, 137; and in 1884, 227; denunciations, 301-303; Reconstruction as cause, 302; Force Bill of 1890, 358-364; and farcical elections, 359; and Populist movement, 385.
- South, and railroad riots of 1877, 50; financial stringency (1890), 370; and Populist party, 385; in panic of 1893, 401; and silver, 458. *See also* Solid South.
- South America. *See* Latin America.
- South Carolina, Hayes and restoration of home rule, 6-8.
- South Dakota, admission and silver, 354.
- Southwestern railroad strike, reduction and strike (1885), 269; growth of Knights of Labor, strike of 1866 as contest for control, opposing leaders, Irons, Hoxie, 270; beginning and progress, and other unions, 271; violence, 271, 277; influence of Gould's unpopularity, Hoxie's policy of inactivity, 272; boycott, 273; effect on business, public demand for freight, 273; resumption of traffic, 274; Gould's interference, Powderly's action, effect of failure on Knights, 275; later revenge of Knights on Engineers, 276 *n.*; Cleveland's message on, 277.
- Spanish America. *See* Latin America.
- Speculation, in Comstock Lode shares, 183. *See also* Panics.
- Springfield *Republican*, on Force Bill, 362; on Cleveland and reform, 412; on Morgan contract, 434.
- Stalwarts, origin of term, 8.
- Stanwood, Edward, on McKinley Act, 348; on tariff and campaign of 1890, 366.
- Stevenson, A. E., Vice-President, and silver, 398.
- Stone, M. E., on Associated Press and Western Union, 230 *n.*
- Storey, Moorfield, on Mugwumps and charges against Cleveland, 221-223.
- Storrs, E. A., in Republican Convention (1880), 119.
- Stoughton, E. W., and Louisiana election (1876), 2.
- Strikes, anthracite coal (1874), 61; and violence, 271, 277. *See also* Labor; Riots.
- Sugar, in McKinley Act, 349; in Wilson-Gorman Act, 419, 420.
- Sugar Trust, and tariff of 1894, 420.
- Sumner, Charles, and civil service reform, 162.
- Supreme Court, Arthur's appointments, 199; on anarchists, 283; on quorum counting, 343; income tax case, 423; on Cleveland and railway strike, 428.
- Surplus, and silver, 258; Cleveland's message on reduction, 305; and burden of taxation, 318; and payment of public debt, 318 *n.*, 319 *n.*; and pension legislation, 345; and McKinley Tariff Bill, 349. *See also* Finances.
- Swift, J. F., Chinese negotiations, 195.
- Taft, W. H., additions to classified service, 167 *n.*; on Cleveland and railway strike, 428; on Cleveland, 461.
- Tammany Hall, and Cleveland, 218, 225.
- Tanner, James, as Commissioner of Pensions, 332.
- Tarbell, I. M., on tariff of 1883, 177.
- Tariff, Democratic "for revenue only" plank (1880), 132, 170; as issue in 1880, Hancock on, 132-134, 137; new interest in, 168; bill for commission to study (1882), 169-172; Arthur on reform, 171; commissioners, 172; their work and report, 173-176; act of 1883, 176-179; influence in campaign of 1884, 227, 233; Morrison bill (1884), 234; Cleveland's message (1887), 305; and reduction of internal revenue, 306, 312, 319; made issue by message, 308; free wool, 306, 319; Blaine's interview on message, 308; platforms on (1888), 309, 312, 318; Mills Bill (1888), 317; as issue in campaign, 318-320, 322; Harrison's campaign utterances, 320; and Latin America, 338; Harrison's recommendation, 346; customs administration act, 346; McKinley as protectionist, 346; framing of McKinley Bill, its symmetry, 347; attitude of manufacturers, agricultural schedule, tin plate, 348; policy as to free list, raw sugar,

- bounty, 349; history of reciprocity provision, 349-351; and Force Bill, 361; McKinley Act and election of 1890, 365-368; Democratic popgun bills, 383; in campaign of 1892, 383, 392; Wilson reform bill (1894), 418; protective changes in Senate, 419-421; corruption, 420; Cleveland's letters on Senate bill, 421, 422; conference and final character, 421; law without President's signature, 422.
- Tariff Commission, bills and act, 169-172; commissioners, 172; work and report, 173-176; ignored by Congress, 176.
- Taussig, F. W., on surplus and silver problem, 258; on Gould system strike, 269, 270, 272, 274.
- Taxation. *See* Finances; Income tax; Internal revenue; Tariff.
- Teller, H. M., Secretary of the Interior, 152 *n*.
- Tenure of Office Act, Cleveland's contest over, 264-266; repeal, 268.
- Texas Pacific Railroad, strike (1886), 271. *See also* Southwestern railroad strike.
- Thayer, J. H., on Woolsey, 9 *n*.
- Thomas, W. M., Molly Maguire attack on, 64-66; trial of assailants, 83.
- Thompson, Hugh, Civil Service Commissioner, 334 *n*.
- Thompson, Jacob, incident of official mourning for, 303.
- Thompson, R. W., Secretary of the Navy, Morton and appointment, 5; and Bland-Allison Bill, 96.
- Thurman, A. G., vice-presidential candidacy, and Edmunds, 323.
- Tilden, S. J., renounces presidential nomination (1880), 128; and candidacy in 1884, 216 *n*.; and Cleveland's Cabinet, 240, 243; and Cleveland's administration, 255, 256.
- Tin plate, McKinley Act on, effect, 348.
- Tobacco, reduction in tax, 179 *n*.
- Topeka *Capital*, on silver, 353.
- Tracy, B. F., and new navy, 440, 442.
- Trade-unionism. *See* Labor unions.
- Trescott, W. H., mission to Peru and Chile, 153-155; Chinese negotiations, 195.
- Trollope, Anthony, on civil service reform, 92.
- Turner, F. J., on the West, 391.
- Twain, Mark, supports Cleveland, 232 *n*.; publishes Grant's Memoirs, 259 *n*.; on Grant and restoration to army rank, 260 *n*.
- Underwood, J. W. H., member of Tariff Commission, 172 *n*.
- Union Pacific Railroad, construction, 181.
- Unions. *See* Labor unions.
- Unit rule, and Republican Convention of 1880, 112, 115, 119.
- Uren, William, murdered by Molly Maguires, 69; avenged, 73.
- Vance, Z. B., and patronage under Cleveland, 247.
- Vanderbilt, W. H., and Grant and failure of Grant and Ward, 203.
- Van Wyck, C. H., on strikes, 277.
- Venezuela-Guiana boundary, controversy, 443; American offer of mediation refused, 444; Olney's dispatch (1895), assertion of American interest, 444, 446; map, 445; Salisbury's denial of our interest, 446; Cleveland's message, 447; reception and criticism of it, 448-450, 453-456; suspense, effect of South African incident, 450, 451; American commission, 452; British-Venezuela arbitration and award, 452, 453.
- Vest, G. G., on silver and Cleveland, 384.
- Vetoes, Hayes's, 95-97, 103; Arthur's, 195, 198; Grant's pension, 294; Cleveland's pension, 297.
- Vices of Chinese in California, 188-190.
- Vilas, W. F., Postmaster-General, 241; removal of Republicans, 248.
- Virginia, Readjuster movement, 170 *n*.
- Voorhees, D. W., patronage and repeal of Sherman Act, 403.
- Wages, reduction on railroads, method (1877), 18. *See also* Labor.
- Waite, M. R., on anarchists, 283.
- Walker, F. A., on free silver, 93; as bimetallist, 353; on Sherman Silver Act, 358 *n*.; on Baring panic, 369; on Guiana boundary dispute, 450.
- Wall Street, panic (1884), 204, 234; stock panic (1890), 369; West and

- 407; and Cleveland's Guiana boundary message, 448, 454. *See also* Finances.
- Wallace, Lew, campaign biography of Harrison, 320.
- Ward, Ferdinand, failure of Grant and Ward, 202, 203; sentence, 204 *n.*
- Warner, C. D., supports Blaine, 232 *n.*
- Washburne, E. B., presidential candidacy (1880), 114, 122.
- Washington, admission and silver, 354.
- Washington, D. C., Coxey's march, 428 *n.*
- Weaver, J. B., presidential candidacy (1892), 385, 390.
- Webster, Daniel, Cleveland's study, 256; on disordered currency, 372.
- West, financial depression, 370, 406; and Populist party, Turner's characterization, 391; and panic of 1893, 401; and Wall Street, 407; and silver, 458.
- Western Union Telegraph Company, Gould's control, 230; and Associated Press, 230 *n.*
- Wharton, W. F., as de facto Secretary of State, 379.
- Wheat, crop, price, and export (1880-92), 205 *n.*, 235 *n.*, 238 *n.*, 369 *n.*
- Wheeler, W. A., and Tariff Commission, 173 *n.*
- White, A. D., in convention of 1884, 211; on Cleveland, character, 217; on campaign of 1884, 219; supports Blaine, on Blaine's personality, 232 *n.*; on Hendricks and reform, 245; on Guiana boundary dispute, 447, 453.
- White, Horace, on riots of 1877 and regular army, 48.
- Whitney, W. C., appointment as Secretary of the Navy, 241; in convention of 1892, 384; and new navy, 439, 440, 442.
- Whittier, J. G., on welcome of Blaine (1888), 321.
- William II of Germany, message to Krüger, 450.
- Williams, J. D., gubernatorial campaign, 319.
- Wilson, W. L., tariff of 1894, 418, 420, 421.
- Wilson, Woodrow, on Hayes, 138; additions to classified service, 166, 167 *n.*; on Cleveland's Cabinet, 242 *n.*; on Cleveland-Senate contest, 266; on committees in Senate, 289; on Cleveland's tariff message, 307; on Cleveland and repeal of Sherman Act, 409; on Guiana boundary controversy, 455; on Cleveland and Congress, 458; judgment on Cleveland, 461.
- Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, 418-422.
- Windom, William, and Hayes-Conkling contest, 91; presidential candidacy (1880), 122; appointment as Secretary of the Treasury, 329; silver plan, 353; on effect of Bland-Allison Act, 353 *n.*; last speech, against free silver, 370.
- Wisconsin, goes Democratic (1890), 366; (1892) 390.
- Wood, J. F., and Molly Maguires, 79.
- Wool, Cleveland and free, 306, 319; in McKinley Act, 348; free, in Wilson-Gorman Act, 419, 421.
- Woolsey, T. D., advice to Hayes, 9; and ministry to Great Britain, 9 *n.*
- World Columbian Exposition, 414-417.
- Wyoming, admission and silver, 355 *n.*, 367.
- Yost, B. F., murdered by Molly Maguires, 66-69; trials of assassins, 80-83.

This index was made for me by D. M. Matteson.

THE following pages contain advertisements of
books by the same author.

"There is a kind of greatness in the lucid simplicity with which Mr. Rhodes has handled his vast and complicated material. I was about to say that his history is as absorbing as a play; but I would like to see a play that is half so absorbing."

— THOMAS BAILEY ALDRICH

History of the United States

From the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877

By JAMES FORD RHODES, LL.D., Litt.D.

- I. 1850-1854 "His impartiality, too, is really judicial, and never results from missing or underrating the greatness of the issues wherewith he is dealing." — *The Saturday Review*, London.
- II. 1854-1860 "It is a work of great dignity of purpose and is rich in resources of learning and political and moral philosophy."
— *The Tribune*, New York.
- III. 1860-1862 "Mr. Rhodes seems to have caught the most happy style for the expression of his thoughts which makes the reader follow him willingly to his conclusion." — *The Dial*.
- IV. 1862-1864 "For the conception and execution of the task in this spirit, Mr. Rhodes is exceptionally well qualified." — *The Yale Review*.
- V. 1864-1866 "We find ourselves following with unflagging interest his strong synthesis of current facts, actions, and opinions, which makes vivid the actual life of the time; we breathe the atmosphere of the period itself, and share the doubts, the fears, and the deep solicitude of the actors in it." — *The Nation*, New York.
- VI. 1866-1872 "Mr. Rhodes has investigated this important chapter in American history with great thoroughness, and his conclusions are marked by sober thought and fairness to the public men who controlled the dominant party during this critical period."
— *The Book News Monthly*.
- VII. 1872-1877 "As in volume five he finished what is on the whole our best history of the civil war, so in volume seven he has finished the best history yet written of reconstruction."
— WILLIAM GARROT BROWN, *American Historical Review*.

*The set, half light calf, \$32; half morocco, \$35;
three-quarters blue levant, \$40; per volume, \$2.75*

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York

History of the Civil War, 1861-1865

By JAMES FORD RHODES, LL.D., D.LITT.

Author of "The History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877," etc.

With maps. Cloth, 8vo. \$2.50.

On the completion of the seventh volume of Mr. Rhodes's "History of the United States," Thomas Bailey Aldrich wrote, "I was about to say that his history is as absorbing as a play; but I would like to see a play that is half so absorbing." This opinion, which seems to be commonly shared by readers of the author's longer work, brought forth in many quarters the request that Mr. Rhodes tell the story of the Civil War in one volume. At first he hesitated to do this but, led at Oxford to inaugurate a course of lectures on American history, he chose for his subject the American Civil War. Immersed again in the period, he was receptive to the oft repeated suggestion that a shorter history from his pen would be very welcome. His compliance with the request is this book. It is not an abridgment of the three volumes of the larger history; in the intervening years since the writing of that, material had accumulated to such an extent that he was obliged to make an entirely fresh study of his subject. Although the conclusions remain the same the history has been largely rewritten. It represents the continuous work of three years and when sentences, paragraphs, and pages have been transferred from the previous volumes it is because they tell the story as well as any fresh rewriting could.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York

Historical Essays

By JAMES FORD RHODES, LL.D., D.LITT.

Author of "The History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877."

Cloth, gilt top, 8vo, price, \$2.25

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. **History.** — President's inaugural address, American Historical Association, Boston, December 27, 1899.
- II. **Concerning the Writing of History.** — Address delivered at the meeting of the American Historical Association in Detroit, December, 1900.
- III. **The Profession of Historian.** — Lecture read before the History Club of Harvard University, April 27, 1908, and at Yale, Columbia, and Western Reserve Universities.
- IV. **Newspapers as Historical Sources.** — A paper read before the American Historical Association in Washington on December 29, 1908.
- V. **Speech Prepared for the Commencement Dinner at Harvard University, June 26, 1901.**
- VI. **Edward Gibbon.** — Lecture read at Harvard University, April 6, 1908.
- VII. **Samuel Rawson Gardiner.** — A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society at the March meeting of 1902.
- VIII. **William E. H. Lecky.** — A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society at the November meeting of 1903.
- IX. **Sir Spencer Walpole.** — A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society at the November meeting of 1907.
- X. **John Richard Green.** — Address at the gathering of Historians on June 5, 1909, to mark the placing of a tablet in the Inner Quadrangle of Jesus College, Oxford, to the memory of John Richard Green.
- XI. **Edward L. Pierce.** — A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society at the October meeting of 1897.
- XII. **Jacob D. Cox.** — A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society at the October meeting of 1900.
- XIII. **Edward Gaylord Bourne.** — A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society at the March meeting of 1908.
- XIV. **The Presidential Office.** — An Essay printed in *Scribner's Magazine* of February, 1903.
- XV. **A Review of President Hayes's Administration.** — Address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University.
- XVI. **Edwin Lawrence Godkin.** — Lecture read at Harvard University April 13, 1908.
- XVII. **Who Burned Columbia?** — A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society at the November meeting of 1901.
- XVIII. **A New Estimate of Cromwell.** — A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society at the January meeting of 1898.

"The author's grasp of detail is sure, his sense of proportion seldom, if ever, at fault, his judgment of a reader's interest in a subject admirable, and his impartiality can never be doubted. No one need hesitate to hail Mr. Rhodes as one of the great American historians." — *New York Sun*.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York

Lectures on the American Civil War

By JAMES FORD RHODES

Cloth, 12mo, \$1.50

These lectures, delivered before the University of Oxford in May, 1912, inaugurated a course on the History and Constitution of the United States. While written for an English audience, they are an attempt to relate concisely the antecedents and the salient events of our Civil War. Mr. Rhodes' deep conviction that the war was due to slavery is cogently set forth; his story of the decade before 1861 shows the resistless march of events toward the bloody consummation. The events of the war itself are grouped about Lincoln, Lee and Grant, three heroes of undying interest; the assassination of Lincoln in his hour of success is the culmination of the tragedy.

The volume contains three lectures, the first, "The Antecedents of the American Civil War, 1850-1860," the second, "The Growth from Lincoln's Election, 1860, to the Proclamation of Emancipation, 1862," and the third, "The Proclamation of Emancipation, 1862, to the Surrender at Appomattox, 1865."

"Of vital interest, . . . masterly workmanship. The volume consists of a series of lectures delivered at the University of Oxford in the year 1912. The Oxford students who heard the lectures are to be congratulated, and any American interested in the political history of his country who reads the book is to be congratulated. We do not know where the student or the reader can find in so short a compass so clear, human, and accurate an account of the period from 1832 to 1865 as may be found in this book. . . . The present volume can be read with equal appreciation in the South as well as in the North—a statement that cannot be made of many historical essays on the Civil War period." — *The Outlook*.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York

This book is a preservation photocopy.
It is made in compliance with copyright law
and produced on acid-free archival
60# book weight paper
which meets the requirements of
ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (permanence of paper)

Preservation photocopying and binding
by

Acme Bookbinding
Charlestown, Massachusetts



2000

mattox rather than in the White House. Those national traditions, to be sure, which implied distrust of the continuance of one man in high office with the possible consequences of personal ambition shaping the country's policy and misusing the patronage, supplied an argument well-nigh unanswerable against this.


succeed
tached
Preside

Earl
country
torial
that G
policy
ercise
of the
and th
had vo
1876, i
is, all
cratic
Democ
1876, a
House,
didate
warlike

Cam
the Pe
Februa
strong

formidable candidate. Cameron, however, was audacious and had a powerful machine. He dominated the Conven-

Set of
8
trim to
7x9 1/4

CUST. LOT NO. 20702		ITEM NO.	DEPARTMENT		CATEGORY	BINDING CLASS																																																												
ACCOUNT ID. 13	TITLE ID.	COLLECTION	LEVEL	SPINE LETTERING PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT																																																														
NAME Christ. U		BIND FREQ		History <u>8.8</u> Of The <u>A</u> United States 1850-1877 V. 8 Rhodes																																																														
<input type="checkbox"/> SAVE TITLE (NEW) <input type="checkbox"/> PERMANENT CHANGE BINDING CLASS CIRCLE ONE ONLY 01 PERIODICAL CUSTOM (F+B ADS OUT) 02 PERIODICAL STANDARD (ADS IN) 03 PERIODICAL BUDGET 04 PERIODICAL LUMBIND 05 BOOK/PAPERBACK ADHESIVE BIND <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SP PRESENT PHOTO COPY-ADHESIVE BIND 08 BOOK/PAPERBACK-SEWING OPTION 87 BOOK/PAPERBACK-SEWING OR STITCHED BIND				SET OF <u>8/8</u> DATE SENT <u>7/18/00</u> COVER COLOR <u>35</u> WATCH LETTERING (EXTRA CHARGE) PRINT COLOR RUB SENT (GOLD) SAMPLE SENT BLACK WHITE PANEL LINES																																																														
JOB 26530 SEQ 8  INSTRUCTIONS 2653 008 RETAIN SEWING DO NOT TRIM SEW THRU FOLD BIND AS IS ADHESIVE BIND MOUNT COVER OVERSEW POCKET				BINDERY USE ONLY <table border="1"> <tr> <td>OR</td> <td>NF</td> <td>HF</td> <td>CF</td> <td>PF</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AR</td> <td>AF</td> <td>RR</td> <td>RF</td> <td>TF</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TR</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>TOP</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>BOTTOM</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FRONT</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>4</td> </tr> </table> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>BE</td> <td>BS</td> <td>EC</td> <td>PA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>F</td> <td>HA</td> <td>HL</td> <td>HP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MB</td> <td>MF</td> <td>MS</td> <td>KP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ML</td> <td>MI</td> <td>OC</td> <td>FP</td> </tr> <tr> <td>P</td> <td>PT</td> <td>SC</td> <td>AT</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PC</td> <td>PK</td> <td>PL</td> <td>PM</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PP</td> <td>PV</td> <td>P3</td> <td>P5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SR</td> <td>SE</td> <td>SW</td> <td>RL</td> </tr> </table> MANUAL BINDERY COPY 1				OR	NF	HF	CF	PF	AR	AF	RR	RF	TF	TR					TOP	0	1	4	BOTTOM	0	1	4	FRONT	0	1	4	BE	BS	EC	PA	F	HA	HL	HP	MB	MF	MS	KP	ML	MI	OC	FP	P	PT	SC	AT	PC	PK	PL	PM	PP	PV	P3	P5	SR	SE	SW	RL
OR	NF	HF	CF	PF																																																														
AR	AF	RR	RF	TF																																																														
TR																																																																		
TOP	0	1	4																																																															
BOTTOM	0	1	4																																																															
FRONT	0	1	4																																																															
BE	BS	EC	PA																																																															
F	HA	HL	HP																																																															
MB	MF	MS	KP																																																															
ML	MI	OC	FP																																																															
P	PT	SC	AT																																																															
PC	PK	PL	PM																																																															
PP	PV	P3	P5																																																															
SR	SE	SW	RL																																																															

PROPERTY OF ACME BOOKBINDING